2026 Worldwide Threats Hearing
03.25.2026 at 12:32am
March 19, 2026 08:30 | HVC- 210
“House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Rick Crawford (AR-01) announced an open full Committee hearing for Thursday, March 19, to examine the annual assessment of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States.”
Witnesses:
- Director of National Intelligence: Tulsi Gabbard
- CIA Director: John Ratcliffe
- FBI Director: Kash Patel
- Acting Director of NSA and Commander of US Cyber Command: Lieutenant General William Hartman
- DIA Director: Lieutenant General James Adams
Find a timestamped breakdown of topics covered in the hearing below, courtesy of artificial intelligence.
Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment Hearing
The hearing convenes to discuss the annual worldwide threat assessment, with testimony from key intelligence leaders.
Acknowledgement of Service:
- Special thanks extended to General Hartman for his lifetime of service and upcoming retirement .
- Commendation for the thousands of intelligence agency professionals whose dedication ensures American safety .
Key Points from Opening Statement (Chairman):
- The world remains dangerous, but President Trump’s leadership has made it less so for Americans .
- Iran: The Iranian regime has been significantly weakened due to U.S. actions, including devastating nuclear facilities, eliminating leadership, and crippling its military and proxies .
- Venezuela: The illegitimate dictator Nicolás Maduro is imprisoned in New York, a success of U.S. military and intelligence operations .
- These successful operations, particularly against Iran and Venezuela, were dependent on timely, accurate, and fact-based intelligence from the agencies .
- A warning is issued to adversaries: no stone will be left unturned .
- The hearing aims to provide an unvarnished and unbiased account of threats from China, North Korea, Russia, and cartels .
- Intelligence agencies have improved through reforms focused on core missions: stealing secrets of adversaries .
- CIA increased foreign intelligence reporting by 25% .
- CIA is on track to hire and deploy more officers than in the last 25 years .
- Support for FISA Section 702 reauthorization and a substantial intelligence budget increase are urged to fund operations against Iran and terrorists .
- Emphasis on continued personnel and institutional reforms to prevent bureaucratic bloat and political bias .
- Intelligence Authorization Act has laid the foundation for a more efficient intelligence community .
- Future reforms will focus on growing collectors, investing in core capabilities, defending space assets, and guarding against bureaucracy .
Key Points from Opening Statement (Vice Chairman):
- Acknowledgement of the vital work of intelligence community members .
- Hearings like this are crucial due to the secret nature of intelligence work .
- Concerns raised about erosion of safeguards protecting democracy and security over the past year .
- Foreign Adversary Election Interference: Intelligence community has long warned about Russia, China, and Iran attempting to influence U.S. elections through cyber intrusions, disinformation, and covert operations .
- Protecting elections should be a top priority for the intelligence community .
- DNI’s Role: The DNI is responsible for coordinating intelligence on foreign election interference, warning the public, and ensuring officials have necessary information .
- Congress mandated a Foreign Malign Influence Center within ODNI to coordinate responses .
- DNI’s Actions: Despite the mandate, the DNI eliminated the Foreign Malign Influence Center and lacks a designated official for election threat response .
- Multiple requests for legally required briefings on foreign election threats have gone unanswered .
- DNI’s Domestic Involvement: Allegations that the DNI is involved in purely domestic matters .
- Fulton County, Georgia Raid: Director Gabbard reportedly participated in a law enforcement raid to seize election ballots and voting machine records .
- The warrant lacked a foreign connection, relying on debunked conspiracy theories .
- Question: If intelligence community is not mobilized against foreign threats, why is it deployed domestically?
- Puerto Rico Voting Machines: DNI’s alleged involvement in seizing voting machines raises alarms .
- Misuse of National Security Powers: Concerns that the DNI is misusing powers to interfere in domestic politics and potentially aid unconstitutional efforts to control elections .
- President’s Rhetoric: President has pushed for nationalization of elections and made false statements about election fraud .
- White House Director of Election Security and Integrity: Kurt Olsson, who played a role in efforts to overturn the 2020 election, now holds a federal position with authority to refer investigations and access sensitive information .
- Watergate Aftermath: Committee established after Watergate abuses; guardrails around intelligence and law enforcement agencies exist for a reason .
- Failure to focus on foreign threats weakens agencies, making the U.S. resemble adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea .
- FBI Purges: Politically motivated purges at the FBI have led to an exodus of agents, with redeployments from counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber to immigration enforcement .
- Agents working on Iran threats were dismissed due to prior involvement in investigating the president’s mishandling of classified information .
- FBI budget cuts impacting cyber, counterterrorism, and counterespionage .
- Reports of squandered resources, including a $60 million jet for the director’s personal travel .
- Whistleblower account of frequent flights delaying response to major incidents .
- Reassignment of elite SWAT agents to escort the president’s girlfriend .
- NSA and DIA Leadership: Both agencies left leaderless for months after the president fired their directors .
- CISA Personnel: Over one-third of CISA personnel forced out, despite ongoing threats like “SolarWinds” and Iranian cyber attacks .
- State Department Crisis: Thousands of citizens trapped in a war zone with limited assistance; hotline provided a message discouraging reliance on the U.S. government for departure .
- Alienating Allies: Pushing allies towards adversaries has consequences; Canada and the UK are pursuing trade deals with China due to perceived U.S. unreliability .
- War with Iran: Resulted in 13 service member deaths, billions of dollars spent, and disrupted supply chains . Allies did not answer the call to reopen the Strait of Hormuz .
- Unilateral Threats: Actions like invading Greenland alienated allies, leaving Americans more exposed .
- Annual Threat Assessment: The global security environment is complex, and armed conflict is becoming more global .
- Omission of Election Interference: The threat assessment since 2017 has omitted discussion of adversary attempts to influence American elections, suggesting a lack of honest reporting .
Director Gabbard’s Testimony
Director Gabbard presents the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, emphasizing its alignment with the President’s National Security Strategy.
Structure of Assessment:
- Focus on threats to the homeland first, then global risks .
Homeland Defense & Border Security:
- Bolstering homeland defense has shown results over the past year .
- Border Enforcement: Strict enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border has served as a deterrent, drastically reducing illegal immigration. Monthly encounters in January 2026 were down 83.8% compared to January 2025 .
- Migration Drivers: Potential instability in Cuba and Haiti, coupled with smugglers profiting from chaos, could trigger migration surges .
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) & Narcotics Trafficking:
- TCOs pose a direct threat through producing and trafficking illegal drugs .
- Fentanyl Overdose Deaths: Decreased by 30% from September 2024 to September 2025 due to President Trump’s aggressive targeting of TCOs and precursor supply chains .
- Fentanyl potency has decreased due to supply chain disruptions .
- International Cooperation: Efforts with China and India to halt precursor chemical flow show improvement, but tens of thousands of fentanyl-related deaths persist annually .
- Dominant TCOs:
- Mexico-based: Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) dominate fentanyl, heroin, meth, and cocaine trafficking into the U.S. .
- Colombia-based: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) responsible for cocaine production and trafficking; attempting to expand to Asia-Pacific .
- MS-13: Operates within the U.S., engaging in violence, extortion, drug trafficking, and prostitution, contributing to regional instability .
- TCOs adapt operations by shifting production locations and trafficking methods in response to pressure .
Islamist Terrorism:
- Geographically diverse Islamist terrorist actors seek to propagate ideology globally and harm Americans .
- Al-Qaeda and ISIS: Weaker than at their peak, but the spread of Islamist ideology remains a fundamental threat .
- Ideology: Used for recruitment, financial support, and advancing objectives of establishing a Caliphate governed by Sharia .
- President Trump’s Designation: Designation of certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organizations is a mechanism to protect Americans .
- Shift in Tactics: Groups focus on information operations to spread propaganda and inspire individuals in the West .
- Counterterrorism Efforts (2025): Operations in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria degraded leadership and planning capabilities of Al-Qaeda and ISIS .
- Border Security Impact: Strict border enforcement and deportations have reduced access to the homeland for suspected terrorists; few encounters with suspected terrorists at borders since January .
- Domestic Attacks: At least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the U.S. in 2025; 15 U.S.-based plotters disrupted, roughly half with online contact with foreign terrorists .
- Example: Michigan synagogue attack plotter had familial ties to a Hezbollah leader .
- Overseas Threats: Al-Qaeda (AQAP in Yemen) and ISIS (ISIS-K in South Asia, ISIS in Syria) pose the biggest threat overseas and are likely conducting external plotting .
- ISIS in Syria attempting to rebuild ranks by recruiting from detainees and displaced persons .
State Actors & Novel Capabilities:
- State actors present a broader risk, seeking new capabilities in kinetic and cyber warfare .
- Nuclear Deterrent: U.S. secure nuclear deterrent ensures homeland safety against strategic threats .
- Missile Development: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are developing novel missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads.
- Threats to the homeland are projected to expand to over 16,000 missiles by 2035 (from >3,000) .
- China and Russia developing advanced systems to penetrate U.S. missile defenses .
- North Korea’s ICBMs can reach U.S. soil; committed to expanding its arsenal .
- Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile development could include ICBMs capable of striking the homeland .
- Iran possesses space launch technology that could enable ICBM development before 2035 .
- Operation Epic Fury Impact: Assessments will be updated based on the impact of strikes on Iran’s missile facilities .
- Cyber Domain: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups will continue to compromise U.S. networks and critical infrastructure .
- China and Russia present the most persistent threats .
- North Korea’s cyber program is sophisticated; stole ~$2 billion via cryptocurrency heist in 2025, funding regime weapons programs .
- Non-state actors are bolder with ransomware, shifting to faster, high-volume attacks .
- Artificial Intelligence (AI): AI innovation will accelerate cyber threats; both operators and defenders will use AI tools .
- Example: AI tool used in August 2025 for data extortion against international government, healthcare, and public health sectors .
Arctic Region:
- Russia and China aim to strengthen their presence through increased maritime trade, resource extraction, and military activity .
- Russia is deploying more military forces and building infrastructure .
- China is advancing its strategic and economic interests in the region .
Artificial Intelligence (AI) & Quantum Computing:
- AI Capabilities: China is the most capable competitor in AI; capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing the threat landscape .
- AI simulates human learning, comprehension, problem-solving, creativity, and autonomy .
- Ensuring human control over AI use is critical .
- AI adoption poses risks, including aiding weapons design and influencing targeting/decision-making in conflicts .
- Quantum Computing: Early developers will gain a significant technological advantage, enabling rapid processing of national security information and breaking current encryption .
Global Security Landscape:
- Volatile and complex, with increasing armed conflict posing threats to U.S. interests .
- Strategic competition and regional powers are more willing to use force .
- Space Domain: Increasingly contested by China and Russia developing counter-space capabilities .
- Proliferation: Threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical/biological warfare capabilities continues to grow .
Western Hemisphere:
- Flagging economies, high crime, organized crime, migration, corruption, and narcotics trafficking present risks .
- Strategic competitors seek greater influence in the region .
- Latin America and the Caribbean will likely see hotspots of volatility .
- Venezuela: Post-Maduro arrest, Venezuela is cooperating with the U.S. to open its economy and develop oil/gas extraction; political prisoners released .
- USMCA Review (2026): Likely to increase uncertainty for Latin American countries reliant on Mexico for exports .
- China, Russia, Iran: Likely seeking to sustain engagement in Latin America .
- China’s demand for raw materials drives economic outreach .
- Russia wants to expand security/diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua .
- China aims to elevate its power for global influence and to fend off threats .
China:
- Military Modernization: Rapidly modernizing forces across all domains, aiming for world-class status by mid-century .
- Taiwan Objective: Developing capability to deter U.S./allied forces and potentially seize Taiwan by force .
- Preferred Approach: Prefers to set conditions for peaceful reunification with Taiwan .
North Korea:
- Concerns: Regime remains a source of regional and global concern due to WMD, conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities, and willingness to use asymmetric capabilities .
- Partnerships: Growing partnership with Russia; improved ties with China .
- Support for Russia: Increased capabilities through combat experience and equipment gained from supporting Russia in Ukraine .
- Deployed over 11,000 troops to Russia in 2024 .
- Strategic Weapons: Continues to develop and expand programs, including missiles that evade defenses; increasing nuclear warhead stockpile; maintains biological and chemical weapons capabilities .
Russia:
- Global Challenge: Retains capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally via military and non-military means .
- Most Dangerous Threat: Potential for escalatory spiral in ongoing conflicts (e.g., Ukraine) or new conflicts leading to direct hostilities, including nuclear weapons deployment .
- Novel Capabilities: Investing in defense industrial base and novel capabilities (hypersonic missiles, undersea capabilities) that threaten U.S. homeland and forces abroad .
- Grey Zone Tactics: Relies on grey zone tactics to compete below the level of armed conflict .
- Counter-Space: Building extensive counter-space capabilities; development of a nuclear counter-space weapon poses the greatest threat to the world’s space architecture .
- Ukraine War: Maintained the upper hand; U.S.-led negotiations ongoing; likely to continue a war of attrition until objectives are met .
Middle East:
- Conflict and instability will shape dynamics .
- Operation Epic Fury: Advancing fundamental change following Hamas’s attack and the subsequent war, resulting in weakened Iran and its proxies .
- Iran Regime: Appears intact but largely degraded due to attacks on leadership and military capabilities; conventional military power projection largely destroyed .
- Strategic Position Degraded: U.S.-led maximum pressure campaign and sanctions added pressure to Iran’s economy, leading to suppressed mass protests .
- Internal Tensions: Likely to increase as Iran’s economy worsens, even if the regime remains intact .
- Rebuilding Efforts: If the regime survives, it will likely seek to rebuild military, missile, and UAV forces .
- Nuclear Program: Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran was recovering from damage to its nuclear infrastructure and refusing IAEA access .
Cooperation Among Adversaries:
- China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran see the U.S. as a competitor/adversary .
- These nations are likely to continue selective cooperation, potentially bolstering individual capabilities and threats to U.S. interests .
- Constraints: Relationships are primarily bilateral, situational, and constrained by divergent interests and concerns over confronting the U.S. .
Africa:
- Conflicts likely to persist through 2026 due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support .
- Ethiopia/Eritrea Tensions: Could rapidly accelerate to conflict .
- Somalia Elections: Contentious elections could distract from counterterrorism against Al-Shabaab .
- Sudan Civil War: Continues despite external negotiations .
- ISIS in West Africa/Sahel: Increased attack intensity, expanding operations closer to U.S. presence .
- Critical Minerals: African governments likely to use wealth in critical minerals to seek beneficial partnerships .
- U.S. Citizen Risk: Concurrent conflicts and crises put U.S. citizens at risk and cause instability .
Closing Statement (Director Gabbard):
- Intelligence Community leaders are committed to providing timely, unbiased intelligence to policymakers to ensure the safety, security, and freedom of the American people .
Q&A Session – Missile Defense, Cyber Security, CIA Contributions
Arrow and Iron Dome Systems:
- General Adams: Explains that the Arrow and Iron Dome systems (built in Camden, Arkansas) are critical defensive systems for Israel against Ballistic Missile (MRBM) and rocket threats, creating a shield with U.S. systems .
Cyber Security Manpower:
- General Hartman: Recommends growing cyber protection teams by:
- Sharing relevant classified information and warnings.
- Establishing a joint reserve cyber organization for advanced training and intelligence access.
- Controlling funding at CyberCom and NSA for mobilizing personnel .
CIA Contributions to Operations:
- Director Ratcliffe:
- Pledged a more aggressive CIA focused on its core mission: stealing secrets for strategic advantage .
- CIA has delivered significant successes, including contributions to Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Absolute Resolve .
- Metrics of Success:
- Increased asset stable/human sources by 25% .
- Foreign intelligence collection up 25% overall, 100% for China, 45% for Tech/AI .
- Counter-narcotics operations up by 70% .
- Counterterrorism numbers are classified but “off the charts good” .
- A 32-year veteran described it as the best year he could remember for the CIA, reflecting high morale .
Iran’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Threat:
- Senator Collins: Asks Director Ratcliffe about the assessment of Iran’s ICBM capability, combining space launch and re-entry vehicle technologies .
- Director Ratcliffe: Agrees with the concern about Iran’s longer-range ballistic missile development (IRBM range 3,000 km). Iran’s space launch program provides experience with booster technologies. If unimpeded, Iran could develop missiles with continental U.S. range .
- Degrading Iran’s missile production capabilities through Operation Epic Fury is crucial for national security .
Q&A Session – DNI’s Role in Domestic Matters, Fulton County Raid
Vice Chairman Warner: Questions Director Gabbard regarding her involvement in the FBI operation in Fulton County, Georgia, noting the warrant lacked foreign interference and was based on conspiracy theories .
Director Gabbard:
- States Congress provided ODNI statutory responsibility for election security and counterintelligence in 2021 .
- ODNI has purview over DHS and FBI, both responsible for election security .
- Denies Participation: Explicitly states she did not participate in a law enforcement activity, as it is outside her authorities .
- Presence at Fulton County: Admits presence at Fulton County at the President’s request to observe the FBI action .
- President’s Request: The President requested her presence to observe the FBI’s execution of the warrant, which was approved by a local judge .
- Foreign Nexus: The operation aimed to understand vulnerabilities in election systems for 2026, focusing on understanding potential foreign threats .
Vice Chairman Warner: Notes that required reports/briefings on foreign interference have not been provided, and the threat assessment omits mention of foreign interference for the first time since 2017 .
Director Gabbard: States the annual threat assessment aligns with the President’s National Security Strategy priorities .
Vice Chairman Warner: Presses for a “yes or no” answer on whether there is a foreign threat to the upcoming elections .
Director Gabbard: “The intelligence community has been and continues to remain focused on any collection and intelligence products that show a potential foreign threat. For those who are so far there has been none.”
Vice Chairman Warner: Interprets the lack of reports and mention of foreign threats as indicating no foreign threat exists .
Draft Executive Order (EO) on Election Seizure:
- Vice Chairman Warner: Inquires if President was preparing an EO in 2020 to seize ballots or bring in federal forces, and if a similar EO citing China is being drafted for 2026.
- Director Patel: Responds, “I do not.”
- Director Gabbard: Responds, “I do not.”
Q&A Session – Iran, War of Choice, Counterterrorism Funding
Senator Collins: Questions Director Gabbard regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the omission of a paragraph from her oral statement about Iran’s nuclear enrichment program being “obliterated” by Operation Midnight Hammer .
Director Gabbard: States she omitted the paragraph due to time constraints .
Senator Collins: Questions Director Gabbard about intelligence provided to the President regarding Iran’s potential actions (closing Strait of Hormuz) before the “war of choice” .
Director Gabbard: States she cannot divulge internal conversations but confirms the intelligence community provides objective intelligence to inform decisions .
Senator Collins: Notes Director Gabbard’s testimony that ISIS and Al-Qaeda are weaker, but points to their continued operations and suggests resources have been diverted from counterterrorism to great power competition .
Director Gabbard: Clarifies that her reference to ISIS and Al-Qaeda being weaker pertains to their organizational size compared to their peak. She fully concurs with the Senator’s remarks about the ongoing threat and states the National Counterterrorism Center is ramping up efforts, dedicating all requested resources .
- Concern about changing tactics: less indicators of large-scale attacks, more focus on self-radicalized individuals .
- Counterterrorism remains a foremost priority; integration across the intelligence community is effective .
Senator Collins: Asks Director Patel about FBI measures to prevent foreign terrorist organizations from recruiting/influencing Americans online while protecting privacy .
Director Patel:
- Terrorist organizations have shifted to online recruitment .
- FBI has expanded resources to environments like the Threat Screening Center for biometric capabilities and intelligence production .
- Expanded agents and intel analysts online, detecting individuals via biometric capabilities and inter-agency intelligence .
- Success Example: FBI stopped four terrorist attacks in December (California, Texas, North Carolina, Pennsylvania), three ISIS-inspired, including a bombing campaign and two mass casualty events for New Year’s Eve .
Senator Collins: Questions Director Gabbard about the intelligence community’s delayed detection of the “SolarWinds” (Salt Typhoon) breach affecting the telecommunications industry and critical infrastructure .
Director Gabbard:
- Working with NSA and partners to detect evolving threats .
- Rebuilding Partnerships: Emphasizes strengthening partnerships with the private sector (telecom, finance, healthcare, energy) which had faltered in previous years .
- Many industry leaders are concerned but lack connectivity/information to secure their infrastructure .
- Focus on stronger partnerships and information/intelligence sharing to secure the country .
Q&A Session – Iran’s Capabilities, FISA Section 702, Commercial Data Purchases
Senator Wyden: Questions Director Gabbard about the intelligence community’s prior assessment of Iran’s capability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz and respond to a regime change attack .
Director Gabbard:
- States the intelligence community continuously provides intelligence related to operations in Iran to the President and his team .
- Cannot divulge internal conversations but notes that Iran has historically threatened to leverage its control of the Strait of Hormuz [timestamp:65:09-65:19, 65:47-66:00].
- The IC assesses the threat of Iran’s missile capabilities and the risk to American troops in the region .
Senator Wyden: Cites President Trump’s statement about not being aware of Iran striking Gulf States or closing the Strait of Hormuz, asking if the intelligence agencies briefed him on these potential consequences .
Director Gabbard: Repeats that she cannot divulge internal conversations but confirms the IC assesses potential and existing threats to the region and provides these assessments to policymakers .
