“Farmed” Diamonds: Lessons Learned for Totoaba Aquaculture and International Trade of Luxury Wildlife Products
For the past sixty years, international trade bans have been the preferred method to deter exploitation of endangered species. But how effective are these trade bans in protecting species that are worth more than cocaine on the black market? Instead of focusing on limiting the supply of luxury seafood and wildlife items, the international community may fare better focusing on promoting strategies that reduce their demand. This essay explores one of these luxury goods, totoaba maw, and the potential efficacy of a legalized international trade enabled through aquaculture as an alternative strategy towards combatting illegal poaching and subsequent trafficking.
On the surface, the totoaba maw and jewelry diamond markets appear to have little in common. However, upon further examination, distinct parallels emerge when examining factors driving the demand for each product. Recent successes in increasing the demand for lab-grown (or “farmed”) diamonds, thereby decreasing the demand of so-called “blood” diamonds, merit further research for applicability to other goods, including luxury wildlife commodities. While this unconventional approach may not be appropriate for making broad policy recommendations to influence customer preferences, it offers an alternative approach worthy of future research.
Totoaba: The “Cocaine of the Seas”
Publicized by the recent National Geographic documentary, Sea of Shadows, the illegal capture of totoaba (Totoaba macdonaldi) has gained international notoriety due to the collateral damage it has inflicted upon the vaquita porpoise (Phocoena sinus) population.[1] Vaquita have been known to get caught in the indiscriminate large-mesh gillnets fishers illegally set at night floating in Mexico’s Gulf of California (also known as the Sea of Cortez). There, fishers leave the nets for several days, sometimes even abandoning them as trash referred to as “ghost nets.”[2] The totoaba fish, though, is itself critically endangered. Totoaba fishing has been banned under both Mexican and US law since 1975; and two years later, the fish was placed on Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) banning its international commercial trade. Continued totoaba poaching risks not only the survival of the vaquita porpoise and totoaba fish, but it jeopardizes the entire ecosystem (and local legal fishing economy) of the Upper Gulf of California.
High prices of totoaba swim bladders in China (referred to when dried as “maw”), reportedly averaging $20,000 US dollars per kilogram, have largely driven actors including Mexican local and transnational criminal organizations (TCO), to illegally fish the species.[3] In contrast to drug trafficking, totoaba poachers’ (or bucheros) participation in the illicit totoaba trade bears less risk—totoaba poachers and smugglers face a maximum two-year prison sentence if caught in Mexico, as opposed to a 10 to 25 year sentence for narcotics smuggling.[4] While the average profit margin for totoaba maw is unknown, it is likely high given the low cost of fishing effort—totoaba poachers rely on small, artisanal fishing vessels known as lanchas to set gillnets near shore, negating the need for large capital investments in industrial ships or operational costs in fuel to facilitate offshore fishing. Moreover, research suggests that Mexican TCOs, namely the Sinaloa Cartel and Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), are using luxury seafood items such as totoaba maws in various money laundering schemes including value transfer systems to essentially pay Chinese money laundering organizations for precursor chemicals used to produce illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine, thereby bypassing the formal banking system and anti-money laundering controls.[5] This practice plays into a larger observed crime convergence trend, as Mexican TCOs have increasingly diversified their business models to include illegal wildlife poaching and logging.
