Special Forces Identify Crisis; Déjà vu all Over Again

In the last few weeks, there has been a fair amount of debate regarding the recent JSOU publication Special Forces has an Identity Crisis, Who are the Green Berets Supposed to Be by COL (Ret.) Ed Croot.  If you haven’t personally seen the data from that study, I strongly recommend reviewing it before commenting. You may disagree with the results, but it’s hard not to acknowledge the data and the rigorous analytical process applied during Croot’s research.  The data clearly indicates that there is, in fact, an identity crisis.  For anyone my age or older, you might recall a similar period in the 1990s, to which I could argue that the 20 years of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) only provided a temporary reprieve from the post-Cold War identity crisis debate.

As I considered why the Force responded the way they did, I can’t help but feel that many of the underlying issues are not as complicated as they are often portrayed.

I recall as a young detachment commander in 1995, I had to wrestle with emerging doctrine that explained how various activities were now to be categorized as new forms of unconventional warfare.  Some of these activities included Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCETs), de-mining operations, and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), when conducted by Special Forces soldiers (referred to as an Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team, or UART).  This all culminated in June of 2001, with the new FM 31-20, Special Forces Operations manual that explained the “traditional” unconventional warfare construct of guerrillas, auxiliary, and the underground was now expanded to include working with “conventional coalition forces”.  The manual states, “The conventional coalition forces trained, organized, equipped and led in varying degrees by SF represents the newest evolution in UW-related surrogate forces.  SF units conducting UW as part of coalition support operations are task organized as Special Forces Liaison Elements (SFLEs).  These elements collocate with military forces of coalition partners and provide essential U.S. command, control, communications, computers and intelligence links.”  This would allow anything and everything to be labeled as unconventional warfare.

To say there was an identity crisis during that period would be an understatement.   I can also say that there was a culture of, if you raised questions or concerns, you ran the risk of being labeled as not on board with the program.  The situation had gotten so convoluted that in 2008 the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) directed a working group to clarify the meaning of UW.  While this effort did result in a revised definition of unconventional warfare (which remains in place today), the purpose was not about changing or updating the topic as much as forcing clarity to arrest the growing interpterion and corresponding degradation of the associated requisite professional knowledge. As a former Chief of Special Forces (SF) Doctrine (2004/05), I can say from experience that when the Force and its leaders (aka General and Field Grade level) don’t take an interest in their own doctrine and treat it with the respect it requires (ensuring it is clear, accurate, concise, and user-friendly), it sends a message that has a ripple effect across the entire Force:  Doctrine matters more than you may think.

You might think that after 20 years of combat experience in the War on Terror, the community would have incredible doctrine based on a wealth of proven practices and experiences and a corresponding clear value proposition message.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  The current doctrine for Special Forces is, in many cases, either completely absent or grossly verbose and unclear.  No one reads 600+ page manuals, as in the case of the current UW manual.  In many cases, the doctrine does not provide viable clear information and in other cases provide outdated or inaccurate information (MARGE BUNDLE codes have not been a thing since 1990, just saying).

The current COIN and FID doctrine are spread over multiple (somewhat redundant) books but still fail to provide concise clarity on the topic.  There is little to no doctrine that explains the unique TTPs and role of Special Forces in counterinsurgency (COIN), based on the lessons from the GWOT.  For example, from 2003-2011, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq, (CJSOTF-AP) had responsibility that spanned the entirety of Iraq.  As an example, three special forces companies or Operational Detachment Bravos (ODBs), with their assigned Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs), under the control of a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), could coordinate their targeting efforts against specific insurgent networks spanning from the Syrian border to Baghdad.  This enabled the CJSOTF to target insurgent clandestine infrastructure and not be restricted by a single unit’s limited battlespace. They could then action those targets with their partner Iraqi CT forces.  They developed procedures to transform classified intelligence into Iraqi warrants, which resulted in significant credibility with the population.   This level of countering the insurgent infrastructure (aka the underground), was beyond any other elements’ capabilities.  The concept and lessons of these efforts are not captured in the doctrine.  The conventional forces then and now, relying on FM 3-24 to understand the role of SF in COIN, have little to no idea this is what Special Forces can and in fact did contribute to the COIN fight (FM 3-24 only makes two minor mentions of special operations forces).