FISA Section 702:
- Senator Wyden: Asks General Hartman about the impact of an expansion in Section 702 reauthorization that broadened the types of companies/individuals who could assist the government in spying .
- General Hartman: States the provision allows collection of foreign intelligence on personnel outside the United States; prefers to discuss specifics in closed session .
- Senator Wyden: Expresses concern that the provision is dangerously broad and may not have yielded value .
- General Hartman: Clarifies it provided no additional authority to target Americans; collection is on foreigners outside the U.S. .
Commercial Database Purchases (Location Data):
- Senator Wyden: Asks Director Patel if the FBI still purchases commercial database information including location data derived from internet advertising, and if he commits to not buying Americans’ location data without a warrant .
- Director Patel: States the FBI uses all tools consistent with the Constitution and laws (ECPA) to perform its mission, including purchasing commercially available information, which has yielded valuable intelligence .
- Senator Wyden: Interprets this as the agency buying Americans’ location data without a warrant, calling it an “outrageous end-run around the Fourth Amendment” and emphasizing the need for the Government Surveillance Reform Act .
Phone Record Subpoenas:
- Senator Wyden: Asks Director Patel if the government should obtain a court order to collect phone records .
- Director Patel: States the government typically obtains court orders for phone records .
DIA Purchase of Domestic Location Data:
- Senator Wyden: Asks General Adams if DIA still holds the position that it can buy Americans’ location data without a warrant and if they are still doing so .
- General Adams: States that purchases of commercially available and publicly available information align with the Constitution and protect U.S. persons’ information .
- Senator Wyden: Presses for confirmation that they are buying location data.
- General Adams: Confirms all purchases of commercially available information undergo legal review and comply with laws .
Q&A Session – Russia/Iran Intelligence Sharing, Climate Change, USMCA
Senator King: Questions Director Gabbard and Ratcliffe on potential Russian/Chinese collaboration with Iran, and the impact of Operation Epic Fury on Ukraine’s success .
- Director Ratcliffe: States media reports are not classification authorities and might be better suited for FBI investigation regarding unlawful disclosures . He notes Russia and China’s historical patterns of such activity .
- Senator King: Criticizes the Patty Murray legislation for potentially defunding ICE and CBP, in addition to Homeland Security Investigations .
General Adams: Discusses the consequences of Operation Epic Fury on the supply chain and U.S. capability to supply NATO allies and Ukraine .
- Acknowledges that the advantage in the Russia-Ukraine conflict currently lies with Russia due to force composition .
- Defers detailed questions on U.S. supply chain limitations and logistics to the Department of War .
Director Ratcliffe: Addresses concerns about Operation Epic Fury’s impact on defending against Russia/China and supporting Ukraine .
- States the same professionals involved in previous successful operations (Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve) are involved in Epic Fury .
- Describes Epic Fury as a specific campaign with clear goals: degrade Iran’s missile/drone inventory, delay/degrade its industrial base, and degrade the IRGC Navy .
- Acknowledges that policy decisions sometimes benefit adversaries (like Russia) while aiming to benefit American citizens (e.g., keeping oil prices low) .
- Expresses confidence that the U.S. can pursue objectives in the Middle East while supporting Ukraine .
Senator Bennett: Questions Director Ratcliffe on whether the consequences of Operation Epic Fury on U.S. ability to defend against Russia/China and support Ukraine were considered .
Director Ratcliffe: Defends the campaign’s goals and thoughtful consideration, stating policymakers are balancing objectives .
Senator Bennett: Criticizes the lack of clarity regarding the war with Iran, President Trump’s changing messages, and the potential for perpetual war .
Senator Rounds: Asks Director Ratcliffe if Iran had diplomatic intentions regarding its nuclear program and if defensive capabilities were rebuilt during negotiations .
- Director Ratcliffe confirms Iran’s diplomatic statements contradicted intelligence assessments .
- States Operation Midnight Hammer was a success, preventing Iran from enriching uranium to 60% .
- Agrees Iran continued developing short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles at alarming rates .
Havana Syndrome:
- Senator Rounds: Asks Director Ratcliffe for assurances that Havana Syndrome issues are being taken seriously .
- Director Ratcliffe: Acknowledges disparate opinions across the IC regarding the cause of AHIs (Anomalous Health Incidents) .
- States Director Gabbard agreed to undertake a comprehensive review across the IC to ensure the issue receives deserved attention .
General Hartman: Commended for service in cyber security .
Q&A Session – China/Russia as Rivals, Iran War Impact, Fundraising Emails
Senator Kelly: Asks Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe if China and Russia are primary geopolitical rivals .
- Director Gabbard: “Yes, they are our primary strategic complaints…”
- Director Ratcliffe: Agrees
Senator Kelly: Questions Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe on whether Russia has gained billions in oil revenue due to the Iran conflict and loosened sanctions, and if increased funding would benefit Russia’s war effort in Ukraine .
- Director Gabbard: “That is what has been reported.” Defers to Treasury/Energy Secretaries for details .
- Director Ratcliffe: Will not speculate on economic calculations but acknowledges sanctions were loosened, providing more funds to Putin .
- Director Gabbard: Defers to an intelligence assessment regarding Putin’s intentions .
- Director Ratcliffe: “I wouldn’t speculate on that.”
Senator Kelly: Asks if China is receiving preferential oil flows from Iran despite the conflict .
- Director Gabbard: Reports indicate China, India, and others moved tankers, but the volume is unclear .
Senator Kelly: Asks Director Gabbard and Ratcliffe if they were asked to brief on Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz before the attack .
- Director Gabbard: Will not comment on presidential requests .
- Director Ratcliffe: Briefings typically originate from the IC to the President, not vice-versa . Analysis regarding the Strait of Hormuz exists .
Senator Kelly: Asks if they were asked to brief on how adversaries and allies would respond to the war in Iran .
Fundraising Email Analysis:
- Senator Kelly: Presents a fundraising email offering “private national security briefings” from the President. Questions if the public should pay for such briefings .
- Director Ratcliffe: States the Hatch Act would prevent him from engaging in such political activity and he is unaware of such a document .
- Director Gabbard: Not familiar with the document .
Q&A Session – International Scams, Counter-Narcotics, Muslim Brotherhood
Senator Lankford: Discusses the growing threat of international scams, accelerated by AI, impacting families and incomes .
- Estimates of losses to scammers range from $$17 billion (FBI, 2024) to $$50 billion .
- AI is used to create fake recovery pages, further scamming victims .
Director Patel: Outlines FBI’s strategy to combat online scams:
- Increase online covert employees and platforms .
- Deploy intelligence analysts and support staff nationwide, including Oklahoma .
- Utilize the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) to shut down networks .
- Overseas Operations: Engaging with premiers in Cambodia and Burma to shut down scam compounds backed by the CCP . Successfully shut down numerous compounds in Cambodia, Burma, and Thailand .
Counter-Narcotics Work:
- Senator Lankford: Commends counter-narcotics work, citing dramatic seizures of methamphetamine and fentanyl .
- Director Patel: Emphasizes partnership with local law enforcement through embedded task force officers and the Southern Border Intelligence Center in Tucson, Arizona .
- Seized enough fentanyl in 2025 to kill 178 million Americans (31% increase YoY) .
- Opioid overdose deaths dropped 20% nationwide .
- Significant cocaine and fentanyl seizures in Oklahoma .
- Shortened task force onboarding pipeline from 1-2 years to 90 days .
Muslim Brotherhood:
- Senator Lankford: Asks Director Ratcliffe how the Muslim Brotherhood finances itself and its terrorist acts, and what measures are needed to protect Americans .
- Director Ratcliffe: Views the Muslim Brotherhood abroad similarly to other proxies like the Houthis . CIA is focused on counterterrorism and has had significant impact, more so in the last year than in the prior four years combined .
Q&A Session – Iran Regime Stability, Russia/Ukraine Intelligence, Climate Change
Senator Reid: Cites Washington Post report on Iran’s regime remaining in place, weakened but hardline. Asks Director Gabbard if she stands by this assessment .
- Director Gabbard: Does not stand by leaked intelligence but affirms the IC’s assessment that the regime maintains power despite degradation .
Senator Reid: Asks if the killing of the Ayatollah and his family contributed to the selection of a hardline successor .
- Director Gabbard: The IC assessment points to various scenarios for successor selection; details can be discussed in closed session .
Senator Reid: Asks if Iran is promoting the deceased Ayatollah as a model to consolidate support .
- Director Gabbard: Iranians are using it as a call to action; intelligence effects remain to be seen. Shia tradition honors martyrs .
General Adams: Responds to questions about conditions for Iranian regime collapse, unconditional surrender, and whether air power alone can achieve this .
- DIA has developed scenarios and tracks four specific goals of the U.S. effort. Prefers to discuss regime collapse triggers in classified hearing .
- Cannot definitively state if air power alone would succeed; prefers not to speculate .
Senator Reid: Asks Director Gabbard and Ratcliffe if they take President Putin’s word that Russia is not sharing intelligence with Iran .
- Director Gabbard: “No, I don’t take Vladimir Putin at
Russia’s War in Ukraine and Operation Epic Fury
- Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil sales, potentially seeing a $20 billion revenue surge.
- Ukraine faces disrupted supply chains for missiles and equipment due to diversion to Operation Epic Fury.
- General Adams states Operation Epic Fury’s effect on the Russia-Ukraine battle is indirect, not direct.
- Collateral effects are carefully tracked, with both Russians and Chinese observing and learning from the operations.
- More details on specific effects will be discussed in a classified session.
Allegations of Political Misuse of National Security Powers
- Senator O’Af calls attention to a presidential fundraising email using an image of a fallen service member.
- The email solicits donations for the president’s campaign and pack, inviting donors to “Claim your spot” for private national security briefings.
- This is described as a disgrace, fundraising using images of fallen service members.
Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI) Responsibilities and Testimony
- DNI Gabbard is responsible for providing national intelligence to the President, executive branch departments, Joint Chiefs, commanders, Congress, and committees.
- National intelligence provided to Congress must be timely, objective, and independent of political considerations.
- DNI’s testimony represents the Intelligence Community’s (IC) assessment of threats.
- DNI’s opening statement claimed Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was “obliterated” by airstrikes last summer.
- The IC assessment also stated there has been “no effort since then to try to rebuild their enrichment capability.”
Assessment of “Imminent Nuclear Threat” from Iran
- The White House stated on March 1st that the war was launched to “eliminate the imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime.”
- DNI Gabbard asserts the IC assessed Iran maintained the intention to rebuild and grow its nuclear enrichment capability.
- When pressed on whether the IC assessed an “imminent nuclear threat,” DNI Gabbard stated the determination of an imminent threat is solely up to the President.
- Senator O’Af argues it is precisely the DNI’s responsibility to determine threats to the United States, especially in a worldwide threats hearing.
- DNI Gabbard repeatedly deflects, stating the President makes the determination based on collected intelligence.
DNI’s Presence at Fulton County Raid
- DNI Gabbard was present at the FBI’s raid on the Fulton County Elections Office on January 28th, executing a warrant approved by a municipal judge to seize ballots and election materials.
- Inquiries into her election-related activities have been opened by the committee.
- Her general counsel and deputy general counsel have already testified to the committee.
- A letter to Senator Warner stated her presence was “requested by the president” on the day of the raid.
- She oversaw the warrant execution, stating it was her role based on statute to have oversight over election security and counterintelligence.
- She denies handling any ballots or election-related materials, stating she was inside an empty FBI evidence truck.
Opening Statements
- General purpose: Annual worldwide threat assessment hearing.
- Witnesses: DNI Tulsi Gabbard, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, FBI Director Cash Patel, Acting NSA Director Lt. Gen. William Hartman, DIA Director Lt. Gen. James Adams.
- Acknowledgement: Special thanks to General Hartman for his 37 years of service.
- Praise for Intelligence Professionals: Commendation for the thousands of men and women in intelligence agencies whose service makes Americans safer.
Geopolitical Landscape and US Leadership
- The world is dangerous, but safer for Americans due to President Trump’s leadership.
- Iran: The Iranian regime is on its back foot due to US actions, including devastating nuclear facilities, eliminating leadership, pummeling military, sinking navy, destroying missiles, neutering proxies, and crippling its economy.
- Venezuela: Dictator Nicholas Maduro is in a New York prison, an operation conducted without a single American life lost, highlighting the effectiveness of US military and intelligence.
- Intelligence’s Role: Timely, accurate, fact-based intelligence is crucial for successful operations.
- Warning to Adversaries: The US leaves no stone unturned; enemies have no place to hide.
Global Threats and Intelligence Community Reforms
- Threats: Communist China, North Korea, Russia, and narco-cartels are global threats.
- Reforms: Agencies have improved by returning to “basics”: stealing secrets of adversaries.
- CIA Performance: Increased foreign intelligence reporting by 25%, on track to hire and deploy more officers than in the last quarter century.
- Support for Intelligence: Full support for FISA Section 702 reauthorization and a robust intelligence budget for operations against Iran and narco-terrorists.
- Continued Reform: Urges continued personnel and institutional reforms to prevent bureaucratic bloat and political bias.
- Legislative Efforts: The first Intelligence Authorization Act reorganized ODNI, improved CIA security, and directed resources to foreign intelligence and covert action. Future efforts include growing collectors, investing in capabilities, and defending space assets.
Erosion of Safeguards and Election Integrity Concerns
- Serious concerns about the erosion of safeguards protecting democracy and security.
- Foreign Adversaries: Russia, China, and Iran seek to shape American elections through cyber intrusions, disinformation, and influence operations.
- Intelligence Community’s Role: Protecting elections should be a high priority; DNI coordinates intelligence on foreign interference and warns the public.
- Foreign Malign Influence Center: This center within ODNI was eliminated, and there is no designated official coordinating election threat responses.
- Lack of Briefings: The committee has repeatedly requested briefings on foreign threats to midterms with no response.
- DNI’s Domestic Involvement: DNI Gabbard participated in a law enforcement raid in Fulton County, Georgia, to seize election ballots and records.
- Warrant Predicate: The warrant was based on debunked conspiracy theories, with no foreign connection cited.
- Question: Why is the nation’s top spy involved in domestic matters if not mobilizing against foreign threats?
- Allegations of Misuse of Powers: DNI’s actions suggest an effort to misuse national security powers for domestic politics and potentially to interfere with elections.
- “White House Director of Election Security and Integrity”: Kurt Olsson, who played a role in efforts to overturn the 2020 election, now holds a position with referral authority and access to sensitive information.
FBI Dysfunction and Resource Misallocation
- Politically Motivated Purges: FBI has seen an exodus of agents, reassigned from counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber to immigration enforcement.
- Resource Diversion: Agents investigating Iran were dismissed due to prior involvement in investigating the president’s mishandling of classified information.
- Budget Cuts: FBI budget slashed by over $500 million, with significant decreases in cyber, counterterrorism, and counterespionage.
- Squandered Resources: A $60 million jet for the director’s personal travel is cited as an example.
- Impact on Operations: Frequent flights allegedly delayed responses to major incidents.
- Elite SWAT Reassignments: Highly trained agents reassigned for personal errands, not intended for their security roles.
- NSA and DIA Leadership: Both agencies were left leaderless for months after their directors were fired.
- CISA Personnel Exodus: Over one-third of CISA personnel have been forced out.
- State Department Failures: Thousands of citizens trapped in a war zone with little assistance; hotline provided a pre-recorded message advising against relying on the US government for evacuation.
- Alienating Allies: Pushing allies towards adversaries; Canada and the UK are pursuing trade deals with China due to lack of US reliability.
- Iran Conflict: War has cost billions, scrambled supply chains, and allies did not respond to requests to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
- Counterterrorism Chief’s Acknowledgment: Iran posed no imminent threat.
- Unilateral Threats: Actions like invading Greenland have alienated allies.
- Omission from Threat Assessment: The annual threat assessment, for the first time since 2017, omits any mention of adversary attempts to influence American elections.
DNI Director Gabbard’s Opening Statement
- Presents the 2026 annual threat assessment, joined by CIA, FBI, DIA, and NSA directors.
- Extends thanks to General Hartman for his 37 years of service.
- Briefing conveys the IC’s assessment of threats, not personal views.
- Follows the structure of priorities in the president’s national security strategy, starting with homeland threats.
Homeland Defense and Border Security
- Deterrent Effect: Strict enforcement of US policies at the Mexico border has drastically reduced illegal immigration.
- January 2026 encounters down 83.8% compared to January 2025.
- Encounters declined 79% compared to 2024.
- Drivers of Migration: Potential instability in Cuba and Haiti, and smugglers exploiting chaos.
- Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs): Pose a daily threat through drug trafficking, especially fentanyl.
- Fentanyl overdose deaths decreased by 30% from September 2024 to September 2025 due to aggressive targeting of TCOs and precursor chemicals.
- Fentanyl potency has decreased due to supply chain disruptions.
- US efforts with China and India to halt precursor chemicals show improvement, but thousands of fentanyl-related deaths persist annually.
- Dominant TCOs:
- Mexico-based: Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel (fentanyl, heroin, meth, cocaine).
- Colombia-based: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN) (cocaine).
- MS-13: Established cells in the US, engaging in violence, extortion, drug trafficking, and prostitution.
- Adaptation: TCOs will likely adapt operations by shifting production locations and trafficking methods.
Islamist Terrorism Threats
- Geographic Scope: Geographically diverse Islamist terrorist actors seeking global propagation and harm to Americans.
- Al-Qaeda and ISIS: Remain weaker than at their peak, but the spread of Islamist ideology poses a fundamental threat.
- Ideology Use: Used for recruitment, financial support, and advancing political objectives (establishing an Islamist caliphate).
- Shift in Tactics: Focus on information operations, propaganda, and inspiring individuals in the West, due to setbacks in large-scale attacks.
- Counterterrorism Efforts (2025): Instrumental in removing key leaders/operatives in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria, degrading reconstitution capabilities.
- Border Enforcement: Strict US border enforcement and deportations have reduced access to the homeland. Few encounters with individuals linked to terrorist groups at borders since January.
- Attacks in the US (2025): At least three Islamist terrorist attacks; 15 US-based plotters disrupted.
- Roughly half of disrupted plotters had online contact with foreign terrorist organizations.
- Example: Michigan synagogue attacker had familial ties to a Hezbollah leader.
- Overseas Threats:
- Middle East: AQAP (Yemen), ISIS-K (South Asia), ISIS (Syria) are most likely for external plotting.
- ISIS in Syria: Seeking to rebuild ranks, expand support, and solicit funds by recruiting from detainees and their families.
State Actors and Advanced Capabilities
- Kinetic and Cyber Warfare: State actors seeking new capabilities.
- Nuclear Deterrent: US secure nuclear deterrent ensures homeland safety.
- Missile Proliferation: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are developing advanced missile delivery systems.
- IC assessment: Threats will expand to over 16,000 missiles by 2035 (from over 3,000).
- China and Russia: Developing systems to penetrate US missile defenses.
- North Korea: ICBMs can reach US soil; committed to expanding arsenal.
- Pakistan: Long-range ballistic missile development could include ICBMs.
- Iran: Demonstrated space launch technology usable for ICBM development before 2035.
- Operation Epic Fury Impact: Assessments will be updated based on the impact on Iran’s missile facilities.
- Missile Defense Awareness: Nations likely seek to understand US plans for advanced missile defense to shape their own programs.
Cyber Domain Threats
- Actors: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups.
- Objectives: Compromise US networks and critical infrastructure for intelligence, disruption, and financial gain.
- Persistent Threats: China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats.
- North Korea: Sophisticated and agile cyber program; stole approx. $2 billion in cryptocurrency in 2025, funding weapons programs.
- Non-State Actors: Becoming bolder with faster, high-volume ransomware attacks.
- Artificial Intelligence (AI): Will accelerate cyber threats; used by operators and defenders to improve speed and effectiveness.
- Example: August 2025 AI tool used for data extortion against international government, healthcare, and public health sectors.
Arctic and AI Threats
- Arctic Presence: Russia and China aim to strengthen presence through trade, resource extraction, and military activity.
- Russia: Deploying more military forces and building infrastructure.
- China: Advancing strategic and economic interests.
- Artificial Intelligence (AI):
- Competitor: China is the most capable competitor in AI.
- Advancement: Rapidly changing the threat landscape; enables machines to simulate human learning.
- Human Control: Critical to ensure humans remain in control of AI usage.
- Risks: AI adoption poses serious risks, potential aid in weapons design, used in targeting and decision-making in recent conflicts.
- Quantum Computing: Early developers will have a significant technological advantage, potentially breaking current encryption.
Global Security Landscape and Western Hemisphere
- Volatility: Global security landscape is volatile, with armed conflict becoming more common.
- Strategic Competition: Strategic competition and regional powers are more willing to use force.
- Space Domain: Increasingly contested by China and Russia developing counter-space capabilities.
- Proliferation: Threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical/biological warfare capabilities grows.
- Western Hemisphere: Flagging economies, high crime, organized crime, migration, corruption, and narcotics pose risks. Strategic competitors seek greater influence.
- Latin America & Caribbean: Expect hotspots of volatility.
- Venezuela: Shift towards cooperation with the US post-Maduro’s arrest.
- USMCA Review: Likely to increase uncertainty in Latin American countries.
- China, Russia, Iran Engagement: Likely to sustain economic, political, and military engagement.
- China: Demand for raw materials drives outreach.
- Russia: Expanding security and diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua.
