The Subaquatic Frontier of Drug Trafficking: Technological Evolution, Asymmetric Warfare, and the Unmanned Paradigm Shift

In July 2025, in the waters of the Caribbean Sea, the Colombian Navy intercepted a vessel that, although empty, carried immense symbolic weight for global security: the first unmanned and remotely guided narco-submarine.[1] This event was not just another seizure in the long and arduous conflict against drug trafficking; it was the materialization of a new era, in which cutting-edge technology, once the almost exclusive domain of state actors, is now fully operationalized by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). This development signals a paradigm shift, where technological innovation is no longer a mere facilitator but the very core of criminal strategy.

Unmanned Prototype Narco-Submarine with Starlink Receiver and 1.5 Tonnes Cargo Capacity Discovered in the Caribbean.[2] Source: Colombian Navy, July 2025.

Introduction

This article analyzes the evolutionary trajectory of narco-submarines, from their rudimentary origins as a logistical counter-insurgency tactic by Colombian cartels to becoming the vector of a sophisticated transatlantic offensive against Europe. It is argued that the arrival of unmanned systems eliminates the main vulnerability of drug trafficking, the human factor, and inaugurates a future of asymmetric challenges that demand a fundamental reassessment of interdiction and international security strategies. This study proposes that the transition from manned to unmanned vessels represents a fundamental change in the drug trafficking paradigm, neutralizing the main intelligence asset of security forces (the captured crew) and requiring a corresponding evolution in state strategies to combat drug trafficking. The response must transcend physical interdiction and evolve into a more complex, intelligence-driven, and technologically sophisticated approach.

To develop this argument, the article is structured into five main sections. The first examines the genesis and initial evolution of narco-submarines. The second analyzes the strategic pivot to the Atlantic and the focus on the European market. The third dissects the unmanned paradigm shift and its technological and strategic implications. The fourth explores the asymmetrical nature of the battlefield and the ongoing challenges of detection. Finally, the fifth section projects the future trajectories of narco-technology and presents strategic recommendations for an effective state response.

The Genesis and Evolution of a Clandestine Naval Force

The narco-submarine is not a sudden invention but the product of an iterative process of innovation and adaptation that spans decades, driven by the dynamic of pressure and response between TCOs and state security forces. This dynamic is often described as a co-evolutionary process, a perpetual “cat and mouse game between interdiction and evasion that can be understood as the symbiotic relationship that creates the conditions for innovation, generating a constant arms race between drug traffickers and state agencies.”[3] This process is fueled by what scholars call the “balloon effect,” where law enforcement pressure on one trafficking route or method simply displaces the activity to another, rather than eliminating it.[4]

The roots of the narco-submarine date back to the last two decades of the 20th century, a period marked by the intensification of the “War on Drugs” led by the United States. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration began to heavily involve the US-military in counternarcotics, bringing advanced military radar, aircraft, and ships to interdiction efforts. Increased surveillance in ports, airports, and traditional air routes, particularly the effective closure of air corridors into South Florida by systems like the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS), made the transportation of cocaine from Colombia to its main consumer markets progressively riskier and less profitable.[5]

In direct response to this pressure, Colombian cartels, notably the Medellín Cartel and later organizations like the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), began to explore a new dimension for their logistical operations: the underwater environment.[6] This was not a choice of convenience but a forced strategic adaptation, demonstrating from an early stage that TCOs operate with a degree of planning and investment in research and development to overcome the obstacles imposed by law. This development followed a clear timeline, with the first known narco-submarine being discovered in 1993, coinciding precisely with the peak of military-supported interdiction efforts.

The development of these vessels can be categorized into three distinct phases:

• Experimentation Phase (Early 1990s–2004): This initial period was characterized by trial-and-error construction. The first models were rudimentary, often little more than speedboats modified with fiberglass covers to reduce their visual profile. The earliest semi-submersibles were built from fiberglass and wood, had low horsepower engines, and were limited in both range and capacity.
• Prototyping Phase (2005–2006): This era saw rapid prototyping with increased capabilities and the use of self-propelled technologies. Vessel designs became more consistent, introducing low-profile vessels (LPVs) with greater stealth, better operational performance, and increased size.
• Standardization and Maturity Phase (2007–Present): In this current phase, designs have become more mature and standardized. Vessels are faster (up to 11 mph), sometimes made from steel, and capable of carrying much larger loads (up to ten tons). Advanced features became common, including twin-diesel engines up to 350 hp, upper lead shielding to minimize heat signatures, sophisticated navigation systems like GPS, anti-radar features, and water-cooled mufflers to reduce thermal detection.[7]

