The Impact of Terrorist Designation on Mexican Cartels: Implications for Security and Policy

Upon assuming office, President Donald Trump enacted a series of executive orders, many of which addressed immigration-related concerns, including asylum applications, mass deportations, and the targeting of cartels and transnational criminal networks involved in human smuggling and drug trafficking that pose a threat to the United States. One of the most notable executive orders, issued on 20 January 2025, titled “Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” specifically designates certain international cartels and transnational groups, including MS-13 and Tren de Aragua, as national security threats. These groups are identified due to their violent activities, links with foreign terrorist organizations, and control over illegal trafficking operations. The order mandates that US agencies take immediate action to dismantle these organizations and safeguard US national security.
This executive action reflects the administration’s broader strategy to leverage counterterrorism designations as a means of applying pressure on the Mexican government, framing the issue of transnational crime within the broader context of global terrorism. The designation reflects the continuing legacy of post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policy, which has made terrorism a central focus of government priorities in the pursuit of national and international security. However, it is uncertain how effective designating these cartels as terrorist organizations will be in reducing the flow of drugs and humans from Mexico. This article examines the potential impact of such designations on the cartels’ criminal activities and explores whether they would cease their operations or adapt and continue in resourceful ways.
The Department of State is the US. agency tasked with designating foreign groups as terrorist organizations if those groups meet the legal criteria in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended: (1) It must be a foreign organization; (2) The organization must engage in terrorist activity . . . or terrorism, . . . or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; [and] (3) The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.
Currently, 68 groups and organizations are officially designated as terrorists, with the majority being Salafi-jihadist terror groups, including affiliates of al-Qaeda and ISIS. The list also features Iran-backed terrorist groups and left-wing revolutionary groups, such as Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN), Turkiye’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the Philippines’ New People’s Army (NPA). Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is the only state actor included. Notably, the list does not include any drug cartels or gangs from Latin America.
The Trump administration aims to designate cartels and transnational gangs as terrorist organizations in order to enhance counterterrorism measures. While the United States has been collaborating with Mexican law enforcement through joint operations, sanctions, and other initiatives, the objective is to broaden these efforts. Such designations would primarily target the financial resources and material support of the cartels, disrupting their operations. Additionally, the designations would permit the US military to operate abroad under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), further complicating the issue of bilateral cooperation. However, these measures are likely to face challenges in the short term, particularly due to opposition from the Mexican government, which views such designations as a breach of its sovereignty.
Mexican cartels are currently the dominant actors involved in drug trafficking and human smuggling operations targeting the United States. Beginning in the 1980s, these cartels gradually supplanted Colombian organizations, which had traditionally supplied the US market with cocaine. Initially, Mexican cartels were confined to specific regions and focused primarily on cocaine trafficking. Over time, however, they diversifiedinto other illicit substances, including heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl—drugs now responsible for tens of thousands of fatalities in the US In 2024, drug overdose deaths in the U.S. surpassed 90,000, a decrease from 115,000 in 2023. Additionally, Mexican cartels have expanded their territorial control in Mexico, increasing their dominance from 10% to 30% of the country’s territory in the last decade. Beyond Mexico, these cartels have extended their operations transnationally, establishing networks throughout Central and South America and penetrating around 40 countries, including a significant presence in Europe.
MS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha) and Tren de Aragua are two additional transnational criminal organizations included in the executive order. Unlike the Mexican cartels, both of these groups are classified as transnational gangs. MS-13, originally founded in California by Salvadoran immigrants in the 1980s, has grown into one of the most notorious gangs in the United States, with a significant presence in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Known for its brutal tactics, MS-13 engages in a wide range of criminal activities, including drug trafficking, human smuggling, and violent crimes like extortion and murder. Their strong presence in the US.makes them a significant threat to domestic security.
Tren de Aragua, originating in Venezuela, operates across several Latin American countries and has expanded into the United States and Europe. This gang is notorious for its involvement in human trafficking, extortion, and drug smuggling. Tren de Aragua has been linked to large-scale operations involving illegal immigration and labor trafficking, with a growing influence in border regions and cities across the Americas. Their adaptability and expansion into various criminal enterprises make them a rising concern for authorities.
Designating cartels as terrorist organizations could have significant academic, economic, and political consequences. The most immediate impact would likely be on how terrorism is defined in academic circles. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism due to differing state interests and political influences. However, terrorism is generally understood as a deliberate act of violence or the threat of violence with political, religious, or ideological objectives, targeting non-combatants and carried out by non-state actors. The key distinction in this definition is the political goal, which sets terrorist groups apart from criminal organizations, gangs, and cartels.
Academics have traditionally avoided labeling cartels as terrorist groups because their primary motivation is financial gain, rather than political or ideological objectives. While cartels do use violent tactics, such as beheadings and burning people alive—methods similar to those used by groups like ISIS—they are typically categorized under the term “narco-terrorism,” but not officially recognized as terrorist organizations.
This designation may lead to a shift in how terrorism is defined academically, with more emphasis placed on narco-terrorism. It’s important to recognize that today’s narco-terrorism is twofold: it involves both cartels and gangs that use terror tactics for criminal purposes, as well as terrorist organizations that engage in the drug trade to fund their operations, such as the Taliban before its recent takeover and the PKK.
The designation of cartels as terrorist organizations could have notable economic repercussions. For example, US companies may face the risk of being implicated in supporting terrorist groups due to the extensive involvement of Mexican cartels in legitimate sectors of the economy, including industries such as avocado farming and tourism. Given the pervasive integration of cartels into the legal economy, it would be challenging for American companies to dissociate from cartel-related activities completely.
