FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
A Civilian’s Comprehensive Critique of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual…In 5-6 Pages
by Braden Civins
Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in 2006, quickly became doctrine for the U.S. armed forces. While the manual has its share of detractors, even its fiercest critics acknowledge that it is regarded as “transcendent” and has “become the defining characteristic of the…new way of war.” This critique (1) explores the validity of a key assumption underlying the manual; (2) analyzes specific guidance offered as a result of that assumption; and (3) argues that the manual makes a significant omission of no small consequence.
The manual’s primary assumption appears on its first page: “[a]chieving victory…depends on a group’s ability to mobilize support for its political interests.” The population, then, is the center of gravity in COIN. The population-centric strategy accords with the conclusions of preeminent asymmetric warfare scholars such as Mao Zedong and David Galula; and the historical case studies described in the manual support the argument that COIN should be oriented towards winning “hearts and minds” through increased reliance on soft power (e.g., strengthening host nations, creating freedom of movement, providing stability, etc.). However, the manual advocates the population-centric approach as the only path to success and does not consider the merits of alternative strategies, thereby assuming, rather than proving, its primacy.
Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
Braden Civins, a native Texan, is in his fourth and final year of study at The University of Texas, pursuing a J.D. from The School of Law and a Master of Global Policy Studies, with a specialization in Security Studies, from the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs. At the law school, he is a member of the Texas International Law Journal and former participant in the National Security Clinic, where he co-authored an ultimately successful appellate brief on behalf of a Guantanamo Bay detainee. During the academic year, he works as a student employee of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. He spent recent summers working at the Criminal Prosecutions Division of the Texas Attorney General’s Office, the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Department of State.
He lost me with his misreading of COL Gentile’s article in footnote 7. Lebanon in 2008?
On the other hand, agree that clear and hold require far greater forces than special ops can provide alone. Fail to hold and you can clear all you want through raids to little avail. If you are going to hold you might as well build while training your replacements who hopefully will hold.
Fail to train your military replacements and the NGO and state department builders will need mercenaries. Hardly a good answer.
Of course it could be more helpful to have indigenous ANA “holders” who speak the same language as those in the territory being held.
The Tamil tiger analogy is a no go. They were a small Budhist minority on a smallish island with no nearby cross-border sanctuary to hide in and little hope of foreign fighter support. Afghanistan, in constrast has more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan and it is hardly the minority that the Tigers were.
Your lit review is wanting on the LTTE. Might want to check out a contridictory viewpoint here:
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_40-44_Smith.pdf
However, I agree FM 3-24 does not include alternative methods. However, nearly all of those are unacceptable morally and ethically to become doctrine for the US Armed Forces. Doctrine isn’t history, doctrine isn’t an intellectual field study. Doctrine is the encapsulation of the approved commonly understood methods employed by the force. While I think the manual should briefly discuss competing viewpoints, its purpose is to guide commanders on how to approach a given problem set so all units employ a similar approach.
That said, doctrine isn’t a suicide pact, and commanders are always empowered to alter and even reject the doctrinal approach whenever circumstances permit. Those kind of decisions are what we expect of thinking commanders, who make such decisions in accordance with guidance from their higher and advice from subordinates.
You could make similar critiques of the Army’s maneuver field manuals, that they neglect discussion of subjects such as recon-pull and command-push in favor of a singular, U.S. Army approved method of maneuver. This too has been critiqued in the pre-OIF literature, and as COL Gentile often reminds us, the great debates over FM 100-5’s AirLandBattle theory.
Niel
I like MF’s last paragraph with his highlighting the differences between Sri Lank and Af/Pak; the former and its problem of insurgency could be isolated, the latter cannot. It reminds of similar comparisons often made between Malaya and Vietnam.
To Neil’s point. Well we just did offer up a competing operational level method to population centric counterinsurgency (aka FM 3-24) and that was the good kill on Bin Laden just a few days ago. Counter Terror should be elevated to the same operational level for “countering insurgencies” as is FM 3-24. Dale Andrade keeps arguing that the two are intertwined and that one cannot separate them. I disagree, especially as a matter of operational choice for strategy to employ.
Until we deconstruct 3-24 and put it back together with more operational options for countering an insurgency we will be mired in a state-building approach to countering any insurgencies and instability in the world. And this state building approach as codified in FM 3-24 is premised on faulty and half baked theories of populations and the insurgencies that come out of them.
FM 3-24 and American counterinsurgency do allow for learning and adapting; but that adaptation is still confined within a very narrow operational framework of state building to counter an insurgency.
As I have argued before, a field army using 3-24 as its operational guide, by rule, cannot learn and adapt its way out of doing population centric counterinsurgency, hence its very restrictive nature. The successful Bin Laden raid may offer up a mechanism to force an operational change from armed state building in Afghanistan to CT, which then at some point may lead to a broader discussion in the Army about the narrowness and near irrelevance (at least as far as American strategy is concerned) of population centric counterinsurgency. Or to put it another way, where in the world is it in our vital interests to do long term, armed stated building (aka FM 3-24)?
But anyway, Neil, how goes it brother? drop me a line when you can.
thanks
gian
Good COIN comes from a good understanding of insurgency itself, and FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.
Good COIN is in the relationship between a government and their own populace, and in the nature of the design and implementation of doemestic policies and how they are perceived by various distinct and significant groups within the larger populace. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.
Good COIN cannot be done by an intervening power. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.
Talk of development vs counterguerrilla, populace “control” vs populace “separation”, etc without bringing those tactical discussions of TTPs into a clear strategic context of the interests of the various parties and governments involved, and within an understanding of insurgency released from the shakles of centuries of foreign intervention perspective, are largely moot. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.
Most who throw rocks at the manual or at our various operational designs in places where we conduct operations that are guided by the thinking that shaped this manual are largely thrown for the wrong reasons at the wrong targets, IMO.
Cheers!
Bob
Except that the case evidence over the last 30 years supports 3-24 pretty strongly, and takes most of the wind of out Gentile’s sails (though it doesn’t seem to stop him from puffing). See:
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_126-128_Paul-Clarke.pdf
Anon (whomever you may be):
So I will see your JFQ article and raise you one with Bing West’s new book “The Wrong War” which has as its main point that population centric Coin (aka 3-24) being used in Afghanistan does not work, hence his title the “wrong war,” or in other words that by using 3-24–hearts and minds Coin–we are fighting the war in Afghanistan the wrong way.
I guess Bing is just “huffing and puffing” too as you say about me.
thanks
gian
FM 3-24 would seem to have been developed to be consistent with and correspond to our current thinking and related initiatives, which suggest that we need to intervene in the less-integrated world so as to transform these regions such that they might (1) become less of a problem for us, (2) be more usable by us and, otherwise, (3) be better aligned with our interests.