Regarding counterterrorism (CT) as a Special Forces core task/operations, there is no Special Forces doctrine for CT operations (listed as TBP for several years on the ARSOF Doctrine website, behind a firewall).  Soldiers in the special operations community routinely hear that the Force needs to shift from CT to focus on Irregular Warfare (IW) (also listed on the doctrine page behind a firewall). This is particularly confusing since CT is listed as a part of IW in the DoD IW Directive.  In many ways this is like saying, “We need to get away from eating apples and focus more on fruit.”  It is not hard to see why a soldier might have some confusion.

The current TC 18-05 Special Forces FID and Support to Counterinsurgency manual (located behind a firewall on Army Publishing Directorate), published in January 2021, explains that Special Forces role in COIN includes (1) Direct Action, (2) Special Reconnaissance and (3) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.  It then goes on to explain “other activities SOF may conduct include: intelligence activities, CI support, security activities, countering IEDs, Cordon and Search, countering threat networks, targeting threat infrastructure, detainee activities, CT and population control.”  This is a very odd list of seemingly routine activities. (Authors note: The majority of the current ARSOF doctrinal publications, although unclassified, are restricted behind a firewall and not publicly accessible, which further reduces their circulation with potential readers).

By comparison, the 1965 Army FM 31-21 Special Forces Operations manual had a very clear chapter on COIN:

“Broad unconventional warfare doctrine does not apply to counterinsurgency situations.  In unconventional warfare operations, the US sponsored guerrillas operate deep within enemy or enemy dominated territory and are the insurgents themselves.  Their efforts are directed towards the delay and harassment of the enemy military force and are facilitated by inducing the local civilians to support the guerrilla effort. In counterinsurgency operations, US sponsored forces are operating in a less restrictive operational environment with their efforts directed toward prevention or countering the insurgent’s movements by winning the support of the population, thus denying the insurgents their support and by combat actions against the insurgent force.”

The chapter then goes on to explain that Special Forces can conduct counter-guerrilla operations, counter-underground operations (like those of the Phoenix program), as well as train, advise, and accompany a host nation’s military, paramilitary, and civilian irregular militias, such as tribal elements.  Perhaps, if there had been COIN doctrine for Special Forces that explained this in 2001, it would not have taken six years of missteps and hard learned lessons to develop effective concepts like the Sons of Iraq or Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan (which were very similar to the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) of Vietnam).

In the past, the Force has demonstrated a tendency to jam the square peg of UW into the round hole of reality, loosely overusing (and misapplying) the term at any opportunity, often leaving members of the Joint Conventional Force and Special Forces community scratching their heads.  A few years ago, a friend of mine, who is a Team Sergeant, deployed for a rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).  During the rotation, the cadre corrected his team’s planning, explaining that he must include “conducts Irregular Warfare” as his mission’s task.  There are a couple of issues here.  “Conduct (insert type of operations here, UW, CT, FID, etc.)” is never an appropriate mission task. A task is something to be accomplished, best expressed as an action verb (e.g. destroy, disrupt). This is far from an isolated incident.  If the cadre at the premier training center, or any other training or education center, does not understand how to draft a mission statement, that’s an issue that should warrant the command’s attention – at all levels.  What are your trainers and educators indoctrinating and infusing into the Force at all levels?  Is it clear and useful or confusing, inaccurate, and disruptive?

In 2004, having just returned from Northern Iraq and one of the largest UW campaigns in Special Forces history, I attended a GWOT planning group at Ft Bragg, North Carolina.  I listened as a senior officer pontificated that we must update the definition of UW to include terrorism. His argument was that we needed to portray a unique Special Forces variety of CT and COIN.  This is the kind of flawed thinking that confuses the special operations and conventional communities as well as dilutes the topic (in this case UW) to the point where it becomes more of a “mindset” or marketing slogan than a topic with actual professional knowledge associated with it. Simplify put, this is inflexibility, masked as adaptability.

The June 2025 ATP 3-18.1 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare doctrine (located behind a firewall) includes a description of three new versions of UW beyond the “traditional models of unconventional warfare” (against occupation and as a standalone insurgency).  These include very confusing descriptions of UW against insurgents and terrorists, operations that the rest of the military would refer to as COIN or CT.  The doctrine also incorrectly describes Phase 1 (Preparation) of the 7 Phases of Unconventional Warfare.  Historically, Phase 1 (formerly known as Psychological Preparation until 2006) has always been preparation of the environment, specifically the indigenous populations’ will to resist, and not a description of home station planning efforts. The description of planning procedures for unconventional warfare is so detached from reality its beyond comment in this forum. The 632-page document includes plenty of other questionable TTPs for UW such as how to sling load a HUMVEE from a CH-47.  If this was a medical textbook, how many inaccurate statements could it have before it raised concerns by its owners and users?

