From Ph.D. to PLA: How Visa Policies Enable PRC Defense Entities to Tap U.S. Higher Education

From Ph.D. to PLA: How Visa Policies Enable PRC Defense Entities to Tap U.S. Higher Education

At the beginning of the 119th Congress, the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched an investigation into six U.S. universities—University of Maryland, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Southern California, Purdue University, and Stanford University. These universities—public and private, large and small, and geographically diverse—were asked a series of questions regarding the presence and research activities of Chinese national students on their campuses. Namely, the Select Committee sought information about where these students previously studied, how their education is funded, what type of research they are conducting, and the extent of each university’s institutional and faculty-level collaboration with China.

What the Select Committee uncovered was deeply troubling:

1. The Biden Administration Failed to Enforce Executive Order 10043, a Ban on Chinese Nationals Who Conduct Military-Linked Research
2. American Taxpayers Are Funding Ph.D. Programs for Chinese Nationals—Even Those Linked to Chinese Military and Defense Research Universities
3. U.S. Universities Admit Thousands of Chinese Nationals with Academic Ties to the Chinese Military and Defense Industrial Base Annually
4. American Universities Maintain Close Collaborative Partnerships with Chinese Universities
5. The University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Leads by Example, Terminates Dozens of Academic Agreements with Chinese Universities

The sheer scale of the problem—compounded by four years of inaction from the Biden Administration, particularly the Department of State in its role approving visas—is staggering. To begin addressing this urgent threat, the Select Committee recommends the following steps:

1. Reinforce visa screening laws to deny access to sensitive U.S. research and substantially reduce technology transfer risks.
2. Establish clear eligibility restrictions, enhanced vetting criteria, and mandatory reporting requirements to limit PRC access to sensitive technologies.
3. Impose restrictions on PRC nationals while residing in the United States to mitigate security risks.

The CCP does not treat overseas study as an apolitical or purely academic exercise. Under its state-directed technology acquisition strategy, international education is viewed as a key vector for accessing cutting-edge science, engineering, and defense-related knowledge. The PRC’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy explicitly calls for leveraging global academic exchanges to enhance its military and industrial capabilities. This strategy dates back all the way to 1950.

Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the CCP entered into a landmark agreement with the Soviet Union—the 1950 Sino-Soviet Agreement on Cultural Cooperation—which facilitated extensive academic and technical exchanges between the two nations. Under this agreement, tens of thousands of Chinese students, scientists, and technicians were sent to Soviet universities, research institutes, and defense laboratories, particularly in fields critical to China’s modernization such as nuclear physics, aviation, metallurgy, engineering, and military science. These exchanges played a pivotal role in jumpstarting China’s technological and defense development. Many of the returnees later became core contributors to China’s “Two Bombs, One Satellite” program and other strategic sectors. In return, Soviet experts were stationed in China to assist in building institutions, designing curricula, and establishing early technical infrastructure. These exchanges were not apolitical—they were ideologically framed and strategically engineered to advance the PRC’s socialist industrialization. The collapse of the program in the early 1960s, following the Sino-Soviet split, marked a turning point in China’s approach to foreign education and talent development, pushing Beijing to eventually reorient its international academic engagement toward the West.

While international academic exchange has long been a pillar of U.S. higher education—bringing diverse perspectives, fostering global collaboration, and advancing science—it must not come at the expense of national security. Welcoming foreign students strengthens America’s innovation ecosystem, but only when accompanied by clear, enforceable guardrails to mitigate exploitation by our adversaries. Nowhere is this more urgent than in the case of China. Without enhanced visa screening, institutional transparency, and technology protection measures, the United States risks training the next generation of engineers, scientists, and weapons designers—not for America’s benefit, but for the advancement of the People’s Liberation Army.

This challenge demands coordinated action from both Congress and the Executive Branch—and the resolve to meaningfully confront Chinese malign influence in academia and protect the integrity of American higher education.

Read the full report here.