South Korea’s Role in the Russia-Ukraine War: Endeavors for a Global Pivotal State and Its Impact
Abstract
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, South Korea has emerged as a significant player in the global response, despite being geographically distant from the conflict. This paper explores South Korea’s evolving role in the war, driven by its ambition to become a “global pivotal state.” South Korea’s engagement is driven by the imperative to address security concerns in Northeast Asia, advance international influence as part of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s “global pivotal state” strategy, and safeguard economic stability amidst volatile global markets. The paper also evaluates South Korea’s contributions, such as sanctions against Russia, various forms of aid to Ukraine, and its growing diplomatic engagement with NATO and other allies. These efforts not only demonstrate South Korea’s commitment to Ukraine’s defense but also bolster its global standing. However, South Korea’s involvement has also led to repercussions, including strained relations with neighboring countries and domestic challenges, such as economic impacts, declining support for the Yoon Administration, and the vote for Yoon’s impeachment. By analyzing South Korea’s actions and their broader impact, this paper provides insight into how South Korea is working to establish itself as a key player in global security during the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Discretion – This analysis was completed on December 20, 2024. As world news is constantly evolving, developments may have occurred since this date that could counter the arguments and perspectives proposed herein.
Introduction
On February 24, 2022, Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a sovereign nation and former Soviet republic. This marked a significant escalation of the conflict that began in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatist movements in eastern Ukraine. What had been an intermittent, localized conflict in the Donbas region evolved into a broader war involving direct Russian military action across Ukraine. In the months that followed, countries around the world took sides, with democratic nations and members of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) aligning with Ukraine to help defend itself against aggression. Meanwhile, authoritarian states have shown support to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
However, unlike previous European conflicts, the war in Ukraine has also drawn participation from states in the Indo-Pacific region, notably South Korea (ROK). Despite being geographically distant from Europe, the ROK has assumed an increasingly vital role in the conflict that has repercussions on many fronts. To further understand the ROK’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war, this analysis will first explore the ROK’s motivations for joining the efforts in Ukraine’s defense, focusing on growing security concerns in Northeast Asia, President Yoon Suk Yeol’s push to expand the ROK’s influence on the international stage via its broader “global pivotal state” strategy, as well as ensuring economic security. This paper will then examine the progress made so far, including the multifaceted assistance given to support Ukraine, alongside diplomatic engagements and achievements made by the ROK to address the war of aggression. Finally, the paper will assess the impact of the ROK’s support of Ukraine and the consequences of its actions.
Motivation #1: Security Challenges in Northeast Asia and the DPRK-Russia Partnership
The ROK is motivated to have a role in the Russia-Ukraine war due to a number of factors, a major one being the regional security concerns in Northeast Asia. Inter-Korean relations took a turn for the worse in January 2024, when Kim Jong Un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea (DPRK), announced in his speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly that the country would no longer pursue the longstanding goal of unification of the Korean Peninsula and would now view ROK as its “primary foe”. Since then, the DPRK has made numerous political and military insinuations that have signified a growing willingness to escalate tensions and challenge the ROK’s security posture, the most evident being the DPRK’s reignited bilateral relations with Russia. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment, “Russia has been providing North Korea with diplomatic, economic, and military concessions in exchange for weaponry to continue the ongoing invasion of Ukraine”. High-level visits between both countries, coupled with growing concerns from the West, have signaled a deepening and dangerous relationship. In March 2024, the U.S. State Department reported that between September 2023 and February 2024, the DPRK had “transferred ballistic missiles as well as thousands of containers of ammunition to Russia via train for use in the ongoing war in Ukraine.” Some sources estimate that this transfer provided with up to five million rounds of ammunition. In late April 2024, UN sanctions experts released a report validating claims from Ukrainian officials that DPRK ballistic missiles were found in missile debris in Kharkiv, Ukraine, a known hot zone in the Russia-Ukraine war. The Defense Intelligence Agency also confirmed this in a May 2024 report.
