The Second Front: PRC Micro-Occupation in the Philippines, Part 2
Editor’s Note: This article is Part IIb in a series on the development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Community Home Defense Operations (CHDO). _______________________________________________________________________________________________________
The Second Front: PRC Micro-Occupation in the Philippines Part 2a described the salami-slicing of features within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines and throughout the West Philippine Sea. We presented a framework for assessing and developing operational concepts to mitigate the threat of continued PRC extraterritorial seizure of the Philippines’ territory, based on the PRC’s actions throughout the West Philippine Sea and in the Himalaya Mountains along the Line of Control with India, and the PRC’s stated objectives regarding Taiwan.
We recommended considering a red zone, identifying features already occupied or under threat of occupation by the PRC, and an orange zone, identifying occupied Philippine islands at risk of limited occupation by the PRC as part of an invasion or blockade of Taiwan. We recommended assigning a yellow zone, comprised of provinces on northern Luzon at risk of occupation secondary to PRC operations against Taiwan. We also described a gold zone, which includes the island of Palawan and associated smaller islands, as being at risk of PRC micro-occupation as part of controlling the West Philippine Sea and the Balabac Strait, Sibutu Passage, and Mindoro Strait. These zones are depicted in Figure 1.
Part 2 of this article discusses the green zone, which represents Philippine territory that the PRC is unlikely to attempt to occupy, but rather coerce through diplomatic and economic pressure, targeting of leadership, and non-lethal operations such as cyberattacks, system sabotage, and misinformation.
Figure 1. The Philippine Islands depicting Red, Yellow, Gold, and Green Threatened Zones (image created by the authors using QGIS)
The Green Zone Challenge: Comprehensive Non-Lethal Attacks
Beyond the physical occupation tiers lie what we term green zones—areas unlikely to face direct PRC occupation but sure to experience comprehensive attack through narrative, economic, cyber, and political warfare. These zones encompass most of the Philippine archipelago, including Metro Manila, the Visayas, and Mindanao, where PRC operations would seek to paralyze decision-making and prevent effective resistance.
Information warfare poses the most significant threat to the Green Zone. PRC information operations would exploit existing political divisions, economic anxieties, and historical grievances to fragment national unity. During the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, Chinese propaganda flooded Philippine social media to pressure Philippine citizens regarding the consequences of perceived threats to PRC sovereignty. While seizing additional terrain, these efforts would intensify exponentially with the increased scale of the PRC’s cyber capabilities. Coordinated bot networks would amplify divisive content, pitting regions against each other by messaging, for example, “Why should Mindanao sacrifice for islands near Taiwan?” Deepfakes showing Philippine officials capitulating or US forces withdrawing would spread faster than fact-checkers could respond. Historical grievances about American colonialism would be weaponized to undermine EDCA support, while simultaneously promoting narratives of PRC investment bringing prosperity to accommodating provinces. The presence of Overseas Filipino Workers’ (OFW) families with members working in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or mainland PRC creates additional leverage points for PRC influence or coercion.
Economic warfare would systematically target Philippine pressure points. The 2012 banana import restrictions following the Scarborough Shoal dispute cost Philippine exporters millions. The 150,000 overseas Filipino workers in Hong Kong would likely receive “visa reviews,” creating family panic without formal threats. Philippine call centers serving Western companies may face mysterious connectivity issues traced to undersea cable “maintenance” by Chinese vessels or following the passage of ships over cable lines. Container ships bound for Philippine ports would experience bureaucratic delays in ports controlled by the PRC along their routes. Construction projects funded by PRC loans would halt, leaving half-built infrastructure as monuments to economic vulnerability. Even remittance flows—the lifeblood of countless Filipino families—would face “enhanced scrutiny” in PRC-influenced banking nodes.
