The End of Battlefield Secrets: Addressing the OSINT Gap in U.S. Special Operations

Abstract: Modern conflict unfolds in an environment no longer covered in secrecy. In a new era of unprecedented transparency, publicly available information often shapes operations faster than classified intelligence. Drawing on lessons from Ukraine, this article argues that United States (U.S.) Special Operations must treat open-source intelligence (OSINT) as a primary discipline and reform organizational structures to enable faster decision-making. Without proactive OSINT integration, Special Operations risks ceding tempo and information advantage to adversaries who operate in the open.

Introduction 

After two decades of operating in politically denied environments and training partner forces during the Global War on Terror, U.S. Special Operations are transitioning away from Counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. With the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, the conclusion of the Syrian civil war in late 2024, and force reductions in Iraq, the counterinsurgency era is effectively closed. At the same time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and growing competition between world powers mark the return of conventional warfare. 

In the rebirth of traditional warfare, new battlefronts emerge. Instead of concealed maneuvers and protected communications, conflict now unfolds in a digital environment of environmental transparency and information confrontation. Environmental transparency is where civilian devices, social media, and commercial sensors continuously expose operational activity. Information confrontation is where adversaries weaponize that visibility to shape perception, disrupt decision cycles, and influence outcomes before armed forces can engage. In this new era of battle, open-source data, commercially available imagery, and real-time digital reporting shape mission plans long before a Special Operations team deploys to the battlefield. The forces that recognize and respond to this shift will dictate operational tempo on future fronts. The forces that do not will be forced to react to an environment defined by its foes.  

When Ukrainian forces began pinpointing Russian troop concentrations using open-source imagery and social media faster than conventional intelligence collection means could validate them, it became clear that information dominance now often starts outside classified channels. The lesson to be learned is profound: special operations units that treat OSINT as supplementary risk losing tactical and strategic momentum to adversaries who treat it as another primary weapon.   

OSINT as a Primary Intelligence Discipline 

Today’s digital battlespace is defined by transparency. Drones stream real-time footage, citizens post battlefield updates, and commercial satellites provide near-continuous global overwatch. In such an environment, the speed and accessibility of OSINT can outperform traditional intelligence collection methods, but only if integrated intentionally and organizationally. Research from the U.S. Army War College’s Lessons from Ukraine confirms that OSINT provided Ukrainian forces with early warning indicators, operational targeting value, and even tactical advantages along the front lines. Yet within U.S. Special Operations, OSINT is often used reactively or ad hoc, dependent upon informal networks rather than a systemic organizational structure.  

Why Special Operations Struggles to Integrate OSINT 

Rather than waiting for validation through traditional multi-layered channels, commanders incorporate OSINT into decision-making and action cycles, enabling faster targeting than Russia’s conventional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)-driven model (a model which the U.S. also relies upon)

The Department of Defense has pioneered advanced tools and invested heavily in OSINT capabilities at the strategic level, but operational and tactical integration remains uneven. Analysts and leaders recognize its value, but many still prioritize classified intelligence methodologies as the default, reflecting a bias in the culture rather than a gap in capabilities.  

Compounding the problem, operators frequently lack OSINT support. This gap in support leads to a reliance on individual initiative rather than on doctrine-driven frameworks. Commanders implement OSINT when asked, but it is not guaranteed when the situation demands it. In the Ukrainian case study, open-source information – whether from intelligence agencies, private-sector technologists, or even civilian volunteers – flows rapidly to operational-level commanders. Rather than waiting for validation through traditional multi-layered channels, commanders incorporate OSINT into decision-making and action cycles, enabling faster targeting than Russia’s conventional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)-driven model (a model which the U.S. also relies upon). An excerpt from the Intelligence chapter of A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force offers direct takeaways for U.S. Special Operations: 

“Although the United States’ use of OSINT increased gradually during the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War, the Russia-Ukraine War suggests the vast information environment of publicly and commercially available intelligence is a tremendous untapped opportunity.” 

Battlefield transparency – enabled by social media, commercial sensors, and ubiquitous connectivity – dramatically reduces the value of secrecy alone. The side that processes publicly available data the fastest obtains the decision advantage.  

Operationalizing OSINT Across the SOF Enterprise 

Rather than relying on request-based or ad hoc OSINT exploitation, operators need proactive, persistent OSINT analysis and fusion throughout the planning, movement, execution, and assessment phases.  

The issue for U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is not whether the tools exist; rather, it is whether organizational design supports their practical use. Current Special Operations Forces (SOF) came from a time when the intelligence edge resided in collection rather than in interpretation. Just as special operators pioneered distributed mission command, SOCOM must now lead distributed intelligence integration. Rather than relying on request-based or ad hoc OSINT exploitation, operators need proactive, persistent OSINT analysis and fusion throughout the planning, movement, execution, and assessment phases.  

To fully operationalize OSINT, SOCOM should take immediate steps to improve OSINT integration across the intelligence spectrum. A centralized OSINT fusion cell at the theater level could coordinate OSINT intelligence collection and synchronize with classified ISR. Having a centralized OSINT fusion cell provides valuable data to strategic leaders, their headquarters elements, forward-deployed SOF units, and partner intelligence community cells. Furthermore, an OSINT analyst embedded with SOF teams on missions could serve as a liaison to the OSINT fusion cell and directly support deployed SOF commanders. OSINT should be treated as co-equal in mission planning and targeting, rather than as a supplement to Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), or other intelligence disciplines. Training must evolve beyond technical proficiency toward cognitive integration, enabling operators to identify disinformation, interpret public sentiment, and act in ambiguous situations. The authority to apply OSINT rapidly should be delegated at or below the level of battalion commanders so that actionable intelligence collected through open-source means is not lost in the process of adjudication. Finally, OSINT integration should be incorporated into readiness assessments, ensuring deployment standards reflect the realities of modern transparent battlefields.  

Conclusion 

The current SOF intelligence framework is highly competent but built for a slower-paced environment. Future adversaries will move faster than our traditional intelligence validation cycles. They will exploit publicly accessible data to orchestrate digital deception, operational masking, and population shaping in real time. Without restructuring now, SOCOM risks repeating legacy intelligence failures in a future conflict where speed and information dominance are more decisive than secrecy. Put simply, SOF cannot win in an era defined by mass transparency if you wait for classified confirmation of what the world already knows. 

OSINT is no longer an additive capability. As societies deepen their engagement in the digital age, spurred by social media and online publications, publicly available intelligence must be a central pillar of Special Operations intelligence and operational design. The framework already exists; it just needs organizational reform, delegated authority, and leadership-driven integration to make OSINT operationally decisive in the battlespace.  

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