Authoritarian Legacy: Myanmar’s Military and the Failure of Professionalization
Since gaining independence in 1948, the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, has remained deeply embedded in the country’s social, economic, and political landscape. However, its presence in international headlines is rarely linked to national defense or public service. Instead, it is notorious for bombings, torture, mass killings, forced displacement, burning of civilian areas, and genocide – brutal acts inflicted upon the very people it once vowed to protect. For decades, the Tatmadaw has ruled through fear, violence, and repression, not only positioning itself as an entity above its civilians but also as a guardian of the people or protector of Buddhism in Myanmar.
It is essential to trace its ideological and historical roots to understand why the Myanmar military has become so powerful and deeply entrenched. The military’s foundation, deeply influenced by authoritarian and strongly nationalist ideologies, has made it an unreliable institution incapable of democratic reform.
The Historical Roots of Authoritarianism in the Tatmadaw
The roots of the Tatmadaw’s ideology can be traced to Burma’s struggle against British colonial rule when a group of nationalists known as the “Thirty Comrades” sought military training from the Imperial Japanese Army before World War II. Some of these individuals, such as Aung San, Ne Win, and Setkya, received specialized oppressive political indoctrination for future senior positions in the Burmese government under Japanese occupation. Among them, Aung San, who later became known as the father of modern Burma, and Ne Win, the architect of dictatorship in Myanmar, served as military chiefs and played crucial roles in Burma’s politics. This group formed the Burma Independence Army (BIA) with Japanese backing, fighting alongside Japanese forces against British rule.
While the BIA’s original motive was to achieve independence, its DNA was unexpectedly modified through imperial Japanese military training, embedding autocratic ideology and extreme militarism at its core. After Japan occupied Burma, the BIA was reorganized as the Burmese Defense Army (BDA) and later rebranded as the Burma National Army (BNA) under the State of Burma, a puppet regime controlled by Japan. However, as the war progressed, Aung San, who graduated from British education, and some of his allies recognized the true nature of imperial Japanese authoritarianism and turned against their former backers. They secretly formed the “Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League” (AFPFL) to lead an uprising against Japan. With support from the British and ethnic armed groups, the BNA played a crucial role in expelling Japanese forces from Burma.
The Myanmar military has gained immense popularity among civilians, particularly among Bamar Buddhists. Despite this victory, the assassination of visionary leaders like Aung San and his cabinet by Buddhist ultranationalist U Saw left a leadership vacuum. This allowed Ne Win and the Tatmadaw to carry forward the militarized, authoritarian predisposition that was embedded during its formative years and finally seize power in 1962.
Institutionalization of Authoritarianism
By rejecting federalism and the Panglong Agreement with minorities and attempting to adopt Buddhism as the state religion, U Nu’s government dragged the country into political chaos. The government waged conflicts against major minority ethnic groups such as the Chin, Kachin, and Karen, perpetuating decades of civil war. Following the 1962 coup, Ne Win consolidated power, nationalizing the economy to eliminate the influence of non-Buddhist minorities and expropriating the properties of Muslims, Christians, Chinese, and Indian descendants, and other minority groups. Under nationalist propaganda, the majority of Bamar Buddhists did not oppose the 1962 coup, viewing it as the only way to sustain the Union of Burma and believing that the Tatmadaw was the institution that could save Burma from political uncertainty.
Later, Ne Win established a repressive regime that ruled under the so-called “Burmese Way to Socialism.” In 1982, he amended the citizenship law to establish a hierarchy of three categories of citizenship (Full Citizens, Associate Citizens, and Naturalized Citizens), thereby restricting non-Buddhists from obtaining full citizenship. He implemented a divide-and-rule strategy to marginalize minorities such as Christians and Muslims. His policies devastated the economy and plunged the nation into isolation, all while maintaining an iron grip on power through purges, censorship, and mass surveillance. As a result of these adverse impacts, Myanmar was classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC) in 1987 by the United Nations.
Under Than Shwe’s regime, the military continued its dominance in 1988 after brutally suppressing pro-democracy protests, killing thousands of demonstrators, and nullifying the results of the 1990 elections, which the opposition had overwhelmingly won. The 2008 Constitution, drafted by the military, further entrenched its power, ensuring that even during civilian governance, it retained control over key institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, the Border Affairs, and 25% of military unelected representation in the Myanmar State and Regional Parliaments with constitutional guarantees.
Under the 2008 constitution, Aung San Suu Kyi became de-facto leader and her government, which sought to appease the military by defending its actions internationally, most notably by contesting allegations of Rohingya genocide before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2019, and by rejecting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in an effort to maintain workable relations with the armed forces. However, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing’s demand to be appointed president went beyond what Suu Kyi’s government could accept, and the fragile civil–military power-sharing arrangement under the 2008 Constitution ultimately collapsed with the military coup in 2021.
Since then, the military, led by third-generation dictator Min Aung Hlaing, overthrew the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and reaffirmed its commitment to brutality, confirming that the Tatmadaw is beyond reform or negotiation. This trajectory reflects a complete breakdown of what Samuel Huntington described as “objective civilian control,” where a professional military remains politically neutral and subordinate to civilian authority, a principle the Tatmadaw has consistently rejected in favor of authoritarian dominance.