China’s Military Modernization and North Korea’s Threat
- China: Rapidly modernizing military forces to achieve world-class status by mid-century.
- Goal: Deter US/allied forces, develop capability to seize Taiwan by force if necessary.
- Preference: Peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict.
- North Korea: Increasingly confident regime is a regional and global concern.
- Threats: Weapons of mass destruction, conventional capabilities, illicit cyber activities, willingness to use asymmetric capabilities.
- Partnership with Russia: Growing; improved ties with China.
- Support for Ukraine War: Increased North Korea’s capabilities through combat experience and equipment.
- Strategic Weapons: Developing and expanding programs, including missiles to evade defenses, increasing nuclear warhead stockpile, maintaining biological/chemical weapons.
Russia’s Global Challenges and Middle East Conflict
- Russia: Retains capability to selectively challenge US interests globally.
- Greatest Threat: Potential escalatory spiral in ongoing conflicts (Ukraine) or new conflicts, including potential nuclear weapon deployment.
- Investment: Defense industrial base and novel capabilities posing greater threats.
- Advanced Systems: Hypersonic missiles, undersea capabilities.
- Grey Zone Tactics: Relies on these to exert pressure.
- Counter-space Capabilities: Developing extensive capabilities to contest US space dominance; nuclear counter-space weapon poses the greatest threat to space architecture.
- Ukraine War: Russia maintains the upper hand; US-led negotiations ongoing. Moscow likely to continue a war of attrition.
- Middle East: Conflict and instability shape dynamics.
- Operation Epic Fury: Advancing fundamental change, weakening Iran and its proxies.
- Iran’s Regime: Appears intact but largely degraded; conventional military power projection largely destroyed.
- Economic Pressure: Maximum pressure campaign and sanctions added pressure to Iran’s economy, leading to mass protests.
- Future Intentions: Likely to seek a years-long effort to rebuild military, missiles, and UAV forces.
- Nuclear Infrastructure: Iran was trying to recover from damage and refused IAEA access.
Strategic Cooperation Among Adversaries
- China, Russia, North Korea, Iran: See the US as a strategic competitor/adversary.
- Selective Cooperation: Likely to continue, potentially bolstering individual capabilities.
- Constraints: Relationships are primarily bilateral, dependent on circumstances, divergent interests, and concerns over direct confrontation with the US.
African Conflicts and Closing Remarks
- Africa: Conflicts likely to persist through 2026 due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support.
- Ethiopia/Eritrea: Tensions could accelerate to conflict.
- Somalia: Contentious elections could distract from counterterrorism against Al-Shabaab.
- Sudan: Civil war continues.
- ISIS in West Africa/Sahel: Increased intensity of attacks, expanding operations.
- Critical Minerals: African governments may seek partnerships for meaningful benefit.
- US Commitment: Leaders committed to providing timely, unbiased intelligence to protect American safety, security, and freedom.
Missile Defense Systems and Cyber Security
- Arrow and Iron Dome Systems: Critical defensive systems protecting Israel from adversary power projection, primarily from Iran.
- Arrow: High altitude, primarily against medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).
- Iron Dome: Closer-in system protecting against rockets.
- Cyber Protection Teams: Need for more cybersecurity manpower; leveraging formations like the Arkansas Air National Guard’s 223rd Cyberspace Operations Squadron.
- Recommendations: Share top-secret classified information, establish a joint reserve cyber organization, ensure advanced training, access to intelligence, and control of funding at CyberCom and NSA.
CIA Contributions to Operations
- Aggressive CIA: Focused on core mission of stealing secrets for decisive strategic advantage.
- Successes: Phenomenal progress across all national security spaces.
- Asset/Human Source Increase: Up by 25%.
- Foreign Intelligence Collection: Up by 25% overall; up 100% in categories like China; up 45% in tech and AI.
- Counter-Narcotics Operations: Up by 70%.
- Counterterrorism: Numbers are “off the charts good.”
- Morale: High due to workforce knowing they are doing a great job and being allowed to fulfill their mission.
Iran’s Intercontinental Missile Threat
- Two Technologies: Thrust for space launch and re-entry vehicle for return to Earth.
- Iran’s Space Program: Used as cover for ICBM development.
- Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs): Iran already possesses re-entry vehicles.
- Potential Timeline: Analysts suggest Iran could have a functioning ICBM within 6 months.
- DNI Assessment: Iran’s development of longer-range ballistic missiles is a concern. If unimpeded, they would have the ability to range missiles to the continental US.
- Operation Epic Fury: Degrading Iran’s missile production capabilities is crucial for national security.
DNI’s Involvement in Fulton County Raid and Election Security
- DNI’s Authority: Congress granted ODNI responsibility for election security and counterintelligence in 2021.
- ODNI Oversight: ODNI has purview over DHS and FBI, both of which have election security responsibilities.
- Correction: DNI states she did not participate in a law enforcement activity, but was present at Fulton County at the request of the president to observe the FBI’s execution of a warrant.
- President’s Request: To “oversee this warrant being executed.”
- Foreign Nexus: DNI claims the purpose was to understand vulnerabilities in election systems for 2026.
- Lack of Reports: DNI has not provided required reports or briefings on foreign interference to the committee.
- Threat Assessment Omission: This is the first threat assessment since 2017 without mention of foreign interference.
- No Foreign Threat?: DNI states “so far there has been none” regarding foreign threats to elections.
- Draft Executive Order (EO): Reports suggest a draft EO exists for 2026 concerning ballots or federal forces, citing China. Both DNI Gabbard and FBI Director Patel deny knowledge of such a draft EO.
Iran’s Nuclear Program and “Imminent Threat” Discrepancy
- DNI’s Testimony: Printed testimony stated Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was “obliterated” and there have been “no efforts to try to rebuild.”
- Oral Statement Omission: DNI omitted this paragraph from her oral remarks, possibly due to contradiction with the president’s “imminent threat” claims.
- President’s Statements: President claimed surprise about Iran taking over the Strait of Hormuz and striking adjacent Gulf States.
- Intelligence Briefings: DNI cannot divulge internal conversations but states the IC provides the President with objective intelligence.
Counterterrorism Efforts and Resource Allocation
- ISIS and Al-Qaeda: Director Gabbard states they are “significantly weaker” than at their peak.
- Counter-Argument: Reports indicate ISIS is growing in Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, and Iraq; Al-Qaeda is surging in Afghanistan, Arabian Peninsula, and Central Africa.
- Resource Diversion: Focusing on great power competitors may have diverted resources from counterterrorism.
- Terrorist Threat: Terrorists “want and can kill Americans today,” citing the Michigan synagogue attack.
- Stovepiped Intelligence: Concerns about a return to a more siloed intelligence effort.
- DNI’s Clarification: Reference to organizational size was about peak strength; IC fully concurs with the threat posed by ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamist groups.
- National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC): At the forefront of ramping up efforts, more active than in a long time.
- Changing Tactics: Increasing concern over fewer indicators of large-scale organized attacks, shifting towards individuals radicalized by propaganda or with less direct contact.
- Counterterrorism as Priority: Remains a foremost priority; integration across the IC occurs daily.
FBI’s Counter-Recruitment and Threat Screening
- Online Recruitment: ISIS targets potential recruits online through social media, gaming, and encrypted messaging.
- Smuggling Network: ISIS facilitated a network to smuggle illegal immigrants into the US.
- Jihadist-Inspired Cases: Over 52 cases across 30 states since April 2021.
- FBI Measures:
- Expanding resources to the Threat Screening Center for biometric capabilities globally.
- Double-digit increase in intelligence production.
- Expanding agents and intel analysts online to detect threats.
- Stopped Attacks (December 2025): FBI stopped four terrorist attacks (California, Texas, North Carolina, Pennsylvania), three ISIS-inspired.
- Thwarted a bombing campaign and two mass casualty events.
Critical Infrastructure Threats (Cyber)
- SolarWinds/ vụ bão (typhoon) Incursions: Intelligence community did not detect severe breach affecting telecommunications industry for a long time.
- Threat to Critical Infrastructure: Poses a severe threat to the electric grid and communication systems.
- DNI’s Actions: Working with NSA and partners to detect evolving threats.
- Public-Private Partnerships: Rebuilding strong partnerships with the private sector (telecom, finance, healthcare, energy).
- Industry Concerns: Leaders are concerned about threats but feel they lack connectivity or information to secure their infrastructure.
- Information Sharing: Integrating and sharing intelligence is critical.
Iran’s Threat to Strait of Hormuz and US Forces
- Previous Assessment (2025): Iran’s conventional forces capable of inflicting substantial damage, regional strikes, and disrupting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
- Foreseeable Consequences: The current situation (global energy crisis, rising gas prices) was foreseeable and predicted.
- Strait of Hormuz: DNI asked if intelligence agencies assessed Iran’s capability to shut down the Strait in response to an attack.
- Intelligence Briefings: IC continues to provide intelligence to the President.
- Hedging: A lot of “hedging” regarding foreseen consequences of the war.
- Iranian Response to Regime Change Attack: DNI states the IC takes the threat of Iran’s missile capabilities and risk to US troops seriously.
- President’s Surprise: President Trump expressed surprise about Iran striking Gulf States and closing the Strait of Hormuz.
- Briefings: DNI does not recall specific remarks but states Iran had specific plans to hit US interests and energy sites.
FISA Section 702 Reauthorization
- Expansion of Provision: A provision in the 2024 reauthorization expanded the type of companies and individuals who could be forced to assist the government in spying.
- Purpose: To collect foreign intelligence on personnel outside the United States.
- Lack of Intelligence Value: Testimony suggests this expansion has had no value so far.
- Broad Provision: Could potentially ensnare anyone with access to a cable box, Wi-Fi router, or server.
- DNI’s Clarification: The provision provides no additional authority to target Americans; it involves collecting intelligence on foreigners outside the US.
Commercial Database Information and Location Data
- FBI Use of Tools: FBI uses all tools consistent with the Constitution and laws (ECPA) to conduct its mission.
- Commercial Data Purchase: FBI purchases commercially available information, which has led to valuable intelligence.
- Location Data: Question arises whether the FBI buys Americans’ location data without a warrant.
- Fourth Amendment Concerns: Doing so without a warrant is seen as circumventing the Fourth Amendment, especially with AI.
- Government Surveillance Reform Act: Bipartisan bill proposed to address these issues.
- Phone Records: FBI obtains court orders to collect phone records.
- DIA Purchase of Location Data: Agency confirms purchasing and searching domestic location data, stating it aligns with the Constitution and protects US persons’ information.
Iran’s Threat Assessment and “Imminent Threat” Debate
- DNI’s Resignation: Head of NCTC resigned, stating Iran did not represent an imminent threat.
- DNI Ratcliffe’s Disagreement: Believes intelligence reflects the contrary; Iran poses an “immediate threat.”
- Historical Context: Iran has been in conflict with the West since 1979 and has “American blood on their hands.”
- Lone Offender Threat: Al-Qaeda and ISIS are most likely to target the US through US-based lone offenders.
FBI Cooperation with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)
- Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs): FBI has 56 JTTFs nationwide, expanded with 59 Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs) co-led by FBI and DHS.
- Purpose: Counterterrorism, violence, and criminal activity in cities.
- Afghan Nationals: Reports of over 190,000 Afghan nationals admitted unvetted, with some committing terrorist attacks.
- Collaboration with HSI/DHS/CBP/ICE: Enables DHS’s workforce to supplement FBI efforts.
- Vetting Afghan Nationals: Back-vetting individuals admitted during the Afghanistan withdrawal.
- Resource Needs: FBI requires more agents to perform this task effectively.
- Use of DHS Data: Utilizing DHS immigration, travel records, and logs to identify and remove individuals, including gang members and ISIS/Al-Qaeda affiliates.
- Tragedy in Washington D.C.: An individual from Afghanistan was allowed to enter the US and shot military service members.
Funding for Homeland Security Agencies
- Patty Murray Bill: A bill to fully fund TSA, FEMA, CISA, and Coast Guard was blocked by Republican colleagues.
- Focus of Dispute: The dispute centered on the conduct of ICE.
- Impact of Non-Funding: Refusal to fund DHS functions, including HSI, makes Americans less safe.
Intelligence Briefings on Iran Action
- DNI/CIA Director Presence: Questioned whether DNI Gabbard or CIA Director Ratcliffe were present or had designees in final decision-making meetings regarding the Iran action (Feb 27-28).
- Intelligence Community Input: Whether an IC presence was part of deliberations.
- Presidential Briefings: CIA Director Ratcliffe states he briefs the President frequently (10-15 times per week on average).
- Discrepancy: Concerns arise from potential discrepancies between IC reporting and presidential statements regarding Iran.
- Strait of Hormuz: Senator Widen cited a report from a year prior predicting Iran closing the Strait; President Trump claimed surprise.
- Briefing Communication: DNI Gabbard states Iran had specific plans to hit US interests and energy sites.
- Force Protection Measures: Department of War and State took measures in advance of Operation Epic Fury.
Russian/Chinese Intelligence Sharing with Iran
- Public Reports: Reports of intelligence sharing between Russia/China and Iran are in the public domain.
- Classified Information: Confirmation of such sharing would be appropriate for a closed session.
- Impact on Operations: According to the Department of War, any Iranian support from Russia/China is not inhibiting their operational effects.
Iranian Nuclear Capability and Regime Change
- Regime Change/Enriched Uranium: Question about accomplishing regime change or eliminating enriched uranium without boots on the ground.
- Classified Discussion: Details on Iranian nuclear capability and the ability to achieve these goals will be discussed in closed session.
Climate Change and Migration as National Security Threats
- Omission from Threat Assessment: Little to no mention of climate change in the current threat assessment, despite its presence in past reports.
- Migration Estimates: Climate migrants could range from 200 million to 1 billion by 2050.
- National Security Threat: Belief that this constitutes a national security threat that should be addressed by the IC.
- DNI Gabbard’s Response: The annual threat assessment is focused on priorities laid out in the president’s national security strategy and effects where operational action can be taken.
- Combating climate change is suggested as an actionable item.
Media Reports on Russian/Chinese Collaboration with Iran
- Media Not a Classification Authority: Such stories, true or not, may be better suited for FBI investigation into unlawful disclosures.
- Likely Actions: Sounds like something Russia and China would do, referencing Cold War practices.
- Defunding HSI: The Patty Murray legislation would have defunded Homeland Security Investigations, which conduct critical work protecting communities from financial crimes, predators, and transnational gangs.
Impact of Operation Epic Fury on Ukraine Support
- US Interest in Ukraine’s Success: Crucial for Ukraine to defeat the Russian invasion.
- Consequences of Epic Fury: Concern about the impact on the US ability to supply NATO allies and Ukraine.
- Supply Chain Impact: Operation Epic Fury’s munitions expenditure will have an impact; boosting the defense industrial base is necessary. Efforts are underway.
- Russia’s Advantage: Force composition and delta between Russian and Ukrainian forces give Russia the advantage.
- Deferral to Classified Session: Specifics on supply chain, US limitations, and Secretary of War’s efforts to boost the defense industrial base deferred to classified session.
Operation Epic Fury and Russian Oil Revenues
- Intelligence Professionals: Same professionals involved in successful prior operations (Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve) were involved in Epic Fury.
- Campaign Goals: Degrade and destroy Iran’s missile and drone inventory, delay/degrade the military industrial base, and degrade the IRGC Navy.
- Policy Decisions: Policymakers sometimes make decisions that may benefit adversaries (like Russia or China) if they believe it also benefits US citizens (e.g., keeping oil prices low).
- Walking and Chewing Gum: Confidence that objectives in the Middle East and support for Ukraine can be pursued simultaneously.
Iran Conflict Rationale and Escalation Concerns
- Unauthorized War: Described as President Trump’s unauthorized war with Iran, lacking congressional approval.
- Casualties and Injuries: At least 13 American service members dead, many injured.
- Shifting Message: President’s statements on Iran’s nuclear threat and capabilities are inconsistent.
- Threats to Allies: Demands for allies to protect their own territory and energy supplies; asking China for help in the Strait of Hormuz.
- Contradictory Statements: Declaring victory while also threatening further bombing “just for fun.”
- Perpetual War Concern: Fear that Iran’s actions (closing Strait of Hormuz, launching drones) will lead to a perpetual war, contradicting the president’s “not the policeman of the world” stance.
- Intelligence Accuracy: Intelligence agencies accurately predicted consequences like closing the Strait of Hormuz and risks to military bases and personnel.
Iran’s Nuclear Program and Diplomatic Negotiations
- Diplomatic Intentions: Clear that Iran had no intention of following through diplomatically with eliminating nuclear aspirations, despite ongoing talks.
- Degraded Defensive Capabilities: During the 12-day war, Iran’s air defenses were taken out, making aircraft operations safer.
- Rebuilding Capabilities: Iran was rebuilding defensive capabilities and continuing to develop short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles at alarming rates.
- Offensive vs. Defensive: Iran was building offensive capabilities faster than the US could build defensive ones.
- Terrorist Affiliations: Continuing to deliver resources to affiliated terrorist organizations.
- President’s Decision: Seen as the right choice and the right time to respond to the threat, prioritizing the safety of service members.
Havana Syndrome and Intelligence Community Review
- Atypical Illnesses: Reports of individuals within the agency and State Department experiencing significant illnesses, possibly attributed to foreign adversary sources.
- IC Disparate Opinions: Differing opinions across the IC regarding the cause of these AHI (Anomalous Health Incidents), also known as Havana Syndrome.
- DNI’s Role: DNI Gabbard agreed to undertake a comprehensive review of the issue across the IC to ensure it receives adequate attention.
China and Russia as Primary Geopolitical Rivals
- Pivot to Asia: US national defense strategy has focused on confronting threats from China for over a decade.
- Primary Rivals: Both DNI Gabbard and CIA Director Ratcliffe agree that China and Russia are primary geopolitical rivals.
Impact of Iran Conflict on Global Oil Supply and Russian Revenue
- Global Oil Shock: War with Iran created a significant shock to the global oil supply, causing gas prices to skyrocket.
- Russian Revenue Gain: Reports indicate Russia has gained billions in additional oil revenue due to price spikes and loosened sanctions.
- Putin’s Funding: Increased funding for Russia is likely to be put towards the war effort in Ukraine.
- China’s Oil Flows: Reporting suggests China continues to receive preferential oil flows from Iran.
Briefings on Iran War Decision and Strait of Hormuz
- DNI’s Tweet: President Trump concluded there was an imminent threat and decided to attack Iran after careful review.
- Information Request: Country deserves to know the information considered.
- Briefing on Strait of Hormuz Closure: DNI Gabbard declines to comment on presidential requests; CIA Director Ratcliffe states briefings are typically initiated by the IC, not the White House.
- Analysis Produced: Analysis regarding the Strait of Hormuz has been and continues to be produced.
- Adversary/Ally Response: DNI Gabbard and CIA Director Ratcliffe are hesitant to confirm if they were asked to brief on adversary and ally responses to the Iran war.
- Fundraising Email: A fundraising email from the President offers “private national security briefings” to donors.
- Hatch Act: CIA Director Ratcliffe states the Hatch Act would prevent him from engaging in political roles related to such briefings.
International Scammers and AI Acceleration
- Domestic Threat: International scammers reaching into the US to gather data or steal money.
- AI Acceleration: AI has dramatically accelerated these capabilities.
- Financial Losses: FBI noted nearly $$17 billion lost to scammers in 2024; some estimates reach \$$50 billion.
- AI-Powered Recovery Ads: OpenAI noted ads offering recovery services for scam victims.
Opening Statements
- Commendation of Intelligence Professionals: The committee acknowledges the dedication, sacrifice, and service of thousands of intelligence agency personnel who ensure American safety. Their work is often unseen but vital .
- Reduced Global Danger: Thanks to the agencies’ efforts and President Trump’s leadership, the world is considered less dangerous for Americans than a year prior .
- Degradation of Iranian Regime: The Iranian regime has been significantly weakened, with actions taken against its nuclear facilities, leadership, military, navy, missiles, proxies, and economy .
- Successful Operations: Complex military and intelligence operations, including those in Venezuela, have been executed successfully without American casualties, highlighting the effectiveness of intelligence agencies .
- Unvarnished Threat Assessment: The hearing aims to provide the public with an unbiased account of global threats, from China and Russia to narco-cartels .
- Intelligence Community Reforms: Agencies have improved by returning to core missions, focusing on stealing secrets and providing timely intelligence, leading to increased CIA foreign intelligence reporting and personnel deployment .
- Support for FISA and Budget: Support for the reauthorization of FISA Section 702 and a robust intelligence budget are crucial for operations against Iran and narco-terrorists .
- Institutional Reforms: Continued personnel and institutional reforms are urged to prevent bureaucratic bloat, political bias, and excessive caution within intelligence services .
- Legislative Foundation: The first Intelligence Authorization Act established a foundation for a more efficient intelligence community, including reorganizing the ODNI and improving security .
- Future Legislative Goals: Future efforts will focus on growing collector cadres, investing in core capabilities, defending space assets, and codifying reforms against bureaucracy .
Concerns Regarding Election Integrity and DNI’s Role
- Erosion of Safeguards: Developments over the past year raise concerns about the erosion of safeguards protecting democracy and national security, particularly concerning election integrity .
- Foreign Adversary Election Interference: For decades, intelligence agencies have warned about foreign adversaries (Russia, China, Iran) attempting to influence U.S. elections through cyber intrusions, disinformation, and covert influence operations .