Despite its availability being the result of illegal fishing and smuggling, totoaba maw is openly sold in Chinese markets and online, as thoroughly detailed in a 2016 Environmental Investigative Agency (EIA) investigative report which found totoaba maw available for sale in both physical locations in China including Shantou, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong; and on internet platforms including Alibaba and Taobao.[6] Demand for luxury seafood items, such as dried shark fin, sea cucumber, and abalone; has been linked to China’s rising income and urbanization. Fish swim bladder, or maw, is the most expensive of these luxury goods and is associated with “wealth, prestige, and honor.”[7] Maw has traditionally been offered as valuable gifts during business and family meetings, and more recently, the collagen-rich material has been used in beauty products as a substitute for shark fin. In Traditional Chinese Medicine, dried maw is used in soups for its flavor and nutritional content. Recommended for everything from postpartum recovery to reducing pain after surgery, nourishing the liver and kidneys to invigorating circulation; there is little scientific evidence to support these claims.[8] While small to medium totoaba maws are purchased for consumption, larger maws are purchased as investments, collectibles, or gifts. While over 100 countries supply the Chinese market with maw derived from various marine species such as black-spotted croaker (Protonibea diacanthus) from India, Kuwait, Iran, and Australia; or Nile perch (Lates niloticus) from Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya; totoaba maw represents an outlier, fetching average prices for fishers an order of magnitude higher than any other species.[9] Overall maw production and value are expected to continue to rise with the Chinese population’s growing wealth.
Totoaba Aquaculture and Legal Trade: Alternative Solutions to Prevent Extinction?
While the Mexican government has focused its efforts on enforcing a gillnet ban in the Gulf of California to deter illegal fishing, the international community and environmental conservations groups have long criticized these efforts as insufficient to prevent vaquita extinction.[10] In 2019, the Mexican government proposed a solution to deter illicit totoaba capture while simultaneously preventing the collapse of its totoaba fishery—totoaba aquaculture. Appealing to the Parties of CITES, the Mexican government submitted guidelines outlining a plan to allow legal international commercial trade of farmed totoaba (a practice known as aquaculture), claiming “goals can be achieved regarding the significant decrease of illegal trade and the reduction of the price of swim bladders.”[11] Mexico’s proposal was met with multiple objections from several CITES signatories and conservation groups, countering that a legal totoaba trade would “increase incentives for illegal harvest and trade of wild-caught fish” and “could provide a means for laundering of illegally caught and stockpiled swim bladders.”[12] Despite these objections, CITES voted to permit Earth Ocean Farms (EOF), a Mexico-based aquaculture company, to export totoaba meat in March 2022, albeit under the stipulation the swim bladders would be removed and destroyed.[13]
While these arguments have some merit, they are all but irrelevant in the event the totoaba go extinct. In the early 1900s, fishers heavily targeted both totoaba and Chinese bahaba (Bahaba taipingenis), a croaker very similar to the totoaba but endemic to mainland Chinese and Hong Kong waters, for their valuable maw. Overfishing contributed to a sharp decline in the Chinese bahaba population, which drove its value as high as seven times its weight in gold during the 1990s. Today, Chinese bahaba is rarely caught and some believe it may be the first commercial marine species to become extinct in the wild.[14] Moreover, without access to the Chinese market, totoaba farmers have little financial incentive to expand their operations and continue to rebuild the wild totoaba population. Since 2014, EOF has annually released 40,000 totoaba juveniles into Gulf of California with support of the federal and local governments in hopes to prevent extinction of the species.[15] Moreover, preliminary research on cultivated totoaba has shown promising results on producing swim bladders comparable in size and nutritional value to wild-caught totoaba, suggesting farmed totoaba could become a viable substitute for illegally harvested fish.[16]
Past Approaches to Farming Wildlife Products
The idea of legalizing the trade of endangered species such as the totoaba is controversial, and there is a paucity of research focused on the efficacy of strategies focused on farming endangered species and lifting associated trade bans to deter illicit harvesting and smuggling. Over the past two decades, however, researchers have examined different facets of this question focusing on various species with mixed results. For instance, Biggs et al. claim the CITES trade ban on rhino horns has proven ineffective in reducing the level of poaching. In fact, they found the rate of poaching black rhinos in South Africa doubled every year over a five-year span ending in 2012.[17] Biggs et al. attributed the rising price of rhino horn, which went from $4,700 US dollars per kilogram in 1993 to over $65,000 in 2012, making it more valuable than “gold, diamonds, and cocaine.” Harsher enforcement penalties, they argue, may drive prices further up given the inelastic and growing demand of rhino horn, which will in turn lead to an increase in corrupt government officials. Other anti-poaching strategies including protection, education, and awareness campaigns have “demonstrably failed” to diminish the demand for rhino horn, which they credit to the economic growth of east and southeast Asia. In place of the trade ban, Biggs et. al. propose a legal regulated trade of rhino horn derived from sedating wild white rhinos located on private conservation land in South Africa and shaving their horns, which regrow when cut.