Imperial Japanese Legacies of the Modern Myanmar Tatmadaw
The Myanmar military exhibits all the characteristics of an authoritarian organization. It continues to use slogans from the BIA period, such as “One Blood, One Voice, One Command.” It adapts versions of Imperial Japanese songs as the official patrimonial songs for the Myanmar Military, like “Let’s Fight Together” from Imperial Japanese “March of the Beloved Horse,” “Will Defend Myanmar” from Imperial Japanese “Hohei no Honryō.”
It is structured on a rigid hierarchy, demands total obedience, and treats dissent as a form of treason. The military also suppresses diversity, barring minorities such as Muslims and Hindus from joining its ranks while exclusively promoting Buddhism within military barracks, leaving no room for freedom of worship. Even the head of state cannot appoint the military chief independently. Still, it must follow the advice of the National Defence and Security Council, which consists of five elected members and six military-appointed members according to the 2008 Constitution, all chosen by the army chief himself. This effectively grants the military chief absolute power in selecting their successor.
Unlike professional military institutions in democratic nations, which operate under civilian oversight, the Tatmadaw functions as an independent, self-serving entity. The military justifies its rule through saffron washing (Myanmar’s military has strategically used Buddhism to legitimize its rule and maintain control while also examining the broader implications of this manipulation), equating its survival with the nation’s survival. This ideology fuels its ethnic policies, particularly against the Rohingya ethnic minority, whom it has systematically oppressed, leading to genocide.
Furthermore, the Tatmadaw has infiltrated every aspect of Myanmar’s society. It controls media narratives, suppresses the education system, and uses propaganda to maintain its grip on the population. Its extensive business conglomerates dominate key industries, ensuring economic power remains within the military elite, preventing wealth distribution that could empower civilian rule.
The executions of opposition politicians such as Kyaw Min Yu (Ko Jimmy) and Phyo Zeya Thaw, along with the forced conscription of young people to defend the militant nationalist regime, demonstrate that the military’s instinct is not negotiation, but rather the annihilation of opposing viewpoints. This deeply embedded control is a testament to its inability to function outside an authoritarian framework. It is not an institution that can be reformed or democratized. Instead, its DNA is autocratic, built upon oppression, saffron washing, ultranationalism, and the maintenance of absolute power.
The Road Ahead
The Spring Revolution (a widespread, grassroots movement resisting the February 2021 military coup)’s slogan, “Uproot the Fascist Military,” underscores the public recognition of the Tatmadaw’s autocratic character and demonstrates that the Tatmadaw is not a professional army (military force most ideally fitted to democratic conditions) but an ultranationalist institution that fails to prioritize even the well-being of its civilians and its members.
Global actors such as the United States, European Union, India, and Japan previously supported military-led reforms to democracy under the 2008 constitution in 2010. They lifted Western sanctions, attempting to engage Myanmar’s military in a path of democratization. Similarly, regional actors like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have made efforts, such as admitting Myanmar into ASEAN in 1997 and recently adopting the Five-Point Consensus in response to the military coup in 2021. These efforts were ultimately undermined by the military’s continued violence against civilians and pro-democracy activists. The Tatmadaw’s systemic violence and its refusal to accept leadership from elected civilians undermine its credibility, whether as a partner in global politics, a guarantor of national stability, or a trustworthy manager of foreign investment from China, India, Russia, or any other country. The international community must recognize that national reconciliation with the Myanmar military and democratic forces is already a failed idea. Given the Tatmadaw’s historical resistance to reform and violent suppression of democratic forces, dismantling the institution, rather than attempting reconciliation, may be the only viable path forward.
To decline the Tatmadaw’s influence in Myanmar politics, it is necessary to strengthen sanctions targeting military-owned businesses and their partner outside of Myanmar and military leaders. This includes blocking arms sales, restricting jet fuel supplies, and avoiding any direct engagement with the Military government over any issue, including the Rare Earth Mining in Kachin State. The junta should not be recognized as a legitimate government. At the same time, the world should support international justice efforts, such as the ICJ case brought by The Gambia accusing Myanmar of genocide against the Rohingya, and the ICC’s investigation into crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh, to hold perpetrators accountable and keep the Tatmadaw seen as an international pariah. However, the Junta is trying to keep in power and, for their survival, with the support of China, Russia, and India, since these countries have many investments in Myanmar and trade, including military equipment, with the junta. Therefore, collective actions of Western democratic countries as normative actors are important to re-establish democracy in Myanmar.
On the other hand, granting international legitimacy to the National Unity Government (NUG) could be contingent upon its adoption of an interim federal constitution that guarantees the protection of ethnic rights, including those of the Rohingya. This would also require the abolition of the discriminatory 1982 citizenship law, which has been used to marginalize ethnic and religious minorities in Myanmar.
Myanmar’s resistance must understand that Spring Revolution slogans like “Let’s fight the common enemy first” only serve as the initial step to unite the pro-democracy movement. For the success of the democracy revolution, the NUG and ethnic armed groups (over 2,600 militias, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED)) must solidify a political agreement or interim federal constitution that guarantees federal democracy for all, regardless of ethnicity or religion. Taking lessons from the BIA’s failure in promoting democratic ideology among its fighters and avoiding the mistakes of the modern Tatmadaw, the NUG, its military wing, People Defense Forces (PDF), and ethnic forces must instill proper democratic values within their ranks, preparing to replace the current military in the post-revolution era.
To achieve a lasting peace, Myanmar’s future must be built not on compromise with authoritarianism, but on its complete rejection. A new, professional defense force, grounded in democratic values and civilian oversight, must replace the Tatmadaw. Anything less will only repeat history.