Cyber operations would create cascading disruptions across critical sectors. Rather than dramatic infrastructure destruction that might provoke resistance, PRC hackers would employ “death by a thousand cuts:” persistent, deniable degradations that exhaust response capabilities. Even seemingly minor targets, such as the Philippine Statistics Authority, would face data corruption, making resource allocation and crisis response coordination more challenging.
Political warfare would target the fabric of Philippine democracy. PRC influence operations would cultivate and amplify existing political rivalries, turning every policy debate into a referendum on resistance versus accommodation. Local politicians in economically vulnerable areas would receive subtle overtures, such as partnership opportunities contingent on stability. Business leaders with Chinese partnerships may be incentivized to advocate for “pragmatic” policies. Academic conferences funded by PRC cultural organizations would feature respected Filipino scholars arguing that resistance over “minor islands” threatens decades of development. Even labor unions may face pressure as Chinese-invested factories threaten closures if “political tensions” continue. The goal isn’t crude control but creating enough domestic opposition to make sustained resistance politically impossible. Persistent corruption in the domestic political landscape may already form part of this broader playbook.
Synchronized across multiple domains, these activities create a sense of inevitable defeat before physical occupation even begins. The Philippines would find itself fighting on a dozen fronts simultaneously, each requiring different expertise and resources to counter, while the source of attacks remains deniable.
Resource Allocation Under Constraints
The Armed Forces of the Philippines face the challenge of defending against this threat spectrum with limited resources that cannot match the PRC’s capabilities symmetrically. This reality demands a prioritization framework that acknowledges hard truths about what can be defended versus what must be prepared for in post-occupation resistance.
For Tier 1 red zones, immediate action is essential before gray-zone activities crystallize into permanent occupation. Reinforcing Second Thomas Shoal requires creative solutions beyond traditional resupply, such as establishing underwater cache points using local diving operations as cover or developing commercial drone delivery capabilities. Establishing a permanent Coast Guard presence at Sabina Shoal through rotating deployments must be supplemented by the integration of civilian maritime fleets, including fishing vessels equipped with encrypted satellite communications and video recording equipment, increasing maritime domain awareness, and exposing PRC coercion of fisherfolk to the international audience. Deploying mobile coastal defense missiles to Palawan requires more than just hardware; it demands creating multiple firing positions, coupled with unpredictable schedules and rapid displacement procedures practiced during disaster response drills, as well as integration with local early warning networks that can distinguish between Chinese fishing fleets and invasion flotillas.
Philippine sailors, assigned to Naval Special Operations Units, and US Naval Special Warfare operators conduct live fire weapons training in Palawan, Philippines, during Balikatan 23, April 19, 2023. US Navy Photo.
Tier 2 orange zones require rapid development of resistance infrastructure before a Taiwan crisis. Pre-positioning supplies means more than stockpiling food and ammunition; it requires cached communication equipment hardened against electromagnetic pulses, medical supplies distributed across multiple concealment sites, and fuel reserves in locations known only to trusted local networks. The window may be measured in months, making Batanes the most time-sensitive priority after ongoing confrontations in the West Philippine Sea. Integration with local fishing cooperatives enhances maritime reconnaissance networks. The construction of community “typhoon shelters” with reinforced basements provides dual-use infrastructure.
Tier 3 yellow zones require enhanced protection against unconventional threats, in addition to traditional defense. Cybersecurity improvements, counter-intelligence capabilities, detecting infiltration, and rapid reaction forces responding to sabotage take precedence over conventional positions. Creating command redundancy and developing alternative facilities ensures continued functionality in the event of successful attacks.
Tier 4 gold zones require long-term capability development, acknowledging both strategic importance and available preparation time. Building integrated coastal defense, establishing distributed logistics, and surviving under attack, as well as creating auxiliary facilities that disperse critical capabilities, provides resilience against standoff strikes while maintaining operational capability.
Green zones require investment in societal resilience to support military defense. Strengthening cyber defenses, developing strategic communication to counter PRC narratives, and building economic resilience require a whole-of-government approach that extends beyond traditional military planning.
