Middlepowerness in RIMPAC: The Case of France and the Philippines

Abstract

This article claims that RIMPAC middle power participants adhered to certain middle power criteria that shaped their RIMPAC participation during their debuts. This theory is tested through document analysis and key informant interviews from the case studies of France and the Philippines. It finds that RIMPAC middle power participants possess a blue water-level naval force that does not surpass the host nation. They identify as junior partners to the great power host nation (the United States) and as security guarantors for other states. Finally, they adhere to multilateralism by participating in the exercise’s multilateral activities.

Introduction

The need to prepare among aligned states for any conflict against a particular adversary allowed the formulation of actions like multilateral military exercises (MMEs). During the Cold War in 1971, the United States (U.S.) organized the first edition of the biennial Exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), in Hawaii. This was an attempt for a consistent training structure to counter the increasing Soviet maritime presence with aligned Pacific complements (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) and even the United Kingdom.

Apart from the U.S., scholars and officials have categorized the other RIMPAC participants as belonging to middle power International Relations (IR) theory. Middle powers could not reshape the international order like great powers, but they possess sufficient resources to help allied great powers uphold the order against aggressive states. For example, Australia and Canada bolstered anti-submarine and naval patrol efforts off the U.S. West Coast as the U.S. utilized its naval might in the Vietnam War.

By the post-Cold War era, a trend emerged in the reduction of military strength or spending among states. However, MME participation gained momentum, as exemplified by RIMPAC gaining strength from 1992 to its current status as the world’s largest naval MME (Table 1).

Table 1: RIMPAC Participants in Every Edition

Source: Author’s compilation.

While RIMPAC saw a growing number of participants in the post-Cold War editions, there are limited discussions concerning participating states’ experiences. At present, the bulk of literature and discussions mainly cover RIMPAC as an MME, activities that are carried out during the exercise, and participants’ intentions.

Hence, this article aims to shed light on RIMPAC experiences, especially among post-Cold War participants, and contribute to middle power and RIMPAC literature. It asks what explains contemporary middle powers’ participation in post-Cold War RIMPAC, further explored through the questions of (1) what naval capabilities support participation, (2) what identities are projected by the participants, and (3) how these states behave within the exercise. This article argues that new post-Cold War participants possess blue-water naval capabilities, identify as junior partners to the U.S. and security contributors to others, and participate in multilateral interoperability activities. The analysis is grounded in Sarah Teo’s middle power IR framework using France and the Philippines as case studies.

From the framework, three particular criteria will be used to characterize middle powers. The first criterion is material capability. Without sufficient tangible resources, a state cannot credibly claim middle power status. This study assesses participants’ naval material capabilities based on their capacity to operate in three maritime operational areas: brown-water (rivers and estuaries), green-water (coastal waters, ports, and harbors), and blue-water (open ocean). Participation in maritime activities of RIMPAC requires a state to have a blue-water navy to reach Hawaii.

The second criterion is identity. Middle powers recognize they cannot match great powers in hard or soft power but can promote norms from aligned great powers for regional benefit. In RIMPAC, middle powers reinforce their role as “partners” — junior allies to U.S.-led norms like the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and contributors to regional stability.

The third criterion is behavior. Middle powers favor multilateral arrangements to assume certain roles typically associated with great powers and take leadership for small states. Hence, one basic tenet of being a middle power is a state’s ability to participate in multilateral activities within RIMPAC. By participating, middle powers are there to learn their niches and contribute, rather than merely being there to observe.

Each of the three criteria—material capability, identity, and behavior—is addressed using varied sources. For material capability, the study utilizes primary data such as speeches from naval and state leaders, official reports, interviews, and military statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Lowy Institute. Identity is examined through policy papers and leadership narratives. Behavior is assessed using data from RIMPAC exercise events and participant accounts. The article benefited significantly from insights provided through informant interviews with Vice Admiral Robert A. Empedrad AFP (Retired), the 2018 Flag Officer in command of the Philippine Navy, and AD3 Beethoven C. Lomeda PN, flight deck personnel of BRP Davao del Sur, who participated during RIMPAC 2018.

Possessing a Blue-Water Naval Force

Of Teo’s three middle power criteria, material capability aptly visualizes the power gap between great, middle, and minor powers. For RIMPAC participants, it is reflected in naval strength through blue-water capability to deploy forces beyond home waters for exercises. It not only enhances their interoperability and operational capacity but also allows projection of influence beyond coastal waters. Thus, a RIMPAC middle power is expected to possess blue-water naval capability.

