The Hypersonic Dilemma: GCC States and the Future of Missile Procurement Post-Iran–Israel War 2025
Introduction
The recent war between Iran and Israel has elevated hypersonic weapons from specialized military periodicals to the forefront of conversations regarding Gulf geopolitics. Iran’s potential deployment of basic hypersonic weapons has prompted Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to advance missile technology, speed, survivability, and penetration to counter evolving regional defenses. Analysts dispute Tehran’s claims, distinguishing “fast ballistic” missiles from true hypersonic glide vehicles. The conflict illustrated the considerable psychological and political impact of the hypersonic narrative: what ramifications does this present for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Manama, Kuwait City, and Muscat if concentrated barrages and unique flight paths can undermine Israel’s multi-layered defense system? The existing solution comprises enhanced collaboration on integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) spearheaded by the US, targeted research into domestic strike and counter-hypersonic technologies, and strategic hedging among principal suppliers, particularly given that China and Russia aim to convert their hypersonic investments into arms transactions and geopolitical leverage.
An effective starting point is to examine the technical and political context of Iran’s assertions on hypersonic weapons throughout the conflict. Tehran asserted that it employed hypersonic weapons during and subsequent to the conflict, frequently referencing the term “Fattah” to substantiate these assertions. However, specialists in open-source technology were uncertain whether the missiles in issue exhibited the long-range maneuverability and low-altitude flight characteristics typical of contemporary hypersonic glide vehicles. The configuration of Arrow and David’s Sling atop Patriot and Aegis, supported by partners, maintained elevated interception rates.
US Push for Regional Air Defense
The United States is leveraging the Iran-Israel conflict to propose a long-discussed concept: a comprehensive regional air and missile defense system that would combine sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control across national boundaries. In late May 2024, Washington conducted U.S.–GCC Defense Working Groups on integrated air and missile defense and marine security in Riyadh. The insights gained during the Iran-Israel interaction demonstrated that collaboration is preferable to isolation. The proposal envisioned real-time data sharing, common operating pictures, and de-conflicted interceptor employment—ingredients that would be indispensable against maneuvering or depressed-trajectory threats. All of these measures are necessary to safeguard against threats that are in motion or descending. The proposal arrived at an opportune moment for Gulf officials who were abruptly altering their strategies and assessing the associated risks. But it also went against people’s concerns about sovereignty, data security, and the political repercussions of openly coordinating defense, especially when working together can be regarded as supporting Israel.
Alongside efforts to integrate regional defenses, the US has conducted a series of “Sands” exercises. US Central Command (CENTCOM) and its subordinate organizations have conducted numerous live-fire tests of air defense and counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) across the region. These exercises, executed with GCC partners, have fostered a culture of rapidly devising and enhancing strategies to counter tiny, persistent threats that frequently accompany or set the stage for missile assaults.
- Red Sands (Saudi Arabia + US Army Central): A live-fire experimentation hub to test new tech—especially counter-UAS, cruise missile, and drone defense—under realistic Gulf conditions.
- Blue Sands (US Air Forces Central + GCC air forces): A multinational air and maritime defense drill, practicing radar sharing, fighter integration, and layered missile interception across borders.
- Yellow Sands (US Air Forces Central + GCC land units): A ground-based air defense exercise, ensuring Patriot, THAAD, and regional batteries can interoperate in real-time coalition engagements.
These exercises are not hypersonic-specific, but they are hypersonic-relevant. If maneuvering, high-speed threats compress timelines and complicate trajectories, then the ability to stitch an allied picture and move interceptors and effectors quickly is the first line of plausibly effective defense.