- DNI’s Mandate: The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is responsible for coordinating intelligence on foreign election interference, warning the public, and ensuring information sharing across government levels .
- Elimination of Foreign Influence Center: Despite the mandate, the DNI has reportedly eliminated the Foreign Malign Influence Center and lacks a designated official for coordinating election threat responses .
- Lack of Briefings: The committee has repeatedly requested legally required briefings on foreign election threats, receiving no response, which is seen as a demonstration of the DNI’s disinterest in combating foreign influence .
- DNI’s Domestic Involvement: Concerns are raised about the DNI’s personal involvement in domestic matters, specifically participating in a law enforcement raid for election ballots in Fulton County, Georgia, which lacked a foreign connection .
- Conspiracy Theories and Warrant Predicate: The warrant for the raid was reportedly based on debunked conspiracy theories, despite rejections by courts and officials .
- Misuse of National Security Powers: The DNI’s involvement in domestic operations suggests a potential misuse of national security powers to interfere in domestic politics and potentially aid unconstitutional efforts to control upcoming elections .
- Administration Appointments: Individuals promoting election conspiracy theories, like Kurt Olsson (White House Director of Election Security and Integrity), have been appointed to positions with access to sensitive information and law enforcement referrals .
- Weakening of Agencies: Politically motivated purges at the FBI, budget cuts, and leadership instability at NSA and DIA are seen as weakening these agencies. CISA personnel have also been forced out, despite ongoing cyber threats .
- Cost to State Department: The State Department’s response to a foreseeable security crisis left American citizens trapped in a war zone with minimal assistance .
- Alienation of Allies: The administration’s unilateral actions have alienated allies, pushing them towards China and Russia and undermining U.S. partnerships .
- Omission in Threat Assessment: The annual threat assessment omits any mention of adversary election influence attempts, a departure from previous years, raising questions about the intelligence community’s ability to speak honestly on the matter .
Director Gabbard’s Opening Statement: 2026 Annual Threat Assessment
- Purpose of the Briefing: The briefing conveys the Intelligence Community’s (IC) assessment of threats to U.S. citizens, homeland, and interests, aligning with the President’s national security strategy .
- Homeland Defense: Bolstering homeland defense and security has shown results over the past year .
- Border Security: Strict enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border has significantly reduced illegal immigration, with substantial year-over-year declines in encounters .
- Migration Drivers: Potential instability in countries like Cuba and Haiti, along with smugglers profiting from chaos, could trigger future migration surges .
- Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs): TCOs pose a daily threat primarily through drug trafficking. Fentanyl overdose deaths have decreased due to aggressive targeting of TCOs and precursor chemicals, though tens of thousands of deaths still occur annually .
- Key TCOs: Mexico-based TCOs (Sinaloa, Jalisco New Generation) dominate fentanyl, heroin, meth, and cocaine smuggling. Colombia-based groups (FARC, ELN) produce large volumes of cocaine .
- MS-13: This gang operates within the U.S., engaging in violence, extortion, and drug trafficking, contributing to instability .
- Terrorist Actors: The U.S. faces a complex threat landscape from geographically diverse Islamist terrorist actors. While al-Qaeda and ISIS are weaker than at their peak, their ideology and recruitment efforts remain a threat .
- Muslim Brotherhood: The spread of Islamist ideology, sometimes linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, poses a threat to Western civilization and underpins terrorist groups’ objectives .
- Terrorist Tactics: Groups focus on information operations, propaganda, and inspiring lone actors due to setbacks in large-scale attack capabilities .
- Counterterrorism Efforts: U.S. counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria have degraded al-Qaeda and ISIS’s ability to reconstitute and plan attacks. Strict border enforcement has reduced access to the homeland .
- U.S. Attacks: In 2025, there were three Islamist terrorist attacks in the U.S., and law enforcement disrupted 15 plots. Roughly half of disrupted plotters had online contact with foreign terrorist organizations .
- State Actors and Missile Threats: State actors (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan) are developing advanced missile systems. The IC assesses a collective increase in missiles threatening the homeland by 2035 .
- Cyber Domain Threats: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups will continue to target U.S. networks and critical infrastructure. China and Russia are the most persistent threats .
- North Korea’s Cyber Program: North Korea’s sophisticated cyber program, including cryptocurrency heists, helps fund its strategic weapons programs .
- AI in Cyber Operations: Artificial intelligence will accelerate cyber threats, with both attackers and defenders using AI tools for speed and effectiveness .
- Arctic Region: Russia and China aim to strengthen their presence in the Arctic through increased trade, resource extraction, and military activity .
- Artificial Intelligence (AI): China is the most capable competitor in AI. AI advancements pose risks, potentially enabling autonomous violations of U.S. interests .
- Quantum Computing: Early developers of quantum computers will gain a significant technological advantage, potentially breaking current encryption methods .
- Contested Space Domain: The space domain is increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counterspace capabilities .
- Western Hemisphere Risks: Flagging economies, crime, organized crime, corruption, and narcotics trafficking present risks, with strategic competitors seeking greater influence .
- Venezuela: Post-Maduro’s arrest, Venezuela shows signs of cooperating with the U.S. and opening its economy .
- China, Russia, Iran in Latin America: These nations are likely sustaining engagement to expand political, economic, and military ties .
- China’s Military Modernization: China continues to rapidly modernize its military, aiming to deter U.S. and allied forces and potentially seize Taiwan by force .
- North Korea: An increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a regional and global concern due to its WMD, cyber activities, and willingness to use asymmetric capabilities. Its partnership with Russia is growing .
- Russia’s Global Challenges: Russia retains the capability to challenge U.S. interests militarily and non-militarily, with the potential for escalatory spirals in conflicts leading to nuclear weapon deployment .
- Russia’s Advanced Capabilities: Russia invests in advanced systems like hypersonic missiles and undersea capabilities to negate U.S. military advantage and employs “grey zone” tactics .
- Russia and Ukraine Conflict: Russia has maintained the upper hand in the war against Ukraine. Moscow is likely to continue a war of attrition until objectives are met .
- Middle East Dynamics: Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change, weakening Iran and its proxies. Iran’s regime is intact but degraded, with conventional military projection capabilities largely destroyed .
- Iran’s Strategic Position: Iran’s strategic position is degraded due to sanctions and protests. Internal tensions are likely to increase as its economy worsens .
- Iran’s Nuclear Program: Iran continues to refuse compliance with nuclear obligations and access to IAEA facilities. It aims to rebuild its military, missile, and UAV forces .
- Cooperation Among Adversaries: China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran see the U.S. as a competitor and are likely to continue selective cooperation, bolstering individual capabilities .
- Africa’s Conflicts: Conflicts in Africa are likely to persist due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support. Tensions in Ethiopia, elections in Somalia, civil war in Sudan, and ISIS activity in West Africa pose risks .
- Critical Minerals: African governments may use wealth in critical minerals to seek beneficial partnerships .
- Commitment to Intelligence: The intelligence community is committed to providing timely, unbiased intelligence to protect U.S. interests and the American people .
Congressional Questions and Director Responses
- Missile Defense Systems: General Adams explains that the Arrow and Iron Dome systems are critical for defending Israel against ballistic missiles and rockets, creating a shield in conjunction with U.S. systems .
- Cybersecurity Manpower: General Hartman suggests establishing a joint reserve cyber organization to provide advanced training, intelligence access, and funding mobilization for Cyber Command and NSA .
- CIA Contributions to Operations: Director Ratcliffe highlights the CIA’s role in the success of operations like Midnight Hammer and Absolute Resolve, contributing to a flawless intelligence picture. He notes a 25% increase in asset stability, foreign intelligence collection, and 100% increase in China-focused intelligence, alongside a 70% increase in counter-narcotics operations .
- Iran’s Intercontinental Missile Threat: Director Ratcliffe confirms that Iran’s space launch program provides experience with booster technologies that, if unimpeded, could lead to missiles capable of reaching the continental U.S. Degrading Iran’s missile production is crucial .
- DNI’s Role in Domestic Law Enforcement: Director Gabbard clarifies that ODNI’s statutory responsibility for election security and counterintelligence, and its oversight of DHS and FBI, allowed her presence at the Fulton County raid. She states she did not participate in law enforcement activity but observed at the President’s request to understand election system vulnerabilities .
- Lack of Foreign Interference Reporting: Director Gabbard states the current threat assessment aligns with the President’s national security strategy priorities. When pressed, she indicates no evidence of foreign threat interference in the 2026 elections has been found thus far .
- Draft Executive Order: Both Director Patel and Director Gabbard deny knowledge of a draft executive order concerning election ballots or federal forces for 2026 .
- Iran Nuclear Program: Director Gabbard confirms that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was “obliterated” by Operation Midnight Hammer and there have been no rebuilding efforts. She attributes the omission of this detail from her oral statement to time constraints .
- Presidential Briefings on Iran: Director Gabbard states she is unaware of the President’s remarks about being surprised by Iran’s actions regarding the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent Gulf States, but confirms Iran has historically threatened to leverage its control of the Strait .
- Intelligence Community Assessment on ISIS/Al-Qaeda: Director Gabbard clarifies that ISIS and al-Qaeda are organizationally smaller and weaker than at their peak, but concur that they remain a significant threat. The ODNI National Counterterrorism Center is actively engaged, dedicating all requested resources .
- Online Recruitment by Terrorist Groups: Director Patel explains that terrorist organizations have shifted to online recruitment. The FBI has expanded resources to environments like the Threat Screening Center for biometric collection and intelligence production. This has led to the disruption of four terrorist attacks in December, three ISIS-inspired .
- Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure: Director Gabbard is working with NSA and other partners to detect evolving cyber threats and rebuild strong partnerships with the private sector to secure critical infrastructure like the electric grid and communication systems .
- Iran’s Capability to Disrupt Strait of Hormuz: Director Gabbard confirms the IC has consistently assessed Iran’s capability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and has provided these assessments to policymakers .
- FISA Section 702 Expansion: General Hartman clarifies that the Section 702 expansion allows for foreign intelligence collection on personnel outside the U.S. He defers specifics to a closed session .
- FBI Use of Commercial Data: Director Patel states the FBI uses all legally permissible tools, including commercially available information consistent with the Constitution and ECPA, which has yielded valuable intelligence. He does not commit to not buying Americans’ location data without a warrant .
- DIA’s Purchase of Location Data: General Adams confirms DIA purchases commercially available information in alignment with the Constitution and protects U.S. person information. He states all purchases are passed through legal channels and comply with laws .
- Section 702 and Americans: General Hartman states that Section 702 does not give authority to target Americans with cable boxes or Wi-Fi routers .
- Iran’s Threat Assessment: Director Ratcliffe disagrees with the assessment that Iran does not pose an imminent threat, citing its history of conflict with the West and its current actions .
- FBI/HSI Cooperation: Director Patel highlights the expansion of 59 Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs) co-led by the FBI and DHS, which integrate the powers of both agencies to combat terrorism and criminal activity .
- Funding for DHS Agencies: Senator King points out that a bill to fully fund TSA, FEMA, CISA, and the Coast Guard was blocked by Republican colleagues, impacting the funding of critical functions including Homeland Security Investigations .
- Intelligence in Decision-Making on Iran: Director Gabbard and Ratcliffe state they provided constant intelligence briefings to the President. While unaware of specific remarks about the Strait of Hormuz, they confirm Iran had plans to hit U.S. interests and energy sites in the region .
- Russia/Iran Intelligence Sharing: Director Ratcliffe defers questions about Russian intelligence sharing with Iran to a closed session, but notes that any support Iran receives is not inhibiting its operational effects .
- Regime Change in Iran: Discussion on regime change or eliminating Iran’s uranium stockpile is deferred to a closed session .
- Climate Change as a Security Threat: Senator King suggests climate change and resulting migration should be assessed as national security threats, citing potential large-scale population displacement .
- Operation Epic Fury’s Impact on Ukraine: General Adams indicates that while efforts are underway to boost the defense industrial base, the munitions expended during Operation Epic Fury will have an impact on supply chains. He defers specific questions on U.S. supply chain limitations to the Department of Defense .
- Intelligence Professionals and Operation Epic Fury: Director Ratcliffe assures that the same military and intelligence professionals involved in successful prior operations are involved in Epic Fury, emphasizing a thoughtful and detailed approach to address a 47-year problem .
- War Justification and Goals: Senator Bennett questions the rationale and goals of the campaign against Iran, citing conflicting statements from the President and the lack of clear congressional approval, resulting in American casualties and escalating conflict .
- Iran’s Diplomatic Deception: Director Ratcliffe agrees that Iran’s diplomatic engagement was not genuine, with intelligence reflecting contrary actions regarding its nuclear program and missile development .
- Operation Midnight Hammer Success: Director Ratcliffe highlights the success of Operation Midnight Hammer in halting Iran’s enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade and degrading its missile delivery capabilities .
- President’s Decision on Iran: Director Ratcliffe concurs that the President made the right choice at a safer time to respond to the threat posed by Iran, prioritizing the protection of service members .
[DOCUMENT SPLIT: This transcript continues in the next part (Part 2 of 3). The full document has been split into multiple materials.]
[DOCUMENT SPLIT: This is Part 2 of 3 (“Part 2: 0:00-0:00”). The content before this section is available in the previous part(s). This transcript only contains content for this part.]
Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment Hearing – Day 1
- Welcome and Panel Introduction: The hearing convenes with an introduction of the panel of witnesses: Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, FBI Director Cash Patel, Acting NSA Director Lt. Gen. William Hartman, and DIA Director Lt. Gen. James Adams .
- Recognition of General Hartman: A special thanks is offered to General Hartman for his 37 years of service, concluding with his leadership at the NSA .
- Intelligence Professionals: The committee commends the thousands of intelligence agency personnel for their service, dedication, and sacrifice, which ensures American safety globally .
- Reduced Global Danger: The world is less dangerous for Americans due to the efforts of intelligence agencies and President Trump’s leadership .
- Degradation of Iranian Regime: Actions have significantly weakened the Iranian regime, including strikes on nuclear facilities, elimination of leadership, and impacts on its military and economy .
- Successful Operations: Complex military and intelligence operations, such as the one leading to Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro’s imprisonment, were executed successfully without American casualties, underscoring the value of timely and accurate intelligence .
- Global Threats: The hearing addresses global threats including China, North Korea, Russia, and narco-cartels at home .
- Intelligence Community Reforms: Agencies have improved by returning to core missions, focusing on intelligence collection. The CIA has increased foreign intelligence reporting and personnel deployment .
- FISA and Budget Support: The importance of reauthorizing FISA Section 702 and providing a sufficient intelligence budget for operations against Iran and narco-terrorists is highlighted .
- Institutional Reforms: Continuous personnel and institutional reforms are needed to prevent bureaucratic bloat, political bias, and excessive caution .
- Legislative Efforts: The first Intelligence Authorization Act laid the groundwork for efficiency. Future efforts will focus on growing collector cadres, investing in capabilities, defending space assets, and codifying reforms .
- Vice Chairman’s Remarks: The Vice Chairman thanks intelligence community members and emphasizes the importance of hearings like this one. He raises concerns about the erosion of safeguards protecting democracy and security, particularly regarding election integrity .
- Foreign Election Interference: Intelligence agencies have long warned about foreign adversaries (Russia, China, Iran) seeking to influence U.S. elections through cyber intrusions, disinformation, and covert influence operations .
- DNI’s Role in Election Security: The DNI is tasked with coordinating intelligence on foreign election interference, warning the public, and ensuring information sharing. Congress established a Foreign Malign Influence Center within the ODNI for this purpose .
- DNI’s Actions on Election Threats: Concerns are raised that the DNI has eliminated the Foreign Malign Influence Center and lacks a designated official for election threat coordination. The committee has received no responses to requests for briefings on legitimate foreign threats .
- DNI’s Involvement in Domestic Matters: The DNI’s personal participation in a law enforcement raid in Fulton County, Georgia, to seize ballots is highlighted as a concern, especially given the lack of a foreign connection in the warrant’s predicate, which was based on rejected conspiracy theories .
- Misuse of National Security Powers: This involvement raises questions about the deployment of intelligence community resources for domestic issues and suggests a potential effort to misuse national security powers to interfere in domestic politics .
- Administration Appointments: Individuals promoting election conspiracy theories have been appointed to positions within the government, raising concerns about their access to law enforcement and intelligence authorities .
- Weakening of Agencies: Politically motivated purges at the FBI, budget cuts, and leadership instability at NSA and DIA are cited as weakening these agencies. CISA personnel have also been forced out, despite ongoing cyber threats .
- State Department Failures: The State Department’s response to a foreseeable security crisis left American citizens trapped in a war zone with limited assistance .
- Alienation of Allies: Unilateral administration actions have alienated allies, potentially pushing them towards China and Russia and undermining U.S. partnerships .
- Omission in Threat Assessment: The omission of adversary election influence attempts from the annual threat assessment is noted as a significant departure from previous years, raising questions about the intelligence community’s ability to report honestly .
Director Gabbard’s Formal Statement: 2026 Annual Threat Assessment
- Purpose and Scope: The statement presents the Intelligence Community’s (IC) assessment of threats, aligned with the President’s national security strategy, focusing first on homeland threats and then global risks .
- Homeland Defense Successes: The administration’s efforts have bolstered homeland defense, with strict border enforcement leading to significant reductions in illegal immigration .
- Migration Drivers: Potential instability in Cuba and Haiti, along with smugglers, could continue to drive migration surges .
- Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs): TCOs pose a daily threat, primarily through drug trafficking. Fentanyl overdose deaths have decreased due to aggressive targeting of TCOs and precursor chemicals, though the problem persists .
- Key TCOs and Their Operations: Major TCOs like the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel dominate fentanyl, heroin, meth, and cocaine smuggling. Colombian groups are key producers of cocaine . MS-13 is active in the U.S., engaging in violence and extortion .
- Terrorism Threats: Islamist terrorist actors globally pose a threat. While al-Qaeda and ISIS are organizationally weaker, their ideology and recruitment efforts remain concerning .
- Muslim Brotherhood: The spread of Islamist ideology, sometimes associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, is seen as a fundamental threat to Western civilization and used for terrorist group objectives .
- Terrorist Tactics Shift: Terrorist groups are increasingly focusing on information operations and propaganda to inspire lone actors, due to setbacks in large-scale attack capabilities .
- Counterterrorism Successes: U.S. counterterrorism operations have degraded al-Qaeda and ISIS’s ability to plan large-scale attacks. Strict border enforcement has reduced access to the homeland .
- Domestic Terrorist Plots: In 2025, there were three Islamist terrorist attacks in the U.S., and 15 plots were disrupted. Roughly half of disrupted plotters had online contact with foreign terrorist organizations .
- State Actors and Missile Threats: State actors (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan) are developing advanced missile systems. The IC assesses a significant increase in missiles threatening the homeland by 2035 .
- Cyber Domain Threats: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups are expected to continue compromising U.S. networks and critical infrastructure. China and Russia present the most persistent threats .
- North Korea’s Cyber Activities: North Korea’s sophisticated cyber program, including cryptocurrency heists, funds its strategic weapons development .
- AI in Cyber Operations: Artificial intelligence will accelerate cyber threats, enhancing both offensive and defensive capabilities .
- Arctic Region Competition: Russia and China are increasing their presence in the Arctic through trade, resource extraction, and military activity .
- Artificial Intelligence (AI) Risks: China is the leading AI competitor. AI advancements pose risks, potentially enabling autonomous actions detrimental to U.S. interests .
- Quantum Computing Advantage: Early developers of quantum computers will gain a significant technological advantage, potentially breaking current encryption .
- Contested Space Domain: The space domain is increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counterspace capabilities .
- Western Hemisphere Instability: The Western Hemisphere faces risks from economic issues, crime, TCOs, migration, corruption, and narcotics, with strategic competitors seeking influence .
- Venezuela’s Shift: Following Maduro’s arrest, Venezuela shows signs of cooperating with the U.S. and opening its economy .
- China, Russia, Iran in Latin America: These nations are likely expanding economic, political, and military engagement in the region .
- China’s Military Modernization: China is rapidly modernizing its military, aiming to deter U.S. forces and potentially seize Taiwan .
- North Korea’s Threats: North Korea remains a concern due to its WMD, cyber activities, and asymmetric capabilities. Its partnership with Russia is growing .
- Russia’s Global Challenges: Russia can challenge U.S. interests through military and non-military means, with a potential for conflict escalation, including nuclear weapons .
- Russia’s Advanced Capabilities: Russia possesses advanced systems like hypersonic missiles and employs “grey zone” tactics and counterspace capabilities .
- Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Russia has maintained the advantage in Ukraine and is likely pursuing a war of attrition .
- Middle East Dynamics: Operation Epic Fury is causing significant change, weakening Iran and its proxies. Iran’s regime is degraded, with its conventional military power projection largely destroyed .
- Iran’s Economic and Internal Issues: Iran faces a worsening economy, likely leading to increased internal tensions despite the regime’s survival .
- Iran’s Nuclear Program: Iran continues to refuse IAEA access and aims to rebuild its military capabilities, including missiles and UAVs .
- Adversary Cooperation: China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are likely to continue selective cooperation, enhancing their capabilities against U.S. interests .
- Africa’s Conflicts: Conflicts in Africa persist due to poor governance, economic issues, and external support, posing risks to U.S. citizens and stability .
