Why AFRICOM Should Stand Alone: Preserving Strategic Agility Through Dedicated Theater Command

Introduction: One Command, One Focus

In the GFM world, priorities are everything. As a former Global Force Management Planner and an incoming Security Cooperation Officer bound for the African continent, I’ve seen firsthand the pressures of allocating limited forces to a world full of demands. It’s a constant negotiation—balancing emerging crises, strategic priorities, and operational realities. Which is why recent proposals to merge United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) into a sub-unified command under U.S. European Command (EUCOM) concern me deeply. Some argue this merger would reduce redundancy and streamline overhead. But in practice, such a consolidation would dilute focus, complicate resourcing, and undermine strategic competition in a region where great powers are playing a long game. From a GFM perspective—where clarity, prioritization, and agility matter—AFRICOM must remain its own Combatant Command.

Background: What AFRICOM Is—and Why It Matters

AFRICOM was established in 2007 as a geographic combatant command with a mandate to partner, enable, and support African nations in addressing transnational threats. Unlike other commands, AFRICOM operates with a “small footprint, light touch” model that emphasizes interagency cooperation, capacity-building, and regional partnership over permanent basing or large-scale operations. Its lean structure belies its vast responsibility: 53 countries, over 1.3 billion people, and every strategic challenge imaginable—from violent extremist organizations and fragile states to climate-induced instability, humanitarian disasters, and an intensifying competition with China and Russia. Merging AFRICOM under EUCOM risks marginalizing Africa at a time when its strategic relevance is growing, not diminishing.

Geographic Complexity Demands Focus

From the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea, from the Horn to Southern Africa, the continent is not a monolith. Each region contains unique political dynamics, cultural landscapes, and threat vectors. Consolidating command under EUCOM—already burdened by NATO, Russia, and Arctic concerns—risks flattening Africa’s complexity into a secondary consideration. As a planner, I’ve seen how resource decisions favor areas with clear COCOM advocacy. If AFRICOM becomes a three-star subcommand, its voice will be diminished in the global sourcing arena. GFM priorities are set by strategic demand signals—if Africa isn’t at the table, it’s on the menu.

The work continues as follows:

• Strategic Competition Is Heating Up

• The “Efficiencies” Argument Misses the Mark

• From Ends-Ways-Means to Strategic Risk

• A Planner’s Perspective: The View from the GFM Desk

• Recommendations: Strengthen, Don’t Subordinate

• Africa Is Strategic—Act Like It

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army Command and Staff General College, Department of the Army, United States Africa Command, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Author Bio

United States Army Major Joel J. Richardson is a Field Artillery officer currently attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. A former Global Force Management Planner at Special Operations Command Central, he brings joint, SOF, and National Guard perspectives to professional military discourse. He writes on operational planning, leader and development.