Herein, the idea is to use the opportunity — the opening — presented by such difficulties as insurgencies, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, etc., as a means — and a justification — for achieving significant and fundamental state and societal change therein; via such things as “state-building.”
All of this being based on the “root cause” theory which suggests that virtually all problems relating to outlier states and societies (to include insurgencies) is due to these entities (a) not being sufficiently like us re: their political, economic and social orientation and (b) not being adequately aligned with and incorporated into our system.
Thus, to change FM 3-24, the theories and understandings noted above — which today seem to underpin and direct our thinking and our actions (and which, likewise, would seem to constrain/preclude other ideas and methods) — would need to be re-thought and re-considered.
Posted by Bob,
“”Talk of development vs counterguerrilla, populace “control” vs populace “separation”, etc without bringing those tactical discussions of TTPs into a clear strategic context of the interests of the various parties and governments involved, and within an understanding of insurgency released from the shakles of centuries of foreign intervention perspective, are largely moot. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.””
Once again I “mostly” agree, but also once again I think your proposal, while not unrational, is focused on resolving the issues driving the insurgency (which may consist of many drivers that are conflicting with one another, so there may not be a viable solution for the “current” State). I suggest also looking at it from the perspective of U.S. interests. Why are we involved? What are “we” trying to accomplish to achieve ou interests?
We may determine that addressing the underlying issues is not possible (for us), but we still need to suppress the insurgency (for whatever reason) to support our interests. In that the case the tactics you listed may very well nest nicely with our strategic objectives.
It is rarely black and white, and as both you and Gian state before we foolishly apply tactics, let’s identify our strategic end state and then evaluate the alternative means (assuming alternatives exist) and ways to achieve them. FM 3-24’s flaw is not necessarily the text itself, but its dogmatic readers and distractors (both want to throw the baby out with the bathwater). It isn’t the end all be all to COIN, and the TTPs offered may in the long run largely be ineffective (one can interpret history in many ways). Still the debate shouldn’t be over a text (hell we never follow doctrine anyway), but over the strategy, only then can we debate tactics.
I recall very clearly having a discussion over Vodka (it was the first glass) with a U.S. Army General (Vietnam Vet) that I respected immensely about COIN, and he said we should never do COIN again, yet he was a major advocate of FID and supporting peace operations. I pushed back arguing that we’ll have to do COIN again and must train for it (before 9/11) based on my understanding of the world from the Cold War era (El Salvador, Philippines, etc.). I thought his Vietnam experience may have soured his view of COIN irrationally, but with more age and more experience I now understand his message, and that we really can’t do COIN (unless we’re an occupying power), the host nation must do it. Our best role, if it is in our interest, is to conduct FID (as Bob and COL Maxwell have stated many times), and ultimately it is up to the host nation to win or lose the conflict. FM 3-24 is flawed not only due to its population centric view (although I support that the population is critically important, but not always the center of gravity), but its view that “we” develop and execute the COIN strategy (instead of support the host nation’s strategy) and sort of pull our host nation brothers along for the ride. That is a plan that will almost always lead to failure.
Not sure I’d use a paper to attack someone that uses The Taliban’s COIN efforts prior to 2001 as “proof” that Pop-centric COIN “works”. I think what they were trying to say was that the Taliban didn’t use the hearts and minds approach and that is why they lost power in 2001. If I mis-read that, then I’ll stand corrected, but if not- then I’m a little skeptical of the rest of their “analysis”- as I am anytime anyone uses history (especially 30 years of it) to “prove” anything…
The low priority given to external sanctuaries in FM 3-24 is evidence that the manual was an effort to resolve the crisis in Iraq at the time it was written. The Army will need different guidance for limited wars in countries with different circumstances, if it is necessary to intervene in such places in the future.
While a further debate over how to conduct counterinsurgency may have value, my impression is that the conditions or terms on which such commitments begin are so important to the outcome that they ought to receive most of the emphasis. They do not do so now.
Regarding the Joint Forces Quarterly article, a survey of recent insurgent wars has been long overdue. But testing FM 3-24 by listing insurgencies can only be meaningful if there are sufficient baselines in common across all of the cases to make a comparison of government policy in each case valid.
None of the successful cases cited in the article were resolved with persistently inadequate numbers of government or counterinsurgent troops facing well-organized insurgencies. This is what we have had in Afghanistan.
Whatever new guidance emerges after the current Afghan conflict will need to be conceived with a longer and broader view, with special attention to the terms under which the U.S. commits itself to foreign internal defense or limited war, and without the pressure of immediate events that shaped FM 3-24 to be the kind of document that it is.
Continuing my comment at 11:38AM above:
So, as an alternative:
a. LET US RETAIN the idea that many/most of the problems experienced by and re: less-integrated states and societies can be traced to the fact that their political, economic and social arrangements and underpinnings are so outdated as to no longer be able to adequately provide for their citizenry. This causing problems — not only for these states and societies themselves — but also for the rest of the world. However,
b. LET US REJECT the idea that the the proper time and place to address these difficiencies is exactly when such outlier states and societies are experiencing insurgencies, natural disasters, humanitarian crises and/or other significant state/societal difficulty. (Thus, we specifically reject the notion that the presentation of such difficulties represents a unique opportunity — a magnificant opening — which we must immediately exploit with our “instruments of power” so as to do “corrective actions” such as state-building.)
With this change made — which specifically precludes attempting to deal with “root causes” during the time of acute state or societal trauma (and thus precluding us from using the crisis as means, motive and opportunity to impose our way of life on the indigenous populations) how then might FM 3-24 (and FM 3-07 for that matter) look?
The failure in the article, as well the critics of COIN, is that COIN is a “triology”; not in Clausewitz in a sense. Here is the conceptual flow. A hearts and minds strategy depends on the size and quality of your carrots and sticks. This is the “Social Capital” paragraph in 3-24 that NOBODY even bothers to read. Social Capital and how one uses all the elements of social capital is key to how you “design” and execute a carrots and sticks approach to your campaign plan of hearts and minds. A popultation centric approach is the use of social capital. SOCIAL CAPITAL key stone to Hearts and Minds. HOW you design and execute (no pun intended..well maybe)the operation is how you gain and lose social capital and traction on your LOO’s.
I also happen to be from Texas and like we say; “Some Folks Just need Killin'” Translation: Kintetics are important in your precision tartgeting. This IS also how you gain or lose “social capital”; see where this is going ?? Our struggles over the last 5 years has been the “How to” part of all this. There is strong evidentary support for the doctrine in the April 2011 World Bank report on conflict and stability and also in the RAND Study “Victory has a Thousand Fathers” redacted in a small article in the 1st Qtr of JFQ. The military lacks “breadth” of expereince, thats why you need the input from your USAID, DAI and NGO’s. If we could really get the linkage, the mental design with the skill and resources of the military the possibilities are endless. The doctrine is beautiful!! we are just a little shallow in how we nuance the “design and execution” and as retired soldier with 24 years of active duty i can still say that the military does not encourage intellectual rigour and that has been the real failure with our “how to”
The old saw about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin often comes to mind when the COIN “experts” roll out the theories.