Establishing the Philippine “Red Beach” Framework
Taiwan’s designation of fourteen invasion beaches as “red beaches” created shared understanding among planners, officials, and the public about priority threats. The Philippines needs a similar framework that acknowledges the unique archipelagic challenges while providing clear defense. The Taiwan model works because it simplifies complex military planning into understandable geographic priorities—everyone from generals to citizens knows that Taichung and Tainan beaches require special attention. For the Philippines, the challenge is more complex due to its dispersed island geography, but the approach remains viable.
This tiered zone system—red for immediate West Philippine Sea threats, orange for Batanes proximity risks, yellow for Northern Luzon EDCA vulnerabilities, gold for Palawan strategic concerns, and green for nationwide non-lethal attacks—provides such a framework. It enables resource allocation based on threat probability and timeline urgency, rather than attempting a comprehensive defense that exceeds the scope of available resources.
…success ultimately depends on the willingness to act before the crisis reaches Philippine shores.
The framework also facilitates international engagement by clearly communicating the Philippines’ priorities and vulnerabilities. The AFP can describe capability gaps in defending red zones or preparing for resistance in orange zones. This clarity enables more effective security cooperation with partners facing similar threats. When discussing defense cooperation with the United States, Japan, or Australia, Philippine officials can specify exactly which zones require specific types of assistance, such as maritime domain awareness for red zones, resistance training for orange zones, cybersecurity for yellow zones, and coastal defense for gold zones. This precision transforms abstract security discussions into capability development.
Public communication benefits from providing citizens with clear and understandable threat information and reducing panic. Communities in orange zones can understand their defensive role and the importance of preparation. In contrast, residents in green zones can identify and address non-lethal threats and misinformation, thereby contributing to societal resilience. This shared understanding fosters national unity, rather than leaving citizens confused by ambiguous threats.
Implications for Philippine Territorial Defense
The threat of micro-occupation fundamentally challenges the Philippines’ defense doctrine, which was developed to maintain internal security and stability. The dispersed, low-intensity nature of creeping occupation paradoxically requires capabilities similar to those of counterinsurgency—information gathering, population engagement, and distributed operations—but applied in reverse to resist external occupation rather than suppress internal rebellion. This doctrinal shift is more profound than simply reorienting from internal to external threats; it requires reconceptualizing the entire relationship between military forces, civilian populations, and territorial control.
The traditional AFP approach emphasized controlling population centers and maintaining government presence in contested areas. Counter-micro-occupation doctrine must instead prepare for scenarios where government forces are absent or underground, where civilian populations must sustain resistance without overt military support, and where success is measured not by the territory held but by the imposition of costs on the occupier. This inversion of conventional military thinking challenges every aspect of doctrine, training, and equipment. Infantry units trained for jungle patrols against the NPA must now prepare for maritime infiltration and island defense. Intelligence services focused on penetrating domestic insurgent networks must pivot to detecting foreign special operations forces and countering sophisticated electronic surveillance.
The Community Home Defense Operations (CHDO) concept being developed by the AFP Joint Special Operations Command provides a framework for this doctrinal evolution. By adapting historical models to local conditions, the Philippines can enhance national resilience and establish the groundwork for potential resistance to occupation, with the added benefit of making communities more resilient to earthquakes, storms, and floods in the process.
This resistance concept draws from successful models—the French Maquis, Norwegian resistance, and more recently, Ukrainian territorial defense forces—but must be adapted to archipelagic realities where each island becomes its own cell, potentially isolated for extended periods. It is essential to emphasize that CHDO is also grounded in Philippine historical experience, such as the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU), the Civil Defense Law, and community-based defense models. This ensures that concepts are not merely imported doctrine but grounded in local realities.
The Philippines can enhance national resilience and establish the groundwork for potential resistance to occupation.
