Special Forces Mission & Mindset: Reclaiming Unconventional Warfare in the Renewed Age of Irregular Conflict

Introduction

The post-Global War on Terror (GWOT) United States (US) Army Special Forces (SF) Regiment faces a unique opportunity to rejuvenate its identity as it seeks to find balance with the overarching US Army’s evolving concentration on irregular warfare (IW), Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), and large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer and near-peer adversaries. During the GWOT, the SF Regiment uncharacteristically engaged heavily in direct action (DA) and combat-oriented foreign internal defense (FID) principal tasks. Nevertheless, unconventional warfare (UW) has long been SF’s organizing principle and core task. The shift away from this UW identity during the GWOT presents a dilemma for current SF leaders attempting to integrate the SF Regiment’s unique capabilities into the US Army’s plans for future irregular conflicts and potential direct conventional confrontations with strategic competitors. The following article provides background on the resurgence of IW in military doctrine and academia following the conclusion of the GWOT era and discusses the importance of the UW principal task to the SF Regiment. The article then explores some essential ongoing debates circulating throughout the SF community concerning the level of focus on UW as a philosophical mindset or exclusively as a doctrinal mission. The central argument is that SF leaders currently have a distinct opportunity to re-stake their claim on the UW aspect of IW, re-elevate the UW mission to prominence, and foster a UW mindset in the SF Regiment’s organizational culture. Special Forces’ reconcentrated efforts on UW can contribute to fortifying and operationalizing US IW policy and become a pivotal component of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to compete globally and maintain an enduring strategic advantage against peer and near-peer threats well into the future.

Background and Context

Irregular warfare has experienced a tremendous ascent back into the spotlight of US military doctrine and academia following the perceived end of the GWOT era. Rightfully, to remain adaptable and evolve the Joint Force (JF) for future conflicts, strategic US Army leaders must seek new opportunities for innovation and pursue essential initiatives such as those related to IW. Yet, with this resurgence in popularity, the IW phenomenon has caused a tendency for some stakeholders and leaders across the armed services to disproportionately adjust their attention toward this movement to the detriment of other equally important areas of focus. For the SF Regiment, one of these focus areas involves rebalancing its identity and shifting away from the GWOT counterterrorism (CT) orientation back toward the UW side of the IW spectrum. Special Forces must also grapple with its future role in MDO and LSCO. The renewed IW-specific emphasis sweeping across all scholarly and operational military domains should not shift attention to such an extent that SF leaders become so immersed in the complexities of “the big picture” that attention to the sub-components of IW, specifically UW, becomes neglected or ignored.

The subsequent sections of this article explore some essential ongoing debates circulating through the US Army SF community related to UW. This community, known for its longitudinal expertise in UW, is currently deliberating the relevance of UW, a vital component of IW, in this “current age” of collective attention concerning irregular conflict and future LSCO. One of the most prominent ongoing conversations centers around whether UW realistically has any utility in the future of armed conflict, specifically the overt peer-to-peer LSCO environment exemplified by the enduring territorial conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Though the SF Regiment generally understands the fundamental importance of UW, the military and policymaking community at large does not fully understand or appreciate the concept and views it as of little worth in modern GPC.

Ancillary to this conversation, many in support of maintaining an emphasis on UW continue to debate the concept in terms of doctrinal mission or as a theory or philosophical mindset. Overall, stakeholders in the SF Regiment should pursue a meaningful understanding of UW doctrine and theory and place renewed attention on cultivating a UW mindset among its ranks. Moreover, to not be eclipsed by the IW strategic perspective, SF leaders must reclaim unconventional warfare, own it, embrace it, and re-elevate it in both theory and practice to the forefront of the Regiment’s organizational culture. To accomplish this task, SF leaders must firmly understand UW’s place in the spectrum of contemporary warfare.

Unconventional Warfare Revisited

Before delving into the realm of UW and IW, a basic understanding of conventional (traditional) warfare establishes an important context for the following dialogue. Conventional warfare continues to present existential threats to nations across the globe; however, the future of warfare indicates a more irregular and unconventional nature of conflict. Conventional warfare is a violent struggle for domination or superiority between nation-states or coalitions of nation-states. Department of Defense Joint Publication (JP) 1 most recently amplified the definition of conventional warfare as “a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states, fought with conventional forces.” The term conventional warfare connotes a direct fight between enemy forces; the struggle habitually occurs with comparable military systems and organizations. Conventional warfare typically concentrates on overpowering enemy militaries, warfighting capabilities, and controlling or occupying key terrain and populations to influence an enemy government’s behavior or actions definitively.

