Contested Logistical Resupply to the Zero Line: How Drones and Signals Require a Change in Standard Operating Procedures

How do Army units survive and win on the modern battlefield? The battlefield has changed, and we must adjust to the new realities. Ukraine has shown that logistical ingenuity and even crowdsourcing are playing a major role in how the zero line or forward line of troops (FLOT) is resupplied. Current standard operating procedures (SOPs) and processes are no longer effective to keep formations equipped and fighting on the modern drone-saturated battlefield. The idea of logistical packages moved from established field trains (large footprint logistical supply areas) to logistic release points to combat logistical trains to the individual unit is an outdated model that needs thought and tactical innovation, creativity, and change. The idea of contested logistics is not a new concept. However, military planners must consider small drones and the evolving importance of signal emissions in operational planning. There is a lack of emphasis in established planning processes, examples might include (Army: Military Decision Making Process or USMC: Marine Corps Planning Process) that continue to prioritize a set framework for mission orders, which may not be relevant to the realities of the modern battlefield. This is exemplified by the lock-step and stringent steps of each; however, there is an opportunity in the wargaming phase of these frameworks for the intelligence and operations teams to analyze and practice scenarios that would affect logistical operations caused by sUAS surveillance and attack. The real issue is basic education on the evolving threat. Simply put, the Services are failing to give their members the foundations of small drone warfare.

In the end, the key to success is security: Logistical Packages (LOGPACs) now require dedicated security, counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) tools, equipment, and tactical adjustments, especially in drone-contested environments. Furthermore, considering the need for armor formations and the importance of limiting these targetable formations through less frequent movements in persistent eye environments should be the logical approach. Main supply routes (MSRs) are now killing zones for first-person view drones that have multiple intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms overhead searching for targets. The idea of encasing MSRs in netting, as seen in Ukraine, is creative but easily defeated and not sustainable. This new way of battle necessitates smaller, agile packages of supply, cached in some instances, that support a more detailed and concentrated resupply methodology. The needs have not and will not change; the basics of fuel, ammunition, food, water, medical supply, repair parts, and maintenance support remain constant. For example, a typical and simple diagram of Logistics Package (LOGPAC) operations for an Armor Battalion may look like this.

This is a large target with many moving parts. It is simply outdated and not sustainable based on current warfare lessons learned. The new normal must be adjusted for practicality, precision, and survivability. That is the challenge. Let’s start with the current reality.

The organizational framework of modern tactical units is well-equipped for the Cold War era. When Army units were designed for large-scale armor battles on a linear battlefield… not for fast fast-paced UAV and artillery-dominated environment of Ukraine. A U.S. Army Combined Arms Battalion (colloquially known as a tank battalion) typically consists of five companies of approximately 550 Soldiers:

Based on the author’s operational experience, the FSC is responsible for executing LOGPAC missions, in coordination with the HHC Company commander, the FSC commander, Battalion S4 (Logistics Officer), S1 (Personnel Officer), Medical Officer, Maintenance Officer, and Brigade Support Operations Officer (SPO). This process then replicates similarly at the battalion level, where LOGPACs then supply subordinate companies. The final stage is the resupply of the platoons. This dedicated operation and mission execution have always been the strength of the United States military forces. The U.S. Army and its supporting infrastructure are the best in the world and have proven it time and time again, but the current design is not agile enough to design a system that meets the same expectations and adjusts to the “new” way of war. Simply stated, we have no choice.

Logistical planning and execution at the tactical level.

The issue of LOGPAC planning and execution sits at the heart of contested logistics. In the current SOPs of Mission Command Systems, the battalion staff uses digital mission planning tools (like CPCE – Command Post Computing Environment and JBC-P) to plan LOGPAC routes, timing, and security. Based on the author’s operational experience and the lessons from Ukraine, these systems all require electricity and emit an electromagnetic spectrum that can be targeted by advisory capabilities. They focus on demand forecasting as units report consumption via systems like GCSS-Army, feeding into automated logistics forecasting. During these 24–48-72-hour planning cycles, planners project needs based on combat tempo, expected contact, and operational tempo.