Like Biggs et al., Gentry et. al. examined the potential effect of lifting the CITES trade ban on endangered wildlife and satisfying the demand through legal farming. Gentry et. al. stipulate that high prices and large profits incentivize illegal hunting despite harsh international trade restrictions against trade.[18] They explore the idea that farming endangered species could not only slow the population decline but increase overall supply “thereby reducing prices and decreasing hunting incentives.” Gentry et. al. claim traditional anti-poaching efforts have done little to stop the illegal trade of “luxury” products including totoaba swim bladder, rhino horn, and elephant ivory; and advocate instead for a market-based solution based on a balance of the cost of farming and cost of hunting or fishing. If farming can produce animal products at a lower cost than the current market price, they argue hunting will lose its profitability. In particular, species with fast growth rates, such as the totoaba, translate to less time invested in farming, bringing down the “cost” of farming proportionally with the cost of hunting/fishing.[19] Cost differential of hunting versus farming, however, is only one important variable, however, as Gentry et al. fail to consider potential differences in customer preferences towards substituting farmed vs. wild-caught or hunted species.
Interestingly, both Biggs et al. and Gentry et al. cite one specific example in which wildlife farming successfully deterred poaching—alligator and crocodile skins. Using a case study of the American alligator (Alligator mississippiensis) in Louisiana, Moyle examines three prevailing perceptions of wildlife farming—1) an increase in farmed wildlife goods will cause prices to fall and “crowd out” harvests obtained through poaching, 2) an increase in farming output could increase demand by both “reducing any stigma effects that are associated with the ban” and “expediting laundering,” and 3) wildlife farming costs more than hunting due to costs such as food that hunters do not need to endure which reduces the competitiveness of farming.[20] Surprisingly, Moyle’s study found little evidence supporting these perceptions for the American alligator. Rather, large increases in farmed alligator did not lead to price decreases in either farmed or wild alligator; there was no increase in alligator poaching in the period studied; and wildlife farms kept costs down through “economies of scale (the average size of farms has increased), better technology and reductions in the mortality rate.”[21] As of 2025, the American alligator population has rebounded and remains stable, and the US state of Florida advertises its hunting program as “nationally and internationally recognized as a model” for sustainable management.[22]
Perhaps Moyle’s most significant finding as it pertains to totoaba aquaculture is that “buyers may perceive differences in the products which generate market segmentation” and that the “two markets of wild and farmed can coexist because they are not catering to the same group of customers”.[23] Moyle offers this finding as a possible explanation on why bear poaching in China persists despite the availability of lower priced bear bladders available via bear-bile farms—a segment of the population simply prefers the illegally hunted wild bear bladders. In recent years, the fashion industry has favored using farmed alligator skin due to its consistency of product. In fact, in 2016 the price of farmed American alligator skin was over four times the price of wild-caught skin.[24] American alligator farming, however, does not serve as an exemplar case study for a legalized totoaba trade for various reasons. Most notably, Moyle considers the “stigma” effect—by lifting the ban on wildlife trade, people’s stigma against buying the same wildlife parts illegally would decrease. The study did not reveal this change in attitudes for alligator skin purchases, and Moyle posits that it might be because people view alligators as dangerous pests and “lack charisma.”[25] Unlike alligators, the local population has very little direct interaction with totoaba to form any kind of opinion. However, the vaquita, which like many other marine mammals are beloved, suffers collateral damage from illegal totoaba fishing. Thus, the stigma effect may be a tool for leverage in totoaba aquaculture, by proxy.