- Commitment to Intelligence: The intelligence community remains committed to providing timely, unbiased intelligence to protect U.S. interests and the American people .
Congressional Questions and Director Responses
- Missile Defense Systems: General Adams explains the Arrow and Iron Dome systems defend Israel against ballistic missiles and rockets, creating a shield with U.S. systems against Iranian threats .
- Cybersecurity Manpower Growth: General Hartman suggests a joint reserve cyber organization for advanced training, intelligence access, and funding mobilization for Cyber Command and NSA .
- CIA Contributions to Operations: Director Ratcliffe highlights the CIA’s role in successful operations like Midnight Hammer, citing increased asset stability, foreign intelligence collection (especially on China), and counter-narcotics operations .
- Iran’s Intercontinental Missile Threat: Director Ratcliffe confirms Iran’s space launch program provides experience with booster technologies that could lead to ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S. Degrading Iran’s missile production is crucial .
- DNI’s Role in Domestic Law Enforcement: Director Gabbard explains ODNI’s statutory responsibility for election security and counterintelligence, and its oversight of DHS and FBI, permitted her presence at the Fulton County raid at the President’s request to observe and understand election system vulnerabilities .
- Lack of Foreign Interference Reporting: Director Gabbard states the current threat assessment aligns with the President’s national security strategy. She indicates no evidence of foreign threat interference in the 2026 elections has been found thus far .
- Draft Executive Order: Directors Patel and Gabbard deny knowledge of a draft executive order concerning election ballots or federal forces for 2026 .
- Iran Nuclear Program Status: Director Gabbard confirms Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was “obliterated” by Operation Midnight Hammer, with no rebuilding efforts. She attributes the omission from her oral statement to time constraints .
- Presidential Briefings on Iran: Director Gabbard is unaware of the President’s remarks about being surprised by Iran’s actions regarding the Strait of Hormuz but confirms Iran has historically threatened to leverage control of the Strait .
- ISIS/Al-Qaeda Threat Assessment: Director Gabbard clarifies that ISIS and al-Qaeda are organizationally weaker but remain a significant threat. The National Counterterrorism Center is actively engaged and resourced .
- Online Recruitment by Terrorist Groups: Director Patel explains the shift to online recruitment by terrorist organizations. The FBI has expanded resources for biometric collection and intelligence, leading to the disruption of four terrorist attacks in December .
- Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure: Director Gabbard is working with partners to detect cyber threats and rebuild private sector partnerships to secure critical infrastructure .
- Iran’s Capability to Disrupt Strait of Hormuz: Director Gabbard confirms the IC has consistently assessed Iran’s capability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and has provided these assessments to policymakers .
- FISA Section 702 Expansion: General Hartman clarifies that the Section 702 expansion allows for foreign intelligence collection on individuals outside the U.S. He defers specifics to a closed session .
- FBI Use of Commercial Data: Director Patel states the FBI uses legally permissible tools, including commercially available information, consistent with the Constitution and ECPA. He does not commit to not buying Americans’ location data without a warrant .
- DIA’s Purchase of Location Data: General Adams confirms DIA purchases commercially available information legally and in compliance with laws, protecting U.S. person information .
- Section 702 and Americans: General Hartman states Section 702 does not authorize targeting Americans with cable boxes or Wi-Fi routers .
- Iran’s Threat Assessment: Director Ratcliffe disagrees with the assessment that Iran does not pose an imminent threat, citing its history of conflict and current actions .
- FBI/HSI Cooperation: Director Patel highlights the expansion of 59 Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs) co-led by the FBI and DHS, integrating their powers to combat terrorism and criminal activity .
- DHS Agency Funding: Senator King notes that a bill to fully fund TSA, FEMA, CISA, and the Coast Guard was blocked, impacting critical functions including Homeland Security Investigations .
- Intelligence in Decision-Making on Iran: Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe state they provided constant intelligence briefings to the President. They confirm Iran had plans to hit U.S. interests and energy sites in the region .
- Russia/Iran Intelligence Sharing: Director Ratcliffe defers questions about Russian intelligence sharing with Iran to a closed session but notes any support Iran receives is not hindering its operational effects .
- Regime Change in Iran: Discussion on regime change or eliminating Iran’s uranium stockpile is deferred to a closed session .
- Climate Change as a Security Threat: Senator King suggests climate change and resulting migration should be assessed as national security threats due to potential large-scale population displacement .
- Operation Epic Fury’s Impact on Ukraine: General Adams indicates that while efforts are underway to boost the defense industrial base, munitions expended during Epic Fury will impact supply chains. Specifics are deferred to the Department of Defense .
- Intelligence Professionals and Operation Epic Fury: Director Ratcliffe assures that experienced professionals are involved in Epic Fury, emphasizing a detailed approach to address a long-standing problem .
- War Justification and Goals: Senator Bennett questions the rationale and goals of the campaign against Iran, citing conflicting presidential statements, lack of congressional approval, and American casualties .
- Iran’s Diplomatic Deception: Director Ratcliffe agrees that Iran’s diplomatic engagement was not genuine, with intelligence reflecting contrary actions regarding its nuclear program and missile development .
- Operation Midnight Hammer Success: Director Ratcliffe highlights the success of Operation Midnight Hammer in halting Iran’s uranium enrichment and degrading its missile delivery capabilities .
- President’s Decision on Iran: Director Ratcliffe concurs that the President made the right choice at the appropriate time to respond to the threat posed by Iran, prioritizing the protection of service members .
Havana Syndrome and Agency Response
- Inquiry: Senator asks about the “Havana Syndrome” and illnesses reported by agency and State Department individuals, believing them to be caused by external sources.
- Director Radcliffe’s Response: Acknowledges the issue is sensitive and will be discussed further in a classified session. When Radcliffe became DNI, there were disparate opinions within the Intelligence Community (IC) regarding the cause of these “anomalous health incidents” (AHIs), including the possibility of directed energy weapons from foreign adversaries.
- Coordination: As DNI, Radcliffe’s role is to coordinate across the IC. He and Director Gabbard agreed that she would undertake a comprehensive review of the issue across the IC.
- Acknowledgement: The agency takes these issues seriously and is not ignoring them.
Geopolitical Rivals: China and Russia
- Senator Kelly’s Observation: For over a decade, the U.S. has attempted a “pivot to Asia” to confront China, identifying it as a top threat. Simultaneously, European allies have been bolstered to deter Russia.
- Witness Agreement: Directors Gabbard and Radcliffe agree that China and Russia are primary geopolitical rivals.
Economic Impact of the Iran Conflict and Sanctions
- Global Oil Supply Shock: The conflict with Iran has caused significant supply shocks to the global oil market, leading to skyrocketing gas prices in the U.S.
- Russia’s Financial Gain: Senator Kelly questions if Russia has gained billions in additional oil revenue due to price spikes resulting from the war and loosened sanctions.
- Director Gabbard: Reports indicate this is the case, but defers to the Treasury and Energy Secretaries for details.
- Director Radcliffe: While not an economist, he acknowledges that policy decisions can sometimes benefit adversaries. Loosened sanctions mean more money for Vladimir Putin, who would likely use it for the war in Ukraine.
- China’s Oil Imports from Iran: Senator Kelly asks if China continues to receive preferential oil flows from Iran.
- Director Gabbard: Reports suggest China, India, and others are moving tankers through the Strait, but the volume is unclear.
Presidential Decision-Making on Iran
- Trump’s Decision to Attack Iran: Senator Kelly references Director Gabbard’s tweet stating President Trump decided to attack Iran after reviewing information, implying an imminent threat.
- Intelligence Briefing Requests (Yes/No):
- Iran Closing Strait of Hormuz: Senator Kelly asks if the White House requested a briefing on whether Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz.
- Director Gabbard: Declines to comment on presidential requests.
- Director Radcliffe: States that briefings to the president typically don’t come at the White House’s request; the IC brings intelligence to the president. Analysis regarding the Strait of Hormuz has been and continues to be produced.
- Adversary/Ally Response to Iran War: Senator Kelly asks if they were asked to brief on how adversaries and allies would respond.
- Iran Closing Strait of Hormuz: Senator Kelly asks if the White House requested a briefing on whether Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz.
- Difficulty in Confirming Briefings: Senator Kelly notes the difficulty in ascertaining if the president was briefed or if the White House even asked for briefings.
- Operation Details: Senator Kelly draws parallels to “Operation Midnight Hammer” and “Operation Absolute Resolve,” which were praised.
- Presidential Fundraising Email: Senator Kelly highlights a fundraising email from the president offering “private national security briefings” to donors.
- Directors’ Responses: Both directors state they are unaware of such practices and that the Hatch Act would prevent them from participating in political roles.
Transnational Criminal Organizations and AI-Driven Scams
- Senator Langford’s Concern: Focuses on the threat of international scammers reaching into the U.S. to gather data or steal money, accelerated by AI.
- Financial Impact: Estimated losses to scammers in 2024 were nearly $$17 billion, with some estimates as high as $$50 billion.
- AI-Enhanced Scams: AI is accelerating these capabilities. A scam is circulating online claiming to help victims recover money, directing them to fake FBI pages.
- FBI’s Approach (Director Patel):
- Online Presence: Drowning online with covert employees and platforms.
- Decentralization: Moving intel analysts and support staff out of D.C. to locations like Oklahoma.
- Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3): Shutting down networks and AI interference capabilities.
- Overseas Operations: Targeting scam center compounds largely located in Cambodia and Burma, backed by the CCP. Efforts are underway to shut down these compounds.
Counter-Narcotics Efforts
- Phenomenal Work: Senator highlights the phenomenal counter-narcotics work in the past year, especially regarding methamphetamine and fentanyl seizures.
- Partnership with Local Law Enforcement (Director Patel):
- Embedded Task Force Officers: Increasing embedding of officers nationwide.
- Southern Border Intelligence Center: Established in Tucson, Arizona, for the counter-narcotics mission.
- Seizure Statistics:
- Enough fentanyl seized in 2025 to kill 178 million Americans (31% increase year-over-year).
- Opioid overdose deaths dropped 20% nationwide.
- Oklahoma seizures: Enough cocaine to fill 232% increase, and enough fentanyl to kill 500,000 Oklahomans.
- Priorities: Embedding police officers at headquarters and shortening task force onboarding from 1-2 years to 90 days.
Muslim Brotherhood and Terrorism Financing
- Threat Assessment: The annual threat assessment highlights the Muslim Brotherhood and its financial support for terrorism.
- Financing and Countermeasures: Inquiry into how the Muslim Brotherhood finances itself and what measures are needed to protect Americans.
- Director Radcliffe’s Response: Views the Muslim Brotherhood similarly to other proxies (e.g., Houthis). CIA is focused on counterterrorism. Cites significant CIA successes against groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, surpassing the prior administration’s achievements.
Iran’s Regime Stability and Succession
- Washington Post Report: Cites a report stating Iran’s regime remains in place, weakened but hardline, with increased IRGC control.
- Director Gabbard’s Stance: Does not stand by leaked intelligence but affirms the IC’s assessment that the regime maintains power despite being degraded.
- Succession and Martyrdom: Discussion on whether the killing of the Ayatollah and family members contributed to a hardline successor. Iranians are using the deceased Ayatollah as a “call to action.”
Regime Collapse and Air Power
- General Adams’s Perspective: Prefers to discuss scenarios for regime collapse and unconditional surrender in a classified session.
- Air Power Effectiveness: Question regarding whether air power alone can destroy the regime, considering its culture and the history of the Iran-Iraq war.
- General Adams’s Response: The joint force has capabilities, but forecasting exact outcomes is speculative.
Russia-Iran Intelligence Sharing and Oil Revenue
- U.S. Special Envoy’s Statement: Steve Witkoff stated Russian leaders told Trump they weren’t sharing intelligence with Iran, and Wickoff suggested taking them at their word.
- Directors’ Views on Putin:
- Director Gabbard: Does not take Vladimir Putin at his word.
- Intelligence Sharing: Iranians are requesting intelligence assistance from Russia, China, and other U.S. adversaries. Whether this is being provided can be discussed in a classified session.
- Collateral Effects on Russia/Ukraine: Senator questions the effect of “Operation Epic Fury” on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, noting Russia’s benefit from oil price spikes and potential Ukraine supply chain disruptions.
- General Adams’s Assessment: The effect on the Russian-Ukrainian battle has been indirect. Russia and China are observing and learning from U.S. actions.
DNI’s Role and Election Integrity Concerns
- Fundraising Email: Senator O’Keefe highlights a presidential fundraising email using an image of a dignified transfer ceremony.
- DNI’s Statutory Responsibilities: Director Gabbard confirms her responsibility to provide national intelligence to the president, executive branch departments, Congress, and military commanders.
- Intelligence Objectivity: The law requires national intelligence provided to Congress to be “timely, objective, and independent of political considerations.”
- Iran’s Nuclear Program:
- Opening Statement Claim: Director Gabbard’s opening statement claimed Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was “obliterated” by air strikes and that there have been no efforts to rebuild it.
- White House Statement: The White House stated the war was launched to eliminate an “imminent nuclear threat” from Iran.
- IC Assessment Discrepancy: Senator O’Keefe presses Director Gabbard on whether the IC assessed an “imminent nuclear threat.” Gabbard states the IC assessed Iran maintained the intention to rebuild its program. She asserts it’s the president’s role to determine what constitutes an imminent threat.
- Fulton County Raid: Senator O’Keefe questions Director Gabbard’s presence at the FBI raid on the Fulton County Elections Office.
- Gabbard’s Presence: Confirms presence, stating it was at the president’s request to oversee the warrant execution, approved by a judge, and related to election security oversight. She denies handling ballots.
- Presidential Request: The request came from the president via his administration the day of the raid.
- Foreign Nexus: The warrant’s predicate was based on conspiracy theories with no foreign connection mentioned.
- DNI’s Involvement in Domestic Matters: Concerns raised about the DNI’s involvement in domestic politics, including the Fulton County raid and seizing voting machines from Puerto Rico, potentially as a pretext for unconstitutional election control efforts.
Intelligence Community Reforms and Funding
- Return to Core Mission: Agencies have improved by returning to basics: stealing secrets of adversaries for timely intelligence.
- CIA Progress: Increased foreign intelligence reporting by 25%; on track to hire more officers than in the last quarter century.
- Support for FISA Section 702: Chairman Cotton supports President Trump’s request for clean reauthorization.
- Intelligence Budget: Expects a healthy intelligence budget request to fund operations against Iran and narco-terrorists.
- Personnel and Institutional Reforms: Urges continued reforms to prevent bureaucratic bloat, political bias, and excessive caution.
- ODNI Reorganization: The first Intelligence Authorization Act reorganized ODNI, improved CIA installation security, and directed resources to foreign intelligence collection and covert action.
- Future Goals: Growing collector cadre, generational investments in core capabilities, new capabilities for space asset defense, and codifying reforms against bloated bureaucracy.
Election Integrity and Foreign Interference Concerns
- Erosion of Safeguards: Developments raise concerns about the erosion of safeguards protecting democracy and security, particularly regarding election integrity.
- Foreign Adversary Efforts: Intelligence community has warned for decades about foreign adversaries (Russia, China, Iran) seeking to shape U.S. elections through cyber intrusions, disinformation, and influence operations.
- DNI’s Role: The DNI is responsible for coordinating intelligence on foreign election interference, warning the public, and ensuring information sharing. A Foreign Malign Influence Center was created within ODNI for this purpose.
- Elimination of Foreign Malign Influence Center: Concerns that the DNI eliminated this center and lacks a designated official coordinating election threat responses.
- Lack of Briefings: The committee has repeatedly requested legally required briefings on foreign threats to midterms, receiving no response.
- DNI’s Domestic Involvement: Accusations that the DNI is involved in domestic matters, citing her participation in the Fulton County raid and seizure of voting machines from Puerto Rico.
- Misuse of National Security Powers: Concerns that the DNI is misusing national security powers to interfere in domestic politics and potentially support unconstitutional efforts to control upcoming elections.
- Omission from Threat Assessment: The annual threat assessment is the first since 2017 to omit any mention of adversary attempts to influence American elections.
FBI Dysfunction and Budget Cuts
- Politically Motivated Purges: Politically motivated purges at the FBI have led to agent exoduses and reassignments from national security areas (counterintelligence, counterterrorism, cyber) to immigration enforcement.
- Budget Cuts: The FBI’s budget was cut by over $500 million, with significant decreases in cyber, counterterrorism, and counterespionage.
- Director’s Travel Expenses: Allegations of squandering resources on a $60 million jet for the director’s personal travel.
- SWAT Reassignments: Highly trained FBI agents from elite SWAT units reassigned for personal tasks, an unprecedented use of personnel.
Agency Leadership Vacancies
- NSA and DIA: Both agencies were left leaderless for months after directors were fired.
- CISA Personnel Changes: Over one-third of CISA personnel have been forced out, a potential mistake given ongoing cyber threats.
State Department and International Relations
- Citizen Trapped in War Zone: Thousands of citizens were trapped in a war zone with limited government assistance; a hotline provided a pre-recorded message advising against reliance on the government for departure.
- Alienated Allies: The administration’s unilateral actions have alienated allies like Canada and the UK, leading them to seek trade deals with China, questioning U.S. partnership.
- Operation Epic Fury and Allies: Allies did not answer the call to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz during the conflict with Iran.
- Unilateral Threats: Administration’s unilateral threats, like invading Greenland, have alienated allies.
Threat Assessment Overview
- Director Gabbard’s Testimony: Presents the 2026 annual threat assessment, emphasizing it reflects the IC’s assessment, not personal views.
- Structure: Follows the president’s national security strategy, starting with homeland threats, then global risks.
Homeland Defense and Border Security
- Border Enforcement: Strict enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border has drastically reduced illegal immigration (83.8% decrease in Jan 2026 encounters vs. Jan 2025).
- Migration Drivers: Potential worsening instability in Cuba and Haiti, and smugglers exploiting chaos for profit.
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and Fentanyl
- TCO Threat: TCOs pose a daily threat through drug production and trafficking.
- Fentanyl Overdose Deaths: Decreased by 30% from Sept 2024 to Sept 2025 due to aggressive targeting of TCOs and precursor chemicals.
- Fentanyl Potency: Decreased, likely due to supply chain disruptions.
- International Cooperation: Improvement in halting fentanyl precursor flow from China and India, but more work needed.
- Major TCOs:
- Mexico-based: Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel (dominant in fentanyl, heroin, meth, cocaine).
- Colombia-based: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN) (cocaine trafficking).
- MS-13: Established cells in the U.S., engaging in violence, extortion, drug trafficking.
- Adaptation: TCOs will adapt by shifting production locations and trafficking methods.
Islamist Terrorism Threats
- Geographic Diversity: Geographically diverse Islamist terrorist actors seeking to propagate ideology globally and harm Americans.
- Al-Qaeda and ISIS: Remain weaker than at their peak, but the spread of Islamist ideology (sometimes linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) poses a fundamental threat.
- Ideological Use: Used for recruitment, financial support, and advancing political objectives (establishing an Islamic caliphate).
- Shift in Tactics: Focus on information operations, propaganda, and inspiring individuals in the West, rather than large-scale complex attacks.
- Counterterrorism Efforts: Successful in removing key leaders and operatives in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria, degrading group capabilities.
- Border Security Impact: Strict enforcement and deportations have reduced access to the homeland for suspected terrorists. Few encounters at borders with individuals linked to terrorist groups.
- Domestic Attacks: Three Islamist terrorist attacks in the U.S. in 2025; 15 U.S.-based plotters disrupted. Roughly half had online contact with foreign terrorists.
- Michigan Synagogue Attack Example: Shooter had familial ties to a Hezbollah leader.
- Overseas Threats: AQAP (Yemen), ISIS-K (South Asia), ISIS (Syria) are likely conducting external plotting. ISIS in Syria seeks to rebuild ranks by recruiting from detainees and women/children released from SDF-run facilities.
State Actors and Advanced Capabilities
- Kinetic and Cyber Warfare: State actors developing new capabilities.
- Nuclear Deterrent: U.S. secure nuclear deterrent ensures homeland safety.
- Missile Proliferation: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan developing advanced missile systems with nuclear/conventional payloads. IC projects over 16,000 missiles by 2035 (up from 3,000+).
- Missile Defense Penetration: China and Russia developing systems to bypass U.S. missile defenses.
- North Korea: ICBMs can reach U.S. soil; committed to expanding nuclear arsenal.
- Pakistan: Long-range ballistic missile development potentially includes ICBMs capable of striking the homeland.
- Iran: Possesses technology for potential ICBM development before 2035. Operation Epic Fury’s strikes on missile facilities are relevant to this assessment.
- Missile Defense Strategy: Nations likely assessing U.S. plans for advanced missile defense to shape their own development programs.
Cyber Domain Threats
- Actors: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups.
- Objectives: Compromise networks, collect intelligence, create disruption options, financial gain.
- Persistent Threats: China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats, continuing R&D.
- North Korea: Sophisticated and agile cyber program; stolen $2 billion in cryptocurrency in 2025, funding regime weapons programs.
- Non-State Actors: Becoming bolder with ransomware, shifting to faster, high-volume attacks.
- Artificial Intelligence (AI): Will accelerate cyber threats; both attackers and defenders will use AI tools.
- AI-Driven Attack Example: August 2025 data extortion operation using an AI tool against government, healthcare, and religious sectors.