Understanding the relative fluidity of contemporary definitions and discussion remains pertinent when deliberating upon the doctrine, theories, and application of UW. A crucial component of modern UW theory revolves around understanding the concept nested within the recently re-popularized concept of IW. The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act defined IW as the activities conducted “in support of predetermined U.S. policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.” In 2022, Field Manual 3-0 provided a US Army-specific definition as “the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.” The definition has now evolved in the 2023 version of JP 1 to indicate IW as “a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.” Regardless, UW has remained a persistent aspect of the collective present-day understanding of IW theory and practice.

Figure 1. USSOCOM Activities

Current US military doctrine considers UW a subset and core component of IW, a category of warfare that also includes stability operations, counterinsurgency (COIN), foreign internal defense (FID), and counterterrorism (CT). Unconventional Warfare is currently defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Unconventional (clandestine) or irregular (open) warfare methods remain harder to defend against due to their operational existence in the grey zone between peace and war. This unconventional realm of warfare has long been the organizing principle and core task of the US Army Special Forces Regiment.

UW: SF Core Task and Organizing Principle

The nuanced origins of UW and examples of implementation across the globe can be traced back as far as a historian is willing to venture. Other authors have done an excellent job capturing the holistic evolution of UW in brief (i.e., Kilcullen). Thus, to reiterate, the scope of this article merely necessitates a focused discussion on what UW means to the US Army SF today. Careful analysis and discussion concerning the history of UW as Special Forces’ organizing principle and enduring core task remains necessary for SF leaders to capitalize on the opportunity to re-stake their claim on the UW aspect of IW, elevate the UW mission to prominence, and cultivate a UW mindset within the SF Regiment’s organizational culture.

The current global order faces numerous unconventional challenges of strategic interest to the US. Recent conflicts across the globe do not resemble the regular or conventional engagements of the past, as UW and broader IW situations present profoundly asymmetric threats to established governments. Guerrilla forces have an intrinsic advantage over state military forces because the latter suffer from eroded or absent situational awareness and are hesitant to inflict significant damage on the civilian populace where guerrillas hide. In 2019, Traben Pleasant highlighted numerous historical examples demonstrating how the increasingly unconventional nature of contemporary warfare indicates a continued dialogue about cultural knowledge and war. Many of the examples support the argument that battles can be won or lost based on the appropriate or inappropriate use of cultural knowledge. Cultural knowledge is a significant portion of foundational SF UW doctrine and individual soldier UW competencies. Special Forces soldiers strive to develop genuine expertise in the cultures and languages in their assigned global regions. Special Forces’ ability to adapt to and respect wide and varied cultures enables them to employ UW immediately and globally when required.

Under the umbrella of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Core Activities, UW remains the core task and organizing principle for US Army Special Forces. Unconventional warfare efforts involve activities conducted to enable a resistance movement, insurgency, or opposition movement to remove an established government, governing authority, or occupying power. This notion translates operationally to a US-supported or inspired insurgency or the creation of a total warfare environment for an indigenous population to affect a regime change. Doctrinally, but not always in practice, UW operations occur in seven phases: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, employment, and transition.

Figure 2. Phases of UW

The UW task characterizes the foundational knowledge SF leaders use to accomplish all other SF missions. The publication of Field Manual (FM) 31-21 (1951), Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare, can be argued as a leading influence in establishing the US Army SF to compensate for gaps that arose after the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) disbanded following the end of World War II. Some of these operational gaps included intelligence collection and analysis, special operations, and unconventional warfare capabilities. Field Manual 31-21 helped establish the inaugural doctrine, framework, and operational foundation for the US Army SF. Special Forces have historically been linked to UW since the publication of that foundational FM, and the linkage solidified through subsequent releases of FM 31-20, Special Forces Group.

Ever since, the US Army has specifically selected and trained SF leaders to conduct UW due to the regionally focused, foreign language qualified, and culturally sensitive orientation of the SF Regiment. The very nature of UW requires military leaders to carefully analyze and consider the costs or benefits of employing a strategic tool such as UW. Ultimately, UW operations represent a politically sensitive and strategic initiative aimed at altering a balance of power within a country or between sovereign powers. Special Forces represent the primary instrument capable of utilizing and employing this national and strategic politico-military tool on the United States Government’s (USG) behalf. Nevertheless, how closely the contemporary SF Regiment should continue to embrace and emphasize its core task and organizing principle in both action and theory remains a vital discussion when juxtaposed against the looming IW shadow cast across all US military services.