Jewelry Diamonds as a Case Study
Research suggests that one of the biggest obstacles to the success of totoaba aquaculture and legalized trade is the potential for market segmentation between farmed vs. wild-caught totoaba—to effect change, customers must view farmed totoaba as a viable substitute for wild-caught totoaba. How, then, can we influence customers’ preferences such that the markets merge? A recent example of a commodity which up until recently had distinct market segmentation between what was “farmed” and “naturally-derived” is that of the jewelry diamond. Using lab-grown diamonds as a case study to evaluate totoaba aquaculture is advantageous for multiple additional reasons. Much like jewelry diamonds, totoaba maw is considered a luxury good in economic terms, meaning that demand for it increases as income increases. In contrast, many other natural resources vulnerable to illicit trade, such as timber, fuel, and many other species of fish, are necessity goods, which have a small positive increase in customer demand given a small increase in income. The profit margin for black market totoaba maw is enormous.
There is a reason that totoaba is called the “cocaine of the seas”—its market shares more similar characteristics with the illicit drug trade than that of the fishing industry. While it would be tempting to use illegal drugs such as marijuana, which many US states have recently legalized and regulated, as a case study for a legalized totoaba trade, this comparison falls short. Many illicit drugs are addictive—demand depends less on how much consumers are willing to pay for illicit drugs and more about how desperate they are to pay the exorbitant prices for their next fix. Furthermore, unlike totoaba maw, purchasing illicit drugs is not considered a status symbol. Finally, from a conservation point of view, unlike totoaba and may other endangered species under CITES trade ban, plants used in the production of illicit drugs such as the marijuana, cocaine (coca), and heroin (poppy) are not endangered species, and we are not concerned with losing the plants in the wild, thereby upsetting ecological stability.
In contrast, the jewelry diamond market offers a surprisingly much better case comparison to the totoaba market and other illicitly traded luxury wildlife products. All three markets feature a cartel that sets the prices, but unlike the production of illicit drugs, the prices for jewelry diamonds and totoaba maw are predominantly based purely on customer perception of their worth. Moreover, jewelry diamonds are cultivated legally in labs as well as mined, allowing us to view both sides of the newly merged market. Finally, much like totoaba poaching, diamond mining is often associated with deleterious consequences, namely illicitly traded “blood” or conflict diamonds mined in conflict areas and sold to help fund opposition forces operating against the legitimate government, namely in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone.[26] While in the past, “farmed” jewelry diamonds have had a stigma attached to them, recent reporting suggests an increase in global demand is now affecting the naturally-derived diamond market.
Evolution of the Lab-grown Diamond Market and Its Applicability to Totoaba Aquaculture
Chemically speaking, diamonds are simply comprised of compressed, crystalized carbon molecules, one of the most abundant molecules in our known universe. While naturally-occurring diamonds were formed over a billion years ago under the extreme heat and pressure of the Earth’s mantle, manufacturers are able to replicate these conditions in a lab to create diamonds in a manner of days.[27] No matter the method, both mined and lab-grown diamonds are virtually identical, and for all intents and purposes, lab-grown diamonds are more “pure” with less potential flaws than their mined counterparts. Moreover, lab-grown diamonds reportedly cost a third of the price of a mined diamond of similar size.[28] It is perplexing, then, to learn the societal stigma that has persisted against purchasing lab-grown diamonds. In fact, in a recent Vogue Singapore article from May 2021, the author remarks that “the reason many are still holding off on lab-grown diamonds is the luxe factor and that nagging doubt at the deepest recesses of our mind that whispers: ‘they’re not real diamonds’” when, of course, they are real.[29] The South China Morning Post even went as far to publish a news article in 2017 that discusses the growing concern over “fake” diamonds “posing a threat to the global diamond market in a way that has forced dominant player De Beers to invest tens of millions of dollars in methods to identify the man-made stones that look exactly like the real thing.”[30]