The re-ignition of DPRK-Russia bilateral relations is concerning because Russia has technology that the DPRK can utilize to augment its military capabilities, such as nuclear and space technology. As the DPRK has successfully and unsuccessfully launched several satellites since late 2023 to mid-2024, Russian technology could improve the success rate (although ROK intelligence has speculated Russia has already assisted in the launches). Additionally, the bilateral relationship, or as Kim has referred to as the “unbreakable relationship”, has benefitted the DPRK on the international stage because Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), vetoed the resolution to extend the mandate for the United Nations’ Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on DPRK in March 2024. In June 2024, the bilateral ties further solidified when Putin visited the DPRK capital of Pyongyang, where he and Kim signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” agreement. According to Russian state media, the comprehensive strategic partnership covers “areas of cooperation such as military, political, and economics”. After the signing, Kim stated to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) that “The relations of the two countries have also been placed on a better track of long-term development conducive to the progress and well-being of the two countries through the expansion of mutual cooperation in various fields, including politics, economy, culture and military affairs”. The new treaty succeeds the previous bilateral agreements signed in 1961 and 2000, as experts have affirmed that it is a revision of the former, including language regarding “mutual assistance in the event of aggression”. During the event, Kim also went on the record to affirm his support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since then, bilateral cooperation has strengthened; railroad traffic between the two countries has intensified, the deployment of DPRK soldiers to Kursk Oblast (the site of Ukraine’s surprise incursion that began in August 2024) , and the ratification of the agreement have shown that Kim is utilizing all capabilities to not only test them in the field, but for a significant return on his investment. In short, if any nation has benefitted the most from the Russia-Ukraine war, it is the DPRK.
The DPRK’s contribution is having a significant impact on the frontlines. At the 2024 Yalta European Strategy forum, Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, stated that the DPKR’s arms shipments are the “worst problem” Ukrainian forces currently face. He emphasized that the arrival of these supplies escalates hostilities, and because the sheer volume of munitions from Pyongyang surpasses that of other countries, it presents a substantial challenge to Ukraine. In addition, the deployment of DPRK troops add another layer to the conflict. In early November 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that at least “11,000 to 12,000” North Korean soldiers have been sent to Kursk Oblast and have confirmed to be in combat. The U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated in a press conference in mid-November 2024 that the deployment is “adding fuel to the fire for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine”. However, experts and defectors have debated whether DPRK soldiers have the field experience not only to make a difference, but also survive the war. According to the Institute for the Study of War, by mid-December 2024, DPRK forces in Kursk Oblast were reportedly facing significant challenges, including high casualties, language barriers, and friendly fire incidents involving Russian troops. Other reports from Ukraine assert that DPRK soldiers are also vulnerable to Ukrainian drone attacks.
Russia’s growing reliance on the DPRK military supplies in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, coupled with the economic and political benefits the DPRK gains from the partnership, has emboldened Kim Jong-Un to adopt a more assertive posture toward both ROK and the United States. Its discreet missile tests and aggressive rhetoric pose threats to the region. Regardless of the level of their collaboration, the Russia-DPRK partnership poses significant security risks to both Europe and the Korean Peninsula. The Russia-Ukraine war incentivizes the ROK to strengthen strategic alliances with partners like NATO, highlighting the need for a coordinated, resilient response to mutual security threats.
Motivation #2: The Stride for a Global Pivotal State
Furthermore, the ROK’s participation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict accentuates its increasing independence on the international stage. By addressing critical global issues and extending its influence beyond the region, the ROK is positioning itself as a key player in international security, committed to upholding peace and stability. It acknowledges that its own future is intertwined with the broader international environment. Yoon affirmed in his 2022 Foreign Affairs piece that “South Korea should no longer be confined to the Korean Peninsula but rise to the challenge of being what I have described as a ‘global pivotal state,’ one that advances freedom, peace, and prosperity through liberal democratic values and substantial cooperation.” The global pivotal state strategy (GPS) can be described as the ROK’s approach to expanding its influence and leadership on the international stage. It focuses on promoting peace, security, and prosperity by actively participating in international affairs, defending democratic values, and collaborating with other nations to address global challenges. Unlike his predecessor Moon Ja-In, Yoon aims for the ROK to expand its foreign policy by “embracing greater roles and responsibilities for resolving regional and global challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond”. In essence, Yoon aspires for the ROK to have an active voice alongside other key decision-makers in matters of global security. While ROK foreign policy has often aligned closely with that of the United States, Yoon’s GPS strategy allows the ROK to emerge from the background and establish its distinct presence on the world stage.
