The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition  by Seth G. Jones.

It is published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

Read the brief by clicking on the title above or click here.

From Seth Jones, president of the Defense and Security Department and Harold Brown Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS):

The Issue

The U.S. government has not adequately leveraged the commercial sector to conduct irregular warfare against China, Russia, Iran, and other competitors because of significant risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions processes, and a failure to adequately understand technological advances. There is an urgent need to rethink how the United States works with the commercial sector in such areas as battlefield awareness, placement and access, next-generation intelligence, unmanned and autonomous systems, influence operations, and precision effects.

U.S. adversaries are developing capabilities and taking actions that pose a growing threat to the U.S. military and intelligence community across the globe. China, for example, is investing significantly in artificial intelligence (AI) such as DeepSeek, quantum computing, and other emerging technologies, as well as improving capabilities in areas such as information and influence operations, long-range strike, autonomous systems, cyber, and space. China can leverage an economy that has greater purchasing power parity ($31.2 trillion) than the United States ($24.7 trillion), a situation that the United States did not face with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.¹

China’s military-civil fusion (军民融合) development strategy—also called national strategic integration—has created a way for the government to direct and facilitate cooperation with the commercial sector and fuse China’s defense industrial base with its civilian industrial base.² China has also cooperated with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other countries to develop greater military, intelligence, and dual-use capabilities that will complicate U.S. military and intelligence activities overseas.³

This analysis focuses on one specific area of competition: actions and capabilities below the threshold of conventional warfare, or what this analysis refers to as irregular warfare. As used here, irregular warfare refers to activities short of conventional and nuclear warfare that are designed to expand a country’s influence and legitimacy. These activities include information operations, cyber operations, support to state and non-state partners, covert action, and economic coercion.

To better understand the changing dynamics of great power competition and the implications for irregular warfare, this analysis asks several questions: How might U.S. adversaries evolve their capabilities in ways that impact the United States’ ability to conduct irregular warfare? What types of missions might U.S. military and intelligence units be asked to conduct, and what types of commercial capabilities will likely be required to conduct these missions? How can military forces and intelligence better leverage the commercial sector to develop and implement these capabilities?

In answering these questions, this analysis makes two main arguments. First, the United States is not adequately prepared for the evolving nature of irregular warfare. China, Russia, Iran, and other states are developing conventional and irregular capabilities that present serious challenges—and opportunities—for intelligence, special operations, and other military forces across the globe. U.S. military and intelligence units will require disruptive capabilities in multiple areas where the commercial sector has a comparative advantage: battlefield awareness; next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; unmanned and autonomous systems; influence operations; placement and access; and precision effects.

Second, the U.S. military and intelligence communities need to fundamentally change the way they work with the commercial sector in order to compete more effectively in irregular warfare—both on offense and defense. Commercial innovation and production capacity in the commercial sector provides a major advantage for the United States and its allies and partners in irregular warfare, including for Title 10 and 50 activities. But the United States has not adequately leveraged these innovations because of risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions regulations, and a failure to adequately understand viable options in the commercial sector. There is a significant need to rethink the framework of government collaboration with this sector and to treat commercial entities as partners serving a common goal.⁴

The rest of this analysis is divided into four sections. The first examines the growing importance of irregular warfare and some of the associated missions and capabilities. The second section argues that U.S. adversaries, such as China and Russia, possess significant capabilities that will likely pose challenges for U.S. military and intelligence operatives. The third section highlights the growing importance of the commercial sector to the development of innovative capabilities for competition in irregular warfare. And the fourth highlights challenges and opportunities for military and intelligence in irregular warfare.