Lessons in Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia’s Expulsion of Al-Qaeda in the Kingdom and Challenges Going Forward

Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s numerous influential countries and a leading member state of the Arab League in terms of soft power. Nevertheless, the Kingdom has been enshrouded in controversy, particularly Islamic extremism.

In the early 2000s, against the backdrop of the September 11th Attacks and the Global War on Terror, Saudi Arabia became embroiled in deadly terrorism and massacres by al-Qaeda, which successfully infiltrated the Kingdom. Realizing an existential threat that not only killed hundreds of civilians but was a public relations nightmare, Riyadh needed to act decisively and combat the root of extremism within the Saudi Kingdom. 

Then, in the spotlight due to extremist indoctrination, Riyadh put its foot down and clamped down on al-Qaeda inside the country in a major crackdown against extremism while simultaneously providing key programs and services to mitigate terrorism inside Saudi Arabia. Forcing al-Qaeda to merge with its sister branch in Yemen, the extremist organization no longer has a foothold in Saudi Arabia, yet it remains a formidable challenge to Riyadh’s regional security apparatus today. 

Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia

In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, Osama Bin Laden, a former Saudi citizen, called for multiple branches of al-Qaeda to be created and expanded, including the Kingdom itself. Yusuf al-Ayeri would be the first leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia/the Land Between Two Mosques (AQBH).

AQBH’s goals included the deaths of Westerners and the expulsion of the US military from Saudi Arabia, the overthrow of the pro-Western royal family, and the establishment of an even more strict Islamic state in the Kingdom. Osama Bin Laden stated in prior manifestos that one of his justifications for his extremist activities was American troops stationed in the Kingdom during the Gulf War, instead of the royal family using his militiamen for defense.

Saudi Arabia was ripe to build a base due to Bin Laden’s ancestry and growing resentment of Western influence in the Middle East. American indifference to Israeli missions in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War, and the protection or propping up of pro-Western Middle East monarchies would include domino effects of regional blowback.

Furthermore, elements within the state ignored warnings of extremist teachings amongst Wahhabi clerics that justified violence, which enabled a powder keg of future jihadist activities at home and abroad. For example, little was done to mitigate the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, and because of the inaction, cells would become emboldened only a few years later.

A Deadly Insurgency That Nearly Destroyed the Kingdom’s Reputation

The height of al-Qaeda’s attacks in Saudi Arabia took place between 2003 and 2004, which saw deadly global terrorism sprees by AQ and inspired groups. Infiltrating elements of the Saudi state security system and using their uniforms, AQBH conducted several high-profile attacks on Westerners and various other foreigners alike.

Major attacks include the Riyadh Compound Bombings, the Yanbu Attack, and the Khobar Massacre, the latter of which AQ militants asked who was Christian or Muslim and then shot and killed the non-Muslims. The attacks on Westerners ruined the reputation of the Kingdom, as many foreign workers fled in fear, and the price of oil increased.

Furthermore, various assassinations via shootings by AQBH operatives took place against American, European, Asian, and Middle Eastern nationals. Perhaps the most gruesome act was the taped execution of American National Paul Marshall Johnson Jr, who the terrorist organization beheaded.

Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia also caught a major break between 2003 and 2004 due to the US war in Iraq. The botched nation-building by coalition forces left a powder keg on the Saudi border, which another branch of AQ, al-Qaeda in Iraq, took advantage of. From the cataclysm, both offshoot branches of al-Qaeda had renewed support.

Saudi Arabia’s Major Crackdown

Despite conducting successful terrorist attacks in the Kingdom, al-Qaeda’s fortunes would quickly be reversed in a major crackdown by Riyadh. Not only was the Kingdom’s anti-extremism reputation at stake, but al-Qaeda made a fatal flaw in its strategy—Muslims were ultimately the group’s biggest victims.

The AQBH attacks on Western targets killed Saudi nationals and other fellow Muslims, which lost the group’s support. Simultaneously, in the North, al-Qaeda frequently targeted Shiite civilians and moderate Sunnis, further alienating the global jihadist organization and its sister branches.