Special Forces Mission & Mindset

An ongoing debate exists within the higher echelons of the post-GWOT SF Regiment and overall Special Operations Forces (SOF) academia concerning GPC and the relevance of the UW mission and mindset in LSCO or on the contemporary conventional battlefield. Subsidiary to this debate, those in the pro-UW camp continue to discuss what seems at first a superficial argument over the meaning behind certain UW doctrinal and organizational beliefs. The discussion revolves around whether UW exists solely as a standalone SF mission (singular among other SF principal tasks) or whether UW represents a holistic mindset and approach that SF leaders must employ to accomplish all aspects of their job. On the surface, this healthy debate may appear to be a classic conundrum of causality.

Nevertheless, central to this debate of “mission versus mindset” is whether UW is merely a specific mission (separate principal task) that SF undertakes “to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.” Or rather, does SF accomplish all other principal tasks (i.e., FID, Security Force Assistance, COIN, DA, Special Reconnaissance, CT, Counter Proliferation, & Preparation of the Environment) under the overarching UW core mission set? Alternatively, does the SF Regiment necessitate a holistic UW mindset, based in theory, to accomplish operations at the operational and strategic levels of war? Though all crucial questions, the renewed IW-specific emphasis sweeping across all scholarly and operational military domains may leave SF leaders immersed in the complexities of “the big picture,” leaving UW neglected or overlooked. In reality, both sides, mission and mindset, contribute to SF’s opportunity to re-stake their claim on the UW sub-component of IW.

SF Mission

There is value in rejuvenating the UW mission to prominence in the SF Regiment. From a basic troop leading procedures (TLPs) standpoint, a mission is a task and purpose that clearly indicates an action to be taken and the reason for the action. Thus, the argument that UW represents a critical SF mission, core activity, and principal task remains relatively clear-cut in basic military terms. Unconventional warfare melds within the construct of IW and exists as one of USSOCOM’s Core Activities. United States SOCOM Directives 10-1cc: Terms of Reference- Roles, Missions, and Functions of Component Commands(U) and 525-89 (S//NF) establish USASOC as the lead component concerning UW. Unconventional warfare represents the organizing principle and core task for the US Army SF under USASOC. Special Forces DA PAM 600-3, Special Forces Branch, further indicates that UW is a core activity and mission of the US Army SF Regiment. The term “mission” means activities or actions completed to achieve an end state. Regarding the phases of UW, SF leaders accomplish preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, employment, and transition during UW missions. Dissecting the definition of UW, SF works with and through underground, auxiliary, (and) or guerrilla forces toward an end state of achieving the overthrow or disruption of a government or occupying power. Historically, legally, doctrinally, and in practice, UW is unequivocally SF’s mission and responsibility.

SF Mindset

Fostering a UW mindset equally strengthens the SF Regiment’s organizational culture and claim to the UW aspect of IW. A generally accepted definition of the term mindset describes an established set of attitudes or ways of thinking that individuals or groups adopt to guide the implementation of goal-directed activities. As discussed earlier, US Army FM 3-18, Special Forces Operations (2014), indicates that the UW task characterizes the foundational knowledge SF leaders employ to accomplish all other SF missions. Much credit is due to David Maxwell for staunchly defending the importance of contemporary UW and the necessity of a UW mindset or philosophy as the SF Regiment moves forward to find its balance in post-GWOT, GPC, and near-peer environments. Maxwell argues that stakeholders in the UW debate should not overly focus on the constraints of UW doctrine. Instead, there should be more emphasis on practically developing and applying the mindset and philosophical underpinnings of UW that have made US Army SF overwhelmingly successful since 1952. He discusses how the field of philosophy represents a collective assemblage of wisdom and that, similarly, a “UW mindset” or “UW thinking” has been behind every successful SF mission. The core aspects of this mindset include “problem-solving, using unique, non-doctrinal, and non-conventional methods, techniques, people, and equipment to solve (or assist in solving) complex political-military problems.”

Why not both?

One important thing to note in this debate is that both positions agree on the importance of UW to the SF Regiment, whether action-based or theoretical, as well as to future LSCO environments. However, rebuilding this capability may take considerable time. Recently, there has appeared to be much more of a unified front in opposition to the notion that UW represents an archaic and obsolete relic of the past. For example, Tovo, Atwell, and Marco recently argued in support of incorporating UW doctrine into professional military education, preserving the military’s unconventional warfighting capability, and maximizing the interaction and integration between conventional and special operations forces. Understanding the legal, doctrinal, practical, and theoretical facets of UW as it relates to SF should continue to be of paramount importance to stakeholders from USASOC, the 1st Special Forces Command (SFC), and cascade all the way down to the lowest levels of each Special Forces Group (SFG). Additionally, a case for continued promotion of, and study into, UW mindset, thinking, and problem-solving remains quite relevant to the success of future SF endeavors. The conversation concerning the UW mission and mindset provides a robust dialogue that serves to bring UW back into the spotlight again.