I’m not aware of any true COIN “experts,” but if anyone around here knows of one, please let me know. I don’t know very much about COIN, but I will tell you this: the only “successful” COIN on the part of the United States was during the period 1861-1865. And the cleanup was a bitch; in fact, it’s still ongoing.
Hate to say it, but if our best exemplar of successful COIN is in our own nation, with people who spoke the same language, and who shared a common heritage, and it still included absolutely beating the shit out of the insurgents–you are aware of the casualty figures and the scorched earth policies, etc., right?–just why in the world would anyone think we would be able to be particularly effective as outsiders in an alien culture? Especially when we don’t include that, “beat the shit out of the insurgents.”
Robert Jones: “Good COIN cannot be done by an intervening power. FM 3-24 lacks that understanding.”
Bill M: “I thought his Vietnam experience may have soured his view of COIN irrationally, but with more age and more experience I now understand his message, and that we really can’t do COIN (unless we’re an occupying power), the host nation must do it. Our best role, if it is in our interest, is to conduct FID (as Bob and COL Maxwell have stated many times), and ultimately it is up to the host nation to win or lose the conflict. FM 3-24 is flawed not only due to its population centric view (although I support that the population is critically important, but not always the center of gravity), but its view that “we” develop and execute the COIN strategy (instead of support the host nation’s strategy) and sort of pull our host nation brothers along for the ride. That is a plan that will almost always lead to failure.”
What is there about history and common sense that COIN lovers don’t understand? An anonymous guy thinks he refutes Gian Gentile by pulling up a paper by Paul and Clarke. Read what those guys say; look at the colors on their map. It doesn’t support COIN as being practiced by the U.S. military. What it supports is COIN when it’s being done by a nation that actually knows what it’s doing and isn’t fatally corrupt. A host country. Not an outsider. Check. But what’s that got to do with Afghanistan?
And then Terry Tucker says “the military does not encourage intellectual rigor…” No shit.
Bin Laden is dead. The NCA, the spooks and the SOF dudes have taken everybody else off the hook. Time for the conventional forces to close down. COIN was never what was needed. What’s always been indicated was an intel/SOF approach, more nearly akin to civilian policing than to conventional soldiering.
Sorry, generals. Wasn’t really ever your kind of fight. Come home. Save some families. Take care of the troops. Lick your wounds. Help the budget problems.
Sincerely appreciate the feedback from those of you who offered. I learn something every time I follow the Small Wars threads, and today’s no exception.
Was truly surprised the article started any kind of dialogue–suppose I should have known better considering some of the healthy debates on FM 3-24 I’ve followed on this site. Although it wasn’t my intention to be provocative (and I realize FM 3-24 discussions tend to take on a life of their own regardless of how they get started), I always look forward to reading the wide array of thoughtful perspectives on this site–rarely find uniform agreement on any issue.
For context, I wrote the article a year ago for a CT/COIN class. I took an immediate interest in the intense disagreement over the value of the manual–didn’t know much about it (or COIN, for that matter), but I’d heard a classmate who served in Iraq talk about it with such reverence I couldn’t tell if he was joking–he wasn’t. After surveying a handful of the greatest hits (Galula, Col. Gentile, Nagl, Mao) working through a few case studies, and having a handful of class discussions, it became clear that the Manual, for better or worse, was regarded as the only way forward despite the fact that people with a wealth of relevant experience were arguing that it was fundamentally flawed (I thought it was telling that the class, which included two former Army SF, a Gov’t PhD, and a handful of IR grad students, split down the middle when asked whether reverence for the manual was deserved).
We were tasked with writing a 5-page thought piece on the Manual–this was the result. I’m obviously responsible for any factual errors and, if as one comment suggested, I mischaracterized one of Col. Gentile’s perspectives, I offer my sincere apologies–I’m a real admirer of his work.
Posted by Grant,
“”Not sure I’d use a paper to attack someone that uses The Taliban’s COIN efforts prior to 2001 as “proof” that Pop-centric COIN “works”. I think what they were trying to say was that the Taliban didn’t use the hearts and minds approach and that is why they lost power in 2001. If I mis-read that, then I’ll stand corrected””
:-), I guess that is the danger of posting a poorly worded comment. I didn’t intend intend to even come close to what you saw, but I guess I can see how you got there.
My point about 2001, was that I had the discussion with the GO prior to the 9/11 attacks implying we were talking about the value (or lack) of COIN long before everyone in the conventional military supposedly became an expert on it starting in Iraq.
I wasn’t making reference to Taliban tactics at all, but rather that I came to agree with the General’s comment that we shouldn’t do COIN (again unless we’re an occupying power and being resisted), but rather focus on FID and ensure we support the Host Nation’s plan instead of forcing them to follow our COIN plan(it won’t work).
Terry your comments simply support the argument that we should do COIN, which I ensure you will generally fail regardless of how nuanced we do it. The nature of the conflict in Afghanistan is different for different players. The Karzai government needs to do COIN or fall, the Taliban and other groups with Pakistan support are conducting a hybred of unconventional warfare and insurgency, and other groups are simply fighting for their individual power-doms that has little to do with the larger picture. What should be most important to us (long before we start discussing tactics) is identifying what we are fighting for? I haven’t read Bing’s book, but I think the point he was making based on the excerpts I have seen is that COIN in Afghanistan isn’t in our interest. Killing AQ and their allies that intend to do us harm is.
We don’t have to drink tea, build roads and schools, and assorted other activities that to date haven’t shown much return on investment to do that. Let our IC and SOF communities fight the terrorists (and not everyone in Afghanistan shooting at us is a terrorist), let State and DOD provide support to Karsai’s government (FID), and as planned start downsizing our conventional foot print on the ground there. I suspect most Afghans not personally benefiting from our wasteful contributions will welcome our departure and return to their norm. Not every fight in Afghanistan is our fight, but we sure as heck are trying to tie everything to some long term CT objectives. Regional stability is nice thought and a goal that we should help the region achieve (without a massive military presence and spending billions of dollars), but it has little to do with the war on terrorism.
Hazarding a general statement, my impression is that any substantial and sustained foreign military presence in a country is more likely to be viewed by locals as an army of occupation to one degree or another. Depending on the effects on the social environment, this occupation may be viewed as a good thing by some and a bad thing by others.