Motivation #3: The Safeguarding of Economic Security
A third motivation for the ROK to aid Ukraine in its war with Russia is economic security. As the 10th largest economy in the world, the ROK has significant economic interests in both countries, given Ukraine’s critical grain resources and Russia’s oil, both essential to global trade. In Russia, this includes major Korean businesses like Samsung Heavy Industries and Hyundai, which have had overseas operations there. In 2021, the ROK ranked Russia as its tenth-largest exporter, with exports amounting to $9.97 billion, as reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Russia has played a key role as an energy supplier for the ROK, providing nine percent of its total energy imports prior to the invasion. On the flip side, Russia’s exports to the ROK exceeded $17 billion in 2021, placing the ROK as its fifth-largest export market. Russia has long considered the ROK a crucial gateway to the Pacific Ocean, while the ROK has regarded Russia as a vital partner in regional connectivity projects, including logistics, energy networks, and broader transnational cooperation across the Eurasian continent.
When it comes to Ukraine, the Observatory of Economic Complexity states that ROK’s largest export to Ukraine in 2022 was automobiles, while the largest import in 2022 was grains. Since the invasion, the global economy has shifted; sanctions on Russian oil, along with a G7 price cap, have compelled Russia to sell oil at discounted rates, primarily to non-Western countries. Although Western countries have largely stopped purchasing Russian oil directly, it still enters the market indirectly through intermediaries and shadow fleets, causing price volatility and prompting countries like the ROK to diversify their energy imports. In addition, Ukrainian grain exports have been disrupted, causing global food insecurity and rising prices on top of that, global food security is still recovering from the quandaries caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Yoon’s 2023 National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of enhancing cooperation with strategic partners like the United States, Japan, the European Union (EU), and Australia to safeguard economic security. While Yoon’s strategy is adamant about the ROK standing by its allies, it would take time for it to execute it (which will be addressed later).
Progress #1: Sanctions Against Russia
The ROK’s motivation to participate has resulted in progress to attaining their objectives. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, The ROK became the first Indo-Pacific nation to join fellow democratic nations (i.e. NATO) in condemning the war of aggression and condemning sanctions. The ROK has implemented multiple sanction packages aimed at isolating Russia. In March 2022, the ROK government joined the EU and the United States in suspending financial transactions with Russian banks, including the central bank, and excluding Russia from the SWIFT network, a global platform for financial transactions. The sanctions were expanded in February 2023, with the ROK “banning the export of 741 strategic items, including machinery, automobiles, and chemicals that could be diverted for military purposes” also known as “dual-use technologies”. Between April and June 2024, the ROK imposed three rounds of sanctions on Russian vessels, entities, and North Korean nationals involved in arms shipments and oil transfers to the DPRK. These sanctions were a response to the deepening military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, which violated UNSC resolutions. These strategic decisions reflect the ROK’s commitment not only to countering the growing Russia-DPRK alliance but also to asserting its role as a global pivotal state in international security. By aligning its sanctions with those of the United States and EU, and targeting sectors critical to both Russian and DPRK interests, the ROK is sending a clear signal of its dedication to upholding international norms and deterring threats to regional stability. The sanctions also reinforce the broader goal of safeguarding economic security, ensuring the resilience of global supply chains, and enhancing the ROK’s influence on the global stage, in line with its aspirations to be a key player in the international community.
Progress #2: ROK’s Multifaceted Assistance to Ukraine
The ROK has also provided assistance to Ukraine in other apparatuses. Unlike other allies such as the United States, the ROK is forbidden to “export of weapons to countries at war and the re-export of weapons without permission” due to its Foreign Trade Act. Due to the law, the ROK government has focused its direct support for Ukraine on financial, humanitarian, and non-lethal military aid. Additionally, in August 2023, The ROK Parliament increased its 2024 support package for Ukraine to $394 million, covering reconstruction, humanitarian efforts, and contributions through international organizations. In September 2023, Yoon announced a $2.3 billion aid package to Ukraine for humanitarian support.
Despite the boundaries of the Foreign Trade Act, the Yoon Administration had found ways around it by transferring military assistance to allies; Since 2023, the ROK has transferred over 550,000 units of 155mm artillery rounds to the United States to replenish U.S. stockpiles sent to Ukraine. According to the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy and as reported by The Washington Post, the ROK’s contribution to supplying artillery ammunition indirectly to Ukraine is reportedly larger than the combined efforts of the European nations. Moreover, the ROK is collaborating with its European allies; Since 2023, Poland has made several agreements worth billions of dollars to procure arms from the ROK, notably tanks and armored vehicles. By partnering with nations bordering Ukraine, the ROK continues to contribute to international cooperation efforts condemning the invasion. These actions underscore the ROK’s commitment to asserting its leadership and influence on global security using strategic partnerships and defense cooperation as means to solidify its standing in the evolving international order.