The designation of Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations would undoubtedly have significant political repercussions. The Mexican government has consistently opposed such designations, often downplaying the role of cartels in fentanyl trafficking. However, it is widely acknowledged that the Mexican government faces considerable challenges, including insufficient resources and systemic corruption, which have facilitated the expansion of cartel influence and operational capacity. While there are instances of cooperation—such as joint law enforcement operations and the extradition of high-profile cartel leaders like Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán—the prospect of US military intervention resulting from such designations would likely be perceived by Mexico as a breach of sovereignty. This could severely strain bilateral relations. Furthermore, increased US military involvement might inadvertently bolster cartel support within Mexico, as it could fuel anti-American sentiment, potentially enhancing cartel recruitment and access to resources.
Another potential consequence of designating cartels as terrorist organizations is the amplification of asylum applications. By classifying cartel victims as victims of terrorism, such a designation could strengthen the legitimacy of their asylum claims. While the current administration is revising asylum laws, it remains unlikely that the asylum system will be fully dismantled, as such actions would contravene international legal obligations.
On the other hand, terrorist designations may provoke a range of potential responses from the cartels. These organizations, which view their operations as meeting consumer demand, are unlikely to be deterred by such designations. The illicit drug trade is highly profitable, and the cartels’ entrenched power structures and territorial control in Mexico make them resilient to external pressures. In fact, rather than ceasing their criminal activities, cartels may adapt by finding alternative routes or employing new tactics to circumvent law enforcement efforts. The economic incentives driving their operations, combined with their significant influence, suggest that they will continue to pursue their illegal activities despite the designation.
In the short term, the designation of cartels as terrorist organizations is likely to disrupt their operations, but it could also lead to increased competition among groups vying for dominance within the shrinking illegal market. This competition may exacerbate violence between cartel factions. If the cartels perceive cooperation between the Mexican government and the US, they may escalate attacks on law enforcement and military personnel, as demonstrated by the violent efforts to release El Chapo’s son in 2023. This incident highlighted how cartels use violence to send messages to the government in an attempt to secure favorable conditions.
Resourcefulness is a defining trait of cartels, and they are expected to adapt to new circumstances by finding alternative routes and methods for trafficking. In recent years, cartels have utilized tunnels, submarines, and aircraft, and it is likely they will continue to diversify their land, air, and sea routes for smuggling. The US Postal Service has also been used to transport fentanyl in small quantities, and cartels may increasingly exploit this system in the future. Furthermore, cartels may recruit more US citizens to assist in trafficking, utilizing advanced concealment techniques.
The “balloon effect”—where pressure on one area causes expansion elsewhere—may lead cartels to shift their operations to other borders, such as the Canadian border, in response to increased pressure on the southern border. Additionally, cartels are likely to raise fees for human smuggling and drug trafficking, making these activities more expensive for both the individuals being smuggled and drug users.
The Mexican cartels may also turn their attention to European markets, expanding their existing cocaine trade. Lastly, these organizations could form temporary alliances, working together to counteract the effects of the designations, thereby increasing their operational capacity and ability to exploit criminal networks more effectively.
Another critical question is how realistic it is to expect effective results from cartel designations. While these designations may reduce material support for cartels, the potential involvement of the military in counterterrorism operations may offer short-term benefits but could lead to unintended consequences in the long term. The US military has already faced the complexities of counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite having control over entire countries, military operations weakened groups like al-Qaeda in Afghanistan but did not eliminate them entirely. The Taliban’s victory in 2021 serves as a clear message about the limitations of relying solely on military action over the long term. If the same strategy is applied in Mexico without full cooperation from the Mexican government, the results may also be problematic.
Furthermore, it is crucial to recognize that a significant portion of drug trafficking involves US citizens. Between 2019 and 2024, 80 percent of fentanyl seizures at US. border ports of entry were associated with American individuals crossing through legal checkpoints. Notably, 92 percent of all fentanyl seizures occurred at legal entry points or interior vehicle checkpoints, rather than at illegal migration routes. This underscores the limitations of a border-centric approach to addressing drug trafficking, suggesting that more comprehensive strategies are needed to combat the issue effectively.
The most effective strategy for combating these issues should involve a multifaceted approach, integrating both supply-side and demand-side perspectives. It is crucial to acknowledge that non-state actors will continue to exploit any available opportunities in response to demand. For example, the demand for illicit drugs in the United States is largely driven by a significant population of individuals with substance use disorders, making efforts to restrict access to these drugs particularly challenging. In 2023, approximately 1.3 million Americans aged 12 and older (0.4% of the population) experienced a cocaine use disorder, while around 372,000 individuals received inpatient treatment for heroin use disorder. To better understand the scope of this issue, a basic calculation of drug consumption can be illuminating: assuming early-stage users consume about 0.25 grams of a drug daily, and long-term users consume more than 0.5 grams, multiplying these figures by the number of users provides a stark illustration of the immense size of the drug market in the US. This substantial demand continues to make the US an exceptionally attractive target for traffickers.
In conclusion, while designating Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations may yield short-term outcomes, it is likely to produce unintended long-term consequences. Given their substantial resources, territorial control, access to weapons, and integral role in both global drug trafficking and human smuggling, it is unrealistic to expect these cartels to disengage from the illicit sector. To effectively combat drug trafficking and human smuggling, a comprehensive, multi-dimensional strategy is required. This strategy should focus on reducing the user population through prevention, treatment, and recovery initiatives, while promoting interdisciplinary collaboration across public health, education, law enforcement, academia, and governmental agencies. Furthermore, strengthening public-private partnerships and fostering enhanced international cooperation, particularly with Mexico, is critical. Effective intervention will ultimately depend on a coordinated effort that includes robust partnership with the Mexican government in addressing cartel operations within the region.