The South Africa–based cartel, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., was established in 1888 upon the discovery of massive diamond mines in South Africa. Since then, the company has maintained careful control over all facets of the global diamond trade. In the face of deteriorating demand during the Great Depression, De Beers launched a successful advertisement campaign that arguably altered Western cultural attitudes towards marriage for the foreseeable future. The ad campaign “set out to persuade young men that diamonds (and only diamonds) were synonymous with romance, and that the measure of a man’s love (and even his personal and professional success) was directly proportional to the size and quality of the diamond he purchased,” setting the foundation for the relatively new tradition of a diamond engagement ring.[31] Later, the company adopted the slogan, “A Diamond Is Forever” to further control the jewelry diamond market, deterring resale of diamonds which would have caused market value fluctuations through “women psychologically conditioned never to sell their diamonds” who “remain convinced that diamonds retained their monetary value.”[32] The reality remains, though, that mined diamonds have no intrinsic value (except for industrial settings), and De Beers and others involved in the diamond trade have had a vested interest in cultivating the illusion diamond supplies are scarce. Interestingly, this adroit cartel, which alongside General Electric has manufactured lab-grown diamonds (albeit for industrial purposes) in addition to mined diamonds since at least the mid-1980s, has only recently started advertising their lab-grown diamonds for use in jewelry as part of their 2018 launch of subsidiary company, Lightbox.[33]
While De Beers had been successful in manipulating the jewelry diamond market in the past to create an illusion of limited “natural” supply of diamonds, thus artificially increasing prices, the demand for lab-grown diamonds has increased in the past few years. While lab-grown diamonds represented only one percent of total diamond sales in 2015, that percentage increased to 20 percent in 2024. Moreover, lab-grown diamond engagement rings consisted of over half those sold in 2024.[34] It seems this increased demand is not simply based on the lower price of lab-grown diamonds. A recent BBC news article commenting on lab-grown diamonds’ growing popularity even remarked that the “usual rebranding effort doesn’t appear to be working for mined diamonds.”[35] Most notably for this case study, demand in China, the largest diamond market second only to the United States, for mined diamonds decreased by five percent in 2019. There seems to be a couple compounding factors leading to this increased popularity in lab-grown diamonds, namely an increased awareness of the negative impact of mined diamonds amongst younger generations advertised through pop culture.
While the 2006 Leonardo DiCaprio film, Blood Diamond, helped illustrate how the diamond trade fuels violent criminal groups in Africa to Western audiences, the film did not appear to appreciably influence customers until over 15 years after its release. I would argue that it was not until a considerable number of celebrities started displaying their choices of lab-grown versus mined diamonds in public events such as awards shows that we achieved some sort of societal tipping point for awareness and subsequent demand. Celebrities including Rihanna, Lady Gaga, Zendaya, Emma Watson, Meghan Markle, Jennifer Hudson, Lana Condor, Regina King, Jennifer Lopez, Kate Mara, and Billy Porter have worn lab-grown diamonds in recent public engagements bringing further awareness of lab-grown diamond availability in jewelry.[36] Additionally, the change in demand may be a specific preference for a new audience that has prioritized efforts to curb climate change. Reportedly, the majority of Millennials and Generation Z, the demographic most interested in purchasing diamonds engagement rings, are specifically considering lab-grown over mined diamonds.[37] Lab-grown diamonds generally have a smaller carbon footprint than mined diamonds.
