The Shadow of October 7th: Peacekeeping (In)Effectiveness in a World of Evolving Conflict
Abstract
The aftermath of the October 7th assaults on Israel revealed and intensified the significant shortcomings of existing peacekeeping frameworks in contemporary conflicts. This article analyzes the inefficacy of enduring United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) in the Middle East. The analysis indicates that the missions’ long-standing mandates, insufficient training for asymmetric threats, and political limitations imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) have incapacitated them from preventing or effectively mitigating escalations involving non-state actors and irregular warfare. The article contends that the difficulties encountered in the Levant represent the changing global conflict dynamics and that the conventional peacekeeping operations methodology is outdated. It finishes by arguing for a fundamental overhaul of peacekeeping doctrine, emphasizing a transition to a more dynamic and proactively mandated approach to maintain the relevance and efficacy of UN missions in the future.
Introduction
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations globally, especially in the Middle East, encounter ever more intricate obstacles. Hybrid armed actors such as Hezbollah complicate their operational capabilities, while targeted misinformation campaigns by conflicting parties erode faith in their role and efficacy. Recent conflict events irrevocably alter the operational environment of these operations. Nonetheless, the international community regards them as an essential source of stability in the region, having maintained a presence for over 77 years.
On October 7th, Hamas launched an attack on Israel, focusing on areas and communities adjacent to the Gaza border, resulting in around 1,200 fatalities and over 200 people taken hostage. This event precipitated a broader conflict between Israel and Hamas that rapidly expanded throughout the region. Three UN missions operate along Israel’s borders with Lebanon and Syria, each under distinct mandates, aimed at functioning as a stabilizing force between conflicting parties. The attack and subsequent escalation in the region highlight the significant shortcomings of existing peacekeeping frameworks in managing conflicts involving non-state actors and entrenched regional rivalries, necessitating a thorough reevaluation of peacekeeping efficacy in preventing and mitigating such crises.
The Landscape Before October 7th
Since Israel’s independence and ensuing conflicts with neighboring countries, the UN has maintained a presence through various diplomatic and peacekeeping missions, referred to as the “Blue Helmets.” It has adjusted to the changing dynamics of the conflict for nearly 77 years and has intervened on behalf of the parties to implement short-term solutions designed to reduce hostilities by facilitating ceasefires and establishing buffer zones. Currently, the Blue Line along the Lebanese-Israeli border and the Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan (Heights) region has an active United Nations presence. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established in 1978 and is situated in southern Lebanon. The United Nations Disengagement Force ( was established after the Yom Kippur War to oversee the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian military units. It persisted in its operations during the Syrian Civil War, notwithstanding threats from insurgent factions, Iranian proxies, and Israeli intrusions. Both missions are supported by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). This mission has been active in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, and Egypt since 1948. This is presently the sole UN mission with a regional presence, supplying military observers to oversee the ceasefires.
Despite this significant presence, all these missions lack the necessary capacity and capabilities to mitigate the potential violent actions between the conflicting parties, as exemplified by the 2006 Lebanon War and Israel’s recent activities in Lebanese and Syrian territories. Tensions persist at elevated levels, with these organizations offering only a transient reduction in hostilities through their sheer presence rather than through substantive action.
Multiple fundamental factors contribute to this issue. The active involvement of non-state actors in Lebanon and Syria’s civil war is a significant factor, as UN peacekeeping operations lack the resources and capabilities to confront irregular threats. Moreover, decade-old mandates aimed at preventing state escalation, primarily in a supporting role to the conflict, hinder proactive measures against non-state actors and relegate these missions to a more observational role rather than an action-oriented one that would enable them to achieve their objectives. A significant aspect is the absence of responsibility and engagement from the existing transitional Syrian administration and the Lebanese government in the regions where the PKOs are stationed.
The October 7th Attacks as a Catalyst for Regional Escalation
The unexpected and unparalleled attack by Hamas on Israel, coupled with the latter’s response, revealed and intensified the interrelation with Israel’s regional wars. These incidents have illustrated how a localized conflict may swiftly incite broader instability in an already tumultuous region, where Israel is the focal point for various factions and organizations, many of whom are financed by Iran, directly impacting UN PKOs in the area.