Any attempt to graft outside values or supplant local customs will likely be viewed as an ‘insurgency’ by the locals, even if the changes suggest long-term benefit. Hierarchical concerns aside, western militaries seem able to produce just enough high-quality personnel to convince even some of the locals that the impossible is achievable.
In a medium to high non-permissive environment, my guess is that 25 years minimum is required for even a well-handled effort. At least a third of the foreign forces would have to be stationed permanently in the country from the onset, i.e. no rotations out. Just an opinion.
One more thing: people assigned to service in foreign lands should exert the greatest of efforts to divest themselves of any unhelpful domestic cultural baggage that they may be tempted to bring with them. Those who are unwilling or unable to do this should not be there. At best they will do no more than prolong the agony, at worst they will foment disaster.
Ultimately, what might confuse the locals about being presented with contemporary ‘COIN’ practice could perhaps be briefly stated in vulgar terms thusly, “If you f**king clowns want to be independent anyf**kingtime soon, y’all better sac the f**k up and do exactly what the f**k I f**king tell you to!” If this proves too slow, the interim default option seems to be finding the best locals that money can buy.
The problem with “contemporary COIN” is that it is rooted in the same perspective and mind-set as “old COIN”: Going to some foreign land where we believe we either adopt or establish a government that we believe will represent our interests as their top priority, and dedicating ourselves to defending that government against all comers, foreign or domestic.
Tactics applied to execute that flawed, outdated construct are really moot. You like the “kill them all” approach? It may well suppress the insurgent, but will not likely resolve the insurgency. It also is sure to turn the segment of the populace that the insurgents emerge from into a rich recruiting ground for non-state UW actors such as Al Qaeda, who will happily sign them up to fight you where ever you might go, and back at home as well.
Prefer “nation building” approaches? The primary drivers are insurgency are related far more to the controlling nature of ones intervening control over the host nation government and the subsequent impunity such governments typically adopt in regards to their own populaces. Why would either of those two primary drivers change when the intervening power is investing even more, and the host nation is protected and enriched? So such approaches avoid or make the primary problems worse and instead offer what are essentially bribes to the populace. “Oh, I’m sorry, am I standing on your neck and disrupting your control of your government? Here, have a cookie.”
No, I get it. Arguing tactics is fun. It just isn’t the answer, nor is it the question. This is deeper. This is a manual that has its greatest shortcomings in its lack of understanding of INSURGENCY (not COIN); and it its failure to recognize the need for a new strategic context for such interventions that is more aware of the needs of the people involved.
This is my drum, and I will keep beating it.
Bob
I’m from the Counterinsurgency and I’m here to help.
Brother Bob said this:
“No, I get it. Arguing tactics is fun. It just isn’t the answer, nor is it the question. This is deeper. This is a manual that has its greatest shortcomings in its lack of understanding of INSURGENCY (not COIN); and it its failure to recognize the need for a new strategic context for such interventions that is more aware of the needs of the people involved.
This is my drum, and I will keep beating it.”
Well said and please do keep beating that drum, since the voice behind it has reason and excellent thinking; shoot Bob maybe at some point somebody will assign you an avatar of an energizer battery bunny. 🙂
I also appreciate Publius’s more thoughtful and “strategic” retort than mine to the anon post that jammed an essay in my face and declared victory. Publius is correct in pointing out that in each of these cases of a so called pop centric coin victory the counterinsurgent was the government of the place and had a long term interest in defeating the insurgents, and more importantly wasnt going anywhere anytime soon.
Lastly Braden I thought your essay was a thoughtful, well written piece. From my experience over the past number of years on this excellent blog, the value of articles is not so much whether or not folks agree with you but the discussion that they generate and your article in that regard on SWJ blog, if I may, gets a passing grade with flying colors. Thanks for writing it.
gian
(ps; Niel, sorry for spelling your name incorrectly on a previous post)
Should we consider that “state-building” is not, as we might have earlier believed, a positive element in winning “hearts and minds” but, rather, a significantly negative factor, as such activity (to wit: changing the political, economic and social structure of a country) is more likely to anger and alienate the subject population rather than to win them over?
Does this expected negative reaction to “state-building” (attempting to achieve fundamental state and societal change) help to explain why massive numbers of foreign security forces (to include elements of the GPF), and exceptional numbers of host nation security and police forces are required when counterinsurgency is attempted in this manner (to wit: when using the state and societal transformation/state-building approach)?
Bill C.
There is nothing wrong with development in general, but we have placed an emphasis and expectation on it that is completely detached from any historical or recent reality.
One driving factor is the old wife’s tale that “effectiveness” of governance prevents or cures insurgency. Little history of that either.
Larger problems come when we go to places like Afghanistan as an intervening power. We just don’t know who’s who; we can’t do projects in unsecure places; and we sure aren’t going to hand a multi-million dollar contract to a know Taliban supporter.
So, instead, we go to guys like MG Shirzai who (quite purposely) has a compound just outside the main gate at KAF. The general is a great host and a great guy. People like him. You need gravel? No problem. You need security? No problem. You need anything at all, not problem. Service with a smile. People like and trust him. I like him and have had dinner at his home (be prepared to eat endless meat on a stick, but avoid the giant glass of yougurt…) He is also reportedly worth several hundred million dollars. Gul Agha Shirzai, who had the Kandahar monopoly initially is worth even more.
This means that the bulk of our development efforts enrich those who support the Karzai regime, provide jobs for the friends, family and tribes of those who support the regime; and the projects are built so that they benefit these same people. Those who are so excluded by the Karzai regime so that they see their only hope being in support to the Taliban get little benefit. This makes the revolutionary insurgency worse. Bringing in thousands of additional foreign troops and development personnel to implement such projects makes the resistance insurgency worse.
Development is not bad. Misguided development is bad, and most COIN development misguided for many very good reasons that are virtually impossible to overcome.
Bob
Bob, I think you danced around Bill C.’s point about State building. Development is only a part of that, and agreed development in itself isn’t “necessarily” bad, unless we’re reinforcing bad actors by carelessly throwing around $$$. State building (at least the way the West does it) is forced cultural change, and that is an offensive action and as demonstrated by ancient and new history will always be rejected by the people. We want to believe we’re doing the right thing (and we are according to our values), so we find it hard that are acts of kindness are largely frowned upon by those we’re trying to help.
I agree with your point about correctly identifying the context (which we fail to do) or political/social ecology of the country we’re operating in, and then determining how to best pursue whatever interests “we’re” pursuing. Our stated objective in Afghanistan is stability (to end safehaven), yet our presence is what creates a great deal of instability. I think your earlier point about a decent interval will become the necessary fall back option.