A typical battalion LOGPAC is organized by commodities that can consist of fuel, ammunition, food, water, maintenance parts, supply, and trash for back hauling. Large off-road capable trucks and trailers can distribute these commodities in austere environments.

Typical modes of delivery are broken down by level of execution. Does this still suffice on a battlefield that has persistent real-time surveillance?

• Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP): Positioned 5-10 km behind the line to receive supplies from the Field Trains and push forward.
• Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP): Receive LOGPAC from the logistics release point (LRP) or CTCP.
• Field Trains (Battalion Trains): Distribution platoon that pulls supply from the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) and delivers it to CTCP or LRP.
• LOG Release Point (LRP): Pre-designated area for handover; located based on terrain and threat level.

LRPs are not permanent locations, and the mission must be completed quickly to reduce risk to the force. The security situation at the LRP is correlated to the amount of resources a unit can or will assign to this mission. There must be considerable thought placed on security and threat Consideration as LOGPACs face considerable threats from sUAS systems in FPV and other modes of command and control, which do not negate the effects of long-range fires and cyberattacks. Decentralizing enemy threats must be first and foremost in the minds of leaders and planning staffs. We cannot fight if we do not have the resources to execute. Resources are finite, and we must simplify this problem for front-line units, as they need to focus on combat operations. Considering a change in doctrine that addresses the realities of modern warfare, including counter-UAS:

Mounted systems, shotguns, crew-served weapons with smart technology, or handheld jammers must be integrated into convoy operations. Take, for example, this article from Politico, Why Ukraine Remains the World’s Most Innovative War Machine – POLITICO, (Let me know if there is a specific section you’d like to highlight from this article?).   The truth today is that systems at the tactical level are allocated based on immediate need and are not a permanent fixture in most units. Due to the episodic nature of using C-UAS equipment, our logistical troop formations are not trained on C-UAS operations during execution. As an example, in Poland, a battalion had 2 x dismounted systems to disable drones. The battalion had limited training and improvised by allocating those assets to the Battalion Main Command Post. The unit did this so their 24-hour manned security desk could access them during a shift, highlighting the immaturity of forward-deployed Army units’ C-UAS toolkits.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, several electronic warfare systems devices were fielded to mitigate the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. The small unmanned aerial system (sUAS) drone threat did not exist, showing the very rapid maturity and evolution of the sUAS toolkit. Getting back to basics is essential for the tactical edge. A camouflage and signature reduction emphasis on limiting electromagnetic and visual signatures to avoid detection is critical. Netting, cloaking, camouflage, and Kevlar blankets are a few examples of tactical solutions; however, these items do not exist on the current organization and equipment tables (MTOEs). Emphasizing signature reduction is a major effort and brings the communication and electronic warfare professionals in the services to the forefront. Leaders must have concern, and a major effort must be brought to our training, including technological solutions, disciplined operations, and most importantly, awareness by all levels of command. Tactical operations centers of the past cannot survive on the modern battlefield.

Addressing long-term emerging solutions. How do we address technological enhancements and future solutions that are disruptive and break the barriers of current thought? Addressing Autonomous Resupply Vehicles (ARVs) with pilot programs includes autonomous or semi-autonomous convoys for contested resupply. Leveraging real-time tracking of LOGPAC movements that are tracked with satellite and radio feeds using command and control systems while building the next generation of common operating pictures. Considering data integration using GCSS-Army and other reporting tools allows real-time updates on supply status and vehicle readiness. Breaking down parochial branch fights and opening a true public/private partnership will give our Services a tactical edge.  Additionally, technology enhancements to LOGPAC operations are something worth exploring. Autonomous vehicles, commonly referred to as unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), are growing in need and maturity, with many systems already working in the Ukraine combat zone for resupply, medevac, and improvised explosive device (IED) delivery in the network of trench lines reminiscent of World War I. Additionally, the ability to track UGVs in real-time with established command and control systems is on the horizon. Perfecting this type of operation will take time, and the importance of signals again tops the list of investments we (and more than just DOD) must consider when thinking about “automating the battlefield.”