The training of civilian auxiliaries, establishing stay-behind networks, and preparing for occupation operations require different skills than those needed for direct action raids. For JSOC, this represents the most critical doctrinal and cultural pivot, moving from counterterrorism operations of the past two decades toward building the foundations of national resistance.
This transition must occur while maintaining internal security capabilities, which requires careful management. The psychological shift is equally significant because special operators accustomed to being hunters must now teach others to survive and resist while being hunted. This requires developing new training programs, doctrine, and even selection criteria, prioritizing endurance and cultural integration over lethal skills.
Conventional forces must also adapt to micro-occupation threats that blur traditional boundaries between war and peace. Maritime forces patrolling red zones face PRC vessels employing calibrated aggression designed to avoid triggering combat while achieving tactical advantages. Ground forces in orange zones must prepare the population for resistance while avoiding provocations that could provide pretexts for preemptive PRC action. Air forces face the challenge of maintaining readiness without exhausting resources responding to persistent PRC probes and intrusions. Each service must develop new operational concepts that function in the gray space between peace and war, where traditional rules of engagement provide little guidance and strategic restraint often trumps tactical advantage.
The Narrow Window for Preparation
Ongoing gray zone activities in the West Philippine Sea could escalate immediately based on PRC political decisions rather than military timelines, as forces are already present. Orange zones could be occupied as part of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait within 24 to 48 hours, providing little time to prepare as tensions escalate. Yellow zones require immediate hardening against threats that PRC forces can already execute.
The PLA’s rapid modernization has dramatically shortened required timelines for complex operations. What might have required months of visible preparation a decade ago can now be executed with little warning, thanks to forward power projection and the expansion of PRC amphibious lift capacity, as demonstrated in exercises involving civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries. The proliferation of PRC maritime militia vessels, with over 300 large vessels by recent counts, provides ready platforms for rapid conversion to military use. Intelligence indicators that traditionally provided strategic warning are becoming less reliable as the PRC develops capabilities for fast transition from peace to war.
Resource constraints exacerbate these time pressures. Wealthy nations may pursue modernization comprehensively. Budgetary limitations constrain the Philippines to carefully sequence capability development, addressing the most urgent threats first. This sequencing must account not only for threat probability but also preparation timelines, with longer-lead items initiated early even for lower-tier threats. The acquisition of major weapons systems requires years from decision to deployment, meaning that choices made today will determine capabilities available in 2027-2028 when Taiwan tensions may peak. Training programs for resistance networks require 18-24 months to produce a competent cadre, infrastructure hardening projects need 12-18 months for completion, and establishing intelligence networks in threatened areas demands months of patient cultivation.
Conclusion: The Second Front’s Strategic Imperative
The micro-occupation threat to the Philippines represents a clear and present danger requiring immediate, prioritized response within severe resource constraints. This tiered framework proposes an approach to support defense planning. Improving national resilience in the Philippines protects more than its territorial sovereignty. The Philippines represents a potential linchpin determining the outcome of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Seizing control of Batanes by the PRC would secure its southern flank for operations against Taiwan. Occupation of the EDCA sites would reduce the United States’ power projection capabilities in the region. Critically, PRC micro-occupations across the Philippine archipelago could create multiple crisis points, fragmenting allied responses and providing Beijing with the strategic distraction needed to achieve a fait accompli in Taiwan.
The strength of the Philippine response will lie not in matching PRC capabilities symmetrically but in making micro-occupation attempts costly enough to deter initiation and unsustainable enough to ensure eventual failure. This requires focused application of limited resources to priority vulnerabilities, development of innovative asymmetric responses, and building national unity around a shared understanding of the threat. This framework provides an analytical foundation, but success ultimately depends on the willingness to act before the crisis reaches Philippine shores. In the grand strategic competition between Beijing and the free world, the Philippines may find itself not as collateral damage but as the decisive terrain where the future of the Indo-Pacific is determined.