I routinely hear that UW is why Special Forces was created in 1952.  While a true statement, we often fail to tell the rest of the story.  The reality is the opportunities to conduct UW are few and far between (once every few decades).  It’s an important mission, but very difficult to anchor your relevance to as a reason for being.   The Force quickly realized that this model was not sustainable within the Army.  As a result, SF doctrine quickly adapted and expanded the role of SF added COIN in 1961, DA and SR in 1968, and CT in 1977.  COIN was replaced by FID in the 1980s.  Good organizations evolve and change what they do over time.  They don’t attempt to alter their environment by redefining long-standing topics in an effort to maintain their preferred core activity.

Organizations have two options for being relevant.  They can be better at something that their customer base wants and needs (a competitive model), and/or they can be unique.  However, being unique doesn’t automatically make you relevant unless that’s what your customer base needs.  In the last 30 years, the Force has become increasingly disconnected from its customer base, the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs).  In 1968, roughly 70% of Special Forces were permanently stationed overseas (1^st, 5^th, 8^th, 10^th   Special Forces Groups, Det-A, Det-K and 46^th SF Company) and three Special Forces Groups were stationed in CONUS (3^rd, 6^th and 7^th).  Since then, the vast majority of the Force has become CONUS-based.  As a result, they are not truly accessible to the customer for employment without going through a slow and lengthy process to request forces.  The solution, in some cases, has been a new normal of rotational HQs deployed forward.  While a predictable and somewhat sustainable solution, these “ad hoc” TF HQs often lack true regional fidelity and long-term perspective.  Furthermore, with the disbanding of the Commander’s In-Extremist Force (CIFs) and Crisis Response Forces (CREs) a few years ago, largely against the wishes of the GCCs, Special Forces has largely removed itself from any (true) crisis response options and further degraded its value proposition to the GCCs.

Final Thoughts

The Special Forces Regiment is a critically valuable capability within the Joint Force. However, its value is degraded if its narrative, doctrine, and employment model are not concise and clear, commonly understood (by the Special Forces and conventional force communities), or an agile and responsive employment model to the GCCs needs.  The Force would do well to stop using the term “SOF” when they really mean “SO”.  They are not interchangeable.  Consider two different panel discussions.  One titled “The Role of SOF” and the other “The Role of SO”.  The first one, by default, will justify the current business model and structure.  The second one, untethered to a specific force, has potential to generate thought that could inform decisions about the best approach, model and structure.  It’s a subtle distinction but critically important.  Constant (over) use of the term “SOF” over “special operations” has the potential of creating solutions in search of a problem to solve.

The Force doesn’t need another slick marketing document that restates all the popular buzz words in the NDS or doctrine that reads more like propaganda, but is surprisingly light on actual TTPs.  It needs a simple and clear narrative rooted in reality.  It needs clear and concise doctrine that underpins the narrative and is based on lessons and best proven practices.  It needs a true business relationship with its consumer (the TSOCs and GCCs).  Imagine a company that puts the bulk of its energy into the quality of its product but almost no time into its distribution plan and connection to the consumer.  This task is handled by another third-party organization. The consumer explains that they are interested in their product but it’s too hard to place an order.  The response they get is that that’s the process, followed by a confusing description of their quality.  The current centralized process managed by USSOCOM was designed at the start of the GWOT for the combat zone rotations.  It was designed for predictive rotation and subsequently outdated and insufficient for the world today.

Replace regional “orientation” with a regional command relationship enabling employment.  Enable your tactical commands to properly command.  Revise the officer assignments and management process to enable longer tours for company and field grade officers in operational units.  No business in the world could run a successful franchise where its mid-level managers are swapping out after 1 or 2 years of management (aka command). Make 0-3 assignments 4 years, 3 by exception and 0-4 assignments 3 years, 2 by exception.  For anyone reading this and automatically thinking of all the reasons this can’t be done, I would submit, that’s the mindset that got us here.