For post-Cold War RIMPAC participants, developing a blue-water navy is challenging due to the significant military expenditure required. Great powers can create and maintain a full blue-water navy by purchasing multiple blue-water capital ships for their multiple naval commands. For middle powers, they meet blue-water navy standards but in a more limited capacity. High-tier middle powers like France (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2) could afford strong naval forces through its historical great power status, which allowed it to match or exceed other middle powers. For instance, France in 2010 had around ten naval bases worldwide (with four in the Indo-Pacific) that had to be patrolled by 53 surface combatants of either primary or multi-capable roles. To complement primary warships like aircraft carriers and submarines, the French Navy ordered the completion of multiple frigates (the most numerous surface combatant) for deployment in French naval commands. In contrast, low-tier middle powers such as the Philippines (Tables 2.3 and 2.4) increased defense budgets more modestly because of economic limits and domestic priorities. In 2018, the Philippine Navy (PN) had to boost the Philippine Fleet, the sole command of all PN ships, to provide combatants for six naval commands that handled various sections of the state and the extended coastline leading to 200 NM. In the combined modernization and expansion, the PN added three new patrol combatants for a total of 68 surface combatants and two new landing platform docks for logistics. Still, both remain far behind the naval expenditures of the U.S. and a rising China in 2010.

Table 2.1. French military expenditure in the Post-Cold War

Source: Author’s compilation based on the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

Table 2.2. 2010 Top 10 States in Military Expenditure and France

Source: Author’s compilation based on the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

Table 2.3. Philippine military expenditure in the Post-Cold War

Source: Author’s compilation from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

Table 2.4. 2018 Top 10 States in Military Expenditure and the Philippines

Source: Author’s compilation based on the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

The requirement for blue-water naval capability varies across RIMPAC middle powers. For instance, the Atlanticist-focused French Navy utilized submarines and nuclear-armed floating assets for metropole defense. However, by the 2000s, strategic uncertainty brought by terrorism and certain regional powers led to expanded maritime metropole defense. In 2008, President Nikolas Sarkozy reinforced France’s extended maritime protection, conflict prevention, and intervention capabilities, especially in the Indian Ocean.  By 2009-2010, French Navy patrol frigates served Indo-Pacific force projection and presence, with the Floréal-class frigate FS Prairial (F 731) serving as the sole participant in France’s 2010 debut. Meanwhile, French Navy capital ships like aircraft carriers or submarines were not RIMPAC-bound in 2010 due to time and distance constraints to venture to the Pacific.

Conversely, low-tier middle powers like the Philippines also needed a blue water navy to patrol extended maritime rights and assist overseas citizens when needed. For instance, the Philippines in 2018 affirmed its commitment to the tribunal ruling over sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea and concerns about great power rivalries. Traditionally focused on internal security operations, the PN transitioned toward blue-water operations with foundational assets acquired from Indo-Pacific middle powers (e.g., South Korea, Indonesia) and great powers (e.g., U.S.).

Under Vice Admiral Empedrad, the PN took a step further in developing its blue-water assets by sending the newly received BRP Andres Bonifacio FF-17 (a former U.S. High-Endurance Cutter capable of extended patrols) and the newly acquired BRP Davao del Sur LD-602 (an Indonesian-made strategic sealift vessel) for RIMPAC. Not only did the participation allow training for prolonged operations overseas, but it also allowed the PN to perform comparably with other middle power participants.

“Partner” Identity

Identity is another vital criterion in shaping middle power experience. In contemporary RIMPAC editions, the U.S. emphasized the participants as “partners,” exemplified from 2018’s “Capable, Adaptive, Partners” and implied in 2010’s “Combined Agility, Synergy and Support.” For middle powers, they are distinguished by their role as junior partners to great powers and as active contributors in specific regional functions that will help promote security across the region.

While not widely documented, the French Navy’s participation could be traced to ideas of then-President Sarkozy. At the time of its RIMPAC debut in 2010, France outlined continuing U.S. domination challenged by growing Asian powers and regional conflicts. Hence, there is a need to securitize the ‘Indo-‘ portion of the Indo-Pacific as a state with overseas possessions and a stake in maritime commerce. France supported American strategies for Indo-Pacific security. Despite some disagreements with the U.S., France recognized that the U.S., as the number one global power, should share and listen to the ideas and views of others. As one of the more capable U.S. allies, France committed to American-led security initiatives like reintegrating into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s integrated command and combating Somali piracy in the Horn of Africa. The deployment of FS Prairial in RIMPAC affirmed the French commitment to extend security for all nations.