The manufacturing of these vessels evolved from improvised modifications into a dedicated clandestine industry. Artisanal shipyards were established in remote locations, hidden in the depths of the Colombian and Ecuadorian jungles, operating in “obscure conditions” to avoid detection.[8] The logistics required to transport materials such as fiberglass, engines, navigation equipment, and fuel to these isolated locations reveal the organizational sophistication and planning capacity of the TCOs.

The financial investment was substantial. The cost of a single narco-submarine ranged from 1 to 2 million dollars, a capital that only the most powerful organizations, such as the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) and the large cartels, could mobilize. The FARC’s Joint Western Command, for instance, was responsible for most of the group’s semi-submersible operations in the Pacific. This high cost was justified by the immense potential return from a single successful voyage, which could transport several tons of cocaine, making the financial risk a calculated gamble. This clandestine industry gave rise to specialists, such as Óscar Moreno Ricardo, nicknamed the “King of the Semi-Submersibles,” whose arrest in 2022 revealed the existence of a network of specialized builders.[9] These networks often relied on coerced labor, kidnapping trained naval engineers and forcing them to collaborate in the construction of vessels.

The conditions on board the first manned narco-submarines were inhumane, a testament to the high-risk, high-reward business model that defines this mode of trafficking. The interior of these vessels is described as claustrophobic, dark, damp, and unsanitary, with minimal space for the crew, who often suffered from toxic fuel vapors and a lack of basic sanitation.[10]

Operation “Maré Negra” (“Black Tide”), which culminated in the first seizure of a narco-submarine in Europe in November 2019, offers a detailed glimpse into this reality. The vessel, named “Che,” was a 22-meter artisanal structure made of fiberglass. Departing from Brazil, the three-man crew navigated for nearly 6,500 kilometers across the Atlantic Ocean to the coast of Galicia, Spain. During the month-long journey, the crew faced extreme conditions. Their food consisted of canned goods, energy bars, and drinks to stay awake. Sanitation was non-existent, with the crew using a bag as a toilet. Constant exposure to humidity and fuel vapors caused skin sores. Navigation was precarious, relying on conventional satellite phones and a compass, while they faced violent storms that nearly shipwrecked them.[11]

What motivates individuals to accept such missions is the financial reward. The “Che’s” cargo was 3,068 kilograms of cocaine, with an estimated European market value of over 150 million dollars.[12] This case illustrates a human capital model in which TCOs treat crews as disposable assets. The promise of a life-changing payment is enough to recruit people from regions with few economic opportunities, making them willing to embark on what is, essentially, a high-risk mission.

Initially, the main operational corridor for narco-submarines was the Pacific Ocean, transporting cocaine from Colombia to Central America and, ultimately, to the United States.[13] Most of these vessels are classified as self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS). They do not fully submerge like a military submarine; instead, they navigate with a small part of their structure, usually the cockpit and the engine’s exhaust pipe, above the waterline.[14] This configuration allows them to navigate at a depth of up to two meters, enough to make them nearly invisible to the naked eye and difficult to detect by radar. However, this reliance on diesel engines creates a critical vulnerability: the need to surface periodically to ventilate the cabin air and expel engine fumes. It is at these moments that they become most susceptible to detection by air and sea patrols.[15]

The Transatlantic Pivot: Europe as the New Epicenter

While the Pacific routes to the United States remain active, the last decade has witnessed a monumental strategic pivot by TCOs towards the European cocaine market. Driven by a combination of economic and logistical factors, criminal organizations have established a robust and sophisticated transatlantic bridge, in which narco-submarines play an increasingly central role.

