Do not Ignore the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Conflict

Introduction

The humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is only deepening as March 23 Movement (M23) and Rwandan forces continue their push deeper inside the nation. Should the recently proposed ceasefire fail, the likelihood of the conflict spilling over into a regional war in one of the most densely populated parts of the world increases dangerously. As each day peace is not achieved, the risk of a humanitarian disaster not seen since the Congo Wars escalates. To prevent this disaster, nations with the ability to help develop peace should provide greater focus on the region and support solutions led by third-party African nations.

Context

As the M23 group continues its crusade into the DRC, Rwanda’s true intentions are increasingly suspect. Ostensibly to rid the Eastern DRC of those responsible for the Rwandan Genocide, the truth, in part, seems to lie in Kinshasa’s vast mineral reserves in the region. Rwandan mineral exports have doubled since the most recent phase of the conflict and the country is exporting more than it mines, a mathematical impossibility. Rwanda has capitalized on limited DRC governmental control of its eastern borders, seizing large swathes of the $24 trillion worth of minerals in its territory.

Rwanda does in fact benefit from their mineral rich neighbor being in a constant state of internal conflict; it is one less nation to compete against. Except for diamond and manganese mining, most of the DRC’s mineral wealth is in these contested eastern reaches.  Yet, the region has no direct links to Kinshasa without having to use a combination of earth tracks and ferries. Rwanda, however, is right next door and has easier logistical access.

It would be easy to think that the current conflict is caused by resource competition alone, but in doing so one ignores the potent drivers that are a bloody history of colonialism and warfare whose impacts are still experienced by the region’s inhabitants today. After all, Rwanda would have far less of a causa belli for the current invasion had the Belgians not installed members of the Tutsi people during the colonial era. While wars are almost never caused by cultural disagreements alone, they certainly set the foundation for attritional warfare and crimes against humanity. The current fighting has significant impacts for all key players and creates even more of a threat to stability in the region.

Future Risks

The upcoming Doha-sponsored cease-fire negotiations between Rwanda and the DRC are a promising step should both nations come to the table and agree to a ceasefire which is never a guarantee of peace. There have been ceasefire agreements, notably one in August 2024 that was violated by M23 two months later. The DRC is likely cautious to enter any ceasefire negotiations but may be forced to the table by the simultaneous withdrawal of the South African Development Community plus Burundian troops and more Ugandan soldiers—favorable to M23—entering the DRC. Should the ceasefire not be successful, the risk of a disastrous regional conflict not seen since the Congo Wars will increase.

Since the beginning of the year alone, there have been 230,000 refugees stemming from the conflict. Continued fighting will displace even more. These refugees will need extensive international humanitarian support as the DRC does not have the resources to adequately provide for them. Besides President Trump’s comment that the situation is a “very serious problem,” not much attention has been given from the U.S. to the crisis besides mulling over a mineral deal. It seems that the United States will be uninvolved in mediating the conflict or providing meaningful humanitarian aid.

To its credit, the French government has shown a degree of interest in solving the problem. Other EU nations, perhaps due to a primary focus on security concerns closer to home, have responded in a way so disjointed that other nations in the Great Lakes region may see this as an opportunity to capitalize on the crisis.

Should M23 continue in their stated goal of pushing all the way to Kinshasa, the fighting will become more intense as the quality of DRC-held infrastructure improves the closer to the capital therefore allowing the DRC military to deliver a greater number of troops and resources quickly. Coupled with the limited troop numbers of M23, the separatist group risks becoming overextended against increasingly concentrated DRC troops. M23 would likely respond to this by increasing its forced recruitment campaigns and use of child soldiers on both sides of the fighting.

Analysts are uncertain if M23 would attempt to march on Kinshasa because as it expands in towards the capital, its ability to be resupplied by Rwanda diminishes.  A more feasible, and disruptive, move would be expanding southward towards the DRC cobalt mines (roughly 10% of the nation’s GDP).  M23 would benefit from keeping as close as possible to Rwanda while preventing the DRC from achieving a logistical advantage.

Inattention from third-party governments combined with potentially increasing support of M23 from Uganda are key factors in the conflict expanding. The state of Burundi will continue to see an increase in refugees should the conflict continue to push south and may find itself needed to enter the conflict to a greater degree due to recent skirmishes with M23 and Rwandan troops. If these conditions continue, Burundi may feel it has little choice but to increase its military response should it view the conflict as even more existential than it already is.

Recommendations

If non-sub-Saharan countries continue to take the same approach they are now, the risk of a larger regional conflict increases. This is not to say that the argument for African Solutions to African Problems is illegitimate by any means. In fact, evidence points to third party African nations being more effective than non-African nations in mediating conflict on the continent. Third-party countries not in Africa that want to ensure a cessation of the conflict and prevent a third Congo War need to listen to third party African nations in how to approach the issue. Further, they need to understand that viewing the conflict as just about minerals minimizes the nuance of culture and the impacts of colonialism on the region today.

This does require a larger lift than what the international community is providing right now but the current approach of limited sanctions is clearly not effective. The level of forces in the region is increasing and the geopolitics are complex. Western nations in particular must remember that this conflict is not just about minerals – there are dozens of distinct groups in the region, each with their own agenda.

Western nations should consult their Sub-Saharan third party counterparts for next steps in reducing the impact of this conflict and prevent its expansion. In the meantime, the international community should take a firmer and more unified stance on sanctions with Rwanda. As a matter of principle alone, concerned parties should aggressively scrutinize, if not cease, exports of minerals from Rwanda especially with coltan, tin, gold, and their derived products until Rwanda ceases support of conflict in the region.

However, Rwanda has limited exposure to trade with western nations so it may not be enough alone to force them to cease their invasion. Ultimately, the next step should be the cessation of economic, education, and governance aid but preserving humanitarian assistance. Should this not work, and the conflict has led to humanitarian impacts seen during the Congo Wars, all aid to Rwanda would cease and instead be sent to the harmed populations in the DRC.

To reduce the chance that Uganda will become directly involved in kinetic conflict, a carrot-and-stick approach should be employed. The carrot being the provision of defensive-only military assistance and development aid. The stick being made clear that entry into the conflict will result in export restrictions on Ugandan food products and increasing diplomatic pressure with third-Party African nations. It is easier to keep a country out of conflict than it is to get them out of it.

Further, because the United States under President Donald Trump has gutted the USAID and its humanitarian efforts, third-party nations both inside and out of the Great Lakes region should be preparing for many refugees who will need help should the conflict expand. The rest of the global community must ensure that funding is available to support an African-led response should the fighting continue to intensify. A benchmark for preparedness should be the ability to provide humanitarian assistance up to a similar number of civilians who needed help in the Second Congo War.