Why The Expansion of Brazilian Gangs Is Largely Going Unnoticed

The Comando Vermelho (CV), or Red Command, has steadily become a major regional threat from sending cocaine to Europe, contributing to devastating the Amazon, and fighting endless wars with rivals.

The Comando Vermelho (CV) is one of the oldest and most influential criminal organizations in Brazil, having emerged in the 1970s within the Rio de Janeiro penitentiary system. Since then, the group has consolidated itself through territorial control, drug trafficking, and strategic alliances, playing a prominent role in both national criminal dynamics and the international organized crime landscape. In recent years, the CV has been expanding its operations abroad—mainly toward Europe—while simultaneously growing and engaging in conflicts in various Brazilian states. At the same time, it faces rivals such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Rio’s militias in disputes that affect both public security and the urban configuration of many regions.

1. Origin and Consolidation in Rio de Janeiro

The Comando Vermelho was born from the forced coexistence of political prisoners and common criminals during the military dictatorship (1964–1985) in Rio de Janeiro prisons. In this environment, they shared knowledge and organizational techniques, initiating a movement that would later become a criminal faction predominantly focused on drug trafficking. The absence of public policies in Rio’s peripheral areas and favelasallowed the group to establish drug sales networks and exert local influence by imposing a “parallel justice.”

The CV’s consolidation in Rio de Janeiro involved controlling territories and frequently using violence against rivals and police forces. For decades, authorities insisted on purely military responses—large-scale police operations with minimal investment in intelligence and little control over corruption or brutality among their own agents. The result has been the perpetuation of armed confrontations, high rates of police lethality, and the expansion of factions. More recently, certain measures defined by the Federal Supreme Court and civil society mobilization have brought about improvements in transparency and reductions in lethality during operations, although levels remain far above what is expected in a democratic regime.

2. Rivalries, Internal Expansion, and the Rise of Militias

While solidifying its hold in Rio de Janeiro, the Comando Vermelho gradually advanced into other regions, disputing territory with local gangs or the PCC. In Brazil’s North region, it took advantage of river routes for trafficking; in the Northeast region, it sought logistical bases and new markets. Recent information from the police forces of Minas Gerais and Bahia indicates that, over the past five years, the CV and the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) have expanded their territories at the expense of regional factions once supplied by the PCC.

According to specialists, this movement occurs because the PCC—ever more focused on international cocaine trafficking, especially to Europe—has paid less attention to “retail” drug markets at home. The higher profits obtained overseas lead the PCC to prioritize control over routes and export ports like Santos (SP). Estimates from the São Paulo Public Prosecutor’s Office show that the group makes around 2 billion dollars a year solely from the sale of base paste purchased in Bolivia and resold on the European market.

In Rio de Janeiro, the dynamic of territorial domination involves the CV, militias, and other factions such as Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) and ADA (Amigo dos Amigos). According to data from the “Grupo de Estudos dos Novos Ilegalismos” (GENI/UFF) and the “Instituto Fogo Cruzado,” between 2008 and 2023, all armed groups expanded their controlled areas—except for ADA, which shrank by 75.8%. TCP grew by 79.1%, CV by 89.2%, and militias soared by 204.6%.

Interestingly, 14% of this overall growth occurred through takeovers of territories already under the control of another group, while 86% came from “colonizing” previously uncontrolled areas. Specialists attribute this phenomenon to the prolonged absence of the State, especially in less urbanized regions, where paramilitary groups or milícias (militias) advance by imposing protection fees and exploiting clandestine services (transport, water supply, gas sales, internet, etc.). This business model—focused on extracting resources from local populations and now also adopted by the CV—makes silent expansion even more profitable.[1]

Although most expansion occurs “quietly” on the part of militias, the Comando Vermelho is considered the group that most often both conquers and loses areas through armed clashes. In recent years, the CV has intensified its offensives against militia-held territories, particularly in the Baixada Fluminense and Rio’s eastern metropolitan area. In the capital, these disputes are concentrated in the northern and western zones, where explosions, burning barricades, and shootouts have become part of daily life in many communities.