The use of submarines to cross the Atlantic, though suspected for years, has become a “common practice” and has been proven, with the first seizure occurring only in 2019. Since then, the flow has intensified. This 2019 case involved a 22-meter Low Profile Vessel (LPV) carrying over 3,000 kilograms of cocaine, which traveled from South America (likely Guyana) to Spain, marking a “wake-up call for the law-enforcement authorities in Africa and Europe”. This event was not an anomaly but part of what has been described as a “narco-submarine epidemic,” with seizure rates increasing dramatically in 2018 and 2019.[16]

Reports from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) confirm that Europe has become a primary destination, with cocaine seizures on the continent surpassing those in the United States, historically the world’s largest consumer market. In 2022, EU member states seized a record 323 tons of cocaine, a significant increase from the 303 tons in 2021, with Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands accounting for 68% of the total seized.[17] This redirection of flow is not accidental, but a calculated business decision aimed at maximizing profits and exploiting new logistical vulnerabilities.

In this new geography of drug trafficking, Brazil has emerged as a fundamental geostrategic “pivot.” Its vast Atlantic coast, proximity to the Andean producing countries, and the presence of one of the world’s most powerful TCOs, the First Command of the Capital (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC), have created the perfect launch platform for transatlantic operations. The structure of modern drug trafficking has evolved beyond the model of vertically integrated cartels. What is observed today is a decentralized and networked criminal ecosystem, operating analogously to a global franchise. In this structure, Colombian cartels act as the “producers,” while the PCC has established itself as the main logistics “franchisee” for the Atlantic. The Brazilian organization, which has expanded massively in the last decade, provides the necessary infrastructure, departure points, and security to dispatch cargoes from South America to Europe, with an established presence in both Africa and the European continent. This collaboration is more than an alliance of convenience; it is a specialization of functions that make the entire network more resilient and difficult to dismantle.

Physical evidence of this connection is recurrent. Inside the narco-submarine “Poseidon,” found in Spain in 2023, investigators found blankets, clothes, and food of Brazilian origin, an unequivocal signature of its journey’s origin.[18]

The Iberian Peninsula, due to its geographical position, serves as the main entry portal for cocaine crossing the Atlantic in narco-submarines. The rugged coastline and long history of smuggling in Galicia make it an ideal destination. Following the “Black Tide” milestone in 2019, a second submarine, the “Poseidon,” was discovered in the Arousa estuary in March 2023.[19] Although the 23-meter vessel was empty when found, authorities believe the operation was a success for the traffickers. The discovery of “narco-boats” (high-powered speedboats) nearby suggests that the cargo was successfully transferred at sea to these smaller vessels, which then quickly brought it to shore before the mother submarine was scuttled. This incident reveals a refined operational method of at-sea transshipment. Furthermore, the discovery in Málaga in March 2021 of the first narco-submarine built in Europe indicates a dangerous decentralization of production and the internalization of the technology on the continent.[20]

Portugal has consolidated itself as another crucial entry point. In March 2025, “Operation Nautilus,” a coordinated international action, intercepted a semi-submersible about 900 kilometers off the coast of the Azores, carrying a massive cargo of 6.6 tons of cocaine.[21] The seizure was notable not only for its volume but also for being one of the first successful interdictions carried out so far from the coast, in the open ocean, preventing the crew from having time to sink the vessel and destroy the evidence.[22] The crew, composed of three Brazilians, one Colombian, and one Spanish national, highlights the transnational nature of these operations. Investigations indicate that the submarine departed from a camouflaged point near the mouth of the Amazon River in Brazil, destined for a location near Sines, Portugal.

Besides the Iberian Peninsula, cargoes departing from Brazil frequently have the major ports of northern Europe as their destination, such as Rotterdam in the Netherlands and Antwerp in Belgium, which function as distribution hubs for the rest of the continent.

A number of narco-submarines have also, since February 2024, been interdicted on their way to Australia which signifies the opening of the trans-Pacific route which spans 10,000 milies and originates on the Colombian shore.[23]

The Unmanned Paradigm Shift: The Dawn of the “Ghost Submarine”

The constant evolution of drug trafficking has reached a technological and strategic inflection point. The July 2025 seizure of the first unmanned and remotely guided narco-submarine represents not just an incremental advance, but a paradigm shift that fundamentally redefines the risk calculation for TCOs and presents an unprecedented challenge to global security forces. This progression can be seen as the next phase in the “Red Queen Hypothesis,” an evolutionary biology metaphor applied to this conflict, which posits that both traffickers and law enforcement must constantly innovate (“run as fast as they can”) just to maintain their current position relative to each other.[24]

The Colombian Navy announced a historic achievement: the interception, in the Caribbean Sea near the city of Santa Marta, of the first drug trafficking “submersible drone.” The vessel, attributed to the Clan del Golfo, the country’s largest cartel, was found empty. Authorities believe it was in a “testing phase,” a proof of concept before being commissioned for actual trafficking missions. Although the seizure was a surprise to the public, it was confirmation of a trend that intelligence services had been monitoring for years. Since at least 2017, there have been reports that Mexican cartels were hiring engineers and technology specialists to develop unmanned submarines, with the goal of creating a fully automated drug transport system.[25] The discovery in Santa Marta proved that this ambition had become a reality.