CIA put out in the news today (part of the continuing media circus post UBL’s death) that intelligence indicates there are AQ cells in over 70 countries, and I bet a good number of those countries are quite stable. Regardless we can’t afford to invest billions/trillions in an attempt to stabilize the world in order to defeat AQ. We need to find and neutralize the cells (unilateral, with partners, or encourage partners to do it). Separate defeating AQ from stability, we only pursue stability operations when it supports a greater interest than defeating AQ.
Bill M,
Those who know me know I don’t dance well. More like I stumbled around the State building. That is indeed another well intended, but misguied and almost inevitably going to produce negative effects.
A state has borders. Securing and reinforcing borders drawn by colonial powers for thier own purposes, with little cultural relevance, creates far more problems than goodness. Good commerce more than bad commerce travels across such borders in the regions we agonize the most over (the seas between Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia; the Maghreb; the AFPAK border; etc.) We disrupt this “legitimate” trade far more than the illegitimate trade we target.
A State has government. Same situation. Colonial forms and current pushes for “democracy” often have little relevance in the cultures we seek to develop them within; also, populace groups most likely to submit to a common governnace are often broken up by the afore mentioned borders.
I don’t know how we undo the damage of generations of colonial disruption. I suspect the best answer will be in getting similar states to join with their neighbors to form more effective unions that can be more self-sufficient and that make more cultural sense. Or breaking off corners perhaps in places like the Kurdish people with several modern states all poking into their homeland. Or maybe lesser included forms of sovereignty, more like an American Indian Reservation, that allows Self-governance and multi-state citizenship for certain peoples, such as the Kurds or Pashtuns, as an example. This is complex stuff. Probably best to leave well enough alone and stop agonizing over the fact that not everyone looks like us or governs like us. They are not us.
Bob,
One of your old friends in SOCPAC actually claimed you were a trained dancer and quite good, but I’ll accept your humble denial :-).
I recall EUCOM prior to the 9/11 attacks trying to encourage the old colonial powers to do more throughout Africa and join us in the ACRI program. Seemed reasonable since they were largely responsible for the lingering mess and humanitarian crisis, but not surprisingly we ended up doing the bulk of the work and spending (while they pointed out our flaws over cappuccinos). Despite the occassional set back, I think we made some progress in parts of Africa with the gradual approach led by State and supported by DOD (and others) on a shoe string budget. However, in the end you still had the residual States that were created by Europeans for exploitation or buffers, and their boundaries don’t reflect the boundaries of the actual nations based on culture, nor were most economically viable (so much for Bill C’s claim that our goal is integration into the modern world). This is just one example that illustrates the more we interfer the more problems we seem to create. Now we carry the guilt of our fathers and want to undue all the wrongs, but is impossible for “us” to do so.
It is complex stuff, but not necessarily complex stuff that we need to load the shoulders of our military. We should deploy military forces to achieve the M objectives in DIME, and those should be relatively well defined, acheivable, and adequately supported (the military is given the right forces, funded, and given the right authorities to execute their mission), and clearly in the interest of the U.S.. We can and should pursue more idealistic policy by gradually influencing certain situations with our DI&E to help shape (not force) the world over “t-i-m-e…..” to become more integrated and peaceful. It is long past time to reject the doctrine of occupation to achieve global stability, it is simply counterproductive to all concerned. If we’re conducting COIN, then we’re an occupying force, so really FM 3-24 is a guise (although incomplete) for occupation.
Bill- sorry for my poorly worded post. I was responding to anon’s attack on COL Gentile with that paper. That paper isn’t a strong one in my opinion- especially the way they treat Afghanistan pre-2001 as a case study backing their thesis. And regardless of their cases- 30 years just isn’t enough time (if there was such a thing as “enough”) to “prove” something about the future.
Bob- totally agree with your comment wrt good governance. That is an ISAF “fact” (or unquestioned assumption): that the insurgency is fueled by “bad” governance. Even if that were true, the follow-on assumption: that we can support the establishment of governance- instead of it emerging over time the way they want it- is just as problematic IMO.
From reading Braden’s comments, most of it is a disclaimer of some sort…not a big motivator for really analyzing his work. If I want to see a product followed by disclaimers and apologies I’ll go watch some LTs at work.
Reading the remainder of the posts reminds me of all the COIN I’ve read, done, failed to read, failed to do, and failed to understand, etc. As with most subjects on this site, I’m thankful for their existence and can’t help but feel (often times) that I’m part of the problem.
As someone pointed out, the military does not encourage intellectual rigor – and I’ve lost count of the times my cohorts have told me, “fight the battle, not the book”. It was always related to me trying to have a discussion with them about the merits of what we do and how we do it, from the fundamentals of EA Development, to what does social capital look like?
As a result, at times I feel I’ve abandoned my personal reading and development in order to play along and fight the battle, which translates to, “stop reading/thinking and do more PT” in garrison and “stop reading/thinking and just keep shooting” in combat.
I think Publius is on to something regarding the salience of Intel/SOF. However, I just don’t think we have the Intel/SOF communities equipped for that fight. The biggest limitation I see are numbers. But, this takes us (me) back to the intellectual rigor – perhaps if our military embraced more rigor and self-analysis, we’d spur growth in our maneuver, intel, and sof communities to create the numbers we need.
Good comment about true COIN experts: although I wouldn’t say there are none. I’d just say I’m not smart enough to identify them. But, I do believe they’re out there, although I hope they are not as elusive as the Yeti. What I’m trying to say is that I think we have the brainpower to find some right answers and the fortitude to see them through to completion. To date though, the only ‘truths’ I believe to be true and effective enough for me to live by are the following: respect costs nothing and rapport is everything. All the other stuff is up for debate on a case by case analysis.
While not entirely feasible, I try to distill many of the topics here down to the following: at its essence, what’s being said, how can I take a lesson learned and bring it all the way down to the METL & OPORD levels, changing how I operate once I hit the LD? Hard to do, but worth the effort.
I suspect this COIN thing will be discussed well after the last BCT leaves Afghanistan. That’s good. I’ll be truly worried if we substitute these discussions with AR 670-1 talks, or how to assign points to the new physical readiness test so we can really parse out our officers on the OER, etc.
Good talk.
a. Does FM 3-24, as presently written, acknowledge — by noting the need for our GPF, the necessity to do much BPC and the requirement for significant WOG capabilities — that counter-insurgency done in this manner (via state-building) can be expected to garner, from the population, a negative rather than a positive response? This, because the 180 degree governing, economic and social changes that we are attempting to implement — via our host nation government — we know and understand, up-front, are likely to anger, frustrate and alienate significant numbers and important portions of the population?
b. This explaining the unique need for such massive numbers and diverse kinds of foreign and host-nation security and other forces when doing counterinsurgency in this manner (via the state-building approach). Such forces and capabilities being needed to hold the population at bay and deal with the resistance that we readily expect will be forthcoming. Such to be expected when one, for example, tries to “liberalize” (make more-open, more-accessable and more-user-friendly) states and societies which presently, and traditionally, have had a more-insular and more-conservative nature.