Saudi Arabia utilized its security service to crack down on suspected extremist mosques and imams sympathetic to Bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabian security services published the names of those wanted for the attacks, which Riyadh had avoided doing in prior extremist activities in the 20th century. According to a 2004 assertion by the 9/11 Commission, Saudi Arabia was heavily engaged in combat against al-Qaeda. 

During the crackdowns, numerous high-value AQBH leaders were killed by Saudi security services, including emirs of the organization from 2003 to 2006. Emirs eliminated include al-Ayiri, the founder of AQBH, and his successors Khaled, Ali Hajj, Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, Saud al-Obtaibi, Saleh al-Awfi, and Faud al-Juwair. 

Nevertheless, the growing crackdowns came under media scrutiny as civilians and foreign nationals were detained without charges on suspicion of involvement with the extremists. On February 23rd, 2005, CNN reported that an attorney of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a presumed AQBH operative, was tortured under his detention, which underscores the unorthodox methods Saudi intelligence used to crack down on extremism that violated the human rights of those detained. 

A key factor that helped Saudi authorities combat al-Qaeda was that AQBH did not openly control, attempt, or have the strength to govern neighborhoods or cities,  unlike other branches or organizations in Yemen, Mali, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. The lack of control over neighborhoods and cities allowed operations in the Kingdom by security services to conduct low-level sweeps and limited urban warfare, whereas other future extremist-occupied towns were razed to the ground, such as Mosul, Raqqa, Ramadi, Marwari, Gaza, and others.

Attempts to Mitigate Terrorism Through Safeguards

Whereas the post-Saddam Iraqi government, Sudanese junta, and other regional governments gave pushback to shared intelligence with the US, the Saudis fully cooperated. Intelligence sharing with the CIA and Saudi security services was enhanced during the crackdown, albeit through back channels, so as not to inflame tensions.

Concrete measures of cooperation were critical for Riyadh to maintain order, such as the 2008 bilateral counterterrorism agreement with Washington. Several key bases were established in the Kingdom to facilitate signals intelligence, enabling the tracking of key AQ figures, as well as the deployment of military and CIA advisers with relevant expertise. 

The bilateral counterterrorism cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States would play a significant role in combating the AQBH successor, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as Saudi intelligence tipped off their American counterparts against the group’s plots. 

The Saudis also used their soft power and influence amongst the Arab League to pressure countries such as Yemen to crack down and extradite AQBH commanders and financiers to the Kingdom to face justice. During the Yemeni Civil War, the Saudis formed a key coalition of Arab states to combat not only the Houthis but also al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, due to the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Yemen, airstrikes at times were indiscriminately conducted, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE having different goals amongst the coalition, which gave al-Qaeda breathing room. 

Riyadh also faced controversies amongst human rights groups as suspects were detained without charges, with reports of torture and unfair trials. For example, executions still take place inside the Kingdom. Though such methods are supposed to provide a deterrent to extremist activities, these actions could further cause resentment and martyrdom among suspects. 

In February 2020, Amnesty International published a report detailing how Saudi courts use allegations of extremism and terrorism to crack down on government dissidents and protestors. By weaponizing its court system, not only has Riyadh deviated from combating extremism, but the government could potentially fuel it due to the kangaroo courts.

Counterterrorism Safeguards

A key aspect of Saudi Arabia’s crackdown that other nations can learn is that the Kingdom, despite still being an authoritative absolute monarchy, did not enact collective punishment on its population to root out and destroy al-Qaeda. Instead, Riyadh included public messages such as “together against terrorism” and emphasized that AQBH was heretical and did not represent Islam with their indiscriminate attacks. The messaging and cooperation between security forces and locals worked as in 2005 in the al-Rass neighborhood, Saudi police successfully eliminated several dozen prominent AQBH members, including the then-recent leader, Saud al-Otaibi. 

Incentives for completing Islamic rehabilitation programs, such as the Sakinah Campaign, included job placements as socioeconomic conditions, particularly in poor villages, which could be ripe for exploitation by extremist recruiters. A June 2010 report from the International Peace Institute detailed the implementation of the Saudi Initiative. Starting in 2005, the Saudi Initiative was a two-stage approach to rehabilitation for suspected extremists. 