The sophistication of the unmanned submarine lies in the intelligent integration of cutting-edge commercial technologies, demonstrating the ability of TCOs to act as agile “systems integrators” demonstrating these features:

• Command and Control (C2): The most revolutionary element is the control system. The vessel was equipped with a satellite internet antenna from Starlink, the constellation operated by Elon Musk’s SpaceX. [ibid] This technology provides global high-bandwidth, low-latency connectivity, allowing an operator to pilot the submarine in real-time from anywhere in the world with an internet connection. This represents a quantum leap from the basic, low-data-capacity satellite phones used in manned models.
• Propulsion and Stealth Design: The “submersible drone” was designed with a hydrodynamic “profile” that makes it extremely stealthy. Its shape minimizes the wake on the surface, and its low radar signature makes it almost impervious to detection by aerial patrols or coastal [26]
• Capabilities and Range: Although this prototype had an estimated cargo capacity of 1.5 tons of cocaine and a projected range between 800 and 1,280 km, it is certain that future models will have much greater capabilities as the technology [27]

The transition to unmanned systems drastically alters the risk-reward analysis for TCOs, eliminating their greatest vulnerability: the human factor.

The main advantage for the cartels is that, in case of capture, the loss is purely material, the cargo and the vessel. There is no crew to be arrested, interrogated, and potentially turned into an informant. The weakest link in the operational chain, the human being, who represents the richest source of intelligence about the network, is removed from the equation at the point of interdiction.

Without a crew on board, attributing ownership, and responsibility for a vessel to a specific TCO or individuals becomes exponentially more difficult. The seizure of an unmanned submarine creates an intelligence “black hole” at the point of capture, breaking the chain of evidence necessary for a successful prosecution in court.

Freed from the biological constraints of a crew (need for food, water, air, rest), unmanned submarines can carry out longer, more complex, and higher-risk missions. They can, for example, loiter in an area for weeks, awaiting the ideal conditions for delivery, a tactic impossible for a manned vessel. Although the initial investment in research and development is high, the operational cost per trip decreases (no payment for the crew), and the risk of losing valuable human assets is zero. This makes the overall business model more efficient, resilient, and, ultimately, more profitable for the TCOs.

The seizure of the test submarine, while a tactical success for the Colombian Navy, can be seen as a strategic victory for the cartel. They lost a prototype but gained invaluable operational intelligence on the detection capabilities of security forces. The next one they launch will be for a real purpose and, with the lessons learned, will be even harder to find. This demonstrates that TCOs are employing an iterative design and testing process, similar to that of a legitimate technology company.

The Asymmetric Battlefield: The Continuous Challenge of Detection and Interdiction

The fight against narco-submarines is a classic example of asymmetric warfare. TCOs need to succeed only once to make an astronomical profit, while security forces need to succeed every time to stop the flow. Physics, geography, and now technology, favor the traffickers, creating a detection and interdiction challenge of enormous proportions.

Narco-submarines are designed to be “almost invisible.” Their low-profile design, which keeps most of the hull submerged, means their radar signature is minimal and can be easily mistaken for the background noise of waves.[28] Key low-observable attributes include an aerodynamic shape, the use of fiberglass which is harder to detect with radar, minimal features on deck, thermal shielding, and dark paint to blend with the ocean surface.[29] The hydrodynamic design minimizes the wake in the water, making tracking by sonar or infrared systems difficult.