Now, giving full and due weight to this idea that the significant and fundamental state and societal changes we are attempting may be expected to garner, from the population, a negative rather than a positive response (thus — to deal with this reality — the need for such amazing numbers and types of foreign and host-nation security and other forces), then:
a. Should we really say that we are doing “counter-insurgency” via the “state-building” approach?
b. Or would it be more accurate to say that we are, instead and in all reality, attempting to do “state-building” via the opportunity — the opening — presented by the insurgency?
What we are most accurately doing based upon pre-Iraq COIN frenzy is:
1. “Expeditionary Intervention” rather than “war”
Problem: The Army hates that, because that is the solid historic truff of the U.S. Marine Corps, SOF, even the Navy and Air Force; but not the Army. I suspect the service-based concerns of the Army are a big reason we have over branded these interventions that are merely subsets of a larger AQ Campaign Plan as “wars.”
Solution: Chairman directs the Army to get over it. Just like the Marine Corps does big wars to assist the Army; the Army gets to do Expeditionary Interventions to support the Marine Corps. Allowing the Marines to set the tone for these operations would keep the mindset and scale more appropriate, and would also keep the Army (and the nation) reminded that this isn’t a war that we are staked to the ground on and that many other things have higher priority for our nation as a whole.
Problem: We call our support to the COIN efforts of some foreign power COIN as well, consider it warfare, and assign military lead. This in turn leads us to get way outside our lane militarily, while strangly and tragically avoiding many political aspects of the problem that are much more part of the root causes.
Solution: Supporting a foreign nation on an internal security concern (regardless of where the threat came from, or who is supporting the threat)? That is Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Keeps us in our lane and keeps Civilian leadership empowered, and keeps our eyes open to the bigger picture.
Do we need to know COIN? Certainly, that is the mission the Host Nation we are supporting is executing. Do we need to understand insurgency? Absolutely. That is the larger dynamic at work, and if one does not understand insurgency, then one is not apt to be able to support the COIN efforts of their host.
If this were basketball instead of insurgency, FM 3-24 would be a manual on how to come is as a sub on defense while playing roadgames, and the relative benefits of playing a zone or man to man.
What we really need is a manual on Basketball as an entire game, from theory, to offensive and defensive tactics; road games vs home games; starting or coming off the bench; etc.
Because we have taken such a narrow and situational perspective on the problem, and then drilled deeply into it like only the the US Army can, it is no wonder we have gotten so far off track.
I’ve always said that it is better to right thing poorly than the wrong thing very well. In this case, we have become masters of the wrong thing.
Actually Bob we do have the manual that you call for and it is titled “On War” by Carl von Clausewitz.
gian
This may seem odd, but should we consider that our primary goal is not to defeat the insurgency but, rather, to use the opportunity presented by the insurgency to achieve substantial and fundamental state and societal change?
Resistance to this endeavor (state and societal transformation) being expected as part and parcel of this process.
Herein, the insurgency being important in that it provides us the opportunity, the opening, which allows us to intervene so as to pursue this, our primay goal (fundamental state and societal change).
Does this possibly more-correct characterization re: our goals and intentions (to wit: we are not pursuing counter-insurgency via the state-building approach so much as we are using the opportunity presented by the insurgency to get at the “root causes” of all such outlier state and societal difficulties); does this help us to better understand such things as:
a. The problems we are experiencing with this approach (host nation government and population not too “hep” on doing fundamental state and societal change — exactly as we require) and
b. Thus, the need for such large quantities and various types of security forces and other capabilities; needed to achieve our primary objective (not defeating this insurgency — but fundamentally transforming the state and society so that such difficulties as these will be less likely to occur in the future)?
Robert C. Jones:
Re: your Problem number 1:
I agree that the result sought is mostly desirable but suggest you reconsider the approach. The Chairman — presumably of the JCS — has no real directive or legal authority over the Army and what you want done will require the assent of Congress and a reordering of budgets. IOW, good idea but the implementation is significantly impacted by US domestic politics.
You always seem to forget that little detail. I provide this little reminder in the spirit of aid for your quest and destination, with which I agree — but yet again suggest you relook your route.
I doubt you can get there unless you do that…
Back to the basics, expeditionary intervention to punish those who attacked us (then leave) much like the air strikes on Libya after the Disco Bombing in Germany. Foreign Internal Defense to aid our allies (not those who have no intention of being our allies). NATO invoked Article 5, collective self defense after the 9/11 attacks, so we have some basis to conduct expeditionary intervention (or OCO) as required to defend ourselves and our NATO allies from potential attacks (or respond to such attacks).
Bill C’s constant drum beat on global integration sounds like a conspiracy theory, but unfortunately I think there is some truth to it. Until we purge the influence of those who push these ideas like Paul Wolfawitz and Tom Barnet from our national strategy we will probably continue to tilt against the windmill of history.
I pretty much agree with all of Bob’s comments in his last post except it this theory that we’re calling it a war because the Army wants to call it a war? I’m pretty sure the President and his administration decided to call it a war for various reasons that had nothing to do with the Army’s desire. I also recall the Army being reluctant to get involved, and GEN Shinseki didn’t have a lot of influence on the administration at the time. The services saluted and moved out after the orders were issued (just as they should have). Of course after that the interservice rivalries were a normal part of life. The Army also focused on ways to do expeditionary operations more effectively long before 9/11. Part of the Stryker concept was to enable the Army to better support expeditionary operations, as were the independent airborne brigades. We’ll never be as good at expeditionary operations as the Marines based on their ability to base their combined arms team onboard ships (the sustainment package and it reduces the need for logistical bases to support short expeditionary operations in the littorial region). However, there is no advantage to the Marines conducted expeditionary operations in Afghanistan (landlocked country) compared to the Army. There may be a disadvantage in that we have diverted our best expeditionary force into a long term landlocked battle, and have less capability to respond to crisis globally in the litorial region where the vast majority of the global population resides. Just a thought.
What I am suggesting — and asking — is:
Are we, in all truth, actually doing state and societal transformation — under the guize of and/or via “expeditionary intervention” or “war?”
As to the “war” title/status, yes civilians used the term first, and they used it incorrectly. I didn’t hear anyone in the Army correcting them.
As to Gian’s comment, I can’t go there. “On War” is a great bit of thinking on war theory; but it is wildly off the mark and inappropriate for Insurgency theory. One is external, legal violent competition between states; the other is internal, illegal, violent or nonviolent competition within a state. Very different animals, and the conflation of the two is a major contributor to much of the bad doctrine and theory we have on the shelves today.
