Transformation in Context: Transformation in Contact and the Aspects of Military Innovation
America is “competing with determined adversaries during a period of unprecedented technological change. To guarantee our security, we must recognize change and adapt faster than any army in the world.” In order to fight and win the next war, the Army began a comprehensive plan to modernize and transform the force.
Simultaneous to ongoing, long-term developments, the Army is focused on what it calls “Transformation in Contact” or TIC: rapid developments and changes to existing formations in the near term. Transformation in contact is a new term for an old idea: rapid military innovation. Like previous attempts at innovation, TIC’s success or failure will depend on how the Army integrates key aspects of military innovation and how it understands the effects of the current international system.
There are many components that influence military innovation, but three key aspects drive effective innovation. These elements are technological advancements, new doctrinal applications of technology, and an adaptable organization that accepts the changes provided by the former two aspects. These elements converge and “cluster together to produce a major change in the way people live – or, in the case of the military, the way they die.” Whether the U.S. is at war or peace as well as the international balance of power further shape innovation. Peace and the balance of power alter the dynamics of innovation, shifting both the drivers of innovation, the focus of a nation’s efforts, and the nation’s cost-benefit analysis.
Keys Aspects to Military Innovation
The first key element of military innovation is the most obvious: technology. Technology acts as a catalyst, creating the opportunity for novel solutions to the challenges of a battlefield. As we develop new technologies, existing constraints no longer apply. For example, the development of the steam engine and advancements such as the telegraph enabled effective power projection, invalidating previous planning assumptions based on wind and extended delays in information dissemination. The new technology enabled new possibilities.
The advent of atomic weapons provides another example of technology as a key element of innovation. The technology of atomic weaponry enabled the United States to change the traditional calculus of mass. Planners could focus on bombs and planes rather than divisions and corps to create a strategy of deterrence. With the new tools provided by technology, innovation could occur. But technology in a vacuum does not create innovation; technology must be applied.
The second key aspect of military innovation is the incorporation of technology into a doctrinal framework. Technology is a tool for the innovator. Like all tools, technology is only as useful as the method through which it is wielded. Doctrine is key to innovation because it applies technology into a coherent way. If technology gives an innovator new means, the innovator uses doctrine to create new ways.
The development of the New Look demonstrates why doctrine is a key element of innovation. The New Look sought to deter the Soviets through Strategic Air Command and the threat of nuclear weapons instead of conventional military power. Atomic weapons and long-range bombers created an opportunity for a paradigm shift when comparing combat power. However, there was no major shift in the first seven years of the atomic age. The New Look provided a new architecture, a “strategy of asymmetry: Future Koreas might be met, not with a conventional defense… but with an atomic strike.” The technology of atomic weapons provided the tools, but doctrine was the key to innovation by providing the way.
The development and adoption of tanks in the late interwar period between WWI and WWII provides another clear example of why doctrine is a key aspect of innovation. Tanks were a development of World War I, specifically to solve the dilemma of trench warfare and return mobility to the battlefield. However, without an effective doctrine, technology could not be employed properly: innovation was only partially complete. The Germans integrated the technology into a doctrine – colloquially called Blitzkrieg – which prioritized flexibility and movement to seek battles of annihilation.
With a focus on doctrine, the Germans leveraged technology to create effective innovation. The decisive defeat of Poland in 1939 proved the efficacy of their doctrinal concepts. Conversely, the Soviets leveraged technology, but did not produce a coherent doctrinal concept. Instead, the Soviets vacillated between parceling out smaller units of tanks or concentrating their tanks to better effect attacks towards the enemy’s rear. Without a consistent doctrinal framework, the Soviets struggled to achieve unity of effort. The effects of their innovation were blunted compared to the innovations of the Germans.
Exploiting Change: The Need for Adaptable Organizations
Technology is a key aspect because it provides an opportunity. Doctrine provides a pathway to use the new technology. However, without an adaptable organization, no real change is possible. Military bureaucracies are notoriously difficult to shift. If an institution is built to resist change, then it will stifle innovation. The British Army’s failure to adopt large-scale, mechanized doctrine in the interwar years between WWI and WWII demonstrates why an adaptable organization is key to innovation.
The British not only invented the tank, but a British officer was also the first to truly advocate for combined-arms mechanized warfare. Twenty years before German Panzers would invade Poland, J.F.C. Fuller discussed how the tank could serve as part of a combined arms team. Moreover, he even advocated the creation of a “New Model Army.” The New Model Army was to combine the new ability of tanks with infantry, cavalry, artillery and others into a fast-moving, powerful force capable of defeating many times its number of purely infantry divisions. Yet, the British organization proved inflexible. Despite the combination of new technology paired with a cohesive doctrine, no meaningful change is possible without organizational support.