This also leads to the concept of data layer visualization and integration for decision-making. All ideas, seemingly complicated, are exactly that, but not out of the realm of possibility. Knowing that communications is often the biggest issue in combat operations with range, link loss, weather interference, and Murphy’s Law, it would benefit planners to take extraordinary time to understand the environment and how these types of operations could take shape. Major Combat Operations (MCO), Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), and All-Domain Operations (ADO) are all common terms used when describing how the DOD is maturing through technological advancements and demands of different environments, taking into account extremes like the Arctic, deserts, dense urban terrain, mountains, and island chains. Experimentation must be expedited, first in sterile areas where end-user collaboration can affect design, next in limited training scenarios to show capability and capacity to handle demand, and finally in real-world live environments that put the stressors on the technologies and operators to expose gaps and seams in design and operational implementation. This method is commonly known as a crawl, walk, run framework.

How are military ground forces addressing sustainment in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO)? Considering the need for dispersed operations, LOGPACs may need to deliver to widely dispersed elements under LSCO concepts, which means interoperability in joint and coalition logistic operations and coordination, particularly in the theater with allies, becomes another science project for Service leaders. The difference in urgency, there is not enough time to do this in years. It must be done much faster.

If we examine the current command and control SOPs, we see that command and control at the Battalion level varies based on unit SOPs, locations, and missions. The system described below outlines the most common approach, using the tactical armor battalion to highlight the growing need for change at all levels. The Main Command Post (MCP), often called the Main CP, manages current operations by tracking battles, maintaining situational awareness, and monitoring the location and combat power of all enemy and friendly units. Its main function is to enable the Commander to coordinate the close fight with the companies while providing a liaison to Brigade, requesting and allocating assets, and giving the big picture to support timely and accurate decision-making. The MCP typically includes the battalion executive officer, operations sergeant major, current operations officer, operations planner, Fires, Intelligence, Protection, and Communication elements. The Tactical Command Post (TAC) is a short-duration deployment used when the Commander needs to control a critical operation from the point of friction, such as a breach or gap crossing. The Commander can command the Battalion from either the MCP or the TAC. The TAC consists of the battalion Commander, fire support, and a Battle Captain. The Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) primarily manages all sustainment-related activities. It supervises and tracks the combat and field trains, maintains awareness of current operations, and can serve as a backup CP if the MCP is destroyed or relocated. The CTCP is a small command post comprising the HHC Company Commander, the battalion S4, a small HQ, elements from the FSC, the field kitchen, the aid station, and the distribution Platoon.

The Field Trains Command Post (FTCP), located at the Brigade Support Area (BSA), interfaces with the larger Brigade sustainment support system. It ensures the BSB provides the proper supplies to the downtrace Battalion and is involved in critical logistical planning for future Brigade operations. This FTCP is very small, typically including the FSC Commander and a small HQ element. The Combat Trains, sometimes called Company Trains, are small packages consisting of the company’s first sergeant and two to three supply trucks, and a water trailer. The Field Trains may include or be the entire distribution Platoon. For a tank battalion, this usually includes six fuel trucks, one large water trailer, and 10-20 supply trucks for general cargo. This formation is large, slow, and usually bound to MSRs, which makes it predictable to target. Large convoys in Ukraine are obvious targets and quickly destroyed. Does this organization remain viable? What are some ways it could be changed? What lessons can from Ukraine and other conflict zones? It is important to think about a shift toward pre-positioning and rapid burst resupply rather than scheduled LOGPACs. Focusing and training on mobility and agility, creating smaller, more frequent resupply runs with agile packages instead of large, predictable convoys might be a way. Instead of viewing the combat support elements as force providers, they become true combat enablers and force multipliers. Now that FSCs will be operating under enemy observation or fire at all times, camouflage, deception, and deception logistics (dummy LOGPACs) are increasingly relevant, which creates a need for added equipment, manpower, and tactics.