According to researcher Daniel Hirata, this escalation is related to a strategic reorganization of the Comando Vermelho, which for nearly a decade has fought on two fronts: internally, against the militias’ expansion; and externally, on national and international scales, against the PCC over trafficking routes.[2] With the death or imprisonment of key militia leaders, the CV found opportunities to advance. Meanwhile, it boosted its focus on cocaine trafficking to Europe by capitalizing on Brazil’s growing relevance as a corridor for illicit drugs and the high demand in the Old Continent.

3. Internationalization: From the “War” in Rio to Global Routes

The presence of the CV and other factions at Brazilian ports reflects their ambition to establish themselves as a transnational player in drug trafficking. Alongside the PCC, the Comando Vermelho maintains ties with Colombian guerrillas (ELN and FARC dissidents) and producers in Peru and Bolivia to obtain cocaine, as well as Paraguay for marijuana. These drugs are transported through the Amazon and other border regions. Once inside Brazil, they travel to ports like Santos (SP), Paranaguá (PR), Itajaí (SC), and terminals in the North and Northeast of the country, from where they head to Europe, Africa, and Asia.

In destination countries, a kilo of cocaine can reach far higher prices, sometimes tens of thousands of euros. The Rio-based faction has forged connections with European mafias such as the Italian ’Ndrangheta and the Balkans Cartel to secure logistics and safe passage for shipments. Due to its vast territory, strategic location, and institutional weaknesses, Brazil has become a central point in the global drug trade.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) warns that, as Brazilian factions strengthen their presence in the Amazon, they affect not only public safety but also environmental conservation and climate security.[3] Drug trafficking, illegal logging, mining, and land grabbing exacerbate deforestation, undermining efforts to mitigate climate change. Thus, the expansion of criminal networks in the Amazon region has global repercussions, given that it impacts an ecosystem crucial to planetary climate regulation.

4. Enforcement Policies and Structural Challenges

Decades of confrontations in Rio de Janeiro show that purely military-style policing, featuring high-impact raids with minimal intelligence, does not resolve territorial control disputes or halt the expansion of factions and militias. On the contrary, repeated shootouts result in civilian casualties, police lethality that surpasses democratic standards, and the strengthening of criminal organizations, which feed on chaos and public mistrust of the police.

Recent measures by the Federal Supreme Court [Supremo Tribunal Federal] and civil society pressure have introduced more rules governing police raids, slightly reducing their lethality in Rio de Janeiro, although there has been an uptick in other states like Bahia and São Paulo. Even so, the practice of “fighting crime” without integrating social services, regulating urban markets, or tackling internal corruption remains insufficient. Much of the massive incarceration affects the poorest ranks of factions, reinforcing criminal leaders’ control over inmates and accelerating personnel turnover without undermining the organizations’ business structures.

Based on data from GENI/UFF and the Instituto Fogo Cruzado, researchers recommend two complementary measures to curb the advance of these factions (especially militias) and reduce armed conflicts:

1. Preventing Silent Growth in Uncontrolled Areas: A significant portion of militia expansion—and increasingly, that of factions like the CV—takes place in underdeveloped or government-neglected regions. Regulating markets such as real estate, informal transportation, and utility infrastructure (water, electricity, internet) is crucial to blocking business models based on extortion and territorial dominance.
2. Dismantling Criminal Networks Intelligently: Instead of merely carrying out mass arrests of low-level members or focusing solely on top leaders (which often triggers succession conflicts), the emphasis should be on key intermediary positions in the criminal chain—where information exchange, money laundering, and international logistics occur. Investing in intelligence, planning, institutional coordination, and data analysis can hamper these networks’ reassembly while avoiding the warlike dynamics that primarily victimize populations in areas under criminal control.

5. Prospects: Between Repression, Regulation, and Intelligence

The current context demonstrates that the Comando Vermelho, like the PCC and other criminal organizations, has thrived in direct response to state vacuums, flawed security policies, and the high profitability of drug trafficking. Whether in Rio, other states, or on the international stage, the expansion of these factions connects directly to the lack of broad prevention programs, precarious public services, and poor coordination among authorities.

On the other hand, the consolidation of militias, the growth of CV-held areas, and the adoption of “militia models” by armed factions demand integrated solutions:

• Urban and land-use regulations to prevent the criminal colonization of territories.
• Investment in intelligence and targeted operations against the logistical and financial cores of criminal networks.
• Social policies to reduce the vulnerability of peripheral populations, who are a recruitment pool for criminal groups.
• Crackdowns on police and political corruption, which are crucial to breaking the cycle of impunity that fuels these organizations.