The vastness of the Atlantic Ocean makes comprehensive patrolling a logistical and financial impossibility. The US-led Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) estimates that, at best, only one in four narco-submarines is intercepted.[30] Some estimates from the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) place the interception rate even lower at 20%. This low success rate is due to a lack of sufficient interdiction assets; one US Southern Command general testified that due to asset shortfalls, they are “unable to pursue 74 percent of suspected maritime drug trafficking.”[31] This means that, despite dozens of annual seizures in Colombia and elsewhere, the global supply of cocaine continues to grow, indicating that the volume reaching its destination is still massive. The seizures, while tactically important, do not have a strategic impact on the drug’s availability.

Given the extreme difficulty of detection in the open sea, the most effective, and perhaps the only viable, strategy is an intelligence-focused approach aimed at dismantling the network even before the vessel is launched. Success lies not in finding the submarine, but in finding the network that builds, finances, and operates it. This requires robust and unprecedented international cooperation between intelligence agencies, police, and armed forces. Multinational operations like “Operation Orion,” led by Colombia, and joint investigations such as “Operation Kraken” involving Spain, and others involving Colombia, the US (DEA), and the United Kingdom, are crucial for success.[32]

The focus of intelligence must be directed upstream in the production chain: 1) Repression at the source, by identifying and dismantling clandestine shipyards; 2) Control of inputs, by monitoring the sale of essential chemicals and materials like fiberglass and high-power engines; 3) Financial intelligence to track money flows; and 4) Human and signals intelligence (HUMINT/SIGINT) to predict movements.[33]

The high-seas environment creates a labyrinth of legal and jurisdictional challenges. Although countries like Colombia have enacted specific legislation that punishes the use, construction, and possession of semi-submersibles with sentences of up to 14 years in prison, law enforcement in international waters is complex.[34] The arrival of unmanned submarines exacerbates this problem. Existing legal frameworks, in many countries, were designed to prosecute human perpetrators. How do you prosecute a crime when there is no criminal on board? The absence of a crew creates a legal vacuum that can be exploited by TCOs to evade criminal liability, making the need to update treaties and national laws a matter of urgency.

The Horizon of Narco-Warfare: Future Trajectories and Strategic Imperatives

Innovation in the world of crime does not stop. The unmanned submarine is not the end of the evolution, but the beginning of a new phase of narco-technology. Anticipating future trajectories and developing proactive countermeasures is essential if states are not to remain permanently one step behind.

An analysis of trends in military and commercial drone technology allows for the projection of the next logical steps for TCOs:

• Swarms of UUVs: The next step after a single large and expensive UUV (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle) is a “swarm” of multiple smaller, cheaper, and potentially disposable UUVs. Launched together, they could saturate the defenses of an area. A patrol that can intercept one submarine cannot intercept twenty arriving from different directions simultaneously. This is a classic saturation tactic that would render current interdiction strategies obsolete.
• AI-Powered Autonomy: Future narco-UUVs will likely incorporate artificial intelligence-based navigation systems. Instead of being remotely piloted, they could be programmed with a destination and a mission, using AI to analyze patrol patterns, detect threats, and autonomously choose the safest route without any real-time human input. This would make them even more difficult to predict and track, as there would be no C2 signal to intercept.
• Fully Electric and Submersible: The main limitation of current models is their reliance on diesel engines, which require a surface presence. Advances in battery technology will inevitably lead to fully electric and fully submersible models. A prototype of an electric submarine was already found in Colombia in 2017.[35] These vessels would be the ultimate “ghost submarine:” no heat signature, no exhaust, no need to surface, and therefore, virtually undetectable by current methods.[36]

The threat of narco-submarines does not exist in isolation. It is interconnected with other criminal activities that finance its technology. The same TCOs, like the PCC, which invest in submarines are also behind “narco-deforestation,” illegal mining, and arms trafficking in the Amazon Basin. The profits from one illicit activity directly finance the technological advancement of another. The UNODC’s 2023 World Drug Report highlights precisely this convergence, warning how drug trafficking accelerates environmental crime and instability, creating a vicious cycle of criminality and degradation.[37]

To confront this evolving threat, a paradigm shifts in counternarcotics strategies is necessary. The reactive approach of interdiction at sea is insufficient. Strategic recommendations must focus on technology, intelligence, and proactive legislation:

