Unconventional Warfare: Solving Complex Political-Military Problems and Creating Dilemmas for Adversaries

Introduction: A Thinking Man’s War

In the 21st century strategic landscape, unconventional warfare (UW) is not a relic of Cold War shadow conflicts. It is a vital instrument of national power: a disciplined, sophisticated, and intellectually demanding capability required to solve the most complex political-military problems (or assist in solving them alongside the Joint Force or Intelligence Community). In addition to solving problems, UW creates dilemmas for adversaries operating in the gray zone between peace and war. It is also a necessary capability before, during, and after large scale combat operations. It is, as many have long argued, a foundational component of the Special Forces identity and one of the three legs of what I call the “two SOF trinities.”

The Strategic Value of Unconventional Warfare

At its core, UW is about solving irregular problems with irregular solutions. When statecraft and conventional deterrence fall short, when kinetic strikes are too blunt an instrument, and when allies and partners are struggling under pressure from revisionist or rogue regimes, UW offers the United States the ability to enable local resistance, disrupt adversary plans, and seize the initiative.

The Department of Defense defines UW as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.” But I have always argued that UW is far more than that sterile definition. It is an entire philosophy of warfare that blends the strategic with the operational and tactical; that synchronizes influence, legitimacy, governance, and indigenous partnership into a coherent campaign. It is the heart of Special Warfare, and without it, our understanding of irregular warfare is incomplete.

The Two SOF Trinities: A Framework for UW

To modernize our conceptualization of Special Operations Forces (SOF), I’ve proposed two SOF trinities:

First Trinity (Core Special Warfare Capabilities):
– Unconventional Warfare
– Irregular Warfare
– Support to Political Warfare

Second Trinity (SOF Comparative Advantage):
– Governance
– Influence
– Support to Indigenous Forces and Populations

UW is foundational to both trinities. It is the operational vehicle by which SOF implements political warfare strategies and secures strategic outcomes through the indirect approach.

The Intellectual Nature of Unconventional Warfare

UW is not ‘armed nation-building.’ Nor is it romanticized guerrilla warfare. It is, as T.E. Lawrence suggested, an intellectual endeavor. It demands language, cultural awareness, deep political understanding, adaptive planning, and the ability to operate in chaos. Unconventional warfare is rooted in deep analysis: of populations, governance structures, political alliances, resistance narratives, and legitimacy.

There are no school solutions in UW. There is no checklist or plug-and-play concept. We must stop searching for silver bullets and instead embrace design, assessment, and continuous adaptation. We must recognize that “campaigning is key,” and success depends on understanding the indigenous way of war and adapting our concepts to fit their realities, not forcing our way of war onto others.

The Role of Education: Completing the Warrior-Scholar

To succeed in UW, Special Forces operators must be more than warriors; they must be scholars and deep thinkers. They must know history, philosophy, strategy, and human geography. They must be as comfortable in a tribal council as on a drop zone. This is why UW must form the intellectual foundation of every Green Beret’s education.

When we train for UW, we train not only to fight but to think. We are preparing to operate in environments where conventional forces cannot go: denied areas, gray zones, occupied territory, or societies emerging from collapse. That preparation cultivates humility, adaptability, and the mental agility to understand both insurgency and counterinsurgency, both repression and resistance.

Why UW Must Be Embraced by the National Security Strategy

There are those in the defense community who still dismiss UW as messy, risky, or politically inconvenient. But we ignore it at our peril. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all understand the utility of unconventional and political warfare. They conduct operations to subvert, divide, and influence without firing a shot. The United States cannot afford to cede this space.

UW provides options in the ‘space between peace and war.’ It gives policymakers tools to act in ambiguous environments, below the threshold of armed conflict, and in support of resistance, resilience, or stabilization efforts. It is the art of the possible when everything else has failed; or not yet begun.

A Korean Peninsula UW Scenario: Assisting Resistance and Mitigating Insurgency

Let me bring this to life through a practical example: the Korean Peninsula. If the Kim family regime collapses due to war, internal fracture, or combined pressure, the result will not be tidy. There will be chaos. There will be humanitarian catastrophe. And there may be a fractured resistance among the population in the north, some aligned with reunification, others indoctrinated and loyal to the regime’s mythology.

Unconventional warfare must be applied in two overlapping phases:

1. Pre-Collapse: Supporting the Internal Resistance. We must begin today to identify, understand, and support latent resistance elements in the north. We must clandestinely map resistance leadership, understand grievances, shape the information environment, and prepare to provide covert support.

2. Post-Collapse: Mitigating Insurgency.  If regime collapse or war occurs, and ROK/U.S. forces move north, they will not be universally welcomed. Some populations will resist. This is where UW-trained South Korean and U.S. Special Forces are essential, not for combat, but for influence, governance support, and counter-resistance operations.

Conclusion: A Call to Elevate UW

Unconventional Warfare is not optional. It is not niche. It is essential. UW is how we campaign in denied areas. It is how we build legitimacy, wield influence, and solve the political-military problems that conventional force cannot. It is, as T.E. Lawrence knew, intellectual war, requiring warriors with “PhDs of the battlefield,” fluent in politics, culture, and resistance.

If we want to win in the 21st century, we must call upon Special Forces not only for direct action, but for strategic UW campaigns. We must invest in their education, their planning capacity, and their integration into national strategy.

De Oppresso Liber – To help the Oppressed Free Themselves