Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking as Irregular Warfare

This article for The Discourse expands upon “Drug trafficking as irregular warfare — and what can be done about it” by Zita Ballinger Fletcher for Military Times.

Here is an outline of Zita Ballinger Fletcher’s article:

• Introduction
• Can drugs be weapons of war?
• State actors and corruption
• The need for joint solutions

Expansion of the thoughts presented in this article:

Drug trafficking and organized crime emerge as sophisticated forms of irregular warfare that challenge traditional understanding of conflict and governance. There is a profound conceptual overlap between organized crime, drug trafficking, and irregular warfare. These criminal networks are far more than simple criminal enterprises; they are complex political actors reshaping societal structures. We must recognize that organized crime, particularly drug trafficking networks, operate as quasi-governmental systems that provide alternative services and opportunities in regions where state institutions fail. These networks strategically manipulate political landscapes, thereby determining economic and social dynamics through a combination of violence, intimidation, coercion, corruption, and strategic service provision. While criminal enterprises do value the monetary gains of their efforts, they are fundamentally engaged in a struggle to influence populations and affect legitimacy.

Drug trafficking networks exemplify these irregular warfare tactics with remarkable precision. In regions like Afghanistan, Peru, and Colombia, these networks are moving contraband and actively creating entire economic ecosystems. These organizations provide critical economic opportunities in marginalized communities, effectively functioning as alternative governance structures. By exploiting weak borders, limited law enforcement capacity, and fragile political institutions, these organizations create environments were illicit activity persists and thrives. Their ability to operate with relative impunity undermines the rule of law and erodes public trust in government. Moreover, by taking advantage of global economic disparities, they provide alternative survival strategies where legitimate economic options are scarce, all while building sophisticated, adaptive global networks designed to stay one step ahead of law enforcement. The strategic complexity of these networks goes far beyond traditional criminal understanding. They utilize advanced technological adaptations, develop intricate communication systems, and create transnational infrastructures that rival many state-level organizations. By providing economic alternatives, protection, and social support in areas abandoned by formal governmental structures, these networks fundamentally challenge state sovereignty and legitimacy.

Drug trafficking itself can be accurately described as a weapon of war due to its capacity to inflict mass casualties and destabilize entire regions. The influx of illicit substances, particularly fentanyl and methamphetamine, leads to significant loss of life and strains public health resources. Just one drug lab bust in Zacatecas led to the seizure of 27 TONS of methamphetamine (more than 698 million doses); while significant, this is only a fraction of the amount of drugs being synthesized and trafficked. The negative impacts on individuals and communities are compounded by the fact that drug trafficking and money laundering are used to mobilize resources that benefit both state and non-state actors. Foreign terrorist organizations, for example, often rely on the illicit drug trade to finance their operations. As the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community points out, “China remains the primary source country for illicit fentanyl precursor chemicals and pill pressing equipment, followed by India. Mexico-based chemical brokers circumvent international controls through mislabeled shipments and the purchase of unregulated dual-use chemicals.” Drug trafficking via organized crime ultimately functions as a form of proxy warfare, where these criminal organizations act as instruments to achieve strategic objectives without direct military engagement.

To effectively combat this multifaceted threat, a comprehensive approach that includes counter threat finance strategies is essential. Counter threat finance involves targeting the financial networks that enable drug trafficking organizations to operate and expand. This includes disrupting money laundering schemes, seizing assets, and cutting off access to the financial system. By targeting the financial underpinnings of these organizations, it becomes more difficult for them to fund their operations, corrupt officials, and engage in violence.

To further enhance these efforts, Mrs. Fletcher argues for a joint solution. She suggests replicating the Afghanistan-based partnership between the Defense Department and a foreign-deployed advisory support team (FAST). This approach involves the U.S. military working with DEA agents to target drug traffickers, combining DOD assets with DEA expertise. This partnership would yield shared intelligence gathering, training, and joint operations. The FAST model, which merges small unit tactics with DEA investigative techniques, offers a comprehensive approach to dismantling these criminal organizations.

Thomas A. Marks and David H. Ucko argue against purely militarized responses to these challenges. They suggest that effective counter-strategies must move beyond enforcement-only approaches, instead addressing the root socio-economic drivers that make these networks attractive. This means understanding local community dynamics, creating alternative economic opportunities, and recognizing that these networks are symptoms of broader systemic vulnerabilities. Ultimately, drug traffickers and organized crime groups actively employ complex irregular warfare strategies that fundamentally reimagine political and economic power. They adapt continuously to geopolitical landscapes, exploit systemic weaknesses, and create alternative social and economic orders that challenge traditional state-centric models of governance.

For more on drug trafficking and organized crime as irregular warfare, read Thomas A. Marks and David H. Ucko’s work “Organized Crime as Irregular Warfare Strategic Lessons for Assessment and Response” featured in Prism.