While the ROK has found ways to support Ukraine, the Russia-DPRK partnership has caused the ROK government to reconsider its laws when it comes to exporting arms. In the aftermath of the June 2024 signing. The ROK government made an official statement that it would review and reconsider directly supplying arms to Ukraine.
Progress #3: ROK’s Bilateral Agreements
On the diplomatic front, the ROK has expanded its global presence to bolster its support for Ukraine. Since 2022, ROK officials have engaged in bilateral discussions with their counterparts from many nations, including Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands with the conflict in Ukraine being a central topic. In July 2023, Yoon visited Ukraine and held a summit with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, where he announced plans to extend support. In September 2023, the ROK government and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) announced a joint partnership to support Ukraine’s agricultural sector through the Agriculture Resilience Initiative-Ukraine (AGRI-Ukraine). Under the initiative, the partnership has pledged to deliver $5 million in fertilizer to support Ukrainian farmers and complement agricultural supplies already contributed by USAID.
Progress #4: ROK’s Multilateral Partnerships
ROK officials have also engaged in discussions with intergovernmental organizations, such as the International Criminal Court and the EU, to jointly condemn the war and underscore their support for Ukraine. The ROK also joined the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine (MDCP), an apparatus that organizes international financial support for Ukraine’s immediate needs and long-term reconstruction. The platform includes major donors such as the EU, G7 countries, and temporary members such as the Netherlands and ROK. According to a June 2024 report, Ukraine has received over $74 billion in budget support from the MDCP, out of a total of more than $142.8 billion committed by all donors. Additionally, ROK officials have also engaged in discussions with non-governmental organizations such as the International Crisis Group to strengthen cooperation in conflict zones.
Progress #5: ROK-NATO Engagements
The most notable diplomatic effort conducted by the ROK in addressing the conflict in Ukraine is its ongoing engagements with NATO. Since 2012, NATO and the ROK have had a formal relationship due to the signing of the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program, an agreement which delineates subject matters for dialogue and cooperation between the two parties. However, the ROK-NATO bilateral relations only gained momentum in 2022, when President Yoon was invited to attend the NATO summit in Madrid.
Since then, the ROK has become more involved in NATO endeavors such as joining NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and participating in the 2023 Locked Shields Cyber Exercise. Yoon has further solidified this engagement by attending three NATO summits, with his 2023 visit followed by a trip to Ukraine, emphasizing his support. He also attended the 2024 summit alongside leaders from Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, the Indo-Pacific allies which are collectively known as the AP4. During the summit, Yoon announced that the ROK would provide more assistance, including doubling its contributions to NATO’s Ukraine Trust Fund, pledging $24 million for 2025. Additionally, NATO and the ROK signed an agreement for the mutual recognition of “military airworthiness certification”, guaranteeing that all air assets used by NATO allies and partners meet safety and airworthiness standards. This agreement is significant as it marks NATO’s first partnership with an Indo-Pacific nation while also benefiting South Korea’s defense industry.
When it comes to common security challenges, NATO has shown support for the ROK’s policy on the DPRK, which motivates the ROK to collaborate with the alliance. NATO advocates for denuclearization, denounces the DPRK’s provocative rhetoric, missile tests, as well as concurs that the actions represent a significant threat to international security. Moreover, concerns shared by the ROK and NATO regarding China as a security challenge have grown. During the 2024 NATO Summit, it was stated that China has become “a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine.” Both NATO and the ROK assert that augmenting their partnership is paramount because they also share mutual concerns of the repercussions of the Russia-DPRK partnership. As then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated it “demonstrates how security in the Indo-Pacific is closely intertwined with security in Europe”.
Moreover, since DPRK soldiers have been deployed to support Russian forces in the fall of 2024, ROK and NATO collaboration has increased. Within days of the news of the deployment, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte (who had only been appointed three weeks prior) spoke with Yoon and not only shared his concerns but also urged Yoon to send a delegation to Brussels to share intelligence on the situation as well as recommendations for further “cooperation in the defense industry and security dialogue.” Within a week, Rutte confirmed the delegation had met, and that DPRK troops were in Kursk Oblast. He stated that “The deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is a threat to both the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security. It undermines peace on the Korean Peninsula and fuels the Russian war against Ukraine.” He later said in this statement that, “This underlines the importance of democracies standing together to uphold our values and to face our shared security challenge.” By November 2024, Yoon, along with several advisors and cabinet members, met with a Ukrainian delegation to further discuses cooperation efforts, the procurement of ROK defense systems, and the prospect of sending a South Korean monitoring team to Ukraine to analyze DPRK troops and possibly interrogate captured ones.