Arctic Domain
- Russia and China Objectives: Strengthen presence through increased maritime trade, resource extraction, and military activity.
- Russia: Deploying more military forces, building infrastructure, seeking recognition of polar great power status.
- China: Advancing strategic and economic interests in the region.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Quantum Computing
- AI Capabilities: China is the most capable competitor in AI. AI capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing the threat landscape.
- AI Risks: Potential to aid weapons design, influence targeting, and streamline decision-making. Risk of machines autonomously violating U.S. interests.
- Quantum Computing: Early developers gain technological advantage, able to process information and break current encryption.
Global Security Landscape
- Volatility: Global security landscape is volatile and complex; armed conflict is growing.
- Strategic Competition: Regional and smaller powers are more willing to use force.
- Contested Space Domain: China and Russia developing counter-space capabilities.
- Other Threats: Nuclear proliferation, advancing chemical and biological warfare capabilities.
Western Hemisphere Threats
- Regional Risks: Flagging economies, high crime, organized crime, migration, corruption, narcotics trafficking. Strategic competitors seek greater influence.
- Venezuela: Shift towards cooperation with the U.S. after Maduro’s arrest; opening economy, releasing political prisoners.
- USMCA Review: May increase uncertainty for Latin American countries relying on Mexico for exports.
- China, Russia, Iran Engagement: Likely to sustain economic, political, and military engagement.
- China’s Demand: Demand for raw materials drives economic outreach.
- Russia’s Goals: Expand security and diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua.
China’s Military Modernization and Taiwan
- Military Modernization: China continues rapid modernization across all domains, aiming for world-class status by mid-century.
- Taiwan Objective: Building forces capable of deterring U.S./allied forces and seizing Taiwan by force if necessary.
- Preferred Approach: Prefers conditions for peaceful reunification over conflict.
North Korea’s Threat
- WMDs and Cyber: Weapons of mass destruction, conventional capabilities, illicit cyber activities, and willingness to use asymmetric capabilities pose a threat to U.S. and allies.
- Partnership with Russia: Growing partnership; North Korea sent troops to Russia for combat operations.
- Weapons Programs: Developing strategic weapons, increasing nuclear warhead stockpile, maintaining biological and chemical weapons capabilities.
Russia’s Threat Landscape
- Global Challenge: Retains capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally.
- Escalatory Spiral: Most dangerous threat is potential escalatory spiral in existing or new conflicts, including nuclear weapon deployment.
- Novel Capabilities: Investing in defense industrial base and novel capabilities (hypersonic missiles, undersea capabilities) to negate U.S. advantage.
- Grey Zone Tactics: Relies on non-military tools and grey zone tactics.
- Counter-Space Capabilities: Developing extensive counter-space capabilities, including a nuclear counter-space weapon, posing the greatest threat to space architecture.
- Ukraine Conflict: Maintaining the upper hand; continuing a slow war of attrition.
Middle East Conflict and Iran’s Degradation
- Operation Epic Fury: Advancing fundamental change, weakening Iran and its proxies.
- Iran’s Regime: Appears intact but degraded; conventional military power projection largely destroyed.
- Economic Pressure: Maximum pressure campaign and sanctions led to mass protests. Internal tensions likely to increase as the economy worsens.
- Rebuilding Efforts: If the regime survives, it will likely begin a years-long effort to rebuild military, missiles, and UAV forces.
- Nuclear Program: Prior to Epic Fury, Iran was recovering from damage to its nuclear infrastructure and refusing IAEA access.
Strategic Cooperation Among Adversaries
- Selective Cooperation: China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran see the U.S. as a competitor/adversary. These four countries are likely to continue selective cooperation, bolstering individual capabilities.
- Constrained Relationships: Relationships are primarily bilateral, dependent on circumstances, divergent interests, and concerns over directly confronting the U.S.
African Conflicts and Crises
- Persistence: Conflicts likely to persist due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support.
- Ethiopia/Eritrea: Tensions could accelerate to conflict.
- Somalia: Contentious elections could distract from counterterrorism against al-Shabaab.
- Sudan: Civil war continues despite external negotiations.
- West Africa/Sahel: ISIS increasing attack intensity, expanding operations.
- Critical Minerals: African governments likely to seek partnerships for meaningful benefit.
- U.S. Citizen Risk: Concurrent conflicts and crises put U.S. citizens at risk and cause instability.
Intelligence Community Commitment
- Mission: Committed to providing timely, unbiased intelligence to the president and policymakers to protect U.S. interests, safety, security, and freedom.
Missile Defense Systems (Arrow and Iron Dome)
- Location: Camden, Arkansas, hosts production lines for Israeli missile defense interceptors.
- Purpose: Critical defensive systems preventing adversary power projection against Israel and protecting U.S. personnel in the region.
- Arrow System: High altitude, primarily against Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs).
- Iron Dome: Closer-in system protecting against rockets.
- Combined Shield: Combination with U.S. systems creates a shield against Iranian attacks.
Growing Cyber Security Capacity
- Need for Manpower: Pressing need for more cyber security personnel.
- Part-Time Formations: Arkansas Air National Guard’s 223rd Cyberspace Operations Squadron as an example of growing the force.
- General Hartman’s Recommendations:
- Share relevant classified information and indications/warnings.
- Establish a joint reserve cyber organization.
- Ensure advanced training and intelligence access for these organizations.
- Control funding at CyberCom and NSA for mobilizing personnel.
CIA Contributions to Operations
- Aggressive CIA Focus: Promised a more aggressive CIA focused on its core mission: stealing secrets for a decisive strategic advantage.
- Successes:
- Operation Midnight Hammer & Absolute Resolve: Flawless military operations reliant on flawless intelligence.
- Metrics: 25% increase in foreign intelligence collection, 25% increase in human sources, 100% increase in China-related collection, 45% increase in tech/AI, 70% increase in counter-narcotics operations. Counterterrorism numbers are classified but “off the charts good.”
- Morale: CIA workforce knows it’s doing a great job and is allowed to do what they signed up for.
Iran’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Threat
- Dual Technologies: ICBMs require thrust for space launch and a re-entry vehicle.
- Iran’s Capabilities: Iran has a space launch program (cover for booster technology) and medium-range ballistic missiles with re-entry vehicles.
- Potential Timeline: Analysts suggest Iran could have a functioning ICBM within 6 months if unimpeded.
- Director Radcliffe’s Assessment: Iran’s development of longer-range ballistic missiles (3,000 km) threatens Europe. Their space launch program provides experience with booster technologies. If unimpeded, Iran could range missiles to the continental U.S. Degrading Iran’s missile production via Operation Epic Fury is crucial.
DNI’s Role in Domestic Law Enforcement
- Fulton County Raid: Question regarding Director Gabbard’s involvement in the FBI operation to seize ballots in Fulton County, Georgia, despite the warrant showing no foreign interference.
- Statutory Authority: Congress granted ODNI responsibility for election security and counterintelligence in 2021. ODNI oversees DHS and FBI, which have election security responsibilities.
- Correction on Participation: Director Gabbard denies participating in a law enforcement activity, stating she was present at Fulton County at the president’s request to observe the action.
- President’s Request: The president requested her presence to work with the FBI and observe the warrant execution.
- Election Vulnerabilities: Focus on understanding vulnerabilities in election systems for 2026.
- Lack of Foreign Interference Reports: No required reports or briefings provided to the committee on foreign interference; the threat assessment omits mention of foreign interference.
- Director Gabbard’s Response: The annual threat assessment matches the prioritization of threats laid out in the president’s national security strategy. She is interrupted when trying to elaborate.
- Draft Executive Order: Reports of a potential EO to seize ballots or bring in federal forces in 2020, and a similar EO being drafted for 2026 citing China. Directors Patel and Gabbard deny knowledge of such a draft EO.
Iran’s Nuclear Program and Imminent Threat
- “Obliterated” Program: Director Gabbard’s testimony stated Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was “obliterated” and there were no efforts to rebuild it.
- President’s “Imminent Threat” Claim: Questioned why this paragraph was omitted from oral remarks, possibly due to contradiction with the president’s claim of an imminent threat.
- Presidential Surprise: President Trump reportedly expressed surprise about Iran moving to take over the Strait of Hormuz and striking adjacent Gulf states.
- Intelligence Briefings: Questioned whether the president was briefed on the likely consequences of a “war of choice” with Iran, including striking Gulf nations and closing the Strait of Hormuz. Directors decline to divulge internal conversations but state the IC provides objective intelligence.
Counterterrorism Efforts vs. Great Power Competition
- Director Gabbard’s Assessment: ISIS and al-Qaeda are organizationally smaller and weaker than a decade ago.
- Senator Collins’s Counterpoint: ISIS is growing in Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, and Iraq. Al-Qaeda is surging in Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and Central Africa. Houthis and Iranian proxies remain a threat. Focusing on great power competitors has diverted resources from counterterrorism.
- Current Threat: Terrorists can kill Americans today; the Michigan synagogue attack is cited.
- Stovepiped Intelligence: Concern about a return to a more stovepiped intelligence community.
- Director Gabbard’s Clarification: Reference to organizational size, not necessarily capability. ODNI National Counterterrorism Center is ramping up; resources are dedicated to counterterrorism.
- Changing Tactics: Concern over less indication of large-scale organized threats, and more focus on individuals radicalized by propaganda.
- Integration: Counterterrorism integration across the IC occurs daily.
FBI and Online Recruitment by Terrorist Groups
- ISIS Online Tactics: Targeting recruits via social media, gaming platforms, encrypted apps; facilitating smuggling of illegal immigrants.
- Jihadist-Inspired Cases: Over 52 cases across 30 states since April 2021.
- FBI Measures (Director Patel):
- Extended resources to environments like the Threat Screening Center for biometric capabilities globally.
- Expanded agents and intel analysts online to detect threats using biometric capabilities.
- Stopped four terrorist attacks in December (California, Texas, North Carolina, Pennsylvania), three ISIS-inspired. Shuttered a bombing campaign and two mass casualty events.
Chinese Cyber Threats (Volt Typhoon) and Critical Infrastructure
- Volt Typhoon Breach: Intelligence community did not detect the breach affecting the telecommunications industry for a long time.
- Threat to Critical Infrastructure: Poses a severe threat to U.S. critical infrastructure (electric grid, communication systems).
- Director Gabbard’s Response: Working with NSA and partners to detect evolving threats. Rebuilding strong partnerships with the private sector (telecom, finance, healthcare, energy). Many industry leaders are concerned but lack connectivity or information to secure infrastructure.
- Information Sharing: Integrating and sharing intelligence where possible is critical.
Iran’s Capabilities and Foreseeable Consequences
- Previous Assessment: Last year’s assessment stated Iran’s conventional forces could inflict damage, execute regional strikes, and disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
- Lead-up to War: Questioned if agencies maintained the assessment that Iran had the capability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz if attacked.
- Director Gabbard’s Response: IC has continuously provided intelligence to the president and his team.
- Global Energy Crisis: Current high gas prices and economic danger are seen as foreseen consequences of the war.
- Iranian Response to Regime Change Attack: Did agencies assess that Iran could attack U.S. forces and Americans in the region if attacked?
- Director Gabbard’s Response: IC has always taken seriously the threat of Iran’s missile capabilities and risks to American troops.
- Lack of Clear Warning: Difficulty in seeing how agencies couldn’t provide a clear warning that Iran would attack U.S. people if attacked.
- President’s Remarks: Donald Trump stated nobody thought Iran would hit Gulf States.
- Director Gabbard’s Response: IC assesses potential threats and provides assessments to policymakers.
FISA Section 702 Reauthorization
- Expansion of Provision: A provision expanded the types of companies and individuals forced to assist the government in spying.
- General Hartman’s Response: The provision allows collection of foreign intelligence on personnel outside the U.S. He prefers to discuss specifics in a closed session.
- Senator Wyden’s Concern: Calls the provision dangerously broad, potentially roping in anyone with access to a cable box, Wi-Fi router, or server. States it had “no value.”
- General Hartman Clarification: Confirms Section 702 does not give authority to target Americans with cable boxes or Wi-Fi routers.
Commercial Data Purchases (Location Data)
- FBI Policy (Director Patel): FBI uses all tools consistent with the Constitution and laws (ECPA) to perform its mission, including purchasing commercially available information. This has led to valuable intelligence.
- Buying Americans’ Location Data: Senator Wyden presses if the FBI will buy Americans’ location data without a warrant, calling it an “end-run around the Fourth Amendment.”
- DIA Policy (General Adams): Purchases of commercially available information align with the Constitution and protect U.S. person information. Passed through legal channels and compliant with laws.
- Commercially Available Data: Observation that if anyone can buy it, the FBI should be able to use it to locate criminals, similar to trash left on the curb.
Iran’s Threat and “Imminent” Determination
- Director Ratcliffe’s Disagreement: Disagrees with the former head of the National Counterterrorism Center (Mr. Kent) who resigned stating Iran did not represent an imminent threat.
- Iran’s Continued Threat: Intelligence reflects Iran continues its nuclear ambitions and desire to build ballistic missiles threatening U.S. troops and allies.
- Historical Context: Iran has been at war with the West since 1979 and has American blood on its hands. Poses an immediate threat.
Lone Offender Terrorism and Interagency Cooperation
- Threat Assessment: Al-Qaeda and ISIS intend to launch operations targeting the U.S., most likely through U.S.-based lone offenders.
- Recent Incidents:
- Austin, Texas shooting (March 1st): Lone gunman wore an “Allah” sweatshirt and an Iranian flag shirt.
- Old Dominion shooting: Individual previously sentenced for attempting to support ISIS released, then committed another attack.
- FBI Role: Applauds FBI’s role in stopping attacks but acknowledges they can’t be everywhere.
- Cooperation with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI): Inquiry into cooperation countering terrorist attacks.
- Director Patel’s Response: Essential to cooperate with the entire interagency. FBI co-leads 59 Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs) with DHS nationwide.
- JTTF Model: Expanded FBI’s 56 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).
- Impact: HSTFs improve crime reduction in cities (e.g., New Orleans murder rate drop).
- DHS Funding Dispute: Senator raises concerns about Senate Democrats voting against funding DHS, including HSI, TSA, FEMA. DHS employees are unpaid.
- Consequences of Underfunding: Refusal to fund DHS functions, including HSI, makes Americans less safe.
- Collaboration Examples:
- Afghan Nationals: Vetting ~190,000 unvetted Afghan nationals admitted to the U.S., some with links to terrorist attacks. FBI and DHS partners are
Opening Statements: Threats and Intelligence Community Reforms
The world presents ongoing dangers, particularly to the United States . However, recent leadership and intelligence efforts have enhanced American safety .
Successes Against Iran
- The Iranian regime, a long-standing global threat, has been significantly weakened .
- Key actions include:
- Devastating Iran’s nuclear facilities .
- Eliminating top Iranian leadership .
- Damaging its military, navy, and missiles .
- Neutralizing its proxies and crippling its economy .
- America has taken a firm stance after years of indecision .
- The successful Maduro raid in Venezuela, resulting in his imprisonment, was an operation of significant difficulty executed without American casualties .
- These operations highlight the critical role of timely, accurate, and fact-based intelligence .
Intelligence Community Improvements
- Reforms have refocused intelligence agencies on their core missions: stealing adversary secrets to provide vital intelligence .
- Examples of progress:
- CIA increased foreign intelligence reporting by 25% .
- CIA is on track to hire more officers this year than in the last quarter century .
- Continued needs:
- Adequate tools and resources for intelligence personnel .
- FISA Section 702 reauthorization .
- Sufficient intelligence budget for operations against Iran and narco-terrorists .
- Urging continued personnel and institutional reforms to prevent bureaucratic bloat and political bias .
- The Intelligence Authorization Act laid the groundwork for efficiency by reorganizing the ODNI and enhancing security .
- Future goals include growing collector cadres, investing in core capabilities, and defending space assets .
Vice Chairman’s Concerns: Erosion of Safeguards and Election Integrity
- Recent developments raise concerns about the erosion of safeguards protecting democracy and security .
- Foreign adversaries (Russia, China, Iran) actively seek to influence American elections through cyber intrusions, disinformation, and covert operations .
- DNI’s role: The DNI is responsible for coordinating intelligence on foreign election interference and sharing information.
- The Foreign Malign Influence Center within the ODNI was eliminated .
- The committee has repeatedly requested briefings on legitimate foreign threats but received no response .
- DNI’s involvement in domestic matters:
- Participation in the Fulton County, Georgia raid to seize election ballots, reportedly based on debunked conspiracy theories without a foreign connection .
- Involvement in seizing voting machines from Puerto Rico .
- Concerns about the misuse of national security powers to interfere in domestic politics and potentially influence upcoming elections .
- The administration has appointed individuals promoting election conspiracy theories, such as the White House Director of Election Security and Integrity, Kurt Olsson .
- The committee’s creation post-Watergate emphasizes the need for guardrails around intelligence and law enforcement agencies .
- FBI dysfunction: Politically motivated purges have led to agent exodus and redeployment from critical national security areas .
- Budget cuts at the FBI have impacted cyber, counterterrorism, and counterespionage .
- NSA and DIA leadership voids for months .
- CISA personnel losses .
- State Department crisis: Thousands of citizens trapped in a war zone with inadequate government assistance .
- Alienation of allies: Canada and the UK are pursuing trade deals with China due to perceived unreliability of the US .
- Cost of the Iran war: Billions of dollars, disrupted supply chains, and failed requests for allied assistance in the Strait of Hormuz .
- The Director of National Counterterrorism Center resigned, stating Iran posed no imminent threat .
- Omission from threat assessment: The annual threat assessment lacks mention of adversary attempts to influence American elections, a significant departure since 2017 .
Intelligence Community Testimony: Threat Assessment
Director Gabbard presents the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, emphasizing its basis in the Intelligence Community’s (IC) assessment, not personal opinions . The assessment prioritizes homeland threats, followed by global risks, aligning with the President’s national security strategy .
Homeland Defense and Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)
- Border Security: Strict enforcement at the US-Mexico border has drastically reduced illegal immigration . Encounters are down significantly compared to previous years .
- Migration Drivers: Potential instability in Cuba and Haiti, coupled with smugglers profiting from chaos, will continue to drive migration .
- TCO Threat: TCOs pose a daily threat primarily through drug trafficking, especially fentanyl .
- Fentanyl overdose deaths have decreased by 30% due to aggressive targeting of TCOs and precursor chemicals .
- Fentanyl potency has also decreased, suggesting supply chain disruptions .
- Mexico-based TCOs (Sinaloa, Jalisco New Generation Cartel) dominate fentanyl, heroin, meth, and cocaine smuggling .
- Colombia-based TCOs (FARC, ELN) are major cocaine producers, expanding to the Asia-Pacific .
- MS-13 operates within the US, contributing to violence and instability .
- TCOs will adapt operations, shifting production and trafficking methods .
Islamist Terrorism
- Persistent Threat: Geographically diverse Islamist terrorist actors aim to spread ideology globally and harm Americans .
- Al-Qaeda and ISIS: While weaker than at their peak, their ideology, sometimes linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, poses a threat .
- Recruitment and Propaganda: Groups use ideology for recruitment and financial support, aiming to establish Islamist caliphates . President Trump’s designation of some Muslim Brotherhood chapters as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) enhances security .
- Shift in Tactics: Groups focus on information operations to spread propaganda and inspire individuals in the West .
- US Counterterrorism Efforts: Successes in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria in 2025 degraded leadership and planning capabilities .
- Border Enforcement: Strict border measures and deportations have reduced access to the homeland for suspected terrorists . Encounters with suspected terrorists at the border are minimal .
- Domestic Attacks: In 2025, there were at least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the US. Law enforcement disrupted at least 15 US-based plotters, many influenced online . An example is the synagogue attack in Michigan, linked to Hezbollah .
- Overseas Threats: Al-Qaeda and ISIS pose the biggest threats overseas in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. ISIS in Syria is trying to rebuild its ranks .
State Actors and Advanced Capabilities
- Kinetic and Cyber Warfare: State actors are developing new capabilities [27:10].
- Missile Threats: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are developing advanced missile systems capable of reaching the homeland. The IC projects over 16,000 missiles by 2035, up from over 3,000 .
- China and Russia are developing systems to bypass US missile defenses .
- North Korea’s ICBMs can reach US soil, and it aims to expand its arsenal .
- Pakistan may develop ICBMs capable of striking the homeland .
- Iran could develop ICBMs before 2035, though Operation Epic Fury has impacted its missile capabilities .
- Cyber Domain: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups aim to compromise US networks for intelligence, disruption, and financial gain .
- China and Russia are persistent threats with ongoing R&D .
- North Korea’s cyber program is sophisticated, stealing approximately $2 billion in cryptocurrency in 2025 to fund weapons programs .
- Ransomware groups are shifting to faster, high-volume attacks .
- Artificial Intelligence (AI): AI will accelerate cyber threats, with both attackers and defenders using AI tools . An AI tool was used for data extortion in August 2025 against various sectors .
- Arctic: Russia and China aim to increase their presence through military activity, trade, and resource extraction .
- AI and Quantum Computing: China is the most capable AI competitor. AI adoption poses risks, potentially aiding weapons design and battlefield decision-making . Quantum computing advancements could provide a significant advantage and break current encryption .
- Contested Domains: The space domain is increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counterspace capabilities . Nuclear proliferation and chemical/biological warfare capabilities continue to grow .