As to Ken’s comment, if one let the law get in the way of a good idea we would never have any insurgency to begin with! Time for a little internal shake up of our own. Seriously though, no need to begin forming cells or organize “million man marches,” but we do need to do a bit more coloring outside the lines and perhaps put a new emphasis on the words of Colin Powell’s Crate and Barrel rule: “You broke it you fix it.” It should not mean “you break it and then hand it to the miltary to go punish it for being broken.”
First step is to simply recognize that insurgency is natural and rarely warfare, and can indeed be managed by civilian leaders. It is only when the civilian leadership has completely lost their focus for an extended time that things tend to devolve to where military support is necessary. Insurgency does not happen when the civilian government loses control of the populace, but rather when the populaces loses control of the civilian government. Shifting our intervention and preintervention focus to that of helping populaces gain and maintain control of their governments would go a long way to getting back in line with our professed core national principles. But that would mean surrendering some control of outcomes, and that is a pill we have not quite swallowed yet.
Bill C.:
I knew you’d pare it down to the essence eventually… 😉
I believe the answer to be yes — in the eyes of some. I also believe Bill M, Robert C. Jones and gian p gentile are correct. That is fallacious logic and those constituting that “some” need to cease supporting that approach.
Even were it realistic and decent logic, we do not do it at all well. We should try other methods…
Robert C. Jones:
I very much agree that it’s “Time for a little internal shake up of our own…we do need to do a bit more coloring outside the lines…It should not mean ‘you break it and then hand it to the miltary to go punish it for being broken.’ ”
I also agree that letting the petty little law stuff getting in the way is tedious — however, been my observation that it trumps what you and I may want.
Reality is so darn boring…
Posted by Bob,
“”Insurgency does not happen when the civilian government loses control of the populace, but rather when the populaces loses control of the civilian government. Shifting our intervention and preintervention focus to that of helping populaces gain and maintain control of their governments would go a long way to getting back in line with our professed core national principles.””
The comment above is another one of your moments of brillance. I agree this is a helpful way of viewing it (also for UW planners), but I think it is useful to continue to look at through the eyes of the government also. Both views will provide unique insights to those developing our policy objectives and the plans that support them. They may in many cases actually convince them that employing the military to achieve the objectives is the least desired option. Some in the know may correctly disagree on this, but in Afghanistan and Iraq it appears we didn’t consider either view; only our own. Then we tried to bribe or force those affected to support our view (ties into Bill C’s suspicion).
I don’t know if you met to say insurgency is not war or warfare, but insurgency more frequently than not is warfare. Not the type of warfare described by Clausewitz. It is an election of sorts and the winning side is the one that employs violence the most skillfully to achieve their political objectives.
Robert C Jones said:
“1. “Expeditionary Intervention” rather than “war”
Problem: The Army hates that, because that is the solid historic truff of the U.S. Marine Corps, SOF, even the Navy and Air Force; but not the Army. I suspect the service-based concerns of the Army are a big reason we have over branded these interventions that are merely subsets of a larger AQ Campaign Plan as “wars.”
Solution: Chairman directs the Army to get over it. Just like the Marine Corps does big wars to assist the Army; the Army gets to do Expeditionary Interventions to support the Marine Corps. Allowing the Marines to set the tone for these operations would keep the mindset and scale more appropriate, and would also keep the Army (and the nation) reminded that this isn’t a war that we are staked to the ground on and that many other things have higher priority for our nation as a whole.”
Bob,
Was Vietnam a small war at half a million troops? Was it a counterinsurgency? Korea a small war? Is any war with 100,000 U.S. troops and 40+ other allies a small war? Could the Marines have led any of those wars and supported years of deployments with 7 month tours?
Seem to recall that FM 3-24 is a joint Army/Marine publication and that the Marines are some of the best at practicing COIN. The recent clearance of Sangin followed by the current hold is one such example. The “don’t be a jerk” school of thought practiced elsewhere in Helmand is another Marine and Army example yielding results.
Now please tell me how SF/SOF alone could seize Helmand, Kunar, Khost, Paktia provinces and hold them…along with the 7,000 Pashtun villages with 11 million Pashtuns that Mr. West mentions elsewhere. Obviously they cannot, nor can 100,000 U.S. troops and ANA and allies. But obviously these conventional forces can clear and hold more villages than a few thousand SF/SOF.
Would you not agree that 100,000 conventional forces can train and lead by example more ANA than a few thousand SF/SOF? What happens if we pull out prematurely and these SF/SOF forces start doing raids into villages laced with IEDs and waiting in ambush?
I see this article in today’s news explaining how Qaddaffi’s forces are hiding amongst buildings and under trees and thwarting airpower.
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2011/05/08/world/africa/news-us-libya-misrata-tactics.html?_r=1&ref=world
So again, given the number of Marines we have, the number of potential small and larger wars that could occur in the Middle East given current disruptions (seen Syria, Lebanon, and Iran problems lately?), and the inability of airpower to bring down Qaddaffi or Hussein before that…just how exactly are Marines, Naval forces, and airpower going to win these possible wars and practice stability operations afterwards?
When was Lebanon the quietest, when Israel occupied it or in 2006 when they attempted their version of EBO? Why does the USAF always hype up the success of Kosovo without mentioning the ground success of peacekeeping forces there?
Perhaps you noticed that Army helicopters emplaced the SEALs and one had problems. Due to temperatures 15 degrees higher than forecast and vortex ring states, just how would a CV-22 or MV-22 have fast-roped in the SEALs since their hover performance in high density altitudes is limited at best?
How would Marine and SOF/SF aircraft and trucks alone resupply all these dispersed ANA and SF/SOF after we pull out conventional forces too soon?
Move Forward:
Robert C. Jones can and I’m sure will answer your post to him, but just for grins, I’d like to intrude and address four points based on personal experience.
More like a couple of million fighters based on all players on both sides, yet Viet Nam was essentially indeed a Small War — we didn’t fight it at all well but it was small and was contained. It was part counterinsurgency, part not.
Korea with much the same numbers, all told, was also small. It was not a counterinsurgency,
Both those were domestic politically inspired foolishness wherein the Administrations of the day tried to achieve a policy objective requiring a scalpel or two while employing a Chainsaw — but still not allowing said saw to work at full throttle. Limited war is an oxymoron.
The answer to the metric based question is the always loved “it depends.” Quality of opponent. Numbers of them. Equipment available. Degree of intensity. Contained or not area of operations. Strategic goals and limitations. Those and more, a number of factors play into an answer to that question. Using your metric approach, Both Afghanistan and Iraq would apparently qualify as being larger wars — yet, IMO based on the parameters I cited they are both small…
Finally, no, the Marines probably could not have led any of those wars and supported years of deployments with 7 month tours. That’s really the point. Avoiding long wars, small or large.