• Investment in Counter-UUV Technology and R&D: Governments must invest heavily in counter-UUV technologies, including wide-area acoustic sensor networks at key maritime chokepoints, satellite-based detection systems (like synthetic aperture radar) enhanced with AI to identify the subtle wakes of low-profile vessels, and, crucially, offensive electronic and cyber warfare capabilities to detect, jam, and neutralize the command and control (C2) links of narco-UUVs.
• Enhanced Intelligence Sharing and Targeting: It is imperative to create specialized international task forces focused exclusively on the narco-UUV threat, combining intelligence, military, and police resources. Intelligence priorities must be reoriented to map and disrupt the TCOs’ technology supply chains and to identify the engineers, programmers, and C2 operators who are the brains behind these operations.
• Proactive Legal and Policy Frameworks: The international community must urgently develop new laws and treaties to deal with unmanned criminal assets. This includes creating legislation that criminalizes the possession or construction of an unmanned submersible with certain capabilities (long range, large cargo bay, satellite C2) without a declared legitimate purpose. Such an approach, analogous to laws against the possession of bomb-making materials, would allow authorities to intervene at a much earlier stage of the operational cycle. Unconventional policies, such as the Belgian proposal to financially target traffickers by registering them as self-employed workers to confiscate social contributions, should also be explored to attack the financial foundations of TCOs.[38]
• Public-Private Partnerships: It is essential to establish a dialogue and cooperation with private sector technology companies, such as Starlink and other satellite communication providers. The goal would be to develop protocols to identify and disable the use of their services for criminal activities, finding a balance with privacy and civil liberties concerns.

Conclusion

The narco-submarine has evolved from a tactical curiosity to a first-order strategic threat. Its trajectory, from artisanal vessels in the Colombian jungles to the sophisticated semi-submersibles that cross the Atlantic, demonstrates the remarkable capacity for adaptation and innovation of transnational criminal organizations.[39] The arrival of unmanned systems, however, is not just another step in this evolution; it is a fundamental rupture that alters the very nature of the conflict.

By eliminating the human factor from the point of interdiction, TCOs have neutralized their greatest vulnerability and, simultaneously, the most valuable source of intelligence for security forces. The “ghost submarine” grants TCOs a level of plausible deniability, operational resilience, and cost-efficiency that gives them a significant asymmetric advantage.

The response from states cannot, therefore, be more of the same. The reliance on reactive strategies of physical interdiction at sea is increasingly unsustainable. It is imperative that the international community adopts a proactive posture, moving towards a strategy of network disruption based on intelligence, technological dominance, and legal innovation.[40] Failure to adapt to this new underwater reality will ensure that TCOs continue to navigate, unseen and unpunished, beneath the waves of global security, undermining stability, and the rule of law on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond.

Endnotes

[1] Tayfun Ozberk, “Colombian Navy captures unmanned narco submarine in Caribbean Sea.” Naval News. 3 July 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/colombian-navy-captures-unmanned-narco-submarine-in-caribbean-sea/.

[2]  For design characteristics see HI Sutton, “A Fundamentally NEW Type Of Narco Submarine Changes Everything.” YouTube. 4 July 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rO-VQllYIZo.

[3] Javier Guerrero C., Narcosubmarines: Outlaw Innovation and Maritime Interdiction in the War on Drugs. Singapore: Palgrave Pivot, 2020, https://www.amazon.com/Narcosubmarines-Outlaw-Innovation-Maritime-Interdiction/dp/9811390223.

[4] Walker D. Mills, “Blue water and white powder: trends in maritime narcotics trafficking in the greater Caribbean.” Master’s Thesis. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School. 2023, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/html/trecms/AD1212945/.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ìcaro Luiz Gomes, “Os narcossubmarinos.” Poder Naval. 30 April 2012, https://www.naval.com.br/blog/2012/04/30/os-narcossubmarinos/.

[7] Michelle Jacome Jaramillo,  “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Development of Narco-Submarines.” Journal of Strategic Security. Vol. 9, no. 1. 2016: pp. 49–69, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1509.

[8] Leticia Messias, “Escuro, abafado e rende milhões: saiba como são os submarinos que levam drogas para a Europa.” O Globo, 17 March 2023, https://lucioflaviopinto.wordpress.com/2023/03/17/escuro-abafado-e-rende-milhoes-saiba-como-sao-os-submarinos-que-levam-drogas-para-a-europa/.

[9] “Narcossubmarinos se estabelecem no Atlântico com ajuda brasileira,” Meia Hora. 2 April 2023, https://www.meiahora.com.br/geral/mundo-e-tecnologia/2023/04/6605260-narcossubmarinos-se-estabelecem-no-atlantico-com-ajuda-brasileira.html.

