Investing in Strategic Influence: A National Security Imperative
The recently published 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) relays a stark outlook, that of a global landscape increasingly defined by the assertive and often malign activities of the “axis of upheaval”—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Two of these nations, which have struck a no-limits partnership, have demonstrated a sophisticated understanding and effective holistic application of strategic influence, often outpacing the United States (US) in this critical discipline of statecraft. This truth underscores a basic flaw in the US’s current approach. The flaw, in particular, is the recent divestment of key influence capabilities within the US Department of State, such as the Global Engagement Center (GEC), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM).
While a critical assessment of our current and past efforts was long overdue, the pendulum has swung too far, thus creating unnecessary risk by way of creating a void that the US’s adversaries are eagerly filling. The way forward cannot be retrenchment but rather an intentional reinvigoration of the US’s strategic influence construct. Optimization demands a profound reinvestment and a fundamental realignment of the US’s strategic influence enterprise to meet the exigencies of this new era.
Considering the complexities and potential of these vital agencies and the broader strategic influence ecosystem, a recalibration was necessary. Experience at attempts to pioneer holistic approaches to influence within geographic regional commands (US INDOPACOM Information Officer and the Fleet Information Warfare Command Pacific) illustrates the urgent need for such a recalibration – one that reduces the friction that has become a feature, not a bug, of influence with American characteristics.
The core truth remains: every action undertaken by the US government carries psychological weight, and actual influence lies in the deliberate and synchronized application to achieve and amplify desired effects to enhance national power.
Evolution and Devolution of US Strategic Influence
The historical evolution of US strategic influence began with the Coordinator of Information (COI), the predecessor of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), where Major General “Wild” Bill Donovan served as COI’s first director. Its two divisions, Research and Analysis and the Foreign Information Service (FIS), evolved into the US Office of War Information (OWI); it then culminated during the Cold War public diplomacy efforts through the US Information Agency (USIA). This enterprise devolved into today’s ecosystem of interagency rivalries and a fragmented approach. However, the contemporary cognitive and information domains demand a unified and agile response.
Nevertheless, the notion that divestiture is the solution is a dangerous miscalculation, akin to removing a vital organ to improve the body’s overall health. Instead, the US government must focus on optimizing and integrating our capabilities instead of eliminating them without a systemic analysis. The core truth remains: every action undertaken by the US government carries psychological weight, and actual influence lies in the deliberate and synchronized application to achieve and amplify desired effects to enhance national power.
Defining Strategic Influence
Before charting a course for revitalization, it is important to firmly define strategic influence. Strategic influence is the deliberate and coordinated application of a nation’s resources—diplomatic, informational, military, economic, cultural, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, and technology—to shape the perceptions, decisions, and actions of key actors and demographics to advance national interests and long-term geopolitical objectives. This definition moves beyond simplistic notions of siloed influence disciplines: Public Affairs (PA), Public Diplomacy (PD), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Civil Affairs (CA), Cyber, Space, and the hard versus soft power dichotomy. Rather, strategic influence recognizes that power is a unified force, an aggregate of capabilities that our adversaries, particularly China, so clearly understand and leverage. To this end, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a masterclass in geoeconomic strategic influence, weaving a web of economic dependencies and shaping global norms in their favor. Similarly, Russia’s multifaceted influence campaigns in Eastern Europe demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of leveraging foreign malign influence enhanced by energy extortion, sabotage, and proxies to attempt to achieve their strategic aims.
The Urgency of Strategic Influence in a Shifting World Order
The 2025 ATA’s assessment of China as the actor “most capable of threatening U.S. interests globally” should serve as a clarion call. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intent to “expand its coercive and subversive malign influence activities to weaken the United States internally and globally” is explicitly stated.” Their leveraging artificial intelligence to enhance these capabilities and evade detection further underscores the urgency to build back better. Moreover, the growing cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea presents a compounding threat that necessitates a unified and strategic counterapproach.
From a realist perspective, this investment in strategic influence is a pragmatic necessity for a self-interested state operating in an anarchic global system.
To pause on the latter and relay the return on investment that is a revitalized strategic influence build, the notion of a “reverse-Kissinger strategy”—attempting to drive a wedge between Russia and China through strategic influence—is fundamentally flawed. Such an approach, predicated on the assumption of inherent and exploitable divisions, risks signaling to Beijing and Moscow the concern we harbor about their no limits-friendship. This, in turn, is likely to reinforce their alignment rather than fracture it. A robust strategic influence enterprise would have identified the faulty assumptions within such an approach and offered actionable data-driven alternate efforts that focus instead on building resilience within targeted societies, exposing the true nature of our adversaries’ actions, and offering compelling alternatives rooted in shared values and mutual benefit.
The Blueprint for Reinvigorating US Strategic Influence
To achieve this, the US government must move beyond the fragmented landscape and embrace a unified and agile model. This requires fundamentally altering our organizational structures and operational processes. Furthermore, the US government must consider a profound fusion of capabilities within the national security ecosystem. The evolving geopolitical landscape demands an entity combining the USIA’s multidisciplinary strategic communication prowess and the intelligence acumen and political and psychological warfare capabilities reminiscent of the OSS. It should report to the National Security Council and be a network of networks by design. This envisioned lean, decentralized, and technically enabled organization operating in close partnership with the private sector would represent a prevailing and potent instrument of national power. It would dissolve legacy friction, resulting in a comprehensive approach to strategic competition, integrating intelligence insight with proactive and reactive influence campaigns with actions across the other domains.
From a realist perspective, this investment in strategic influence is a pragmatic necessity for a self-interested state operating in an anarchic global system. It is about proactively shaping the strategic environment to favor our interests, deterring potential adversaries, and fostering an international order that aligns with our values without necessarily resorting to direct military confrontation.
Not an Option, A Strategic Imperative
Strategic influence is not an optional capability—it is a national security imperative. The US cannot afford to surrender the cognitive domain to foes that place greater weight on shaping global perceptions than deploying physical force. The last two decades have revealed that military superiority alone does not safeguard strategic success.
The US must abandon the flawed notion that divestment equals efficiency. A thoughtful and directed investment in a holistic strategic influence formation will ensure that the US does not merely react to malign influence but actively shapes global perception in its favor.
History demonstrates that influence is power. The nation ignores influence as a critical element of national power at its own peril.
