U.S. Spacepower: Shield & Sword
Abstract
Space is no longer a sanctuary but a contested domain where the United States must achieve local, time-bound control of key orbital inclinations and celestial lines of communication. This article proposes an operational framework that integrates a shield and sword approach – layered resilience, active/passive satellite self-protection, and guardian-escort constellations paired with agile co-orbital and non-kinetic counterspace options – to enable deterrence by denial and punishment while managing escalation, debris, and attribution risks. Furthermore, grounding in the theories presented by Corbett and Clausewitz translates theory into practical guidance, enabling campaigns to be conducted effectively in orbit without ceding strategic initiative.
Introduction
The transition of space from a sanctuary to a contested domain marks a pivotal shift in global security dynamics. Orbital regimes – Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), and Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) – and the vast expanses of inter-celestial space are now arenas of strategic competition. The rapid proliferation of space-faring nations, commercial entities, and dual-use technologies compressed strategic maneuver space in orbit and intensified competition for control over critical orbital regimes. Nations like China and Russia are rapidly advancing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, co-orbital systems, and cyber capabilities, challenging the United States’ dominance. Sustained strategic advantage for the United States in the emerging era of space warfare will depend on the urgent development, integration, and perfection of offensive and defensive satellite capabilities capable of asserting control and proactive denial in contested orbital regimes and inter-celestial space. These systems must be paired with resilient force composition, intelligent redundancy, and tailored doctrine to ensure deterrence stability, safeguard critical assets, and shape the norms of engagement before adversaries dictate them.
The United States has long recognized the strategic importance of space and thus attempted to guide the global community in establishing global norms. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) established the principle that space should be used for peaceful purposes, prohibiting the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit. However, the OST did not prevent the development of conventional military capabilities in space, nor did it define “peaceful” in a way that precluded military uses. The United States and the Soviet Union both pushed this boundary during the Cold War. Each country conducted rudimentary ASAT testing, including co-orbital interceptors that approached targets to disable or destroy them. These tests demonstrated that space could be contested, but technological limitations and the desire to avoid debris-generating incidents dissuaded significant advancements. Today, technological advancements, integration of space into joint force operations, and the rise of peer competitors have removed many of these constraints, creating a need to establish control in localized orbital slots and defend them.
Control
Control must be defined for the space domain if the United States is to attempt to re-establish dominance. The preeminent view for control in space falls in line with the maritime view on control of the sea, more specifically with Julian S. Corbett’s analysis of sea command and control. Corbett put forth that absolute control of the sea could not be maintained due to the disposition required, the vast size of the sea, and the command-and-control issues that would arise due to time and distance. Moreover, control in space cannot be achieved through occupation in the terrestrial sense; it requires maneuver dominance, persistent space domain awareness (SDA), and the ability to deny or degrade adversary access to critical orbits and deep space corridors. Adapting Corbett’s view of sea control for space while incorporating SDA and focusing on space corridors, or celestial lines of communication (CLOCs), an approach to local, temporary control of specific portions of space and space-enabling locations could be undertaken.
If the United States is to gain control of CLOCs or even specific orbits in any of the orbital regimes, understanding what is at stake is critical. Orbital regimes are space highways, crowded with military, commercial, and civilian satellites essential for navigation, communication, and intelligence. While each orbital regime – Low-Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium-Earth Orbit (MEO), Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), and Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) – has its advantages and disadvantages, they share a common trait in that they are all contested. The United States must therefore adopt a nuanced approach – balancing persistent control with targeted denial of adversary capabilities. The U.S. must develop and integrate offensive and defensive satellite systems to assert dominance and deter aggression in these contested zones.
Sword
Securing control within an orbital regime demands the same strategic calculus as seizing key terrestrial terrain: offense. An offensive posture enables the aggressor to determine the time and place of engagement, shaping the conditions under which conflict unfolds or is avoided. Such an approach advances political and strategic objectives either by employing force to seize a contested asset or by preemptively occupying an unclaimed one. Drawing on Corbett’s concept of command of the sea and Clausewitz’s general theory of war, offensive action amplifies the inherent advantages of the attacker by initiating operations, thereby increasing the likelihood of transforming local and temporary control into general and enduring dominance. Implicit in this is the centrality of surprise as a decisive factor in seizing and maintaining the initiative.