[10] João Lara Mesquita, “O narcossubmarino brasileiro que chegou à Europa.” Mar Sem Fim. 17 March 2023, https://marsemfim.com.br/o-narcossubmarino-brasileiro-que-chegou-a-europa/.

[11]“Polícia espanhola intercepta primeiro ‘narco-submarino’ da Europa.” Isto É Dinheiro. 15 March 2021, https://istoedinheiro.com.br/policia-espanhola-intercepta-primeiro-narco-submarino-da-europa; Irene Hernandez Velasco, “A incrível saga do primeiro narcossubmarino apreendido na Europa.” Terra. 22 January 2022, https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/mundo/a-incrivel-saga-do-primeiro-narcossubmarino-apreendido-na-europa,44490f7d5f1ba2635e9e2117811e22ea3mkkz45o.html.

[12] “Narcossubmarinos se estabelecem no Atlântico com ajuda brasileira.” Exame, 02 April 2023, https://exame.com/brasil/narcossubmarinos-se-estabelecem-no-atlantico-com-ajuda-brasileira/

[13] Ibid.

[14] Flavio Cesar Montebello Fabri, “PCC: da selva ao mar (Da degradação ambiental aos narcossubmarinos).” DefesaNet, 10 July 2024, https://www.defesanet.com.br/pcc/pcc-da-selva-ao-mar-da-degradacao-ambiental-aos-narcossubmarinos/.

[15] Alberto Dantas, “Narcossubmarinos No Oceano Atlântico: Crime Transnacional Emergente, Desafios Para O Brasil”. Revista Brasileira De Inteligência, nº 20. 2025: pp. 1–27, https://doi.org/10.58960/rbi.2025.20.255.

[16] Carsten Weerth,  “Cocaine Smuggling by Help of Narco-Submarines from South America to Europe and Africa: A Proven Case – A Last Wake-Up Call for Customs Services Around the World.” Customs Scientific Journal, no. 1. 2020: pp. 37–42, https://doi.org/10.32836/2308-6971/2020.1.5.

[17] Isabel Laranjo, “323 toneladas de cocaína. Apreensões batem recorde na Europa pelo sexto ano consecutivo.” Diário de Notícias. 12 June 2024, https://www.dn.pt/sociedade/323-toneladas-de-cocaina-apreensoes-batem-recorde-na-europa-pelo-sexto-ano-consecutivo.

[18] Alexandre Galante, “Narcossubmarino ‘fantasma’ encontrado na Espanha tinha cobertores, roupas e comida brasileira.” Poder Nava. 16 March 2023, https://www.naval.com.br/blog/2023/03/16/narcossubmarino-fantasma-encontrado-na-espanha-tinha-cobertores-roupas-e-comida-brasileira/.

[19] “Narcossubmarino encontrado na Espanha tinha roupa e comida do Brasil.” Repórter Diário. 17 March 2023, https://www.reporterdiario.com.br/noticia/3235140/narcossubmarino-encontrado-na-espanha-tinha-roupa-e-comida-do-brasil/.

[20] Op. cit., Dantas at Note 14.

[21] “Polícia espanhola intercepta primeiro ‘narco-submarino’ da Europa.” Isto É Dinheiro. 15 March 2021, https://istoedinheiro.com.br/policia-espanhola-intercepta-primeiro-narco-submarino-da-europa/.

[22] Op. cit., Guerrero at Note 3.

[23] Robert J. Bunker, “Cartel Narcosubs Open the Route to Australia.” C/O Futures Cartel Research Note Series. 3 December 2024, https://www.cofutures.net/post/cartel-narcosubs-open-the-route-to-australia.

[24] Francisco Sena Santos, “Submarino do Brasil que transportava 6,6 toneladas de cocaína é apreendido em Portugal.” SBS Português. 4 April 2025, https://www.sbs.com.au/language/portuguese/pt/podcast-episode/submarino-do-brasil-que-transportava-6-6-toneladas-de-cocaina-e-apreendido-em-portugal/orcaojluj.

[25] Ibid.

