Reloading at Sea: Addressing America’s Overlooked Naval Vulnerability

Abstract

This essay examines the United States Navy’s vulnerability to sustainment amid China’s growing blue-water naval capabilities and expanding regional reach. It argues that reliance on fixed bases, such as Yokosuka Naval Base, exposes U.S. forces to strategic risk and proposes establishing an at-sea reload and repair detachment under the Navy’s Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) to strengthen combat endurance, flexibility, and maritime superiority in the Western Pacific.

Introduction

Once considered a green-water force, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has rapidly evolved into a prominent blue-water navy, demonstrating its prolific naval ecosystem, including the 2022 launch of aircraft carrier Fujian and the 2025 resumption of joint operations with Russia in the East China Sea. With the preponderances of Beijing’s innovative infrastructure and expanding naval syndicate, designed not only to maintain regional hegemony in the East but also to extend its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) envelope and overall threat profile, its reach now threatens U.S. basing facilities in allied territories such as Japan.

This overextended naval reach has amplified vulnerabilities in U.S. maritime operations, particularly for repair and reloading, with Yokosuka Naval Base serving as a prominent U.S. naval ship repair facility and missile replenishment hub positioned within striking range. Although the U.S. maintains additional larger facilities in California and Hawaii, their use as a reload and repair station creates external vulnerability in sustaining logistical support during prolonged conflict.

The reliance of small number of large bases creates exploitable opportunities for adversaries, to mitigate these vulnerabilities, the Department of the Navy ought to formally designate an at-sea expeditionary reload and repair detachment under the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) to reduce its dependency on fixed hubs and strengthen U.S. force posture in the Western Pacific theatre, as well as extending its own A2/AD reach.

The Challenge to U.S. Forward Posture and Overlooked Sustainment Gap

Strategically located around the Western Pacific theatre—excluding those on the mainland —the United States maintains roughly six naval installations in Guam, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. Additional locations include Philippine facilities made available to U.S. forces through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), all of which are well within reach of China’s A2/AD envelope. Aside from being within missile strike zone, these fixed locations reduce mobility through overreliance on land-based infrastructure, making U.S. force projection predictable and vulnerable to sudden logistical disruptions.

Navies maintain operational superiority and a forward posture by relying on auxiliary repair and reload centers, which extend endurance, preserve readiness, and ensure rapid reloading while limiting adversary opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities. Without these kinetic capabilities, the fleet risks diminished resilience. Meanwhile, Beijing is reinforcing its blue water naval pursuits by expanding its fleet, increasing ship capacity replenishment, and rapidly advancing missile development, particularly vertical launch systems (VLS). Political pundits predict that China will have more launchers than the U.S. Navy by 2027, increasing its threat vector and placing nearby installations at risk.

Increasing Combat Sustainability through NECC At-Sea Reload and Repair Detachments

As of now, the United States does not have a formal unit designated specifically for at-sea repair and reload, despite experimenting with trial methods, including the Transferrable Reload At-sea Method (TRAM), first demonstrated in 2024. To ensure proper funding and training for combat readiness, the Department of the Navy should formally designate an at-sea reload and repair detachment under the NECC. The nebulous of the NECC is to provide oversight of current Navy expeditionary forces while simultaneously developing new capabilities to address emerging maritime security obstacles. By specifically designating an at-sea reload and repair detachment, the U.S. naval forces can maintain prolonged combat operations without returning to port, thereby preserving U.S. combat power projection against the PLAN’s blue-water ambitions.

Repairing vessels at sea, in concert with at-sea munitions replenishment, can minimize operational disruptions, preserve combat power effectiveness, extend the life of maritime assets, and expand the U.S. A2/AD range. Such preponderance would provide the U.S. with strategic superiority by controlling sea lines that may otherwise fall susceptible to China’s naval ambitions, by limiting their movements, and capitalizing on blue water operations. Aside from enhancing seafaring dominance, the use of an at-sea reload, and repair detachment unit would enable suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions by securing the battlespace for unmanned aircraft and other assets to operate more safely in contested territories through constant replenishment and upkeep.

Unlike static facilities, a more dynamic approach, such as at-sea reload and repair detachment units under the NECC, could offer a resilient and adaptive solution to wartime needs, rather than strictly relying on large bases due to their flexibility, maneuverability, and rapid response times. Under the NECC umbrella, these at-sea detachments will have the advantage allotted to other units to maintain consistent combat readiness, such as training standardization to ensure seamless integration into joint and coalition operations. Centralizing this approach can allow the U.S. Navy to maintain progressive resource adaptability in countering Beijing’s expanding A2/AD envelope and its blue-water aspirations.

Addressing Counterarguments: Current U.S. Shipbuilding Enterprise

 As it stands, the U.S. already maintains difficulties staying abreast with shipbuilding and preserving its current architecture, much less repairing damaged vessels at sea during segments of conflict. In response, it can be argued that, in April 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order, “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” directing various agencies to create a Maritime Action Plan (MAP) to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding enterprise. These sentiments were similarly echoed in an address to Congress that same year, when the president reaffirmed his commitment, designating an Office of Maritime and Industrial Capacity within the National Security Council (NSC) to address the PLAN’s shipbuilding industry. Given these executive commitments to alleviating recent shortcomings, designating a specialized at-sea detachment unit under the purview of the NECC would further U.S. commitments to naval superiority and combat readiness.

Conclusion

To maintain operational superiority under contentious periods, the U.S. must address critical sustainment gaps that can be exploited by adversarial states. Formalizing an at-sea reload and repair unit could provide the U.S. with the opportunity to outpace oppositional forces through perseverance, flexibility, and sustainment tactics, all while deterring their A2/AD expansive growth through naval dominance.