GCC Strategies in the Hypersonic Era
Against this backdrop, what are the GCC states thinking about when arming for a hypersonic age? Due to the varying strategic positions, industrial bases, and alliance preferences, there is no single answer. The narrative concerning missile development in Saudi Arabia is the most advanced. Open-source reports and imagery analysis indicate that Riyadh has transitioned from merely purchasing Chinese ballistic missiles to domestic production in recent years. The solid fuel infrastructure indicates the nation’s intention to possess a greater share of the propulsion and airframe systems in the long run. This history is significant, as it demonstrates that nations are prepared to invest substantial sums in alternatives to airpower for prolonged deterrence attacks. Riyadh is evidently exploring hypersonic strike concepts, recognizing that hypersonic velocity and maneuverability might circumvent contemporary defense systems. Nonetheless, there exists a robust inclination to enhance defenses and combat management. Saudi Arabia remains the premier location globally for acquiring expertise in managing missile and drone assaults. The country excels in maintaining robust defenses and training military personnel.
Since 2024, several senior US officials have asserted that the Iran-Israel conflict demonstrated the necessity for integrated defense.
Conversely, the UAE is one of the most adaptable integrators of next-generation systems in the region and frequently adopts American missile defenses. American integration facilitates networking and maintenance, yet it necessitates adherence to regulations concerning compliance, cybersecurity, and transparency. This might pose challenges for a foreign policy that seeks to be adaptable. The UAE’s contention with Washington regarding the suspended F-35 procurement underscores the significance of this matter.
The presence of Chinese technology exacerbated conditions for the US. If hypersonic strikes were feasible, regulations would likely be more stringent, not relaxed. U.S. policy currently lacks a formal program for deployed hypersonic weapons and intends to establish carefully controlled export channels. In the foreseeable future, the Emirati are expected to enhance and fortify integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), encompassing counter-hypersonic detection and cueing. They are likely to engage in selective co-development in propulsion, guidance, and materials, maintaining future possibilities but avoiding significant export and compliance issues.
Iran’s missile strike against the US Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in June 2025 prompted reflection among many throughout the region. Reports from CENTCOM and other sources indicate that the US and Qatari defenses thwarted an intended Iranian ballistic missile strike on Al Udeid Air Base. This demonstrated the significance of Qatar’s air defense sector to the region and the challenges of hosting CENTCOM’s Combined Air Operations Center while managing regional diplomacy. Doha has recognized that credible layered defenses and rapid coalition integration are essential for a state functioning as the region’s air hub. If hypersonic systems proliferate, Qatar’s optimal defense strategy is to avoid initiating an expensive arms competition and instead position itself at the core of the most sophisticated, interconnected defensive network in the region. This umbrella must incorporate sensors (over-the-horizon, space, and high-altitude), data fusion, and interceptor families capable of managing difficult-to-track profiles. This instinct—defensive and alliance-oriented—is in line with Qatar’s historical actions and the constraints of its political identity.
This is Washington’s opportunity to transform years of rhetoric into tangible structures. Since 2024, several senior US officials have asserted that the Iran-Israel conflict demonstrated the necessity for integrated defense, urging Gulf nations to acquire additional interoperable sensors and weapons capable of sharing early warning and employing uniform tactics. However, challenges persist; certain GCC nations continue to seek procurement from diverse sources, including the U.S., Europe, and Asia, whilst others remain reluctant to disclose sensitive information that may reveal vulnerabilities or political rifts. Transitioning from practice and communication to a comprehensive, routine regional IAMD is challenging, particularly if the threat of hypersonic weapons prompts Gulf states to consider alternatives to US partnerships.
External Partnerships and Technical Barriers
China and Russia are alleged to have tested and demonstrated hypersonic weapon systems. The Chinese DF-17 and extended-range DF-27 weapons serve as the foundation for a narrative concerning credible, maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles integral to the doctrine of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Russia is attempting to market the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. However, their deployment in conflict and the mixed outcomes observed in Ukraine complicate their sales proposition. For GCC nations, collaboration with China or Russia on hypersonic technologies entails not only acquiring hardware but also gaining leverage—demonstrating to Washington the existence of alternatives and indicating to Tehran that its deterrent capabilities may evolve. However, the barriers are exceedingly significant. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) exemplify US and multinational export-control frameworks. These controls do not impose a legal obligation on Beijing or Moscow to collaborate, and Washington would likely react severely to any Gulf hypersonic co-development with those capitals, potentially resulting in fines, program cancellations, and a reduction in intelligence-sharing akin to the previous F-35/Huawei disputes.
