The MWI Ukraine Papers, 2022-2025
Check out “The MWI Ukraine Papers, 2022-2025.”
The Modern War Institute at West Point’s “Ukraine Papers” chronicle three years of professional military discourse that evolved from early debates about urban warfare and civilian resistance to deeper examinations of stalemate dynamics, the changing character of ground combat, and the complex challenges of ending the Russo-Ukrainian War.
Collectively, these articles reveal a conflict that has reshaped assumptions about modern warfare, demonstrating both the enduring relevance of historical lessons (force ratios, logistics, combined arms) and the emergence of new paradigms (ubiquitous drones, precision fires, information operations). Lastly, the collection illustrates how Ukraine has become a crucial laboratory for Western militaries—not just in providing equipment and training, but in learning from Ukrainian innovation, adaptation, and the harsh realities of high-intensity conventional conflict in the twenty-first century.
Below is a rollup of the contents of this report, with a brief explanation of each article’s thesis.
The Initial Conflict
The Two Debates in Military Circles the War in Ukraine Could Help Settle (John Amble, March 2, 2022): Russia’s invasion forces a reckoning on two key debates: whether urban warfare is inevitable in modern conflict and whether civilian resistance can credibly deter aggression.
Wargaming a Long War: Ukraine Fights On (James Lacey, Tim Barrick and Nathan Barrick, April 4, 2022): Marine Corps wargaming predicts Russia will reach operational culmination well short of maximum objectives, leading to indefinite stalemate without negotiated settlement.
Time Is Not on Kyiv’s Side: Training, Weapons, and Attrition in Ukraine (Andrew Milburn, June 27, 2022): Ukraine’s manpower shortages and slow Western weapons delivery risk turning the war into a deadly war of attrition that favors Russia’s larger force.
Don’t Underestimate the Bear—Russia Is One of the World’s Most Effective Modern Counterinsurgents (Martijn Kitzen and Marnix Provoost, March 24, 2022): Russia’s brutal authoritarian counterinsurgency approach, proven effective in 87.5% of conflicts since 1917, poses a grim outlook for any Ukrainian insurgency through indiscriminate violence and collective punishment.
The Stalemate
The Russian Way of War in Ukraine: A Military Approach Nine Decades in the Making (Randy Noorman, June 15, 2023): Soviet/Russian military concepts of nonlinear and noncontact warfare, developed since the 1980s in response to Western precision-strike capabilities, have finally matured in Ukraine, where both sides can conduct deep strikes.
All to Play for: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive and its Prospects for Success in 2023 (Dale Pankhurst, September 6, 2023): Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive faces challenges from limited Western equipment delivery and Russia’s well-prepared defensive lines, but success remains possible if Ukraine can exploit weak points before winter.
The Army and the New Paradigm of Ground Combat: Lessons from Ukraine’s Failed 2023 Counteroffensive (Bryan J. Bonnema and Moises Jimenez, February 18, 2025): Ukraine’s failed 2023 counteroffensive reveals a new paradigm where battlefield transparency, mines, and precision fires favor the defender, requiring the US Army to adopt an “Isolate, Suppress, Destroy” framework that prioritizes combat power preservation.
The Kursk Offensive: How Ukraine’s Operational-Level Guerrilla Warfare Is Bringing Maneuver Back (Robert G. Rose, September 12, 2024): Ukraine’s surprise Kursk offensive demonstrates how light infantry can enable maneuver warfare by exploiting vulnerabilities along undefended borders, avoiding prepared Russian defenses that would prevent mechanized breakthroughs.
How Does this End?
Every War Must End (Ukraine Edition) (Chase Metcalf and John Nagl, August 29, 2024): With both sides facing mounting costs and uncertain external support, a negotiated settlement may prove the least bad alternative to indefinite stalemate or broader escalation.
No Substitute for Victory: How to Negotiate from a Position of Strength to End the Russo-Ukraine War (Robert G. Rose, February 25, 2025): Like Theodore Roosevelt ending Russian expansion in 1905, the West must help Ukraine achieve a decisive battlefield victory when Russia culminates, as only defeat will force Putin into accepting a negotiated settlement rather than using peacetalks to rearm for future aggression.
Security Force Assistance
The United States is Sending Billions in Military Aid to Ukraine—Just Not the Systems It Needs (Andrew Milburn, May 20, 2022): The US provides obsolete equipment like M777 howitzers while failing to supply crucial capabilities Ukraine actually needs, such as long-range strike drones, modern rocket artillery, and logistics platforms.
