Iran using criminal gangs for hit jobs abroad, court papers show | BBC
Iran using criminal gangs for hit jobs abroad, court papers show by Jiyar Gol for the BBC.
Iranian Regime’s Transnational Covert Operations
Jiyar Gol discusses the sophisticated strategy of plausible deniability employed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These grey zone activities demonstrate how extraterritorial targeting transcends traditional state-sponsored violence. By leveraging criminal networks like the Thieves-in-Law and utilizing intermediaries such as Naji Sharifi Zindashti, the Iranian regime constructs intricate operational layers that obfuscate direct state responsibility while effectively neutralizing perceived threats abroad.
This article examines a critical aspect of irregular warfare by analyzing the strategic outsourcing of violence through criminal proxies as a means of achieving state objectives. Zindashti’s network exemplifies how state intelligence services can exploit criminal infrastructure to conduct targeted operations, thereby creating strategic distance between state actors and violent outcomes. Notably, the reported plots against dissidents, journalists, and political figures in multiple jurisdictions (United States, United Kingdom, Turkey) demonstrate a systematic, transnational approach to regime security and ideological enforcement.
This article provides insights into hybrid threat environments where state intelligence, criminal networks, and ideological motivations converge. The IRGC’s Unit 840’s infrastructure for establishing “terror infrastructure abroad” represents a sophisticated model of networked, decentralized operational planning that challenges conventional counterintelligence frameworks.
The strategic relevance stems from both the specific incidents and the broader methodology. State actors leverage criminal networks as deniable, adaptable tools of political violence, creating operational complexity that traditional diplomatic or military responses struggle to counter effectively.
