Testing the Waters: Modernization of People’s Liberation Army

Beginning in 2015, China launched broad military reforms under President Xi to institutionalize China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for a common future. As a result of these reforms, the Strategic Support Force (SSF, or PLASSF) was established, a new command-and-control structure was established, regional commands were replaced with a theater command system, the army’s strength and influence were reduced, cadre training and education were improved, and other changes were made. These modifications, which have a solid historical foundation, are the basis of the PLA’s fighting prowess. Despite repeated efforts, the PLA is having trouble integrating jointness into the military.

According to Chairman Xi, the modernisation of the PLA should be finished by 2035, and by 2049, it should be a “world-class force”. The foundation of these initiatives is jointness. The term jointness describes the process of combining all the military services into a single, cohesive organization that is stronger than the sum of its components. Within this framework, each service can highlight their strengths while minimizing their limitations through effective cooperation. But encouraging jointness involves several difficult tasks, such as creating a shared culture, getting past narrow service interests, and coordinating many operational initiatives. China still has a long way to go before realizing its goals. Chinese strategist criticizes technology problems, interservice rivalries, and incompetent operational commanders as inhibitors to achieving jointness throughout the PLA.

Authors note that advancing a joint force continues to face technical difficulties. Assuring that the services’ technology is consistent will promote interoperability and is one of the most crucial elements in making sure they can coexist. Along with that, scholars claim that for the PLA to fulfil its jointness objectives, there needs to be a “single information technology system standard”. Mid-level operational commanders, according to Chinese analysts, are not prepared for modern combat. The phrase “Five Incapables” perfectly expresses this concern. According to the official Chinese slogan, officer cadres are incapable of accurately assessing fighting situations, comprehending the goals of the top authority, making operational judgements, sending troops, or handling certain situations. This theme has been reinforced by Xi personally, who feels the PLA must solve this issue. In fact, since 2015, it has been the PLA’s most often spoken catchphrase. This demonstrates how often political leadership, rather than the military itself, provides diagnoses of the PLA’s limitations.

Many visible signs of the PLA’s jointness issues support the establishment’s concerns. For instance, the National Defense University, one of the most important military institutions in the PLA, just opened the Joint Operations Academy, which seems to be experiencing something of a curricular revolution. The institution aims to be at the forefront of developing cadres for joint warfighting. Since the institution’s establishment in 2017, the curriculum has undergone many changes. Both students and teachers have become weary of the rapid speed of change, with professors lamenting that they are no longer sure what and how to educate their uniformed students regarding joint warfare. The other military universities and training commands most certainly have comparable issues if the National Defense University is having trouble preparing its students for jointness. The majority of PLA officers have little practical experience leading joint operations.

The seemingly unrestricted optimism that Chinese analysts have for the possibilities of cutting-edge technologies is revealed in their discourse on intelligentization. They urge the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to improve the tactical commander’s decision-making powers and the use of intelligent self-driving weapons to take the role of soldiers on the battlefield. The PLA thinks that intelligentization would profoundly alter future combat and present a unique opportunity to get ahead of Beijing’s enemies in terms of development in addition to offering a solution to its problems with jointness. The majority of Chinese scholars advocate for strong central decision-making frameworks in their debates on intelligentization. These theorists want operational commanders to expertly guide the intelligent swarming of unmanned warfare systems to accomplish campaign goals with the guidance of cutting-edge algorithms. Chinese scholars assert that this strategy will centralize command authority on a select group of generals who can remain secure away from the front lines of battle, which is in direct opposition to the contemporary idea of mission command. The failure of any operational commander in this scenario, however, may be devastating at a time of war.

The underlying fragility that still exists in AI and autonomous systems seems to be missed by intelligentization theory proponents. Chinese strategists’ visions of the PLA’s future are mostly centered on cutting-edge technology, with little attention paid to potential risks and strategies for mitigating them. If these goals are achieved, the PLA’s ability to command its soldiers could be seriously hampered by a well-timed electronic warfare assault from an opponent. Chinese policymakers who are speaking about intelligentization seem to place too much faith in what AI and cutting-edge technology are capable of. According to these authors, intelligent machines will someday be more capable of making decisions than people. The PLA does not yet appear to have addressed or absorbed this doubt, even though the excitement around AI may be beginning to fade amid the realization that AI is “neither artificial nor intelligent”. The PLA will also need to improve the technical expertise of its officers and infantry corps to keep developing and implementing AI in battle as intelligentization initiatives advance and more command choices can be outsourced to computers. Contrarily, this can lead to a wider division of labor within the PLA, with core members being underused due to automated decision-making and under-skilled for technical tasks.

Optimism on the part of the PLA in the capabilities of cutting-edge technology entails several dangers that could hinder its ability to wage war. Although the PLA’s technological prowess and breakthroughs are widely hailed in China as a paradigm change in future warfare, their utility depends on how well they are implemented and used in Chinese warfighting doctrine. Outside observers must comprehend that intelligentization might not provide the PLA with all the benefits it anticipates.