[26] “Colômbia apreende pela 1ª vez narcossubmarino não tripulado” Isto é Dinheiro. 3 July 2025, https://istoedinheiro.com.br/colombia-apreende-pela-1a-vez-narcossubmarino-nao-tripulado.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Rodrigo Craveiro, “Narcotráfico colombiano fabrica o primeiro submarino teleguiado.” Correio Braziliense. 3 July 2025, https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/mundo/2025/07/7190097-narcotrafico-colombiano-fabrica-o-primeiro-submarino-teleguiado.html.

[29] Osmar Ribeiro, “Descubra os Segredos dos Narcossubmarinos no Tráfico de Drogas.” Fala Barreiras. 10 April 2025, https://falabarreiras.com/policiais/narcossubmarinos/.

[30] Sergio A. Sierra, “Unmanned Low Profile Vessels: ‘Narco Subs’ for Contested Logistics.” Master’s Thesis. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School. 2024, http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.20846.01609.

[31] Flavio Cesar Montebello Fabri, “PCC: da selva ao mar (Da degradação ambiental aos narcossubmarinos).” DefesaNet, 10 July 2024, https://www.defesanet.com.br/pcc/pcc-da-selva-ao-mar-da-degradacao-ambiental-aos-narcossubmarinos/.

[32] For example, on Operation Orion, see Luke Taylor, “Colombia-led operation seizes world record 225 tonnes of cocaine, and uncovers new Australia trafficking route.” The Guardian. 27 November 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/27/colombia-drug-bust-narco-submarine-australia. On Operation Kraken, see , Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Narco Drone Submarines Seized and Workshop Raided in 14 Month Long Operation Kraken in the Provinces of Cádiz, Málaga, and Barcelona, Spain.” C/O Futures Cartel Research Note Series. Claremont, CA: 27 July 2022, https://www.cofutures.net/post/narco-drone-submarines-seized-and-workshop-raided-in-14-month-long-operation-kraken.

[33] Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, Eds., Narco-Submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for Drug Smuggling Purposes. Carlisle Barracks: US Army Foreign Military Studies Office. 2015, https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_facbooks/30/. For earlier research on this topic see Byron Ramirez, “Narco-Submarines: Applying Advanced Technologies to Drug Smuggling.” Small Wars Journal. 8 March 2014, https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/narco-submarines-applying-advanced-technologies-to-drug-smuggling; and HI Sutton, “”Ghoast Gliders: Spanish Narco-Submarines.” Small Wars Journal. 31 August 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2020/08/31/ghost-gliders-spanish-narco-submarines/.

[34] “Colômbia faz apreensão inédita de submarino do tráfico sem tripulantes.” Roma News. 3 July 2025, https://www.romanews.com.br/mundo/colombia-faz-apreensao-inedita-de-submarino-do-trafico-sem-tripulantes-0725.

[35] Enrique Fonseca, “Los Narcosubmarinos se están volviendo absurdamente avanzados.” Megaprojekts. 22 November 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-3ExTrcMd0.

[36] The placement of photovoltaic cells (skins) on the outside of the more advanced AI controlled narco-subs is a likely projection. These vessels would retain their stealtiness with dark non-reflectic surfaces and allow for the recharging of batteries (fuel cells) as required.

[37] World Drug Report 2023. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2023.html. See especially: “The Drugs-Crime Nexus in the Amazon Basin,” November 2023 at https://www.unodc.org/res/WDR-2023/Research_Brief_Amazon_FINAL.pdf.

[38] “Ministra sugere registrar traficantes para arrecadar contribuição.” O Tempo, 30 June 2025, https://www.otempo.com.br/mundo/2025/6/30/ministra-sugere-registrar-traficantes-como-autonomos-para-arrecadar-contribuicao-social.

[39] On the rise of the global narcosubmarine reach, see Sam Woolston and Hernry Shulder, “Under the Radar: What Hundreds of Narco Sub Seizures Tell Us About Global Cocaine Routes.” InSight Crime. 16 May 2025, https://insightcrime.org/news/under-radar-what-hundreds-ofnarco-sub-seizures-tell-us-about-global-cocaine-routes/.

[40] On the potentials of multilateral maritime interdiction operations see, Peter Appleby, “After Historic International Crackdown, Are Multinational Drug Ops the Future?” InSight Crime. 6 December 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/after-historic-international-crackdown-are-multinational-drug-ops-the-future/