The conflict in Lebanon affected UNIFIL’s area of responsibility. The kinetic engagement between Israel and Hezbollah involved missile and rocket strikes on military and civilian sites in Israel, with Israel retaliating through precision airstrikes in Lebanon, specifically targeting Hezbollah leadership in the suburbs of Beirut and compounds in southern Lebanon, leading to the deaths of senior Hezbollah officials. Furthermore, the incursion of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) into Lebanon, aimed at repelling Hezbollah forces, compelled UNIFIL personnel to seek refuge in their bases while taking fire from both IDF troops and Hezbollah fighters. Nevertheless, the mission persisted with constraints on observation and reporting for the UNSC, conveying the realities on the ground to the international community. Nevertheless, it faced significant restrictions concerning freedom of movement and presence in various localities throughout southern Lebanon and was unable to execute its mandate in assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with regional disarmament, not only due to the conflict itself but also because of the LAF’s diminished presence in the area, which had withdrawn to avoid direct confrontations with the IDF.
In Syria, where UNDOF operates, no active military engagements occurred as a result of the attacks on October 7th. Upon the collapse of the Assad government, Israel capitalized on the situation to reposition its forces westward. The IDF breached the de facto border, known as the Alpha Line, seizing the buffer zone and Syrian positions within the Area of Limitation designated for Syrian troops. Since then, Israel has declared that the 1974 agreement had collapsed, owing to the lack of a Syrian counterpart to handle this issue, thus constraining UNDOF’s responsibilities and contributions in the region.
The Limited Effectiveness of Peacekeeping in Preventing Escalation
Both missions failed to avert the escalation following the October 7th attacks, partly because their mandates do not include intervention by the use of force to de-escalate situations. Peacekeeping forces serve as a deterrent to prevent parties from escalating hostilities, due to the multinational composition of the personnel involved in these missions. The cost associated with UN casualties is far too great for the conflicting parties and the international community, due to the potential backlash among citizens of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and international condemnation. The ramifications of UN casualties in the region are contingent upon the concerned party. An instance of impunity regarding assaults on peacekeepers occurred in 2006 when unarmed military observers were killed at a UN Observation Post by Israel. The latter, despite the primary responsibility for the protection of UN personnel in fulfilling the mission mandate, rests with the host country.
Additional concerns pertain to the intensity and characteristics of contemporary conflict. Both missions were established in the 1970s. The technological innovations, strategies, and characteristics of these regional conflicts have progressed. Current peacekeeping operations function with few personnel, as UNIFIL has approximately 10,000 troops, whereas UNDOF consists of 1,000 men. There is a lack of substantial air and naval presence, limited to support missions primarily. Compared to the conflicting parties, the UN’s presence lacks effective deterrence mechanisms and is not specifically structured to prevent or swiftly respond to cross-border assaults by the involved actors in the region. It is unable to proactively enforce its mandate while facing ongoing threats from the host countries that impede its operational freedom in the designated areas.
A crucial factor is the lack of a baseline training and educational framework to address the various risks now facing the region. The UN mandates that TCCs undergo a pre-deployment course featuring a common curriculum tailored for this sort of deployment. They touch on several issues in a short period of time. In other words, a mile-wide and an inch-deep course. There is also a lack of standardized training in irregular warfare, while Hezbollah is regarded as the preeminent non-state actor globally. Furthermore, peacekeepers are inadequately taught within the UN educational framework to manage high-risk scenarios. This training originates from their own military, encompassing varying levels of expertise, competence, and, crucially, differing interpretations of the application of force. The latter exhibits a deficiency in standardized military vocabulary and terminology. Although this gap narrows throughout mission deployment, it remains ineffectual, as the six-month UN rotation system renders it inadequate for maintaining a functional force capable of successfully executing its mission.
Another significant factor to examine is their leadership structure. A UN mission authority exists, often an officer of General level, alongside a national command led by the most senior officer present on the ground. This facet may possess wider ramifications. In 2014, 45 Fijian peacekeepers stationed at a UN post were abducted by Syrian rebels in the Golan buffer zone after the commanding General of UNDOF ordered their surrender. Subsequently, a comparable incident occurred using a Philippine-manned UN post. The senior national authority, however, ignored the directive, and Philippine forces confronted Syrian opposition fighters, successfully repelling the assault and subsequently crossing into Israel later that night.
The Role of International Actors and the Limitations of Diplomacy
The UNSC is the sole authority capable of sanctioning UN PKOs. This means that they are generally consensus-oriented and reliant on the alignment of the United Nations Security Council’s member states, which include the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom — the P5 — permanent members of the council possessing veto powers from the sole entity that enforces binding resolutions on the international stage. PKOs operate under constrained mandates influenced by tenuous mutual interests.