In contrast to the ground forces, the Royal Air Force provides an example of how an adaptable organization ensures innovation can occur. Considering the danger posed by advanced bombers, the RAF transitioned from a bomber focus to create an air defense network. In doing so, they shifted focus from bombers to fighters, while incorporating technologies like radar with new doctrine to coordinate multiple systems and elements into a cohesive whole. The willingness of the RAF to adapt to changing circumstances enabled successful innovation in a way that the army’s inflexibility prevented.
State of War or Peace
Whether a nation is at war or peace determines the impetus for innovation. When a state is at war, the major driver of innovation is the battlefield. During war, the need to achieve battlefield success drives innovation. Organizations either innovate, or people die needlessly. Organizations adopt more flexible approaches and innovation focuses on shorter-term solutions.
During peace, the impetus for innovation is different. Entrenched bureaucracies exert more influence. Furthermore, the end state of innovation can be less clear. False assumptions can stifle innovation. Because of the ambiguity of peace, cooperation between civilian and military leadership is necessary to drive innovation. Civilians protect the careers of innovative officers, while the officers drive innovation by shaping the doctrine and organizational flexibility. Without this alliance and the clarity of combat, innovation is more difficult to implement.
Balance of International Power
The balance of power in the international system is the final variable affecting innovation. Balance of power acts as a focal lens, narrowing or broadening the perceived challenges that a state must innovate to overcome. In a bipolar system, such as the Cold War, each major power has a clear enemy. Thus, the innovator can narrowly tailor innovation to defeat the major opponent. The New Look was a product of a bipolar system, a tailored solution to the only major enemy. After the New Look, the US-Soviet rivalry spurred large-scale innovation because the bipolar system had a clearer challenge: the defense or assault of Western Europe from the East. Similarly, the United States spent tremendous time and resources to develop near-real time satellite capabilities specifically to better counter the Soviet Union. The bipolar system let the Cold War warrior orient on one threat, focusing innovation efforts against a narrower problem-set.
Transforming in Contact: Succeeding at Innovation
Over a year has passed since the beginning of the Army’s effort to transform in contact. The effects of this transformation have been complicated by a changing world. The current international environment and state of the nation do not clarify the direction of innovations. The world is increasingly multipolar with “several major state actors [that] present proximate and enduring threats to the United States and its interests in the world.” Due to an increasingly multipolar system, the Army cannot focus on countering only one potential adversary’s Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), nor focus on only one Area of Responsibility (AOR).
The world is not in a period of relative peace, further obfuscating the direction innovation should focus. Instead, potential adversaries are “challenging U.S. interests in the world by attacking or threatening others in their regions, with both asymmetric and conventional hard power tactics.”
Without the benefit of a clear threat to overcome, and with an ever more dangerous world, the application of the key aspects of innovation are critical to the success of the Army’s transformation. Technologically, the Army is identifying and adapting new systems to better enable maneuver. Drones are becoming more integrated into the force. Short, medium, and long-range systems, as well as one-way precision capabilities provide increased capabilities relative to previous legacy systems. Active units are testing more radical technological advancements, such as Human-Machine Integration (HMI) and the inclusion of robots, further refining future needs.
Organizationally, the Army has already undergone large changes to its formations. New formations have been created. Simultaneously, capabilities in intelligence and fires are consolidating at the division level. Meanwhile, some traditional organizations, such as the Cavalry Squadrons in the Infantry and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams have been inactivated completely. Internally, organizations are adapting. For example, at the Brigade Combat Team Level the Multifunctional Reconnaissance Company is attempting to bridge the gap created by the loss of the Cavalry Squadron using emerging technologies.
TIC as a concept has the Army embracing new technologies in adaptable organizations. However, TIC is not yet producing coherent doctrinal innovation. At echelons above the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) provides the blueprint for how to converge emerging capabilities into a cohesive plan.
At the BCT level and below the situation is less clear. The current model relies on small units to create TTPs and then work to scale upwards. The lack of a clear doctrine for employment creates gaps at the tactical level. For example, the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company (MFRC) has no doctrine from which to build yet. Yet the MFRC is expected to provide the same capability formerly provided by a squadron. How it will accomplish that mission remains unclear. Similarly, robots are being fielded within an HMI framework while the concepts to employ robots remains vague.
Conclusion
In the latter half of the 2020s, innovation remains a critical aspect upon which militaries focus. When preparing for the future, there is a never-ending quest to create new solutions to achieve an advantage. The Army’s current model to innovate in the near term – Transformation in Contact – shows promise when viewed as the application of the key aspects of innovation (technology, doctrine, and organizational flexibility). The Army seeks to combine emerging technologies and new organizational frameworks.
Yet, without a clear, coherent doctrinal concept at the Brigade and below level, the overall efficacy of TIC will be blunted. Ultimately, the full utility of TIC will not be understood for years. As the effort continues, its practitioners must continue to converge new technologies, foster adaptive organizations, and write clear doctrine for employment in order to ensure its success.