Western Hemisphere Threats
- Regional Instability: Flagging economies, crime, corruption, and migration flows create risks. Strategic competitors seek influence .
- Venezuela: A shift towards cooperation with the US is noted following Maduro’s arrest, with efforts to open its economy and release political prisoners .
- Trade Uncertainty: The USMCA review may increase uncertainty for Latin American countries reliant on Mexico as an export destination .
- Strategic Competition: China, Russia, and Iran likely seek to sustain engagement in the region . China’s demand for raw materials drives economic outreach, while Russia seeks to expand security ties with Cuba and Nicaragua .
Asia-Pacific Threats
- China: Rapid military modernization aims for world-class status by mid-century, including capabilities to deter US/allied forces and potentially seize Taiwan . China likely prefers peaceful reunification but is prepared for conflict .
- North Korea: Remains a concern due to WMDs, cyber activities, and willingness to use asymmetric capabilities. Partnership with Russia is growing, and ties with China are improving . North Korea’s support for Russia in Ukraine has enhanced its capabilities and combat experience . They continue to develop strategic weapons, nuclear warheads, and biological/chemical weapons .
European and Middle Eastern Threats
- Russia: Retains capability to challenge US interests globally. The most dangerous threat is escalation in ongoing conflicts (Ukraine) or new conflicts, potentially involving nuclear weapons . Putin invests in defense and novel capabilities, including hypersonic missiles and undersea assets . Russia uses “grey-zone” tactics and is building counterspace capabilities, including a nuclear counterspace weapon . Russia maintains the upper hand in Ukraine; negotiations are ongoing .
- Middle East:Operation Epic Fury is driving change, following Hamas’s attack and the 12-day war, which weakened Iran and its proxies .
- Iran: The regime is intact but degraded. Its conventional military power projection is largely destroyed . Internal tensions are likely to increase due to economic decline . Iran continues attacks on US and allied interests. If the regime survives, it will likely rebuild military forces over years . Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran refused IAEA access and was recovering from damage to its nuclear infrastructure .
Strategic Cooperation and Africa
- China, Russia, North Korea, Iran: These nations see the US as a competitor or adversary and may selectively cooperate, potentially bolstering their capabilities. However, these relationships are primarily bilateral and constrained by divergent interests and concerns about confronting the US .
- Africa: Conflicts persist due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support.
- Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea could escalate .
- Somalia’s elections may distract from counterterrorism against al-Shabaab .
- The civil war in Sudan continues .
- ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel is intensifying attacks .
- African governments may leverage critical minerals for partnerships .
- Concurrent conflicts pose risks to US citizens and regional stability .
Closing Remarks
- The Intelligence Community remains committed to providing timely, unbiased intelligence to policymakers .
Defense Systems and Cyber Security
Missile Defense Systems
- Arrow and Iron Dome systems manufactured in Camden, Arkansas, are crucial for Israel’s defense and protect hundreds of thousands of American citizens and troops in the region .
- Arrow system: High-altitude defense, primarily against Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) .
- Iron Dome: Closer-range system, protecting against rockets .
- These systems, combined with US systems, create a shield against Iranian attacks .
Growing Cyber Protection Teams
- Challenge: Need for more cybersecurity manpower .
- Recommendations:
- Share top-secret classified information and indications/warnings .
- Establish a joint reserve cyber organization for advanced training and intelligence access .
- Control funding at CyberCom and NSA to mobilize personnel for difficult problems .
CIA Contributions to Operations
- The CIA has become more aggressive and focused on its core mission: stealing secrets to provide policymakers with a decisive strategic advantage .
- Successes:
- Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Absolute Resolve relied on flawless intelligence .
- Increased asset/human source base by 25% .
- Foreign intelligence collection up by 25% overall, and 100% in areas like China .
- Technology and AI collection up by 45% .
- Counter-narcotics operations up by 70% .
- Counterterrorism successes are “off the charts good” (classified) .
- A 32-year veteran described the past year as the best he could remember for the CIA .
Iran’s Intercontinental Missile Threat
- Iran’s development of longer-range ballistic missiles is a concern .
- Iran has experience with booster technologies through its space launch vehicle program .
- If unimpeded, Iran could develop missiles capable of reaching the continental US .
- Degrading Iran’s missile production capabilities through Operation Epic Fury is crucial for national security .
DNI’s Involvement in Domestic Law Enforcement
- Fulton County Raid: Director Gabbard was present at the FBI operation to seize ballots in Fulton County, Georgia .
- The warrant reportedly lacked foreign interference nexus and was based on conspiracy theories .
- ODNI Authority: Congress granted ODNI responsibility for election security and counterintelligence in 2021 . ODNI also oversees DHS and the FBI, both involved in election security .
- Correction: Director Gabbard stated she did not participate in a law enforcement activity, only observed at the President’s request .
- President’s Request: The President requested her presence to work with the FBI and observe the warrant execution .
- Vulnerability Assessment: The purpose was to understand vulnerabilities in election systems for 2026 .
- Foreign Interference Reporting: The committee has not received required briefings on foreign interference. The annual threat assessment did not mention foreign interference . Director Gabbard stated the IC remains focused on potential threats, but “so far there has been none” .
- Draft Executive Order: Reports suggest a draft EO to seize ballots or involve federal forces for the 2026 election, citing China. Directors Patel and Gabbard deny knowledge of such a draft EO .
Iran’s Nuclear Program and War Justification
- Operation Midnight Hammer: Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was allegedly “obliterated,” with no efforts to rebuild since . This paragraph was omitted from the oral statement, possibly due to President Trump’s claims of an imminent threat .
- Strait of Hormuz: President Trump expressed surprise at Iran’s actions regarding the Strait of Hormuz . Intelligence assessments historically indicated Iran’s capability and willingness to leverage control of the Strait .
- Briefings to the President: Internal conversations about briefings are not disclosed. However, Iran had specific plans to hit US interests and energy sites in the region, leading to force protection measures .
Counterterrorism Efforts and Threats
- ISIS and Al-Qaeda: While organizationally smaller than at their peak, they remain a significant threat, operating in various regions (Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, Iraq) .
- Shifting Tactics: Terrorist groups increasingly focus on online recruitment and propaganda to inspire individuals, especially lone offenders .
- FBI Counterterrorism: The FBI has expanded resources to online environments, collecting biometric capabilities and increasing intelligence production . In December 2025, the FBI stopped four terrorist attacks (ISIS-inspired and others) using online and in-person detection .
- Critical Infrastructure Threat: The Chinese “Volt Typhoon” incursions highlight a significant threat to US critical infrastructure (electric grid, communication systems) .
- The ODNI is working with partners (NSA) to detect evolving threats .
- Building private sector partnerships is crucial, as many industry leaders are concerned but lack connectivity and information to secure their infrastructure .
FISA Section 702 and Data Purchases
- Section 702 Expansion: A provision expanded the scope of companies and individuals who can be compelled to assist the government in spying, focused on collecting foreign intelligence on individuals outside the US . General Hartman stated this did not grant authority to target Americans with cable boxes or Wi-Fi routers .
- Commercial Data Purchases: The FBI purchases commercially available information, including location data derived from internet advertising, consistent with the Constitution and ECPA . This has led to valuable intelligence .
- Buying Americans’ location data without a warrant is seen as circumventing the Fourth Amendment .
- The DIA also purchases commercially available information in alignment with the Constitution .
- The argument is made that if data is commercially available and can help locate dangerous individuals, law enforcement should be able to access it, similar to accessing trash placed on the curb .
Iran’s Threat and US Response
- Imminent Threat Disagreement: Director Ratcliffe disagrees with the assessment that Iran does not pose an imminent threat, stating intelligence reflects the contrary . Iran has been a constant threat since 1979 and poses an immediate threat .
- Lone Offenders: The threat assessment notes that al-Qaeda and ISIS are most likely to attack the US through US-based lone offenders .
- Recent Incidents: Examples include shootings in Austin, Texas, and Virginia, highlighting the threat from individuals influenced by foreign terrorist organizations .
- FBI and HSI Collaboration: The FBI cooperates with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and other agencies through Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs) to counter terrorism and criminal activity .
- Afghan Nationals: The FBI, with DHS partners, is vetting Afghan nationals admitted to the US, some of whom have committed terrorist acts . This vetting process requires significant resources and collaboration with DHS’s large workforce and data access .
- Funding Dispute: A dispute over funding for DHS agencies, including HSI, TSA, and FEMA, is mentioned, with implications for national security and safety .
Deliberations on Iran Action
- President’s Decision: Questions arise about intelligence community presence and input during the President’s final decision-making process regarding action against Iran .
- Intelligence Briefings: Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe confirm numerous briefings with the President during the lead-up to the war .
- Discrepancy in Reporting: Concerns are raised about a potential discrepancy between intelligence assessments (e.g., Iran’s capability to close the Strait of Hormuz) and the President’s public statements of surprise .
- Daily Briefs: The President receives intelligence briefings frequently, averaging 10-15 times a week, sometimes multiple times a day .
Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment Hearing Opening Statements
Committee Chairman’s Remarks
- Praise for Intelligence Agencies: Commended the dedication, sacrifice, and service of intelligence professionals who ensure American safety globally.
- Reduced Global Danger: Stated that under President Trump’s leadership, the world is less dangerous for Americans due to efforts against threats like Iran.
- Successes Against Iran: Highlighted the degradation of Iran’s regime through military and intelligence operations, including strikes on nuclear facilities, leadership, military, navy, missiles, proxies, and economy.
- Operation in Venezuela: Noted the successful military and intelligence operation resulting in Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro’s imprisonment in New York, with no American lives lost.
- Intelligence Community’s Role: Emphasized the critical need for timely, accurate, and fact-based intelligence from agencies to support successful operations.
- Warning to Adversaries: Issued a warning that no stone will be left unturned in uncovering threats.
- Purpose of Hearing: To provide an unvarnished and unbiased account of remaining threats, including China, North Korea, Russia, and domestic cartels.
- Agency Reforms: Praised improvements in intelligence agencies over the past year due to reforms focused on core missions, such as increasing foreign intelligence reporting and hiring officers.
- Support for FISA Section 702: Advocated for clean reauthorization of FISA Section 702.
- Need for Increased Funding: Highlighted the necessity of supplemental funding for intelligence agencies, similar to military needs, particularly for operations against Iran and terrorist organizations.
- Continued Reforms: Urged continued personnel and institutional reforms to prevent bureaucratic bloat, political bias, and excessive caution.
- Intelligence Authorization Act: Mentioned the foundation laid by the first intelligence authorization act for a more efficient intelligence community, including reorganizing ODNI and improving security.
- Future Goals: Expressed commitment to growing collector cadres, investing in core capabilities, developing new space defense capabilities, and codifying reforms against bureaucracy.
Vice Chairman’s Remarks
- Thanks to Intelligence Community: Acknowledged the tens of thousands of individuals in the intelligence community keeping the country safe.
- Importance of Hearings: Stressed the significance of public hearings due to the secret nature of intelligence work.
- Concerns about Safeguards: Expressed concerns about the erosion of safeguards protecting democracy and security, particularly regarding election integrity.
- Foreign Election Interference: Detailed historical warnings from the intelligence community about foreign adversaries (Russia, China, Iran) attempting to influence U.S. elections through cyber intrusions, disinformation, and covert operations.
- DNI’s Role in Election Security: Outlined the DNI’s statutory responsibility to coordinate intelligence on foreign election interference, warn the public, and share information.
- Elimination of Foreign Malign Influence Center: Noted the elimination of this center within ODNI and the lack of a designated official for coordinating election threat responses.
- Lack of Briefings: Reported that the committee has repeatedly requested briefings on foreign election threats without response.
- DNI’s Involvement in Domestic Matters: Criticized the DNI’s alleged involvement in domestic issues, specifically participating in a law enforcement raid for election ballots in Fulton County, Georgia.
- Warrant Predicate: Highlighted that the warrant for the raid was based on debunked conspiracy theories without a foreign connection.
- Misuse of National Security Powers: Raised concerns about the DNI potentially misusing national security powers for domestic political interference and to potentially justify unconstitutional election control efforts.
- President’s Rhetoric on Elections: Cited the president’s calls for nationalizing elections and false statements about election fraud.
- Conspiracy Theorists in Government: Mentioned the appointment of individuals promoting election conspiracy theories, like the White House Director of Election Security and Integrity, Kurt Olsson.
- Committee’s Origin: Recalled the committee’s creation after Watergate to prevent unconstitutional abuses.
- Deterioration of Agencies: Expressed concern that actions over the past year have weakened intelligence and law enforcement agencies, citing politically motivated purges at the FBI, budget cuts, and leadership vacancies at NSA and DIA.
- Impact on State Department: Described the consequences for the State Department, leaving citizens trapped in war zones with limited government assistance.
- Alienation of Allies: Noted that allies like Canada and the UK are seeking trade deals with China due to a perceived lack of U.S. dependability.
- Consequences of Iran War: Highlighted the war’s cost in lives, taxpayer money, and disrupted supply chains, with allies not responding to calls to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
- Omission from Threat Assessment: Pointed out the absence of information on adversary attempts to influence American elections in the annual threat assessment since 2017.
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Testimony
Opening Statement
- Statutory Responsibility: Stated that the briefing is provided in accordance with ODNI’s statutory responsibility.
- Intelligence Community Assessment: Emphasized that the briefing reflects the IC’s assessment of threats, not personal views.
- Threat Prioritization: Followed the structure of the president’s national security strategy, starting with homeland threats, then global risks.
Homeland Threats
- Border Security: Highlighted strict enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border, resulting in an 83.8% decrease in illegal immigration encounters in January 2026 compared to January 2025.
- Drivers of Migration: Acknowledged that factors like instability in Cuba and Haiti, and the profit-seeking nature of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), will continue to drive migration.
- Counter-Narcotics Efforts: Reported a 30% decrease in fentanyl overdose deaths from September 2024 to September 2025, attributed to aggressive targeting of TCOs and disruptions to precursor chemical flows.
- Fentanyl Potency Decrease: Noted a likely decrease in fentanyl potency due to supply chain disruptions.
- Key TCOs: Identified Mexico-based TCOs (Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel) and Colombia-based groups (FARC, ELN) as major players in drug trafficking.
- MS-13 Threat: Described MS-13’s presence in the U.S. and its involvement in violent crime and regional instability.
- Adaptation of TCOs: Anticipated TCOs would adapt operations in response to counterdrug pressures.
Islamist Terrorism
- Persistent Threat: Acknowledged that Islamist terrorist actors continue to pose a threat globally, even if al-Qaeda and ISIS are weaker than their peaks.
- Ideological Spread: Highlighted the threat posed by the spread of Islamist ideology, sometimes linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, for recruitment and political objectives.
- Shift in Tactics: Noted a shift towards information operations, propaganda, and inspiring individuals in the West, rather than large-scale complex attacks.
- Counterterrorism Successes: Cited successes in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria in 2025 for degrading terrorist leadership and planning capabilities.
- Border Enforcement Impact: Stated that strict border enforcement and deportations have reduced access to the homeland for suspected terrorists.
- Domestic Plots: Reported three Islamist terrorist attacks in the U.S. in 2025 and the disruption of 15 U.S.-based plotters, many with online contact with foreign terrorist organizations.
- Overseas Threats: Identified al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP), ISIS-K in South Asia, and ISIS in Syria as the most likely groups conducting external plotting.
- ISIS Rebuilding Efforts: Indicated ISIS in Syria is seeking to rebuild by recruiting from former detainees and displaced persons.
State Actors and Advanced Capabilities
- Kinetic and Cyber Warfare: Noted state actors posing broader risks through advancements in kinetic and cyber warfare.
- Missile Threats: Assessed that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan are developing advanced missile systems, potentially expanding threats to the homeland to over 16,000 missiles by 2035.
- Penetrating Missile Defenses: Assessed China and Russia are developing systems to bypass U.S. missile defenses.
- North Korea’s ICBMs: Confirmed North Korea’s ICBMs can reach U.S. soil, with a commitment to expanding its arsenal.
- Pakistan’s Missile Development: Mentioned Pakistan’s potential ICBM development.
- Iran’s ICBM Potential: Assessed Iran could develop militarily viable ICBMs before 2035, though Operation Epic Fury’s impact on Iran’s missile capabilities is still being determined.
- Cyber Threats: Assessed that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups will continue to target U.S. networks and critical infrastructure for intelligence, disruption, and financial gain.
- China and Russia as Persistent Cyber Threats: Identified China and Russia as the most persistent cyber threats.
- North Korea’s Cyber Program: Described North Korea’s cyber program as sophisticated and agile, noting significant cryptocurrency theft in 2025 funding its weapons programs.
- Ransomware Groups: Noted increased boldness and speed of ransomware attacks.
- AI Impact on Cyber: Assessed that artificial intelligence will accelerate cyber threats, used by both attackers and defenders.
- AI-Driven Attacks: Cited an example of an AI tool used for data extortion in August 2025.
Arctic and Emerging Technologies
- Arctic Interests: Assessed Russia and China aim to increase their presence in the Arctic through trade, resource extraction, and military activity.
- Russia’s Arctic Ambitions: Noted Russia’s desire for polar great power status and deployment of military forces.
- China’s Arctic Engagement: Described China’s limited efforts to advance strategic and economic interests in the Arctic.
- AI as a Defining Technology: Assessed China as the most capable competitor in AI, which is rapidly changing the threat landscape and enabling autonomous actions.
- AI Risks: Highlighted risks associated with AI adoption, including its use in weapons design and battlefield targeting.
- Quantum Computing Advantage: Stated that early developers of quantum computers will gain a significant technological advantage, potentially breaking current encryption.
Global Security Landscape
- Contested Domains: Identified the global security landscape as volatile, with increasing armed conflict and growing willingness of powers to use force.
- Contested Space Domain: Assessed the space domain as increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counterspace capabilities.
- Proliferation Threats: Mentioned the growing threats of nuclear proliferation and advancements in chemical and biological warfare.
Western Hemisphere
- Regional Risks: Identified flagging economies, high crime, organized crime, migration, corruption, and narcotics trafficking as risks to U.S. interests, with strategic competitors seeking influence.
- Venezuela’s Shift: Assessed a shift in Venezuela’s leadership towards cooperation with the U.S. following Maduro’s arrest.
- USMCA Review Impact: Predicted increased uncertainty in Latin America due to the 2026 USMCA review.
- Competitor Engagement: Noted China, Russia, and Iran seeking to sustain economic, political, and military engagement in Latin America.
China
- Military Modernization: Assessed China’s continued rapid military modernization across all domains to achieve world-class status by mid-century.
- Taiwan Objective: Stated China’s goal to deter U.S. and allied forces and potentially seize Taiwan by force.
- Preference for Reunification: Assessed China likely prefers peaceful reunification with Taiwan over conflict.
North Korea
- Regional Concern: Assessed North Korea as a persistent source of regional and global concern due to its WMD, conventional military, cyber activities, and willingness to use asymmetric capabilities.
- Partnerships: Noted growing partnerships with Russia and improved ties with China.
- Ukraine War Impact: Assessed North Korea’s support for Russia in Ukraine has increased its capabilities through combat experience and equipment.
- Strategic Weapons Development: Confirmed continued development of strategic weapons programs, nuclear warhead stockpiles, and biological/chemical weapons capabilities.
Russia
- Global Challenge Capability: Assessed Russia’s capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally through military and non-military means.
- Escalatory Spiral Risk: Identified the potential for an escalatory spiral in conflicts like Ukraine or new conflicts leading to direct hostilities, including nuclear deployment, as the most dangerous threat.
- Investment in Defense: Noted Putin’s continued investment in the defense industrial base and novel capabilities.
- Advanced Systems: Mentioned Russia’s advanced systems, including hypersonic missiles and undersea capabilities, designed to negate U.S. military advantage.
- Grey Zone Tactics: Highlighted Russia’s reliance on grey zone tactics below the level of armed conflict.
- Counterspace Capabilities: Stated Russia is building counterspace capabilities and developing a nuclear counterspace weapon posing a threat to space architecture.
- Ukraine War: Assessed Russia maintained the upper hand in the war against Ukraine, likely continuing a slow war of attrition until objectives are met.
Middle East
- Operation Epic Fury Impact: Assessed Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change, weakening Iran and its proxies.
- Iran’s Regime Status: Assessed the Iranian regime remains intact but degraded due to attacks on leadership and military capabilities, with largely destroyed conventional power projection.
- Iran’s Strategic Position: Noted Iran’s significantly degraded strategic position due to maximum pressure campaigns and sanctions.
- Internal Tensions: Assessed internal tensions in Iran are likely to increase as the economy worsens.
- Rebuilding Efforts: Assessed that if the regime survives, it will likely begin a yearslong effort to rebuild military, missile, and UAV forces.
- Nuclear Program: Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran was recovering from damage to its nuclear infrastructure and refusing IAEA access.
Strategic Cooperation Among Adversaries
- Perceived Competition: Assessed China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran see the U.S. as a strategic competitor or adversary.
- Active Conflict with Iran: Noted Iran is engaged in active conflict with the U.S.
- Selective Cooperation: Assessed these countries are likely to continue selective cooperation, potentially bolstering individual capabilities and threats to U.S. interests.
- Constraining Factors: Identified bilateral relationships, divergent sovereign interests, and concerns over directly confronting the U.S. as constraints on their cooperation.