Impact #1: Strengthening Multilateral Security and Diplomacy
The ROK’s participation in the global response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has strengthened its relations with intergovernmental alliances, enhancing its role in multilateral security and diplomacy. This is likely to result in deeper strategic partnerships, increased military cooperation, and greater influence within international organizations. One could argue that the ROK has effectively advanced its GPS strategy by “strengthening solidarity with nations that share universal values and establishing a global network for comprehensive security cooperation.”
Impact #2: The Shifting of Regional Security Dynamics
That being said, the ROK’s participation has come at a cost, as regional security in Northeast Asia has become more precarious due to the DPRK-Russia partnership and the ROK’s alignment with its allies in response. As stated previously, inter-Korean relations has deteriorated. Despite Yoon introducing a “freedom-based unification” policy in August 2024, it may be a case of “too little, too late” to counter all of the provocations and alliance building. Additionally, ROK-Russia relations have deteriorated, jeopardizing one of the objectives in the National Security Strategy, which was to “maintain stable relations with Russia.” ROK-China relations have navigated a mix of cooperation and strain in recent months. In April 2023, tensions emerged following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s remarks framing the China-Taiwan issue as a “global issue.” This was followed by South Korea’s growing alignment with NATO, highlighted by Yoon’s participation in NATO summits in July 2023 and 2024. However, during their meeting in November 2024, on the sidelines of the APEC summit, Presidents Yoon and Xi emphasized bilateral cooperation, particularly on economic ties and addressing regional stability, while also discussing concerns over North Korea-Russia military cooperation Additionally, some scholars argue that NATO’s presence in the Indo-Pacific could heighten tensions with China and may not align with the strategic interests of countries that are cautious about choosing sides in the Great Power Competition The ROK (and assumingly the AP4) may need to tactically shape future security policies and ensure any threats are responded prudently.
Impact #3: Growth in the Defense Sector
Furthermore, the ROK’s commitment to support Ukraine and its allies has opened up opportunities for the defense sector to grow. Yoon has been keen on transforming the ROK into a “defense industry powerhouse” through diplomatic efforts as well as promoting policies in part of his national security strategy to make the ROK as the fourth-largest defense exporter in the world by 2027. In fact, the ROK was ranked the tenth largest arms exporter in 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The “boom” in defense production is mostly via exports, leading to new dealings in Europe and the Middle East. One notable example is the September 2024 the joint announcement between shipbuilding companies Hanwha Ocean (ROK) and WB Group (Polish) of a “memorandum of understanding” to collaborate on submarine projects. These endeavors help advance the objective of expanding defense exports that can lead to further diplomacy and mutual trust between nations.
Impact #4: Economic Costs of Sanctions and Energy Volatility
The ROK’s assistance to Ukraine and condemnation of Russia has also had some negative impacts on its economy. The imposition of sanctions on Russia has severely affected ROK businesses operating in the region, resulting in substantial financial losses. Companies in the shipbuilding sector have been forced to cancel contracts, while major automotive firms like Hyundai have been compelled to sell factories at a significant loss. Additionally, ROK electronics manufacturers, including LG and Samsung, have halted operations in Russia due to persistent supply chain disruptions
Moreover, the global energy price volatility has placed additional pressure on the ROK’s economy. Although the ROK was relatively insulated from direct dependence on Russian energy, sourcing only 9% of its energy from Russia prior to the conflict, the surge in global energy prices since early 2022 has contributed to inflationary pressures. By 2023 the ROK’s fossil fuel imports from Russia significantly decreased from $13.2 billion in 2021 to just $5.5 billion. Despite these reductions, some experts have criticized the fact that imports from Russia were still occurring and that the ROK “had not formally join the G7 price cap on Russian oil”. Additionally, there had been a year-long delay in implementing sanctions on dual-use technologies compared to other nations. In short, while the ROK’s support for Ukraine has strengthened its global standing, it has also imposed significant economic costs and complicated its regional security dynamics.