There are several applicable takeaways for this case study when applying these lessons learned to the totoaba maw market. In the jewelry diamond market, a cartel had a vested interest in maintaining the perceived value of its good, regardless of the actual quality. Those perceptions were successfully countered only through education and awareness of the existing ethical issues with the naturally derived industry, not only in film, but through social entrepreneurs and celebrities’ advocation. For totoaba maw, arguably Mexican and Chinese organized crime groups have a vested interest in cultivating a perceived superiority of wild-caught totoaba over farmed totoaba. We, however, may be able to overcome propagation of those perceptions not only through films such as Sea of Shadows, but identifying and leveraging appropriately influential social entrepreneurs and celebrities whose public opinions matter most to the Chinese elite that are currently purchasing totoaba maw. The timing for such a campaign might be right—amid economic uncertainty stemming from slow post-COVID growth, in May 2024, the Chinese government launched a “luxury shame” campaign by banning several “wealth flaunting” influencers from Chinese social media sites, claiming these activities run counter to Mao Zedong’s concept of “common prosperity” and moderate wealth for all.[38]
Conclusion: Limitations and Future Research
With limited successful documented cases of wildlife farming or aquaculture of endangered species, one may be hesitant to consider the idea of a legalized and regulated international totoaba maw trade. For this particular species, however, it seems prudent to consider this policy change in order to prevent the fate its predecessor, the bahaba, likely suffered. While there are obvious limitations of this case study, namely that unlike totoaba maw, diamonds are not consumed nor presumed to have medicinal qualities, there is hope this essay will help researchers view luxury wildlife markets in a different way. While demand for mined jewelry diamonds in China has declined much like the West in recent years, we cannot assume that the same strategy for lab-grown diamonds will work in promoting farmed totoaba maw. Jewelry diamonds, regardless of geographic location, target a very specific age demographic—typically the younger generation which are preparing for their first marriages. As such, further research is needed on the demographics of the Chinese elite who purchase totoaba maw on the black market to figure out how to best target them.
One must also consider secondary or tertiary effects of a legalized totoaba aquaculture and trade. For instance, what is the role of corruption in Mexican enforcement and/or Chinese customs, and how might Mexican and Chinese organized crime exert influence over legalized aquaculture companies and exporters? Legalized totoaba trade presents additional regulatory and enforcement burdens on Mexican security, customs, and fisheries management agencies, which arguably already face capacity issues. As trade is by definition international, however, customs officials in transshipment (including the United States) and destination countries (including China) will likely need to administer additional scrutiny to totoaba shipments. Additionally, from an environmental conservation perspective, aquaculture as an industry has not generally been a panacea for waste management or overfishing, especially for carnivorous species like the totoaba, which often require fishing for food sources. For its part, EOF’s new brand, Totoaba Santomar, operates offshore totoaba farms within the Gulf of California and purportedly relies on regenerative aquaculture techniques meant to minimize environmental impacts. Additionally, the company is advertising the ability to identify its farmed fish through unique QR codes to provide transparency to government officials and importers.[39] Regardless, further research will be necessary to establish the overall net effects of a legalized totoaba cultivation and trade.
Endnotes
The views expressed herein are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, or any other US Government agency.
[1] National Geographic, Sea of Shadows. 2019, documentary, https://films.nationalgeographic.com/sea-of-shadows.
[2] Collateral Damage: How Illegal Trade in Totoaba Swim Bladders is Driving the Vaquita to Extinction. London & Washington, DC: Environmental Investigation Agency. 20 September 2016, https://eia-international.org/report/collateral-damage/.
[3] Yvonne Sadovy de Mitcheson, Allen Wai-lun To, Nga Wing Wong, Hiu Yin Kwan, and Wing Sum Bud, “Emerging from the murk: threats, challenges and opportunities for the global swim bladder trade.” Reviews in Fish Biology And Fisheries. Vol. 29, no. 4. 13 November 2019: pp. 809–835, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11160-019-09585-9; Dyhia Belhabib, Philippe Le Billon, and David J. Wrathall, “Narco‐Fish: Global fisheries and drug trafficking.” Fish and Fisheries. Vol. 21, no. 5. 26 June 2020: pp. 992–1007, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/faf.12483.
[4] Broke Bessesen, Vaquita: Science, Politics, and Crime in the Sea of Cortez. London: Island Press, 2018.
