Could American-Made Peace in Bosnia be Deteriorating Under European Hands?
Peacekeeping, when placed in the timeline of human history, is a fairly new concept. After the horrors of the First and Second World Wars (WWI and WWII, respectively), the international community came together in an attempt to denounce war altogether. The product of these efforts was the creation of the United Nations (UN), the successor to the failed post-WWI League of Nations. It was the UN that started the peacekeeping project in 1948 to observe the Armistice Agreement that ended the First Arab-Israeli War.
Over the years the United Nations has conducted a host of peacekeeping operations across the globe. Yet, considering the UN’s varying degrees of success in each of these operations, criticism has surrounded the UN’s peacekeeping efforts. Critics began to question the UN’s capability to enforce peace, to protect civilians, and to prevent the destruction of civilian infrastructure during conflicts. The UN’s deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to Bosnia during the Bosnian War (1992-1995) is one mission that received a lot of scrutiny. Ultimately, the decisive actions of the United States and the initial missions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led to peace in Bosnia; however, its maintenance by the European Union Force (EUFOR) revealed major flaws, particularly as certain contributors’ national interests began to erode the effectiveness of the mission. It is crucial to understand the conflict in order to analyze the various peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.
Background
As the name implies, the Bosnian War occurred throughout Bosnia. The war was part of the dissolution and break-up of Yugoslavia. The Bosnian War resulted from Serbian forces and Croatian separatist proxies attacking the newly independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina shortly after it declared its independence. This conflict was characterized by its viciousness, which was fueled by long-standing historical, cultural, and religious hatreds. The actions of the Bosnian-Serb Army (VRS) were notably barbaric. Throughout the war, the VRS inhumanly attacked and brutalized Bosnia’s Muslims (Bosniaks) and Bosnian Croats. During the war, the UNPROFOR established safe zones where peacekeepers would protect civilians, specifically Bosnian Muslims, from the VRS and their attempts to ethnically cleanse Bosnia. Yet, the reluctance of UN member states to contribute troops often resulted in these safe zones being lightly guarded. The lack of credible deterrence from the UNPROFOR emboldened the VRS to attack the safe zone of Srebrenica in July 1995. The VRS’s attack fueled one of the largest massacres in the 20th century. In Srebrenica, the VRS needlessly slaughtered more than 8,000 Bosniak civilians. The VRS’s atrocity became the first genocide in Europe since WWII. The Srebrenica massacre caused the United States to intervene and launch Operation Deliberate Force. This operation relied primarily on airpower and focused on bombing VRS targets throughout Bosnia. The United States’ intervention, along with the tide of the war shifting away from the Bosnian-Serbs, led to the Dayton Agreement in November 1995, which officially ended the Bosnian War. After the war, the United Nations Security Council’s International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ruled that the VRS and its Serbian leadership were guilty of ethnic cleansing.
To make sure the peace agreement held, the United States, via NATO, established the Implementation Force, or IFOR, relieving the UNPROFOR of its responsibilities in Bosnia. The IFOR was charged with ensuring that the Dayton Agreement was appropriately implemented throughout Bosnia. In December 1996, the IFOR was replaced by the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which continued the IFOR’s original mission. SFOR operated in Bosnia until it was disbanded by NATO in 2004. Due to the fragile nature of peace in Bosnia, the European Union (EU) stepped in and created the European Union Force, or EUFOR, which continues to operate in Bosnia to this day under the name Operation Althea.
NATO’s decision to establish their first peacekeeping mission, rather than allowing UNPROFOR continue their operation, represents the international community’s lack of confidence that the UN can maintain peace. The UN’s lack of consensus contributes to this problem. Not so surprisingly, the UN’s push towards neutrality, particularly its policy of avoiding engagement, essentially made it ineffective. By transferring peacekeeping operations to NATO—a united force that can mobilize a greater amount of troops—many of the EUFOR’s logistical and bureaucratic roadblocks were lifted.
Nonetheless, NATO, just like the UN, is a collection of nations. But unlike the UN, where opposing superpowers and regional powers are often at loggerheads, NATO is led by the US, and most of its members follow the US’s lead. Of course, this does not imply that NATO is immune from the bias of its member states national interest, nor does it unquestionably follow the US. The same applies to the cause of EUFOR with dominant countries such as France or Germany. One of the main challenges for NATO is ensuring that these biases are kept in check and do not affect the alliance’s mission.
US Operations in Bosnia
Contrary to neo-realist theory regarding American intervention in Bosnia, the US’s only interest in Bosnia was preventing further civilian harm and upholding the peace agreement. This is why the US committed 20,000 troops to the operation in Bosnia. In fact, much rhetoric coming from opponents suggested that the mission was doomed to fail due to a lack of objectives beneficial to the US besides upholding the peace agreement. This doesn’t even account for the American public’s lack of knowledge on the war in Bosnia. A poll in 1995 found that only 40% of Americans could name the group (VRS) that was committing the massacres in Bosnia. When US President Bill Clinton presented the idea to congress in 1995, the same concerns that opponents brought up earlier resurfaced, suggesting that there was no purpose to commit that many troops.