Sanctions targeting Israel are consistently blocked by the United States, and those impacting Russian interests, particularly in Syria prior to the demise of the Assad regime, experience similar obstruction. Notwithstanding the international community’s calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and subsequently from Syria, the United States’ financial support and veto power in the UNSC facilitated Israel in accomplishing its objectives. The presence of Russian military in the Golan region, supporting Al Assad’s regime, contradicted the latter’s support for missions in the area. The endeavors of PKOs to execute their missions are constantly undermined by P5 nations. Moreover, each year the missions are required to renew their mandates. The recent intensification of the war and interests by the current US administration may have impacted the UNSC’s decision to terminate UNIFIL’s operations by the end of 2026.
Nevertheless, the missions offer a supportive framework for enhanced interaction between the conflicting nations that would likely not occur in the absence of UN mediation or presence. Currently, UNIFIL facilitates contact between Israel and Lebanon to ensure that isolated events and Blue Line issues are resolved peacefully. It also offered its facilities –UNIFIL’s headquarters in Naqoura, Lebanon– for a US-mediated compromise between Israel and Lebanon about an unresolved maritime border dispute that impacted the interests of both sides due to the possible exploitation of gas resources.
Notwithstanding prevailing circumstances, disinformation campaigns, and constrained resources, the UN’s presence in the region via peacekeeping operations is regarded by states as a neutral platform for enhanced diplomatic dialogue, which could ultimately facilitate the resolution of other conflicts. Although Israel, Lebanon, and Syria bear the primary responsibility for attaining lasting peace, UN missions facilitate the emergence of accords. They continue to be regarded as a beneficial presence for the countries engaged in attaining their own objectives and interests.
Reassessing Peacekeeping for a New Era of Conflict
What mechanisms might peacekeeping operations employ to effectively deter serious escalations when a specific side perceives an existential threat? This is likely the most challenging subject to address in a region where, despite a substantial on-ground presence and the utilization of diplomatic channels, tensions have repeatedly intensified.
On the international stage, the efficacy of PKOs has been demonstrated, serving as “a key driver of the gradual decline in the number and severity of armed conflicts,” despite constrained mandates and budgetary limits that influence on-ground efficiency and potential impact. The Middle East missions are familiar with these constraints, yet contribute to a modest success in maintaining regional stability.
Consensus from the UNSC is essential for modifications to mandates and increases in budgetary allocations. Diplomatic support, especially from the P5 countries, is essential to ensure that their interests do not impede peacekeeping operations on the ground. Enhancements for effective deterrence should focus on expanding the existing mandates regarding actions to decrease tensions.
Furthermore, given these objectives and the multifaceted nature of missions centered on conflict prevention and resilience—which may encompass everything from medical treatment to infrastructure projects—missions must be assigned the appropriate resources, including budget, manpower, and equipment.
One of the most critical components for successful deterrence pertains to the existing training system. The UN system is deficient in a doctrine that can be implemented promptly due to the rapid turnover of personnel, insufficient shared tactical and technical competencies, and a lack of a unified operational language across TCC. Reforms to the training system are essential for the missions to establish a unified and sustained training regimen that addresses the disparities within each TCC. This is crucial in the region, as the missions have not adjusted to the persistent asymmetric threats that have existed for decades in the area. Their present capacity to resolve this issue is nonexistent.
Conclusion
The events that followed October 7th indicate that the existing structures for UN PKOs in the Middle East are not prepared to address the intricacies of contemporary conflicts. Long-standing mandates, an absence of a unified training doctrine, and political constraints have significantly undermined the efficacy of the operations. This has made the “blue helmets” more susceptible observers than efficient stabilizers. The UN is currently reassessing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations; however, an essential transformation in doctrine from passive observation to a more dynamic and proactive engagement is required, emphasizing not merely the tasks to be executed, but also the manner in which they are carried out.
While this article examines PKOs in the Middle East, the implications of revisions in their capacities and capabilities to execute mandates may impact other UN missions globally. Moreover, such a change might significantly influence public perception, which typically regards UN operations as bureaucratic and a needless expenditure of resources.
Action-oriented mandates that enable peacekeeping operations to actively reduce tensions, along with a comprehensive restructure of the UN training system to standardize the knowledge and capabilities of TCCs operating within the same Area of Responsibility, are of paramount importance. Nonetheless, comprehending the dynamics and objectives of the UNSC, the prospect for substantial reform regarding mandates remains unattained. A more pragmatic and practical approach must be considered. The question lies in how to effectuate substantial change that would enable PKOs to sustain their role as a valuable and efficient instrument of the international community for conflict resolution and mediation.
The responsibility is with the latter, specifically the P5 members of the UNSC, to implement a thorough and immediate reform of peacekeeping, focused on a proactive strategy in the operational and tactical landscape. The future of peacekeeping as a mechanism for global stability necessitates a novel model that is both agile and adaptive, as are the conflicts it aims to contain.