Even if the policy issues were more manageable, the technical challenges would remain exceedingly difficult. Hypersonic weapons require unconventional materials, including thermal protection that can endure prolonged flights at elevated Mach speeds, guidance and control systems capable of managing aerothermal effects, plasma-induced blackouts, and robust midcourse and terminal updates, as well as specialized testing infrastructure such as wind tunnels, flight corridors, telemetry, and range safety measures. The United States’ hypersonic arsenal remains predominantly in the pre-program-of-record phase, despite years of augmented funding. This illustrates the difficulty of implementing the capability in practice. To transition from a cold start to a credible hypersonic strike capability, the GCC requires more than mere financial resources, of which they possess an abundance. They would also require access to appropriate design knowledge, supply chains for solid-rocket motors, scramjets, and composite fabrication, as well as instrumented test ranges. These typically present options for aligning initiatives that have enduring political implications.
Opportunities and Implications
The rationale for GCC interest in hypersonic strike capabilities is evident: deterrence through punishment, the capacity to threaten high-value, well-defended targets, and the intention to undermine opposing defenses or complicate Iranian strategic calculations. The arguments opposing the initiative are as compelling: the expense, the ambiguous military advantage relative to concentrated conventional strikes, the potential for escalation, and the risk of jeopardizing IAMD partnerships with the US that ensure daily security. Furthermore, if one party experiences a hypersonic strike, the opposing party must adjust by employing additional decoys, enhancing dispersion, and fortifying bunkers. They must also more actively target the enablers required for hypersonic use (ISR, navigation, and communications) in cyberspace and space. Hypersonic do not represent a miraculous remedy; they only constitute an additional increment on an already congested ladder of escalation.
The rationale for GCC interest in hypersonic strike capabilities is evident: deterrence through punishment, the capacity to threaten high-value, well-defended targets, and the intention to undermine opposing defenses or complicate Iranian strategic calculations.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are optimally positioned to spearhead a counter-hypersonic initiative due to their substantial size, robust affiliations with the United States, and extensive expertise in acquiring advanced air-defense technologies. Riyadh’s domestic missile production, even if limited to conventional ballistic systems, enhances capabilities in materials, solid propulsion systems, and quality assurance, which could be advantageous for future glide-vehicle initiatives or, more plausibly, for fortifying defensive arsenals to improve reload speed and interception efficacy amidst high volumes. Abu Dhabi’s systems-engineering culture and openness to innovative effectors render the UAE an advantageous location for testing novel sensor fusion and command-and-control methodologies, particularly those that integrate allied airborne sensors and maritime assets into the coastal defense framework.
The trajectory of Qatar is evidently focused on self-defense. The defense of Al Udeid underscored the significance of maintaining several US Patriot deployments and the necessity of preparedness and collaboration with the United States. Doha is expected to invest further funds in early warning systems, command-and-control systems, and potentially advanced interceptors such as the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to enhance battlefield challenges. This is particularly accurate when adversaries employ quasi-ballistic or maneuvering terminal trajectories to circumvent or evade outdated interceptors. Given that Qatar’s diplomatic initiatives prioritize peace and assistance to host nations, a hostile hypersonic strike would be inconsistent with its ethos and could result in significant political ramifications. Doha’s strategic advantage derives from its capacity to integrate the defensive assets of its neighboring states. This further solidifies the U.S. commitment to ensuring Qatar’s security.
As hypersonic technology proliferates, the strategic dynamics of the GCC will evolve in both advantageous and detrimental ways. Iran’s leaders will need to allocate funds for defense and expansion if Gulf countries employ or threaten hypersonic strikes. This will complicate their ability to finance and execute expeditionary operations via intermediaries. This may contribute to maintaining stability in deterrence within the region. Conversely, the development of hypersonic weapons may exacerbate crisis instability by facilitating decision-making and prompting pre-emptive actions, particularly in regions prone to errors. The rapid and directional mobility of firearms complicates the detection and notification of individuals. Their fundamental architecture exploits vulnerabilities in detection and command systems. The result may induce significant stress, prompting executives to feel compelled to immediately employ advanced techniques when issues arise.