First, Saudi authorities would question the motives of suspected AQBH members and ask what caused the individuals to engage in terrorism. This factor would help track the root causes within the Kingdom to curb recruitment towards al-Qaeda. Secondly, those who checked into the program were allowed to participate in sporting events, visit with family, and engage in social interactions so that they felt less isolated and could integrate back into society, which can help troubled individuals avoid a life of crime.

Pinpointing key recruitment avenues for AQBH was a priority for Saudi security services, as the organization often recruited its family members. For this, the government had to work closely with imams who knew family members of each of their respective congregations, which Riyadh referred to as the religious subcommittee. Post-completion, participants would be asked to remain in touch with program administrators, akin to a parole officer who monitored the progress of post-radicalization. 

Concrete financial measures were also implemented, and electronic transactions facilitated the financing of Jihadist movements. Learning lessons from American financial crackdowns, the Saudis likewise would implement safeguards to make sure any financier of extremist organizations would be tracked and prosecuted.

Expulsion of al-Qaeda but Heightened Threats in Yemen

According to a November 2007 RUSI report, transparency with American and European investigators led to crackdowns on charities and foundations linked to Saudi nationals that acted as fronts for AQBH fundraising. Ultimately, AQBH decided to leave Saudi Arabia as the security crackdowns became effective in halting their operations, and surviving commanders used Yemen as a new base. Merging with their sister branch, al-Qaeda in Yemen formed AQAP—an even deadlier organization. 

Though not having a launching pad in Saudi Arabia, AQAP, at one point in the early 2010s, had a standing army and held large swaths of Yemeni territory during the civil war. Furthermore, AQAP was considered not only to be the most powerful al-Qaeda sister branch but even more dangerous than the central command in Pakistan. The organization was entangled in several high-profile attacks that frequently targeted Americans and US interests alike. 

Saudi airstrikes were frequent on AQAP and the even more dangerous Houthis militia, and cooperating with local forces in Yemen and the US military via intelligence sharing, Riyadh helped pass valuable information to high-value targets. 

Conclusion

Cooperation and cultural cognition are essential in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, as mutual trust is crucial for effective collaboration and coordination. Saudi Arabia was able to halt AQBH attacks within the Kingdom. Still, the country faces key hurdles in combating extremism in neighboring Yemen, along with addressing methods to eliminate human rights abuses and illegitimate sham trials. 

The Arab world remains disillusioned by continued Western influence, which means the Saudi government will need to calculate its cooperation in counterterrorism behind the scenes. At the same time, public messaging says otherwise. Monitoring hardline Wahhabi clerics and providing key social programs to youth who are prone to radicalization will be instrumental in mitigating extremism.

Lastly, though the Kingdom is an absolute monarchy, human rights, such as fair trials and the cessation of torture, will need to be implemented. Various innocent people have been tortured, arrested, and not given fair representation in court. Extremist organizations could benefit from Saudi human rights abuses, as Riyadh could unwittingly create new generations of extremists by placing false charges and enacting hardline judicial punishments on citizens. 

The growing relationship with the West in the economic, energy, and security sectors is also key for stabilization in Saudi Arabia and the wider Middle East. Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries plagued by an al-Qaeda branch in their homeland, which compelled Riyadh to engage in decades of brewing extremism. 

Continued progress on counterterrorism and addressing the socioeconomic causes of radicalization will be necessary. Furthermore, regional cooperation amongst Middle Eastern countries can help coordinate against weak points where extremist groups could form and thrive.

Despite the key success of terror cells within the country, Riyadh must also acknowledge key mistakes that gave al-Qaeda breathing room, such as illegal detention, torture, and suppression of dissidents during the crackdowns. As al-Qaeda remained resilient in its base in Yemen, Riyadh must also remain vigilant not only to extremism but also to factors that caused the rise of AQBH, such as human rights abuses and totalitarian judicial practices.