Meanwhile, the Philippine case of middle power identity in RIMPAC 2018 is reflected at presidential, administrative, and operational levels. During the Duterte presidency, the Philippines was already identified as an Indo-Pacific middle power. Between the U.S. and China, the Philippines seemed to align with the former. However, President Duterte preferred the U.S. for military exercises, leading to an from 258 in 2017 to 261 in 2018. The state also recognized the U.S. as a global power and demonstrated its willingness to coordinate with the great power in common maritime security interests.

The Philippines’ interest also lies in committing to overall American-supported regional security. RIMPAC participation allowed the PN to train in overseas sealift to kickstart long-distance transportation of goods and services. With this, the state could also send its naval ships to assist other states should a humanitarian mission be needed. It is reflective of Filipino-associated values of openness and hospitality, as well as returning the assistance afforded to the Philippines in times of need. At the operational level, Filipino openness and hospitality were showcased to RIMPAC participants in 2018 during shipboard tours for military and civilian visitors. As a result of its participation, the PN was seen as a sail partner for cooperative sailing by other RIMPAC participants, as exemplified by joint sailing with Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, and India en route to Hawaii.

Participation in a RIMPAC Activity

With a preference for multilateralism as a key behavior, middle powers build partnerships, assume leadership roles in certain niches, and align resources toward shared regional security goals. Participation in a RIMPAC activity signals a middle power’s reliability and operational readiness in various maritime security issues. States typically had various exercises to choose from in RIMPAC’s three-phase setup, especially in 2010 and 2018. The activities within the phases address overcoming cultural, linguistic, and operational barriers, especially since maritime challenges are similar despite varying state interests.

RIMPAC 2010 prepared the French Navy to lead and act in particular threats arising from patrols and blue-to-littoral operations. For instance, the crew of FS Prairial participated in a vessel board, search, and seizure (VBSS) drill of Phase II or the Operational Phase. Such activity honed the French ability to lead in various European-led VBSS initiatives, such as anti-drug smuggling. Furthermore, FS Prairial participated in littoral operations. As the exercise allowed expertise in joint ocean-to-coast maneuvers for various operations, French participation allowed the tying of French naval forces in the region as a genuine threat deterrent for any regional challenger of free navigation.

Likewise, the PN is also lead and participated in experiences during RIMPAC on a regional scale through RIMPAC 2018. Beforehand, the Philippines had a PN delegation in the 2012 to 2016 editions to join as observers. By 2018, the Philippines, being an effective middle power with blue-water assets following the PN’s modernization track, could effectively participate in RIMPAC and the overall Indo-Pacific security operations. Its initial commitment in RIMPAC was through joining the initial, middle, and final planning pre-exercise conferences in California and Hawaii. The Philippine Marines, fresh from victory against Islamic State militants at Marawi in 2017, trained with foreign Marines in urban fighting events at Big Island, Hawaii. To show its capacity in multilateral warfighting operations developed from a formerly internal focus, PN ships participated in firing exercises and naval aviation events. Meanwhile, the BRP Davao del Sur also featured in large sealift activities as the nation recognized its usefulness in long-distance humanitarian and disaster response operations in the state’s vast archipelago and overseas. The airlift and sealift exercises proved useful in 2020 when PN ships repatriated Filipinos in the Middle East amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conclusion: Why It Matters

Going back, this article showed that new RIMPAC middle power participants like France and the Philippines possess a blue water-level naval force; identify as a junior partner to the great power host nation and security guarantor for other states; and participate in at least one multilateral interoperability activity. These criteria matter because these participants seek to cultivate influence and security by aligning their material capability, identity, and behavior with the expectations of the international order, or at the very least with their great power ally. With ample capability and directive, middle powers elevate their regional standing not just as an ally in times of conflict but also as a dependable partner to check regional threats. Since they do not have great power capabilities and interests, middle powers pursue a limited “punching above their weight” strategy by securing recognition, partnerships, and strategic relevance that they could not achieve unilaterally. Participation in RIMPAC is an avenue to show that middle powers have the means and intention to become meaningful partners in regional security, especially in the contested Indo-Pacific waterways between the U.S. and China.