Africa
- Persistent Conflicts: Assessed conflicts in Africa are likely to persist due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support.
- Ethiopia-Eritrea Tensions: Noted potential for rapid acceleration to conflict.
- Somalia Instability: Predicted contentious elections could distract from counterterrorism efforts against al-Shabaab.
- Sudan Civil War: Mentioned the ongoing civil war.
- ISIS in West Africa: Noted increased attacks and expansion of operations by ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel.
- Critical Minerals Partnerships: Assessed African governments will likely use wealth in critical minerals to seek beneficial partnerships.
- U.S. Citizen Risk: Stated concurrent conflicts and crises put U.S. citizens at risk and cause further instability.
Closing Remarks
- Commitment to Intelligence: Reaffirmed commitment to providing timely, unbiased intelligence to policymakers for decision-making and ensuring American safety.
Questions and Answers
Missile Defense Systems (Arrow & Iron Dome)
- General Adams’ Explanation: Described the Arrow system as high-altitude defense against medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and the Iron Dome as a closer-in system against rockets. The combination with U.S. systems creates a shield against Iranian attacks.
Cybersecurity Manpower Growth
- General Hartman’s Recommendations: Advocated for sharing top-secret classified information, establishing a joint reserve cyber organization, ensuring advanced training, providing access to intelligence, and controlling funding at CyberCom and NSA for difficult problems.
CIA Contributions to Operations
- Director Ratcliffe’s Remarks:
- Promised a more aggressive CIA focused on its core mission of stealing secrets for policymakers.
- Highlighted successes like Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Absolute Resolve, enabled by flawless intelligence.
- Reported a 25% increase in asset stability and foreign intelligence collection, with a 100% increase in China-related intelligence and a 45% increase in tech/AI intelligence.
- Noted a 70% increase in counter-narcotics operations.
- Described counterterrorism successes as “off the charts good.”
- Quoted a retiring veteran stating it was the best year the CIA has ever had, reflecting high morale and effective work.
Iran’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Threat
- Senator’s Concern: Expressed concern about Iran potentially developing an ICBM within six months by combining space launch and re-entry vehicle technologies.
- Director Ratcliffe’s Assessment: Confirmed Iran’s progress in booster technologies through its space launch program and the threat posed by longer-range ballistic missiles (up to 3,000 km) that could threaten Europe. If unimpeded, Iran could develop missiles capable of reaching the continental U.S.
- Operation Epic Fury’s Importance: Stressed the importance of Operation Epic Fury in degrading Iran’s missile production capabilities for national security.
DNI’s Involvement in Fulton County Raid
- Senator Warner’s Question: Questioned the DNI’s authority to involve herself in a domestic law enforcement activity like the Fulton County ballot seizure, noting the warrant lacked foreign interference nexus and was based on conspiracy theories.
- DNI Gabbard’s Response:
- Stated ODNI has statutory responsibility for election security and counterintelligence since 2021.
- Clarified that ODNI has purview over DHS and FBI, which have election security responsibilities.
- Corrected the statement that she participated in a law enforcement activity, stating she was present at Fulton County at the President’s request to work with the FBI and observe the action.
- Claimed she was unaware of the warrant’s contents.
- Stated the purpose was to understand vulnerabilities in election systems for 2026.
- Senator Warner’s Follow-up: Asked about the President’s specific request for her presence and why he knew about the affidavit before it was served.
- Lack of Foreign Interference Reports: Noted the failure to provide reports or mention foreign interference in the current threat assessment.
- DNI’s Response on Foreign Threat: Stated the IC remains focused on potential foreign threats, but none have been detected thus far. [தலாக:52:15]
- Draft Executive Order: Inquired about knowledge of a draft EO to potentially seize ballots or involve federal forces, citing reports of a similar EO related to China for 2026. Both DNI Gabbard and FBI Director Patel denied knowledge.
Iran’s Nuclear Program and Imminent Threat
- Senator Warner’s Concern: Questioned the omission of a paragraph from DNI Gabbard’s oral statement stating Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was obliterated by Operation Midnight Hammer with no rebuilding efforts, contrasting it with the President’s claim of an imminent threat.
- DNI Gabbard’s Explanation: Stated she omitted the paragraph due to time constraints.
- President’s Surprise: Inquired about President Trump’s alleged surprise at Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz and striking Gulf States. DNI Gabbard stated she was unaware of those remarks but noted Iran’s historical threats to leverage control of the Strait.
- Briefing the President: Asked if the President was briefed on the likely consequences of a war of choice, including Iran striking Gulf nations and closing the Strait of Hormuz. DNI Gabbard declined to divulge internal conversations but affirmed the IC provides objective intelligence.
Counterterrorism Efforts
- Senator Collins’ Concern: Argued that ISIS and al-Qaeda are growing and posing threats despite DNI Gabbard’s statement about them being weaker. Cited operations in Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, Iraq, Arabian Peninsula, and Central Africa.
- Resource Diversion: Suggested that focusing on great power competitors has diverted resources from counterterrorism.
- DNI Gabbard’s Clarification: Clarified that her statement referred to the organizational size and weakness compared to a decade ago, but fully concurred with the ongoing threat. Stated ODNI’s National Counterterrorism Center is ramping up efforts and dedicating resources.
- Changing Tactics: Highlighted concern over shifts towards individuals radicalized online with less contact with established groups.
- Integration: Emphasized daily integration across the intelligence community to thwart terrorist attacks.
FBI Counterterrorism Online Recruitment
- Director Patel’s Response:
- Acknowledged the shift to online recruitment by terrorist organizations.
- Detailed expanded resources to environments like the Threat Screening Center for biometric capabilities and increased intelligence production.
- Reported an increase in agents and intel analysts monitoring online environments.
- Cited the disruption of four terrorist attacks in December (California, Texas, North Carolina, Pennsylvania), three ISIS-inspired, detected online and in person.
Critical Infrastructure Protection (Chinese Salt Typhoon)
- Senator Collins’ Question: Asked about measures to deal with the threat to critical infrastructure, electric grid, and communication systems following the undetected Chinese Salt Typhoon incursions.
- DNI Gabbard’s Response:
- Stressed ongoing work with NSA and partners to detect evolving threats.
- Highlighted the importance of rebuilding strong partnerships with the private sector (telecom, finance, healthcare, energy).
- Expressed astonishment at industry leaders’ concerns yet lack of connectivity and information to secure their infrastructure.
- Emphasized strengthening partnerships and sharing information/intelligence.
Iran’s Threat Assessment and War Consequences
- Senator Wyden’s Questions:
- Asked if intelligence agencies maintained their assessment that Iran had the capability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz in the leadup to the war.
- Questioned the hedging on foreseen consequences of the war, calling it a potential historic mistake given the global energy crisis.
- Asked if agencies assessed Iran’s potential to attack U.S. forces and personnel in the region if attacked.
- DNI Gabbard’s Response:
- Affirmed the IC has continued to provide intelligence related to the operation.
- Stated the IC has always taken seriously the threat of Iranian missile capabilities and risks to American troops.
- When asked about the President’s surprise at Iranian strikes on Gulf States, reiterated she was not aware of those remarks but confirmed the IC assesses potential and existing threats to the region and provides them to policymakers.
FISA Section 702 Reauthorization
- Senator Wyden’s Inquiry to General Hartman: Asked if the expansion of companies and individuals forced to assist the government under Section 702 has yielded any intelligence.
- General Hartman’s Response: Stated the provision allows collection of foreign intelligence on personnel outside the U.S. and preferred to discuss specifics in a closed session.
- Senator Wyden’s Concern: Described the provision as dangerously broad and potentially intrusive, questioning its value.
- General Hartman’s Clarification: Assured that Section 702 does not grant authority to target Americans.
FBI Purchase of Commercial Data
- Senator Wyden’s Question to Director Patel: Inquired if the FBI still purchases commercial database information including location data derived from internet advertising and if they would commit to not buying Americans’ location data without a warrant.
- Director Patel’s Response: Stated the FBI uses all tools consistent with the Constitution and laws, including purchasing commercially available information that has led to valuable intelligence.
- Senator Wyden’s Concern: Interpreted this as buying Americans’ location data without a warrant, calling it an “outrageous end-run around the Fourth Amendment” and emphasizing the need for the Government Surveillance Reform Act.
- Phone Records Subpoena: Asked Director Patel if the government should obtain a court order for phone records, to which he responded that it typically does.
DIA Purchase of Location Data
- Senator Wyden’s Question to General Adams: Asked if the DIA still maintains its position that it can buy Americans’ location data without a warrant and if they are still doing so.
- General Adams’ Response: Stated that purchases of commercially available and publicly available information align with the Constitution and protect U.S. person information, passing through legal channels and complying with laws.
FISA Section 702 and Americans
- Senator Wyden’s Follow-up to General Hartman: Asked if Section 702 gives authority to target Americans with cable boxes or Wi-Fi routers.
- General Hartman’s Response: Confirmed that Section 702 does not grant authority to target Americans with such devices.
Commercially Available Data
- Chairman’s Remark: Observed that if data is “commercially available,” the FBI should be able to use it to locate criminals, comparing it to discarded trash having no privacy interest.
Iran’s Threat and Nuclear Ambitions
Senator asks Director Ratcliffe about the resignation of the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, who stated Iran did not represent an imminent threat. Director Ratcliffe disagrees, stating that intelligence reflects the contrary and that Iran poses a danger to the U.S. He confirms that Iran has been a constant threat since 1979 and poses an immediate threat.
Counterterrorism Efforts and Interagency Cooperation
The threat assessment indicates that Al-Qaeda and ISIS intend to launch operations targeting the U.S., likely through U.S.-based lone offenders.
Director Patel is asked about cooperation with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) in countering terrorist attacks. He highlights the FBI’s role in stopping attacks but acknowledges they can’t be everywhere.
To address this, the FBI has established 59 Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs) nationwide, co-led with DHS. These task forces expand the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) model.
These joint efforts aim to combat not only terrorism but also criminal activity and violence in cities, citing success in places like New Orleans.
Funding for Homeland Security
Senator questions whether the refusal to fund DHS functions, including HSI, makes Americans less safe. Director Patel confirms this, noting that DHS employees were without pay.
Collaboration with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)
Examples of FBI collaboration with HSI are requested. The discussion touches upon the admission of approximately 190,000 Afghan nationals into the U.S. without thorough vetting, some of whom have allegedly committed terrorist acts. The FBI, with DHS partners (HSI, CBP, ICE), is working to vet these individuals, though finding all of them remains a challenge.
This collaboration also includes identifying and removing violent gang members, ISIS-affiliated individuals, and Al-Qaeda-affiliated individuals.
Congressional Funding Disputes and DHS Agencies
A Senator clarifies that a bill to fully fund TSA, FEMA, CISA, and the Coast Guard was blocked by Republican colleagues, with the dispute focused on ICE.
Intelligence Briefings on Iran Operations
Questions are raised regarding whether Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, or their designees, were present during President Trump’s decision-making process for actions against Iran on February 27th-28th, and if an intelligence community assessment was present.
Director Ratcliffe states he has had numerous briefings with the President but doesn’t recall a specific meeting related to this decision.
Senator asks if the President was briefed on the intelligence community’s predictions, such as Iran’s potential to strike neighboring states or close the Strait of Hormuz, especially given the President’s statement “nobody knew.”
Director Ratcliffe confirms that Iran had specific plans to hit U.S. interests and energy sites in the region, leading to force protection measures. He notes that the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz is evident.
Director Gabbard adds that the intelligence community has consistently assessed Iran’s potential to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage.
Presidential Briefings and Intelligence Sharing
The frequency of the President’s daily intelligence briefs is discussed. Director Ratcliffe estimates he briefs the President on intelligence matters approximately 10-15 times per week, sometimes multiple times a day.
Russia-Iran Intelligence Sharing
A question arises about intelligence sharing between Russia and Iran concerning the current conflict. Director Ratcliffe states that if such sharing is occurring, it would be an appropriate topic for a closed session. He notes that according to the Department of War, any support Iran receives does not inhibit its operational effects.
Iranian Nuclear Capability and Regime Change
The possibility of regime change in Iran or eliminating highly enriched uranium without “boots on the ground” is raised. Director Ratcliffe defers details on Iran’s nuclear capability and methods to eliminate it to a closed session.
Climate Change and Migration as National Security Threats
A Senator notes the limited discussion of climate change and migration in the threat assessment, despite estimates of 200 million to 1 billion climate migrants by 2050. The Senator believes this poses a national security threat that should be addressed, referencing the impact of Syrian refugees on European politics.
Director Gabbard responds that while migration has multiple drivers, the annual threat assessment focuses on issues where operational action can be taken to protect U.S. interests, aligning with the President’s national security strategy.
Media Reports on Russia/China Collaboration with Iran
A Senator comments on media reports about Russian or Chinese collaboration with Iran, stating that the media is not a classification authority and such stories might be better suited for FBI investigation regarding unlawful disclosures of classified information. The Senator also notes that this type of activity is characteristic of Russia and China.
Impact of Funding Decisions on Law Enforcement
A Senator points out that proposed legislation would defund ICE and CBP, as well as Homeland Security Investigations, which conduct critical work on financial crimes, predators, and transnational gangs. The Senator emphasizes the desire to avoid defunding “immigration police.”
Operation Epic Fury and Ukraine Support
A Senator expresses concern about the consequences of “Operation Epic Fury” on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian invasion. General Adams is asked about the impact on U.S. supply chains and the capability to supply NATO allies and Ukraine.
General Adams states that the U.S. continues to observe the situation in Ukraine. He explains that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) focuses on foreign threats and capabilities, deferring questions about U.S. supply chain limitations and efforts to boost the defense industrial base to the Department of War.
Operation Epic Fury’s Impact on U.S. Defense Capabilities and Ukraine Support
A Senator presses for facts on how Operation Epic Fury has affected U.S. supply to Ukraine and NATO allies.
A representative confirms that efforts are underway to boost the defense industrial base, acknowledging that munitions expended during Epic Fury will have an impact.
Consequences of Operation Epic Fury on U.S. Defense and Ukraine
Director Ratcliffe is asked if the consequences of Operation Epic Fury on the U.S.’s ability to defend against adversaries like Russia or China, and specifically its impact on aiding Ukraine, were considered.
It’s stated that U.S. support for Ukraine includes military and economic assistance, but Operation Epic Fury has caused increased oil prices, and waivers on sanctions against Russian oil companies reportedly provide Russia with additional revenue.
Director Ratcliffe assures that intelligence is thoughtfully considered and policymakers can pursue objectives in the Middle East while supporting Ukraine.
Rationale and Goals of Operation Epic Fury
Director Ratcliffe describes the campaign against Iran as a specific, focused effort to address a 47-year problem, aimed at degrading Iran’s military capabilities. He emphasizes that the same professionals involved in previous successful operations are involved in Epic Fury.
He clarifies that the goals are to degrade and destroy Iran’s missile and drone inventory, delay and degrade its industrial base, and degrade the IRGC Navy.
Discrepancies in War Reporting and Intelligence
A Senator criticizes the lack of clear rationale, goals, and changing messages from President Trump regarding the “war” with Iran, citing statements about obliterating nuclear facilities and the potential for perpetual war.
The Senator contrasts the President’s statements with the intelligence community’s clear-eyed assessments regarding risks to military bases and personnel in the region.
Director Ratcliffe disputes the characterization of the war, stating that the goals are clear: degrade and destroy Iran’s missile and drone inventory, delay and degrade its industrial base, and degrade the IRGC Navy.
Intelligence Community Assessments vs. White House Statements on Iran
A Senator questions Director Ratcliffe about warnings given to President Trump regarding potential consequences if Israel assassinated the Supreme Leader, and the likelihood of a hardline puppet successor.
Director Ratcliffe addresses the distinction between political rhetoric and military/intelligence execution, stating that the goals of Operation Epic Fury were clearly defined.
Intelligence Community’s Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Director Gabbard confirms that the intelligence community’s assessment, as stated in her opening statement, was that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was “obliterated” by last summer’s air strikes and that no efforts have been made since then to rebuild its enrichment capability.
When asked if the intelligence community assessed an “imminent nuclear threat” posed by the Iranian regime, Director Gabbard states that it is not the intelligence community’s responsibility to determine what constitutes an imminent threat; that determination rests with the President based on the intelligence provided.
FBI Raid in Fulton County and Election Activities
A Senator questions Director Gabbard about her presence at an FBI raid on the Fulton County Elections Office on January 28th, where ballots and materials related to the 2020 election were seized.
Director Gabbard confirms her presence, stating it was at the request of the President to oversee the warrant execution, and that she has oversight over election security and counterintelligence. She denies handling any ballots or election materials and states she was inside an FBI evidence truck.
Russia, China, and Iran Collaboration
A Senator expresses disappointment that public reporting on China and Russia assisting Iran has not been publicly confirmed by the witnesses, hindering the public’s understanding of the war’s challenges.
It is reiterated that the media is not a classification authority, but such actions are characteristic of Russia and China.
International Scammers, AI, and Cyber Threats
Senator Langford highlights the growing threat of international scammers, accelerated by AI, targeting Americans’ families and incomes. He notes FBI estimates of significant financial losses to scammers and the emergence of sophisticated scams, including fake FBI recovery pages.
Director Patel outlines the FBI’s strategy: increasing online covert employees and platforms, strategically relocating intel analysts and support staff, and utilizing the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). The focus is on shutting down networks overseas, particularly in Cambodia and Burma, which are backed by the CCP.
Counter-Narcotics Efforts
Director Patel discusses the FBI’s successful counter-narcotics work, including significant seizures of methamphetamine and fentanyl. He emphasizes the importance of partnerships with state and local law enforcement, embedding task force officers, and standing up the Southern Border Intelligence Center.
Statistics on seized fentanyl and opioid overdose death decreases are shared, along with seizures of cocaine in Oklahoma. The priority of police partnerships and the reduction of task force officer onboarding time are highlighted.
Muslim Brotherhood and Terrorism Financing
Director Ratcliffe addresses the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly its financial and material support. He states that the CIA is focused on the counterterrorism front and has achieved significant successes against groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, surpassing the accomplishments of the prior administration.
Iran’s Regime Stability and Succession
A report indicating Iran’s regime will likely remain in place, though weakened and more hardline, with the IRGC exerting greater control, is discussed. Director Gabbard stands by the intelligence community’s assessment that the regime maintains power despite being degraded.
The impact of the Ayatollah’s death on the selection of a hardline successor is questioned, with details deferred to a closed hearing. The use of the deceased Ayatollah as a call to action by the regime is noted.
Regime Collapse and Air Power in Iran
General Adams discusses scenarios for Iranian regime collapse and the necessity of unconditional surrender. He states that specific precipitating factors for collapse would be discussed in a classified setting.
When asked if air power alone could destroy the regime, General Adams prefers not to speculate, citing the capabilities of the joint force.
Russia’s Intelligence Sharing with Iran and Support for Ukraine
A Senator references a statement that Russian leaders told President Trump they were not sharing intelligence with Iran and asks if Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe take President Putin at his word.
Director Gabbard states she does not take Vladimir Putin at his word. Both directors indicate that discussions about whether Russia and China are providing intelligence assistance to Iran would be for a classified session.
Collateral Effects of Operation Epic Fury on Russia/Ukraine Conflict
A Senator inquires about the effects of the battle on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, noting Russia’s potential benefit from oil sanctions relief and Ukraine’s potentially disrupted supply chain due to resources devoted to Epic Fury.
General Adams states the effect of Epic Fury on the Russia-Ukraine battle has been indirect. He notes that both Russians and Chinese are observing and learning from the joint force’s displayed capabilities.
Fundraising Email and Political Use of National Security Briefings
A Senator highlights a fundraising email from the President inviting donors to receive “private national security briefings,” featuring an image of a fallen service member. The Senator calls this a disgrace.
Director Gabbard asserts that providing such political briefings would violate the Hatch Act and states she is unaware of any such occurrences.
Intelligence Community’s Role and Independence
Director Gabbard confirms her responsibilities include providing timely, objective, and independent national intelligence to Congress, as mandated by law.
She reaffirms that her testimony represents the IC’s assessment of threats.
Intelligence Community Assessment vs. White House Claims on Imminent Threat
The White House statement describing the war as a campaign to “eliminate the imminent nuclear threat” is contrasted with the intelligence community’s assessment that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was “obliterated” with no efforts to rebuild.
Director Gabbard maintains that determining an “imminent threat” is the President’s responsibility, not the intelligence community’s, despite the latter’s role in providing threat assessments.
FBI Raid in Fulton County and Election Integrity Concerns
A Senator questions Director Gabbard about her presence at the FBI raid on the Fulton County Elections Office, her role in overseeing the warrant execution, and her awareness of ongoing inquiries into her election-related activities.
Director Gabbard confirms her presence was requested by the President to oversee the warrant execution, aligning with her statutory role in election security oversight. She denies handling ballots and states she was in an empty FBI evidence truck.
Adjournment and Closed Session
The open session is adjourned, with reconvening scheduled in 30 minutes for a closed session.
Senator Young’s absence due to attending a dignified transfer of remains is noted.
General Hartman is acknowledged for his service, with his upcoming retirement mentioned.
Members are reminded that questions for the record are due by the close of business on Friday, March 20th.
Tags: 2026 Iran Conflict, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, James Adams, John Ratcliffe, Kash Patel, National Security Agency, ODNI, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, SWJ Videos, William Hartman