The saying of just-in-time logistics was helpful during a period when large maneuver formations operated in environments favorable to non-contested logistical support. However, from the author’s operational experience and as these conditions evolve, the concept of just-in-case or strategically preplanned logistics becomes a more practical objective, as exemplified in Ukraine and even in wars in the Middle East. Ukraine has proven that just-in-time logistics is a failure, and survival with this mentality is severely degraded. Even in the open terrain of Eastern Ukraine, where maneuvering is possible, such approaches have yet to materialize for various reasons, with the primary one being that sUAS and other robotics account for 70-80% of battlefield casualties and equipment damage. The principles of mobility, agility, and innovation open up opportunities for smaller footprints and more frequent logistical missions while equipping logistical patrols with advanced electronic warfare devices, kinetic platforms, and effective concealment tools. In Ukraine, it’s common for vehicle movements to be supported by soldiers ready with shotguns and hand-held jamming devices; however, the need for detection at a distance remains critical. Based on the author’s experience and expertise with detection and mitigation technologies, the emergence of sUAS flying on fiber optic cables requires portable radar systems that could be linked to acoustic sensors. Developing this kind of technology in smaller, sturdy, and portable formats should be a key requirement in the commercial market. This AI-generated image offers a conceptual design of how such a system might appear.

Let’s summarize key considerations now, answering the challenge of surviving and winning in a completely contested logistical environment, from reliance on supply chains to tactical edge operations. This topic exists in all the levels of war – strategic, operational, and tactical and can be addressed in the following manner:

1. Planning must start with an understanding of the sUAS ecosystem. Education at all levels of the DOD’s professional military education (PME) structure should include courses in sUAS and C-UAS technology solutions and the laws of the environments where the force is operating from and in. Next, Commanders and staff must produce a drone vulnerability and risk assessment that studies threats, critical asset protection, vulnerability/consequence, and potential risk mitigation options. A thorough understanding of drone emergency response planning that includes policy and standard operating procedures, including how those SOPs are executed and how often they are updated. Lastly, we have to become experts in left of drone launch, combining information, intelligence, and operations together to synchronize on proactive and pre-event opportunities to disrupt our enemies’ operations. Concerning the contested logistical environment, using digital tools, artificial intelligence data, terrain modeling, and potentially quantum computing provides for a value-added research and development project.
2. Delivery, Security, and Material Solutions based on these considerations must be agile, secure, frequent, and dispersed. Security must consider all the lessons learned in Ukraine and other conflict zones and support the adjustment to training, tactics, and even doctrine. Material solutions must be considered to lighten logistical requirements at the FLOT. Some examples include, but are not limited to, ruggedized solar power to reduce the need for generators, water purification kits, Starlink terminals, and wired telephones.
3. Communication and Command and Control (C2) must consider how and with what tools, but also how we look at the enemy. What are the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency methods and tools we should use and train on? We must consider cyber defense for encryption and integration. Electronic Warfare: Lighter and individually carried equipment that is capable of passive jamming without the need for batteries. Command and Control, using our example, leverages the expertise in each of the echelons regarding logistical operations and the “Just-in-Case” supply and resupply mindset.

In the end, the DOD survives and wins because of many factors, most importantly the creative and innovative actions of our Service Members who use ingenuity, initiative, and courage to win our fights, but they can’t do it without logistics, and they definitely cannot do it with our current standards. The sUAS evolution has changed modern warfare; we can no longer rely on safe rear areas, and we must now consciously “look up.”

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Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of War, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. Government.