It is important to remember that the Dayton Agreement was brokered, written, and guaranteed by the United States. It is also vital to appreciate is that the US’s intention with the Dayton Agreement was to quickly end the war. During negotiations, the Bosnian Army (ARBiH), launched a counter-offensive (Operation Sana) which devastated the VRS. By October 1995, when the Dayton Agreement was being finalized, the ARBiH had advanced to 26 km, or roughly 16 miles, from Banja Luka, which was the Bosnian-Serb separatist government’s de-facto capital. US envoys feared this offensive would jeopardize the peace process, and therefore immediately met with Bosnian and Croatian representatives, effectively ending the offensive. Through this action, the United States effectively sided against the ARBiH and thus showed no sign of favorability toward the ARBiH’s cause.
When NATO took over the responsibility of UNPROFOR, it maintained the same peacekeeping methods as its predecessor. IFOR was tasked with separating warring factions and overseeing the withdrawal of heavy weapons from Bosnia. However, the civilian framework as prescribed in Dayton was slow to emerge and this began to conflict with the peacekeeping mission. Consequently, questions began to arise about whether IFOR should expand its responsibilities beyond peacekeeping operations. This was never explored due to reluctance from US military officials who were unwilling to put troops in danger. After a year, the number of NATO troops fell to just 7,000, which reflected the US’s declining interest in the region.
EUFOR in Bosnia and Threats to Peace
NATO’s peacekeeping operation ended in 2004 with the establishment of the EUFOR. For the most part EUFOR continued the original objectives of IFOR and SFOR. However, EUFOR also built upon those objectives. The EUFOR helped sustain Bosnia’s path into the European Union by cooperating with law enforcement and civilian infrastructure in the country. While there have not been any outbreaks of fighting in Bosnia, recent developments have presented themselves as the biggest threats to peace since the end of the war. In addition, these threats began to uncover major flaws with EUFOR, particularly with certain contributors to the mission. A few of the more flagrant threats to peace follow.
In 2023, Milorad Dodik, president of Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian-Serb political entity established in Bosnia as part of the Dayton Agreement, began defying the Bosnian central government. Decisions made by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which is responsible for implementing the peace agreement, are being ignored in RS. This constituted serious violations of the Dayton Agreement and has brought unease to civilians in the country. In the meantime, Bosniak returnees in RS (whose return is guaranteed under the Dayton), face a growing number of hate crimes, often going unpunished. While these actions were condemned by the European community, that was the extent of the response.
The appointment of Hungarian General László Sticz to command the EUFOR in early 2024 stirred more controversy. Hungary, under Viktor Orbán, has been seen as an enabler of Dodik’s violations of the Dayton Agreement. It is therefore only reasonable for people to have growing concerns regarding Sticz’s command of EUFOR. However, this is not the end of Hungary’s meddling in Bosnia’s peace process.
In 2025, Dodik was sentenced to a year in prison, including a 6-year ban from politics for violating the Dayton Agreement. Hungary, expecting Dodik to be sentenced, attempted to send special forces into Bosnia. These forces operated under the cover of a joint police exercise and were ready to extract Dodik to Hungary, however, they were unsuccessful. What is even more puzzling is that Hungarian troops helped constitute the EUFOR troops in Bosnia at the time of Dodik’s violations of the Dayton Agreement. Therefore, one must question Hungary’s commitment to upholding the Dayton Agreement. Considering president Orban’s actions regarding Dodik, it is difficult for EUFOR to be an unbiased mediator in Bosnia when one of its contributors is actively destabilizing the internationally agreed upon peace process in Bosnia. Considering this point, it is worth mentioning that shortly after the events involving Dodik and Orban, EUFOR excluded Hungarian troops from its latest force rotation. Moreover, it is equally important to note that Hungary remains a member of NATO, and it is a voting member of the EU, which has the ability to block any necessary action in Bosnia.
Concluding Thoughts
In retrospect, both NATO and EUFOR missions in Bosnia have been more effective than the first UNPROFOR mission as they have been able to establish the framework for peace in the country. The guaranteed security of civilians in Bosnia shortly after the war, the training of Bosnian law enforcement, and continued cooperation with the Bosnian Army. These operations have been crucial to the reintegration of Bosnia into the European community after the horrors of the 1990s. Be that as it may, new challenges to peace have shown that EUFOR has major flaws, which is a far cry from the times of IFOR and SFOR. The bias of states contributing forces to EUFOR is deteriorating to the peace in Bosnia. As the international community becomes increasingly polarized and once-dormant conflicts across the world risk sparking up again. Another war in Bosnia would not just be devastating to Bosnians, but also to the security of the North Atlantic community, the Balkan region, and larger European security. It may be the time the United States begins to think about revitalizing its role as a leader of the peacekeeping process in Bosnia, where its citizens hope to move on to a better future.