With the possible exception of Korea, all of those could have been avoided — should have been, I believe — and though all required some action and some war like activity, far better strategic and operational choices could have been made and such choices would have likely made seven months more than enough time.
Clearing and holding villages is a fools game, it’s to be avoided as it makes no military sense to play by the opponent’s rule on his turf. There are better ways. Our business as usual mode has nor worked all that well for us. We need to chuck it…
Size and degree of violence are poor variables for defining conflicts.
“Small War” or “Large Wars” may either both be very similar or very different. The large one may be very unconventional and a small one may be extremely conventional. Size matters, but it does not define.
Same with violence. tactics don’t define nature, and nature does not dictate tactics.
But you miss my point. When the Army abandon’s Army things to focus on expeditions one has to wonder who is organized, trained and equipped to do Army things?
As to the massive missions you describe however, I would ask you to consider this:
Were/are they so massive that they require the Army to perform them?
or
Are they so massive because they were given to the Army to perform?
It seems we either win by going in large and decisively with clear objectives (Grenada, Panama) and then get the heck out quickly (at least the major forces), or we go in very small like we did in Greece and El Salvador for a long time, by going small the host nation must do the fighting, and we must adapt to them (the way it should be) instead of trying to force them to adapt to our way of doing fighting war. In my opinion, Moving Forward’s arguments are actually moving us backwards. If “we” are doing the heavy lifting, then the heavy lifting needs to be decisive, not a 100k troops stuck in a quagmire. SOF can do Afghanistan with minimal conventional support if we limit our fighting objectives to CT, CAS support for Afghan forces that are being overwhelmed, and capacity building. We don’t our men patrolling the villages endlessly, because in this case there is no end game with that tactic. We are doing little more than retaking the same hill again and again.
Bill M,
Near as I recall, we were in Panama before and after 1989. Grenada was a non-threat to begin with and it along with El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua all were truer examples of “small wars” and we were there for a while in two out of three.
How did that light forces on the ground work out for us in Iraq and early years of Afghanistan?
Oh contrair, if you abandon the villages to the ANA before they are ready, the reinforcing SOF/SF are the ones stuck retaking the hill over and over again.
Move Forward:
I think you just made the point the three of us are approaching from different directions. The first question could more properly be “Why did we stay in either country?
Your above quoted second point just reinforces what Bill M. said: “…We don’t (need) our men patrolling the villages endlessly, because in this case there is no end game with that tactic. We are doing little more than retaking the same hill again and again.”
I’ll again mention that it seems foolish to play by the opponent’s rules on his turf…
Ken,
The Brits had many bases near Sangin but Michael Yon reports indicated they could not venture far from them due to IEDs because of insufficient forces spending too much time on COPs.
In constrast, the Sangin U.S. Marines patrolled nearly constantly. That implies adequate forces to have multiple patrol shifts while retaining forces to guard the COP.
That cannot occur without sufficient forces to man multiple COPs with multiple platoons of conventional forces. It also is less effective unless general purpose MEDEVAC and attack/lift aviation is close enough to respond as a QRF force. Adequate logistics forces also are required.
None of this sounds like we are playing by the opponent’s rules since he has no COPs, insufficient forces and firepower to mass effectively against our surge, poor logistics, and has no Army and Joint airpower.
How did that “light forces on the ground” thing work out in the early years of Vietnam? How did it work when we left prematurely?
Historians like to point to the COIN relationship between Afghanistan and Vietnam but conveniently omit similar sanctuary problems that then and now tie our hands. At least we could bomb North Vietnam and other areas of the Ho Chi Minh trail.
But as bin Laden and Lashkar e Taiba show us in Pakistan, the true threats lie there and simply leaving prematurely does nothing but allow some in Pakistan to mount an eventual assisted but “covert” assault on weak Afghanistan…perpetuating the terror problem, oppression of women, and other ethnicities that together form the population majority that wants nothing to do with the Taliban or Islamic extremism.
How is that “no forces on the ground” thing working out in Libya?
Move Forward,
I believe you are missing the main point. To fight a major war effort one certainly needs to employ a large professional army for best effect.
The problem is, that when sent to deal with a problem where there is a “threat” and “violence” the tendency of such large professional armies is to turn that problem into a major war. In your listed examples this was certainly the case.
This is natural, for when one doesn’t know what to do, the do what they know. In Nam the SF guys went out and built guerrilla forces among the tribesmen, conducted capacity building with the conventional forces, and began a range of programs for the people. That really missed the real crux of the problem. When big Army rolled into town they similarly defined the problem along lines that met their training and experience and sat out to defeat the enemy, secure terrain and win the war. That too missed the main crux.
Insurgency is politics, albeit illegal politics. To focus on the violence is to miss the main point. To focus on the insurgent is to miss the main point. To focus on the populace is to miss the main point. All of those must be understood, but the focus of engagement must be on the government. Too often intervening powers, who are there to protect that same government, turn their back to the problem from the outset and dedicate their efforts to attacking the symptoms instead.
COL Jones:
If “the problem” is that the foreign intervening power has installed and/or is supporting a local government, whose job is to carry out our wishes (for example: to fundamentally transform the state and society so that these might [1] cause us fewer problems and [2] better meet our needs).
And if the insurgency is based on an abhorance of and complete disagreement with this (radical state/societal change) or some other initiative of the foreign intervening power,
How then does the intervening power, by focusing primarily on the local government it has installed and/or is supporting:
a. Quell the insurgency yet, at the same time,
b. Still achieve its goal (again as an example: fundamental state and societal change); especially when such a “foreign” endeavor must often be pursued against the will of a significant portion of the population (thus, the insurgency)?
Bill C.
My assessment is that you are focusing on the sizzle rather than the steak.
COIN Sizzle: Transforming of state and society (your words)
COIN Steak: Ensuring the survival of a government over some region/populace where the intervening party believes itself to have vital interests and that believes this “puppet”/partner government is the best option to manage the same.
Insurgent Sizzle: (as characterized by the COIN team) abhorent and radical change.
Insurgent Steak: Throw off excessive external influence over national government; force reform or removal of governments that are not recoginized as legitimate, or that have come to act with impunity, or that perhaps treat certain segments of the populace with injustice or disrespect compared to other equally situated segments.
For the West in particular, but for any intervening power in general my advice is to find new ways to manage your interests. Time honored approaches that are dedicated to the adoption or creation of some government, and then to the defense of the same against all challengers, foreign and domestic, is IMO obsolete and dangerous.
We will always have interest in foreign lands. We will always need to manage those interests. Old techniques based in such dysfunctional governmental relationships and that discount the will of the affected people are no longer the right answer. In fact, they were already the wrong answer when they led to the retirement of the British Empire. Far more so today.
Cheers!
bob