A Primer on Ukrainian Special Forces | Joint Force Quarterly

The article “A Primer on Ukrainian Special Forces” by Stringer and Vivdych at Joint Force Quarterly provides a corrective to a persistent Western misunderstanding: Ukrainian special operations forces (SOF) are not a unified, centrally controlled enterprise akin to USSOCOM, but rather a dispersed, interministerial ecosystem rooted in Soviet institutional legacy. This structural reality has direct implications for how Ukraine fights, adapts, and partners with the West.

The authors’ central argument is that Ukrainian SOF are best understood as “beyond joint.” Unlike the U.S. model, where SOF are consolidated under a single combatant command, Ukrainian special operations capabilities are distributed across the Ministry of Defense, intelligence services, internal security organizations, and law enforcement agencies.  This includes the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces Command (USOFCOM), as well as entities such as the Security Service’s Special Operations Center Alfa (SOCA), the National Police’s KORD units, the Border Guard’s DOZOR units, and likely special elements within the Foreign Intelligence Service. The result is a heterogeneous force structure with overlapping missions, varied authorities, and uneven coordination.

The dispersion, adaptability, and hybridization of Ukrainian special forces… may be less a liability than an evolutionary response to modern war… in a conflict characterized by contested rear areas and partisan activity, a more networked and less centralized architecture may offer advantages in resilience and operational reach.

This fragmentation is deliberate. It reflects a deeper historical lineage tracing back to Soviet spetsnaz. In contrast to Western SOF—where “special” denotes elite units performing specific missions—Soviet spetsnaz referred broadly to units with specialized capabilities or politically sensitive roles.  These units were distributed across multiple state organs, including military intelligence (GRU), the KGB, and internal security forces, creating a system of institutional competition and redundancy. Ukraine inherited this model after 1991, along with several GRU brigades and KGB-derived units, embedding dispersion into its security DNA.

Post-independence reforms attempted to rationalize this structure, but progress was uneven. Efforts in the 2000s to consolidate SOF stalled due to political constraints, and special units were often misused as elite infantry.  It was only after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas that Ukraine undertook serious reform, culminating in the establishment of USOFCOM as an independent service in 2016. Even then, however, consolidation was partial. Key capabilities remained outside the formal SOF structure, preserving the broader ecosystem.

The ongoing war since 2022 has both exposed and validated this model. Ukrainian SOF, broadly defined, have conducted a wide spectrum of operations: deep reconnaissance, sabotage in Russian territory, targeting of high-value systems, and support to partisan activity in occupied areas.  At the same time, they have frequently been employed as assault troops, reflecting both operational necessity and structural ambiguity about roles. Coordination across the ecosystem remains uneven, often relying on personal relationships rather than on institutionalized command-and-control arrangements.

NATO and U.S. SOF should assess the entire Ukrainian SOF “ecosystem” and coordinate assistance accordingly, ideally through centralized mechanisms such as SOCEUR or NATO Special Operations Headquarters.

One of the most interesting developments highlighted in the article is the emergence of non-traditional SOF formations, particularly the Kraken Regiment under the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR). Formed from volunteers, including veterans, civilians, and technical specialists, Kraken evolved rapidly into a highly capable unit conducting reconnaissance, direct action, and infrastructure-protection missions.  Conceptually, the authors suggest Kraken resembles an “elite partisan” or Ranger-like formation rather than a NATO-style SOF unit. Its success challenges Western assumptions about recruitment, force generation, and the boundaries of what constitutes special operations.

For Western audiences, the key takeaway is the danger of mirror-imaging. Much of NATO’s engagement with Ukraine has focused on USOFCOM because it most closely resembles Western SOF structures. However, this risks overlooking a significant portion of Ukraine’s special operations capability. Security force assistance (SFA) efforts have therefore been fragmented, with different U.S. agencies engaging their Ukrainian counterparts in parallel—military SOF with USOFCOM, law enforcement units with DEA or Border Patrol analogues—without sufficient integration.

The authors argue for a more holistic approach. NATO and U.S. SOF should assess the entire Ukrainian SOF “ecosystem” and coordinate assistance accordingly, ideally through centralized mechanisms such as SOCEUR or NATO Special Operations Headquarters. This would reduce duplication, align capabilities, and better match support to Ukraine’s actual force structure rather than an idealized Western model.

More broadly, the Ukrainian case raises questions about the future of SOF in large-scale combat operations. The dispersion, adaptability, and hybridization of Ukrainian special forces—blurring lines between military, intelligence, and law enforcement roles—may be less a liability than an evolutionary response to modern war. In a conflict characterized by contested rear areas, partisan activity, and deep strike operations, a more networked and less centralized SOF architecture may offer advantages in resilience and operational reach.

At the same time, the costs are evident: coordination challenges, inefficiencies in support, and the risk of misemployment. Ukraine’s experience suggests that effectiveness emerges from the ability to translate a diverse set of capabilities into coherent action under pressure.

In short, Ukrainian SOF are not a flawed version of the Western model—they are a different model altogether; understanding that distinction is the prerequisite for both effective partnership and meaningful lessons learned. Read A Primer on Ukrainian Special Forces.