Impact #5: Yoon’s Domestic Challenges and possible Downfall
Moreover, while Yoon has been refining the ROK’s foreign affairs, the same cannot be said for domestic affairs; As of December 2024, Yoon’s approval ratings have dropped to 11%, marking the lowest levels since his inauguration. The Yoon Administration has encountered scandals and criticisms in response to issues such as the administration’s “handling of medical reforms, the cost of living, the president’s ability to communicate”, the abundance of scandals surrounding the First Lady, as well as Yoon’s focus on foreign policy.
However, Yoon’s declaration of martial law marks a decisive moment in his presidency, amplifying public discontent and firmly establishing it as one of the most controversial actions of his administration. In a late-night televised address on December 3, 2024, Yoon stated, “I hereby declare martial law to protect the free Republic of Korea from the threat of North Korean communist forces, to root out the shameless pro-North, anti-state elements that are plundering the freedom and happiness of our people, and to safeguard the free constitutional order.” Yoon further justified the declaration by citing the need to “wipe out anti-state forces as soon as possible and normalize the country’s operation.” This rhetoric is arguably reminiscent of South Korea’s pre-democracy era. Some analysts and reporters argue that Yoon has “put himself in a bubble,” perceiving members of opposing parties as existential threats and that his actions serve the greater good of the country, no matter how contentious they are.
The order triggered pandemonium, with military forces and police blocking lawmakers from accessing the National Assembly. In addition, troops were also sent to several offices of the National Election Commission. Reports out of Seoul as well as Japan suggest that Yoon may have been trying to find evidence towards election fraud allegations regarding the outcome of the April 2024 elections, which did not end in his favor. Lawmakers broke through the barriers of the National Assembly, and 190 members of parliament unanimously overturned the declaration, forcing Yoon to revoke it within six hours. However, the fallout was swift and severe. A first impeachment vote failed due to a ruling party boycott, but mounting public protests and internal divisions led to a second parliamentary vote on December 14, where Yoon was impeached by a decisive 204-85 margin. At least 12 lawmakers from Yoon’s own People Power Party (PPP) defected to support the motion.
As Yoon’s presidential powers have now been suspended, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo assumed the role of acting president. Investigations have been launched into Yoon for alleged insurrection, abuse of power, and violating the constitution. Several senior officials, including the defense minister, police chief, and head of Seoul’s police force, have already been arrested for their alleged roles in the martial law declaration. Additionally, mass resignations swept through the government as the fallout has taken affect, including the PPP party leader Han Dong-hoon. Public outrage has fueled large-scale protests, with opposition leaders framing the impeachment as a victory for democracy.
Following the second vote, Yoon remained defiant, pledging to “fight to the end” and accusing opposition parties of obstructing his governance. The Constitutional Court now has up to six months to determine Yoon’s fate. However, the court only has six out of the nine vacancies filled due to “a delay in appointing replacements.” While the court can technically review the impeachment motion due to recent rule change in October 2024, just having six judges presents challenges, as one vote could nullify the impeachment. In this period of ambiguity, the ROK faces political instability, mounting legal challenges, and internal divisions within the ruling party, leaving the nation in a state of uncertainty.
The domestic challenges and persistent criticism undermine Yoon’s capacity to sustain public support, leading him unable to manage a dual focus on foreign and domestic policy. His decision-making has now jeopardized the future of not only ROK politics, but also his presidency, and future endeavors for a global pivotal state.
Conclusion
President Yoon and his administration have made significant efforts to elevate the ROK’s global standing, particularly through its participation in aiding Ukraine’s defense against Russian forces. While these efforts have yielded notable results some scholars express concerns about the long-term implications of such policies. With the likelihood that the war in Ukraine will extend into 2025, key global events, such as the United Nations General Assembly, where President Zelenskyy emphasized that Russia must be “forced into peace” to end the war; the change of Zelenskyy’s rhetoric regarding NATO membership; the fate of the Yoon Administration; the convening of the Supreme People’s Assembly; and the return of Donald Trump to the presidency will likely shape the conflict’s trajectory. The extent to which these developments will impact the ROK’s ongoing commitment to Ukraine remains uncertain.
This raises critical questions: Will the strengthening ties between Kim Jong Un and Putin exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula and further strain inter-Korean relations? Is the DPRK-Russia relationship purely transactional, or will it deepen after the war? Will the ROK adjust its stance on directly procuring arms for Ukraine? How will its defense industry evolve post-war? Finally, will Yoon’s successor uphold the same commitment to aiding Ukraine and continue the GPS strategy? As strategic decisions often take time to manifest their full impact, only time will tell how the ROK will determine its role in the broader international response.
