Member Login Become a Member
Advertisement

DoDI 3000.07: New policy for Irregular Warfare

  |  
10.30.2025 at 10:39am

The new DOD Instruction  3000.7 Irregular Warfare can be downloaded HERE. (a 32 page document)

Thanks to SOF Support for flagging this and providing the summary and operational vignette below.

Surprisingly (or perhaps unsurprisingly) there have been no news reports of the new IW policy since the DoDI was published on September 29, 2025 other than the summary below from SOF Support.

All I can say is this:

“America may not be interested in irregular​ warfare but ​I​W is being practiced around the world by those who are interested in ​ it.”
With no apologies to Trotsky

Executive Summary: DoD Instruction 3000.07 – Irregular Warfare (IW)

Overview
The Department of Defense (DoD) has reissued its Irregular Warfare directive as a formal Instruction (DoDI 3000.07), effective September 29, 2025. This new framework elevates Irregular Warfare (IW) as a core joint force competency and establishes the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) as the hub for doctrine, training, and collaboration. IW remains a critical tool for achieving U.S. national security objectives in the gray zone between peace and large-scale war.


What is Irregular Warfare?
Irregular Warfare is defined as the use of indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities by states and non-state actors to coerce or assure others. Unlike conventional war, IW often focuses on eroding an adversary’s legitimacy and influence or strengthening the political will of allies and partners. It includes:

  • Unconventional warfare
  • Counterterrorism & counterinsurgency
  • Foreign internal defense & security force assistance
  • Stabilization activities
  • Counter-threat finance and transnational organized crime
  • Civil affairs operations
  • Military information support operations (MISO)
  • Operations in the information environment (OIE)

Why It Matters

  • Strategic Competition: IW is central to countering adversaries who rely on coercion, disinformation, or proxy forces rather than direct military confrontation.
  • Whole-of-Government Approach: IW requires close collaboration with interagency, international, and partner organizations to achieve lasting effects.
  • Proactive Defense: IW allows the U.S. and allies to prevent small threats from growing into major conflicts.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) at the Core
SOF play a leading role in IW due to their ability to:

  • Operate with and through foreign partners, including irregular forces.
  • Extend U.S. reach into denied or hostile areas.
  • Conduct clandestine and non-attributable missions.
  • Integrate with conventional forces for unified campaigning.

The Instruction also underscores the importance of language, regional expertise, and cultural knowledge (LREC)—areas where SOF already excel.


Irregular Warfare Center (IWC)
The IWC serves as the focal point for:

  • Training and education in IW for both military and civilian personnel.
  • Partner engagement and international collaboration.
  • Research, doctrine development, and lessons learned.
  • Building interoperability across the U.S. Government and allied forces.

Implications for the SOF Community and Families

  • Recognition of SOF Expertise: DoD acknowledges IW as a core mission area, solidifying SOF’s role as the tip of the spear.
  • Long-Term Commitment: Families can expect IW missions to remain central to SOF deployments and training.
  • Support for Partners: SOF will continue to help allies build resilience against aggression, reinforcing the value of partnership and trust.
  • Future-Ready Force: Investments in cyber, space, and artificial intelligence will shape how SOF adapts to new irregular challenges.

Conclusion
DoDI 3000.07 reaffirms that Irregular Warfare is not a peripheral task—it is a strategic necessity. For the SOF community, this means continued leadership in missions that require adaptability, cultural acumen, and the ability to operate in the most complex environments. For families and supporters, it highlights why ongoing programs of resilience, care, and advocacy remain essential.


SOF Support remains committed to honoring the resilience of SOF warriors and families who stand at the forefront of this enduring mission.

Example: SOF Employing Irregular Warfare in Practice
In a coastal partner nation facing coercion by a criminal proxy network, a small SOF team deploys to work by, with, and through the host nation’s maritime police. Over several months, the team helps map illicit finance flows, trains a vetted boarding unit on low-cost, releasable equipment, and establishes a simple information cell that counters disinformation by sharing verified seizure results and community safety messages. In parallel, civil affairs projects restore a storm-damaged pier to reduce the community’s dependence on the smuggling economy. The partner force leads every interdiction while SOF remain in an advisory role. As arrests disrupt the network’s revenue and the public regains trust in local authorities, the host nation sustains operations with minimal U.S. presence—a textbook IW outcome: eroding adversary influence, strengthening partner legitimacy, and denying freedom of action to malign actors.

About The Author

  • David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. He commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines during the war on terrorism and is the former J5 and Chief of Staff of the Special Operations Command Korea, and G3 of the US Army Special Operations Command. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, on the board of advisers of Spirit of America, and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

    View all posts

Article Discussion:

0 0 votes
Article Rating
Subscribe
Notify of
0 Comments
Oldest
Newest Most Voted
Inline Feedbacks
View all comments