Though some aspects of this debate may seem minor at first glance, many thought-provoking points emerge that are worth noting. Foremost, the SF Regiment needs to take a deep look at what UW will mean to its organizational culture in the future. The hot topic of the day remains IW, but what often becomes lost in its broad wake is the foundational importance of the UW sub-component to the theory and action of IW. On an even more profound level, SF leaders risk becoming so immersed in the complexities of “the big IW picture” that the core activity and principal task of UW cede ground to all the other intricacies of the irregular conflict concept. What is needed in the future is a consensus from all stakeholders in the SF Regiment that an understanding of UW doctrine and theory and a renewed emphasis on the UW mindset should be at the forefront of the organization’s collective mind.

Conclusion: Reclaim Unconventional Warfare

In the near future, UW operations worldwide can be expected to evolve considerably. Adversarial enhancements in UW and the capability to influence populations pose significant threats in the gray zone between peace and war. Of course, a certain level of unpredictability exists due to the non-linear development of many modern conflicts and trends in warfare. With this in mind, UW operations should be monitored, rigorously assessed, and adapted continuously to keep pace with these developments. It will be incumbent on the SF Regiment to rise to the occasion and adapt UW to fit the current and future operating environment as it has successfully accomplished in past conflicts. Likewise, US Army SF stakeholders must continue to take ownership of this critical mission and foster the mindset necessary for enduring operational and strategic success. Of course, none of these efforts happen in a vacuum. As always, special operations missions, specifically UW, require non-SOF support (Fifth SOF Truth) and interservice cooperation. Therefore, this “call to arms,” per se, aims to reinvigorate the conversation concerning UW’s critical importance to SF within the IW concept and application in future conflicts.

Special Forces leaders must reclaim unconventional warfare, own it, embrace it, and re-elevate it in theory and practice to the forefront of the organizational culture. From a legal aspect, UW remains a USSOCOM core activity delegated down to USASOC and, thus, the SF Regiment. Doctrinally, UW exists as the organizing principle and core activity for the US Army SF under USASOC. All other SF principal tasks can be executed underneath the UW core activity. Many of these principal tasks (i.e., FID, CT, COIN) are all named missions within IW that SF already executes. Furthermore, a UW mindset and philosophy have continually fostered SF’s mission success for over 70 years.

The IW juggernaut that has gained steam across all military branches need not cause an undue shift in focus or a massive identity shift for the SF Regiment. Yes, IW remains relevant and vital to modern warfare and the fights to come; nevertheless, this does not mean SF leadership should lose sight of its core responsibility within the IW realm. Unconventional warfare remains a critical tool for irregular conflicts and provides policymakers with flexible options to achieve national security objectives. Special Forces contribute to this effort through their expertise in leveraging resistance movements and indigenous forces to counter adversaries effectively. The UW component of IW allows SF to address threats through asymmetric and non-traditional means. In the context of GPC, UW enables the USG to compete successfully below the threshold of war, particularly against near-peer adversaries. Moreover, UW nests well with the current irregular threat environment and plays a strategic role in countering both state and non-state threats while maintaining political deniability. The USG indicates that both primary and supporting IW efforts, including UW, can contribute substantially during LSCO.

Special Forces’ reconcentrated efforts on UW can help to fortify and operationalize US IW policy and become a pivotal component of the DOD’s efforts to compete globally and maintain an enduring strategic advantage against peer and near-peer threats well into the future. The SF Regiment must seize this opportunity to contribute and integrate into the overall JF’s IW efforts through multiple means. First, SF leaders should lead a concerted effort to reclaim the UW aspect of IW by embracing its historical roots as the US Military’s only organized and trained force capable of conducting UW. Paramount to this effort is the ability of the SF Regiment to move past the GWOT mindset of DA, CT, COIN, and combat-FID. Secondly, elevating the UW mission back to prominence allows the SF Regiment to gain buy-in with conventional forces and potentially complement operational and strategic efforts during future LSCO. Through its UW capabilities, SF can help shape the operational environment before and during LSCO, conduct deep area disruption, provide targeting and intelligence support, employ psychological operations, and sustain resistance activities behind enemy lines. Thirdly, SF must foster a UW mindset throughout its organizational culture, prioritizing flexibility, creativity, cultural knowledge, and collaboration with partner forces or resistance networks in complex and ambiguous environments.⁵⁶ Capitalizing on these factors related to UW can help solidify SF’s post-GWOT identity, integrate the SF Regiment more efficiently into the overarching IW conversation, and, more broadly, prepare SF leaders to succeed in LSCO environments shaped by strategic and great power competition.