Taipei in Four Days

Consider China’s potential invasion of Taiwan. For policymakers and military planners who think conventionally, or believe that time is on their side, it is easy to brush away any potential invasion as illogical. Nonetheless, those policymakers and planners would be wise to add five basic assumptions to the understanding of the situation.

Assumptions:

1. China wants Taiwan for national sovereignty.
2. China wants Taiwan for its advanced technologies and industries.
3. China wants to protect its military capabilities.
4. The international community will not act preemptively.
5. The international community is dependent on attribution.
6. The international community wants to keep Taiwan from being decimated.

There are at least two pertinent lessons from Ukraine that China can apply to its assumed planning for Taiwan. From the 2022 invasion, it’s obvious that much of the international community does not support a military buildup and drawn-out invasion of an independent country. Speed is of the essence. From the 2014 occupation and conquering of Crimea, there is more than one way to exert military power. Using “little green men” was a stroke of military genius that confused the international community long enough to be effective.

China has the manpower to infiltrate Taiwan with sufficient quantity to disable most means to defend Taiwan. This would be a multi-phase plan to infiltrate 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers, possibly less, into Taiwan as businessmen, tourists, laborers, and ship workers with no uniforms. Using basic small arms, grenades, explosives, and possibly rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), small units can take down critical infrastructure, blockade chokepoints, and tie up island defenses. In a Tet Offensive scale of attack model, small units, mission-focused infantry, and special forces can wreak havoc on communications, transportation, command and control, and island defenses. 

The second phase, an air campaign to support the forces on the ground, would quickly be followed by a full invasion. Troops and material flown into airfields, possibly airborne troops, and airstrikes would do what the “little green men” could not. Unlike 2014, this phase will be violent. Once the initial assault takes down the Taipei government, it will be nearly impossible for the international community to come to their aid. China will now consider this as an internal security matter, further negating international options to intercede. The initial commando attacks and shaping operations will do the important work of decapitating the government, while the invasion forces from the mainland will consolidate control of the island.

Prepositioned troops and weapons can be concealed in shipping containers delivered around the island or still on vessels at all the ports, sea, and air. The police will be overwhelmed and ineffective. If not pre-armed and staged, the Taiwan military will be neutered, unable to arm or deploy with their bases and routes under siege. Coastal and air defenses can likewise be negated long enough for the Chinese air assault to take effect. Small units of 4-6 men can take down cell towers, server farms, police stations, and power substations. Larger formations can attack military armories, barracks, bridges, tunnels, railways, and critical government buildings. All of this will be supported by massive cyber operations and likely co-opted actors.

Every means of commercial conveyance can be used to ferry these troops and weapons in advance and up to zero hour. Commercial flights can be used to deliver armed troops to airfields, even under the guise of in-air emergencies. Using taxis, Ubers, and absconded police cars, attacking troops can quickly move over the island to their targets. The greater the shock, surprise, chaos, and violence, the better conditions for the attackers. Taiwanese leadership will be challenged to define the attacks as anything matching a military operation before it is too late. The first 24 to 48 hours would be the most critical. Anything after that would be consolidation and mop-up operations. Once the objective is consolidated, there will no longer be a non-China government to rescue. The break-away province of Taiwan will cease to exist.

From the outside, it will appear that Taiwan is in chaos and China is planning an imminent invasion. However, the overthrow and occupation of the island will already have occurred. Much like 1939, there may be “calls” from the island to China asking for assistance. Unopposed, the Chinese military could flood onto the island in astronomical numbers and solidify their hold. Any response would then have to weigh the means of expelling the Chinese military against preserving Taiwan.

If China plans and executes a traditional, massive military invasion, it risks some kind of failure or outsized expense. Does China need to conduct this campaign in a way that shows the full power and modernization of its military, or does the result speak for itself? The faster and less resource-dependent route is beneficial in a few ways. Taking Taiwan in a matter of days, not weeks, prevents interference and limits responses. Success is success. Not getting into a large-scale military fight with those who might defend Taiwan, including the Taiwanese, protects the reputation of the Chinese military as well. Not knowing if China’s military could take Taiwan is a better unknown than any glaring failures that show their military is not yet ready for other challenges.