Hunter-killer satellites, dubbed “celestial demons,” are essential for seizing the initiative in orbital warfare. Primarily, hunter-killer satellites would possess the capability to identify, discriminate, coerce, and degrade targets through a spectrum of offensive measures. The Defense Intelligence Agency warns that China and Russia maintain operational co-orbital ASAT capabilities, including systems designed for surveillance, jamming, and destructive effects. Armed with non-kinetic systems such as directed-energy weapons, these “celestial demons” could impair adversary intelligence-gathering, disrupt command-and-control networks, or hold critical assets at risk without contributing to orbital debris. Alternatively, when equipped with projectile weapons or rendezvous mechanisms, such platforms could disable essential components to render a satellite inoperable or physically seize and reposition it outside its assigned orbit [see Figure 1]. Moreover, these systems could be fielded in swarms, enabling concentrated action against a single high-value target or coordinated operations to degrade an entire constellation.
Figure 1: Six proposed space-based weapons that can deliver temporary or permanent damage
Offensive satellites can also function as instruments of deterrence, signaling the capability and intent to respond decisively to hostile acts against friendly assets. When designed for maneuver across multiple inclinations or orbital regimes, their rapid responsiveness and mobility can dissuade adversaries through the implied threat of timely reprisal. The significant fuel expenditure and operational time required for such maneuvers, however, impose a high cost that must be weighed carefully before committing these forces. Offensive satellites could be maintained in a constant state of readiness as an “on-orbit Isaiah,” poised for immediate activation and prepared to be “sent into battle.” A fleet of such assets, concealed in the shadows of space, could serve as a psychological and physical deterrent to hostile activity or as a trigger for decisive action.
However, deploying hunter-killers risks escalation. Visible forces may provoke pre-emptive strikes, while concealed systems could violate transparency norms, feeding escalation spirals. The U.S. must balance these capabilities with explicit signaling and attribution frameworks to maintain deterrence stability.
Shield
This fragile balance may be maintained simply by developing defensive countermeasures ahead of offensive strike capability. John Klein describes these as the “guardian angel” satellite to juxtapose the offensive “celestial demons.” Although increased separation from terrestrial anti-satellite systems offers some protection for communications, navigation, imagery, and intelligence-collection constellations, an active defense approach may also be viable. Advances in CubeSat technology – small, standardized satellites analogous to nanosatellites – combined with reduced launch costs, enable the deployment of defensive CubeSat networks around high-value space assets. For instance, a critical U.S. satellite could be encircled by a micro-constellation of two to three CubeSats operating cooperatively and autonomously to monitor the immediate orbital environment while maintaining a protective formation. Such an SDA micro-constellation would, at a minimum, provide early warning of any anomalies or potential threats in the vicinity. The ability “to predict, detect, and characterize natural and human-made events and, when appropriate, attribute an attack to an adversary” builds the foundation for active and passive defense on orbit.
The active defense capability of these “guardian angels” could originate from the co-orbital CubeSat micro-constellation or from the protected asset itself. In the former case, the constellation would execute a reactive countermeasure if its formation were threatened or penetrated, collapsing onto the intruding system before it could engage the primary target. If equipped with directed-energy weapons and sensors capable of distinguishing friend from foe, such platforms could disable hostile satellites at a predetermined standoff range. However, both this approach and the broader use of blocker CubeSat micro-constellations raise concerns over increased orbital congestion and the potential generation of debris. Where congestion risk is significant, the defended satellite itself could be configured to serve as its own active protective system.
One option for self-defense is turning the target satellite bus into a spiny bastion or “porcupine satellite.” The satellite is designed with built-in or deployable defensive systems to counter physical intrusion attempts. Szymanski suggests that such defenses could incorporate “optically absorptive materials so the threatening satellite would have trouble detecting them.” Thereby adding a critical element of deception and stealth to on-orbit protective measures. Extending the porcupine concept to encompass more dynamic defenses, the “barbs” could be electrically charged to disrupt adversary satellites upon contact. Alternatively, if designed as tendrils with friction points – similar to octopus tentacles – that can extend and ensnare encroaching spacecraft, they could also provide an opportunity to capture and exploit adversary satellite technologies for intelligence purposes [see Figure 2].