The Gulf’s hypersonic challenge presents a distinct opportunity for Russia and China. Beijing can leverage its established advancements to offer a customizable selection of components—materials, expertise, and computational fluid dynamics assistance—while retaining complete systems. This will facilitate profit generation and electricity acquisition while mitigating excessive blowback from the MTCR. The sales of conventional armaments by Moscow have significantly declined due to the conflict in Ukraine. They possess ample justification to profit from hypersonic branding—whether through whole systems or through research alliances and test-bed cooperation that sustain Russian design bureaus. Both capitals recognize the diplomatic leverage derived from being perceived as the final source of supply when U.S. export capacity is diminished. Discussions between the GCC and Russia or China would complicate the U.S. efforts to establish a cohesive IAMD network, as Washington would be reluctant to incorporate non-U.S. elements.
Hypersonic proliferation pathways are likely to occur through “grey” channels, including dual-use materials and instruments, computational tools, and university collaborations that facilitate skill acquisition for local engineers. Consequently, US policy employs both incentives (enhanced collaboration on integrated air and missile defense, access to advanced defensive technology) and deterrents (export controls, potential sanctions) to ensure alignment among partners. The MTCR and HCOC are not universally binding and have limited membership; yet they still influence compliance with regulations and the reputational consequences of unrestricted transfers. Their objective is not to “prohibit” hypersonic—numerous hypersonic technologies do not align precisely with MTCR Category I classifications—but to render unfavorable agreements more costly and more transparent. GCC planners recognize that to secure US early warning, cyber defense, space support, and weapons resupply during a crisis, they must likely cease engagement with non-aligned hypersonic programs.
What implications does this have for the primary inquiry: are GCC nations considering the acquisition of hypersonic missile technology following the Iran-Israel conflict? They are undoubtedly approaching the matter analytically: examining flight profiles and defense ramifications, soliciting briefings from vendors, and exploring R&D collaborations to develop requisite competencies. However, “acquisition” of the rapid deployment of hypersonic strike missiles represents a significantly greater challenge. The current emphasis appears to be on fortifying defenses, especially counter-hypersonic capabilities and operational integration, rather than procuring costly offensive systems that entail significant political ramifications. U.S. policymakers are embracing this rationale by advocating for regional missile defense systems and establishing IAMD working groups to ensure Gulf resources are allocated towards unified designs rather than fragmented offensive strategies.
Conclusion
The most credible projection for the forthcoming years is a GCC security framework characterized by three modifications. A more compact and federated sensor network capable of identifying and tracking elusive profiles more promptly by using U.S., European, and national resources. Secondly, enhanced defensive munitions and a broader array of effectors, ranging from THAAD-class interceptors to expendable end-game alternatives, appropriately sized for salvos encompassing ballistic, cruise, and potentially maneuverable threats. Third, collaborations among enterprises that enhance the nation’s capacity to produce propulsion systems, composites, seekers, and command software—elements crucial for hypersonic technology that do not violate Washington’s export restrictions. This architectural approach does not diminish the allure of hypersonic strikes; rather, it postpones their implementation, allowing for observation of the technology’s performance in actual warfare and the evolution of exportability norms.
The hypersonic factor will alter the Gulf in subtle but significant manners. It will expedite discussions around data sharing that were previously deemed politically unfeasible. The sole method to combat “faster and lower” threats is by “earlier and more intelligent” defense. Procurement decisions will transition from platform-based criteria to network-based criteria. This will enable nations to integrate sensors from cyber, space, aerial, and maritime domains into a unified perspective. If your defense relies on your partner’s spatial sensors and AI-driven fusion, it is imperative to ensure that your diplomatic decisions maintain the partner’s receptiveness to your participation. It will challenge individuals to evaluate costs and advantages from a novel perspective. In a domain where assailants seek speed and agility, defenders must cultivate time and trust. This underscores the significance of investing in both interceptors and robust command and control systems, as well as backup communications and the capacity for rapid assembly of these components. The Gulf can manage this, provided that political and physical factors are aligned