Furthermore, international coordination is essential, given the scale of trafficking routes and the variety of actors (Colombian guerrillas, European mafias, gangs from other Latin American countries like Tren de Aragua, and Mexican cartels). Without effective cooperation and joint police and intelligence measures, Brazilian drug trafficking will continue to grow and diversify its sources of profit, to the detriment of security and the environment.

Conclusion

The trajectory of the Comando Vermelho illustrates the complex relationship between organized crime, social vulnerabilities, corruption, and failures in public security policies. From its origins in Rio de Janeiro’s prisons to its international expansion, the faction has benefited from a context in which state actions—centered on overt repression—fail to reverse the logic of territorial control or prevent the strengthening of increasingly sophisticated criminal networks.

Alongside other factions, the CV exploits governance gaps to impose militia-like models, control clandestine services, and forge high-profit partnerships in global drug trafficking. Confrontations and the “war” in Rio de Janeiro continue to claim thousands of lives, while Brazil takes on a prominent role in international drug routes, with negative repercussions for both security and environmental preservation—especially in the Amazon.[4]

In this scenario, the most promising proposals involve regulating urban markets, investing in intelligence, applying selective repression to strategic points in criminal networks, and strengthening international cooperation. Combined with inclusive social policies, these measures could begin to break the vicious cycle in which violence is perpetuated by ineffective interventions, thus fueling the Comando Vermelho’s growth and that of other armed groups. Only by aligning efforts across diverse fronts—ranging from reforming security forces to regulating urban spaces and bolstering democratic institutions—will it be possible to effectively curb these groups’ influence and mitigate the social, political, and environmental fallout of organized crime.

Endnotes

An earlier version of this article was first published by Roberto Uchôa, executive member at the Brazilian Public Security Forum (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública; FBSP) on 21 January 2025 in a social media posting. It is republished here with his kind permission. Thank you to Chris Dalby, World of Crime, for facilitating this republication of the article at El Centro.

[1] See “Atualização do Mapa Histórico dos Grupos Armados [Update of the Historical Map of Armed Groups].” GENI/UFF e Fogo Cruzado-RJ, April 2024, https://geni.uff.br/2024/06/04/atualizacao-do-mapa-historico-dos-grupos-armados/.

[2] See, for example, Daniel Hirata, Lia de Mattos Rocha, and Orlando Alves dos santos Junior, “Illegalisms, armed territorial control and the city: reflections from the perspective of a research agenda.” Cadernos Metróole. Vol. 26, no. 61, September/December 2024, https://doi.org/10.1590/2236-9996.2024-6168000-en.

[3] See Irene Mia and Jaun Pablo Medina Bickel, “The threat to global climate goals from organised crime in the Amazon.” IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 4 Decemebr 2023, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/12/the-threat-to-global-climate-goals-from-organised-crime-in-the-amazon/.

[4] For varying perspectives on “crime wars,” see the special issue on “Organized Crime” at the International Review of the Red Cross, No, 923, June 2023, https://international-review.icrc.org/reviews/irrc-no-923-organized-crime, especially Robert Muggah, “Organized Crime in Armed Conflicts and other Situations of Violence,” Najla Nassif Palma, “Is Rio de Janeiro preparing for war? Combatting organized crime versus non-international armed conflict,” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/is-rio-de-janeiro-preparing-for-war-923, and John P. Sullivan, “Crime wars: Operational perspectives on criminal armed groups in Mexico and Brazil,” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/crime-wars-operational-perspectives-923.

For Additional Reading

Mariana Cavalcanti, “For a war yet to end: Shootouts and the production of tranquillity in massive Rio de Janeiro.” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 190, no. 1, March 2024, https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12565.

John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz, and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 32: Militias (Milícias) Surpass Gangs (Gangues) in Territorial Control in Rio de Janeiro.” Small Wars Journal, 26 October 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2020/10/26/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-32-militias-milicias-surpass-gangs-gangues/.

John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz, and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 51: Milícias (Militias) Continue to Surpass Gangues (Gangs) in Dominating Criminal Territory in Rio de Janeiro.” Small Wars Journal. 22 September 2022, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2022/09/28/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-51-milicias-militias-continue-surpass-gangues/.