Figure 2: Example Research Satellites with Long Aerial Whip Antennae, analogs for ‘porcupine quills’
The porcupine satellite defense need not rely exclusively on kinetic means. At its core, the concept establishes a protected zone around an individual satellite. Rather than outfitting the platform with physical weaponry, it could employ directed-energy weapons or localized electromagnetic pulses to disrupt or disable hostile spacecraft. This approach offers the advantage of minimizing orbital debris, resulting in a single defunct satellite rather than multiple fragments created by a collision. The trade-off, however, lies in the increased power demands and mass that such systems impose. Directed-energy weapons and electromagnetic pulse generators require substantial battery capacity, additional hardening of onboard electronics, and increased payload weight.
An alternative is the armadillo design philosophy. In this model, the satellite bus and payload operate normally until passive detection systems identify a threat. At that point, the payload’s external components – sensors, radiators, antennas, and similar appendages – retract into the bus, which then seals itself against intrusion. This cloistering could deny an adversary the ability to grapple or dock with the satellite. The limitation is operational: the armadillo cannot execute mission tasks while cloistered, and determining when it is safe to redeploy its systems is difficult without external observation from another on-orbit asset. Moreover, if the bus incorporates integral shielding capable of withstanding kinetic impacts, the resulting mass increase would be significant. Nonetheless, this inherent protection could enhance survivability in debris-rich environments or when transiting through a potential space minefield.
Expanding on the concepts of control and denial, an orbital minefield could pose a substantial challenge to any actor seeking to operate within a given orbital regime around a celestial body. Functionally analogous to terrestrial and naval mines, space-based mines would be armed, capable of detonating upon contact or within a predetermined proximity, and readily detectable to reinforce their deterrent effect. From an offensive perspective, U.S. Space Force Brigadier General Kristin L. Panzenhagen, then U.S. Air Force Major, suggested that “Space mines could be positioned near [a] target well ahead of the time for attack” as a trap lying in wait. Conversely, an orbital minefield could serve as a defensive measure to block direct access to a high-value asset. However, kinetic or projectile-based space mines carry the risk of producing vast quantities of debris, potentially exacerbating Kessler syndrome and rendering the celestial body’s orbit hazardous. While non-kinetic minefields – employing electromagnetic interference or directed-energy effects – could reduce the likelihood of unintended conjunctions or collisions, they would still leave disabled satellites adrift and incapable of maneuvering, thereby continuing to jeopardize the orbital environment.
Orbital minefields present the danger of substantially increasing debris in Earth’s orbit or around any human-inhabited celestial body. Yet, in select circumstances, deliberately contaminating an orbit could serve as an effective tool of strategic denial. In Deep Space Warfare: Military Strategy Beyond Orbit, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John C. Wright notes that conflict in space will most likely begin as a contest between human adversaries. While he acknowledges that it is unwise to disregard other potential threats, his emphasis underscores the necessity of planning for and countering the actions of other nation-states as the primary strategic concern. Taking Wright’s perspective into account, an orbital minefield could be employed offensively above an adversary’s celestial body to restrict egress and threaten the deliberate degradation of its orbital environment should a breach be attempted. While the same tactic could theoretically be used against Earth, Mars, or any other future human-inhabited location, the more immediate concern lies in how rival states or coalitions might leverage such capabilities against one another in pursuit of strategic dominance.
Conclusion
The accelerating militarization of space demands that the United States transition from a predominantly reactive posture to one of deliberate, proactive control in both orbital and inter-celestial domains. As the competition for strategic high ground intensifies, the ability to combine offensive systems – capable of imposing denial and seizing initiative – with robust defensive architectures – engineered to protect and sustain critical capabilities – will determine the balance of power in the space domain. Offensive measures such as hunter-killer satellites, agile maneuver platforms, and prepositioned orbital minefields offer decisive options for shaping the battlespace and deterring aggression. Still, they must be paired with resilient, layered defenses like “guardian angel” constellations, porcupine and armadillo designs, and active protective measures to preserve freedom of action.
Ultimately, sustained U.S. strategic advantage will hinge on integrating these capabilities into a coherent doctrine that preserves deterrence stability, assures allies, and constrains adversary escalation. This requires not only technical innovation and intelligent redundancy but also the deliberate shaping of norms and operational expectations before competitors define them to their advantage. Local control of space is no longer a theoretical objective but an operational imperative. The nation that masters both the art of denying adversary use of space and the science of defending its own will dictate the strategic calculus in the emerging era of space warfare.
(The views and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The author prepared this material in a personal capacity, outside the scope of official duties. All information discussed is derived from unclassified, publicly available sources. Reference to any specific commercial product, process, or service does not constitute or imply endorsement by the Department of Defense.)