[5] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The China connection in Mexico’s illegal economies.” Brookings. 22 February 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-china-connection-in-mexicos-illegal-economies/; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “China-Linked Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking in Mexico.” Brookings. March 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/FP_20220328_wildlife_trafficking_felbab_brown.pdf; Leland Lazarus and Alexander Gocso, “Triads, Snakeheads, and Flying Money: The Underworld of Chinese Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Research Publications. 58, Florida International University. August 2023, https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/jgi_research/58.
[6] Op. cit., Environmental Investigation Agency at Note 2.
[7] Abdulrahman Ben-Hasan, Yvonne Sadovy de Mitcheson, Miguel A. Cisneros-Mata, Érica Antunes Jimenez, Moslem Daliri, Andrés M. Cisneros-Montemay, Rekha J. Nair, Sangeetha A. Thankappan, Carl J. Walters, and Villy Christensen, “China’s fish maw demand and its implications for fisheries in source countries.” Marine Policy. Vol. 132,104696. October 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104696. .
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., According to their research, Ben-Hasan et al. found the average price of totoaba maw received by fishers (including through auctions, landing sites, or black-market sales) was 5,033.1 US dollars per kilogram (USD/kg). In contrast, the next highest priced maw was the black-spotted croaker at only 409.5 USD/kg.
[10] “Mexico’s Failure to Effectively Enforce Totoaba Trade Prohibitions Violates CITES and Is Causing Extinction of the Vaquita Porpoise.” London & Washington, DC: Environmental Investigation Agency.” October 2018, https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/Mexico%E2%80%99s-failure-to-effectively-enforce-totoaba-trade-prohibitions-violates-CITES.pdf ; Barbara L. Taylor, Lorenzo Rojas-Bracho, Jeffrey Moore, Armando Jaramillo-Legorreta, Jay M. Ver Hoef, Gustavo Cardenas-Hinojosa, Edwyna Nieto-Garcia, Jay Barlow, Tim Gerrodette, Nicholas Tregenza, Len Thomas, and Philip S. Hammond, “Extinction is Imminent for Mexico’s Endemic Porpoise Unless Fishery Bycatch is Eliminated: Mexican porpoise near extinction via gillnets.” Conservation Letters. Vol. 10, no. 5: pp. 588–595. 05 December 2016,https://conbio.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/conl.12331; “CITES’s Last Chance: Stop the Illegal Totoaba Trade and Save the Vaquita,” Environmental Investigation Agency. August 2019, https://reports.eia-international.org/savethevaquita/; V. Boilevin, A. Crosta, and S. J. Hennige, “Addressing Illegal Transnational Trade of Totoaba and Its Role in the Possible Extinction of the Vaquita,” Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 104–134, 01 September 2023, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13880292.2023.2229637.
[11] “Additional Information Regarding the Registration of the Operation ‘Earth Ocean Farms. S. De R.L. De C.V.’ Breeding Totoaba Macdonaldi.” Geneva (Switzerland): CITES. SC71 Inf. 2. 16 August 2019, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/71/inf/E-SC71-Inf-02.pdf.
[12] Op. cit., Environmental Investigation Agency at Note 2; Op. cit., Environmental Investigation Agency at Note 10; Op. cit., Boilevin at Note 9.
[13] “Mexico obtains approval for international trade of Totoaba,” Aquaculture Magazine, 11 March 2022, https://aquaculturemag.com/2022/03/11/mexico-obtains-approval-for-international-trade-of-totoaba/.
[14] Op. cit., Ben-Hasan at Note 7.
[15] “40,000 totoaba offspring individuals were released in Baja California Sur, Mexico,” Aquaculture Magazine, https://aquaculturemag.com/2019/07/23/40000-totoaba-offspring-individuals-were-released-in-baja-california-sur-mexico/.