More Bang for the SFA Buck: Improving US Security Force Assistance in Ukraine and Beyond (Jahara Matisek, William Reno and Sam Rosenberg, February 15, 2023): SAG-U (Security Assistance Group – Ukraine) and JMTG-U (Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine) show promise but require better unity of effort, dedicated personnel, and standardized methods among allied trainers to optimize assistance.
What Does European Union Advising of Ukrainian Troops Mean for the Bloc’s Security Policies? (Jahara Matisek, Sascha E. Ostanina and William Reno, June 11, 2024): EU training of Ukrainians through EUMAM (European Union Military Assistance Mission) reveals significant challenges, including outdated training programs disconnected from battlefield realities, language barriers, and European militaries sacrificing their own readiness to assist Ukraine.
The Ukraine Dividend: Return on Investment of US Security Assistance (Steven S. Lem, April 17, 2025): Beyond helping Ukraine defend itself, US security assistance provides invaluable battlefield lessons and technological insights that will save American lives in future conflicts, which the authors argue is a return on investment often ignored in cost calculations.
Learn or Lose: Lessons from Ukrainian Training in Germany (Joshua Hood, Jahara Matisek and Anthony Tingle, August 5, 2025): NATO must abandon outdated training models and embrace “reverse advising” that incorporates Ukrainian frontline innovations to remain relevant for future conflicts.
Innovation
Ukraine’s Fight on the Front Lines of the Information Environment (Peter Schrijver, September 12, 2023): Ukraine’s innovative information operations borrow from Soviet, Russian, and Israeli approaches, such as using intercepted communications, personal celebrity on social media, and coordinated messaging to shape narratives at home and abroad.
Frontline Innovation and Domestic Production: The Keys to Ukraine’s Journey Toward Defense Self-Reliance (Paul Schwennesen and Olena Kryzhanivska, March 13, 2025): Ukraine has transitioned from wholesale dependence on Western aid to producing one-third of its weapons domestically, including 100% of combat drones, demonstrating remarkable self-reliance through frontline innovation and industrial expansion.
Innovating Under Fire: Lessons from Ukraine’s Frontline Drone Workshops (Jorge Rivero, March 25, 2025): Ukraine’s frontline innovation workshops continue to offer a critical model for US forces that may face similar logistics challenges in contested environments.
From Georgia to Ukraine: Seventeen Years of Russian Cyber Capabilities at War (Ketevan Chincharadze, July 30, 2025): Russia’s cyber operations evolved from rudimentary attacks in 2008 Georgia to sophisticated campaigns in 2022 Ukraine targeting infrastructure and NATO allies, though kinetic strikes remain more decisive than cyberattacks in achieving battlefield effects.
Lessons
How Ukraine’s Roving Teams of Light Infantry Helped Win the Battle of Sumy: Lessons for the US Army (Michael G. Anderson, August 17, 2022): Ukraine’s modified hedgehog defense (combining static strongpoints with mobile light infantry armed with anti-armor weapons) disrupted Russian logistics and denied operational reach toward Kyiv, demonstrating the decisive impact of properly employed light forces.
Urban Operations in Ukraine: Size, Ratios, and the Principles of War (Louis DiMarco, June 20, 2022): Russia’s failure to capture major Ukrainian cities stems from insufficient force ratios (2:1 vs the required 6:1) and inadequate troop strength to conduct urban operations against competent defenders in cities comparable to history’s largest urban battles.
The Battle of Novodarivka, Part I: Armor’s Promise and its Limitations (Joshua Ratta, September 10, 2025): Ukraine’s transition from armor-led to infantry-led assaults at Novodarivka reflects historical realities that, when penetrating prepared defenses, cause massive tank losses, challenging assumptions about armor’s decisive role in modern breakthroughs.
Evaluating US Strategy for Ukraine: A Pre-Postmortem (Chase Metcalf, January 9, 2025): While US strategy succeeded in avoiding direct conflict and preventing Russian victory, it failed to achieve the stated policy objective of a prosperous Ukraine capable of self-defense, illustrating the importance of aligning ends, ways, and means while managing escalation risks.
Ukraine and Taiwan: Why Learning the Right Lessons Matters (Zenel Garcia and John Nagl, June 11, 2025): Unlike Ukraine, a Taiwan invasion faces amphibious complexities, deeper economic interdependence limiting sanctions, ambiguous legal status complicating coalition-building, and China’s superior information operations, which all suggest that Beijing will pursue military pressure short of war.