[16] Mayra L. González-Félix, Martin Perez-Velazquez, Miguel Castellanos-Rico, Adam M. Sachs, Laura D. Gray, Steven D. Gaines, and Garret M. Goto, “First report on the swim bladder index, proximate composition, and fatty acid analysis of swim bladder from cultured Totoaba macdonaldi fed compound aquafeeds,” Aquaculture Reports. Vol. 21, 100901. November 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aqrep.2021.100901.
[17] Duan Biggs, Franck Courchamp, Rowan Martin, and Hugh P. Possingham, “Legal Trade of Africa’s Rhino Horns.” Science. Vol. 339, no. 6123, 01 March 2013: pp. 1038–1039,https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.1229998.
[18] Rebecca R. Gentry, Steven D. Gaines, Jeremy S. Gabe, and Sarah E. Lester, “Looking to aquatic species for conservation farming success.” Conservation Letters. Vol. 12, no. 6. 04 November 2019,https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12681.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Brendan Moyle, “Conservation that’s more than skin-deep: alligator farming.” Biodiversity and Conservation. Vol. 22, no. 8. 06 June 2013: pp. 1663–1677, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10531-013-0501-9.
[21] Ibid.
[22] “Statewide Alligator Harvest Program.” Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. 2025, https://myfwc.com/wildlifehabitats/wildlife/alligator/harvest/.
[23] Op. cit., Moyle at Note 20.
[24] Lindsey Leake, “Florida alligator meat, skin values vary as farm-raised market grows for fashion houses.” TC Palm. 14 November 2019, https://www.tcpalm.com/story/news/local/florida/2019/11/14/florida-alligator-hunt-skins-meat-market/3825839002/.
[25] Op. cit., Moyle at Note 20.
[26] “Blood diamond.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/blood-diamond.
[27] Harriet Constable, “The sparkling rise of the lab grown diamond.” BBC. 09 February 2020, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200207-the-sparkling-rise-of-the-lab-grown-diamond.
[28] “How to make synthetic diamonds.” The Economist. 10 May 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/05/10/how-to-make-synthetic-diamonds.
[29] Celine Yap, “The lab-grown diamond jewellers even top celebrities are getting into.” Vogue Singapore. 19 May 2021, https://vogue.sg/lab-grown-diamonds-jewellery/.
[30] Celine Ge, “De Beers fights lab-grown diamonds with technology as China’s synthetic gems threaten viability of their market.” South China Morning Post. 05 March 2017, https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2076225/de-beers-fights-fakes-technology-chinas-lab-grown-diamonds.
[31] Uri Friedman, “We Buy Engagement Rings Because a Diamond Company Wanted Us To.” The Atlantic. 06 December 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/how-an-ad-campaign-invented-the-diamond-engagement-ring/385376/.
[32] Edward Jay Epstein, “Have You Ever Tried to Sell a Diamond?” The Atlantic. February 1982, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/02/have-you-ever-tried-to-sell-a-diamond/304575/.
[33] Op. cit., The Economist at Note 28; G. Ariovich, “The Economics of Diamond Price Movements.” Managerial and Decision Economics. Vol. 6, no. 4. December 1985: pp. 234–240, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2487029.
[34] Garth Friesen, “Lab-Grown Diamonds Boom: Is It Game Over for Mined Diamonds?” Forbes. 24 March 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/garthfriesen/2025/03/22/lab-grown-diamonds-boom-is-it-game-over-for-mined-diamonds/.
[35] Op. cit., Constable at Note 27.
[36] Op. cit., Yap at Note 29.
[37] Op. cit., Constable at Note 27.
[38] Ernestine Siu, “‘Luxury shame’: China’s rich shy away from flaunting their wealth amid economic jitters.” CNBC. 15 July 2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/07/16/chinas-rich-shy-away-from-flaunting-wealth-amid-economic-uncertainty.html.
[39] Marta Negrete, “Earth Ocean Farms is now Santomar.” WE ARE AQUACULTURE. 24 April 2024, https://weareaquaculture.com/news/aquaculture/earth-ocean-farms-is-now-santomar.
