Elevating Information: Why the Army Should Establish Information as a Core Warfighting Function for Multi-Domain Operations

Introduction

The modern battlefield transcends traditional geographic boundaries, encompassing the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. In this complex environment, the United States Army’s FM 3-0, Operations (2022), outlines the critical shift towards Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) to prevail in Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). While this doctrine recognizes information as a critical component of contemporary warfare, this article argues that the Army must take the next logical step: formally establishing information as a core warfighting function, equal in status to mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides compelling evidence that information operations are not merely supporting efforts but are central to military success across domains. This article contends that formally elevating information to a warfighting function would enable commanders to more effectively integrate operations in the information environment into every facet of military planning, from Brigade to Corps levels, creating decisive advantages in MDO.

Ukrainian Integrated Information Operations: A Case Study

Research into Ukrainian operations reveals a sophisticated approach to information integration across multiple domains:

Physical-Information Integration

Ukrainian forces have employed a combination of physical and informational means to achieve military objectives. They have used drones not only for direct attacks but as part of sophisticated deception operations. According to the New York Times, drones now account for approximately 70% of deaths and injuries on the battlefield, illustrating their central role in the conflict. Ukraine’s plan to produce up to four million drones annually by 2024 underscores their strategic importance in both direct combat and information-enabled deception operations.

Technical Deception with Information Amplification

The Ukrainians have masterfully combined technical deception with information operations. Companies like Inflatech provide inflatable decoys, such as tanks and radars, which can simulate multispectral signatures, including thermal and radar, to appear realistic to modern sensors. These decoys are cost-effective, often made from plywood and drainpipes, and help preserve Ukrainian resources by misleading Russian targeting efforts.

The Guardian reported that Ukrainian factories are producing decoy equipment at less than $1,000 per unit, compared to the millions required for Russian precision missiles. What makes these efforts particularly effective is the simultaneous information campaign that amplifies their impact, creating what Business Insider termed a “decoy arms race”, which has significantly complicated Russian operations .

Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations

While less prominently reported, Ukrainian forces have integrated electromagnetic spectrum operations with their broader information strategy. This includes electronic warfare activities to disrupt Russian communications while simultaneously exploiting the information gained from these disruptions for psychological effect. By jamming Russian communications and then broadcasting intercepted conversations revealing Russian vulnerabilities, Ukrainian forces have created a multiplier effect that extends beyond the technical impact of the jamming itself.

This multi-layered approach highlights how Ukrainian forces have effectively integrated information across all domains, creating effects that no single warfighting function could achieve independently.

The Case for Information as a Warfighting Function

The current Army warfighting functions—mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection—provide a framework for organizing capabilities and synchronizing operations. However, this structure, developed for industrial-age warfare, is increasingly insufficient for Information Age conflicts where influence and perception can determine outcomes before kinetic operations even begin. Recognizing this shift, integrating information as a core warfighting function becomes essential to securing decision advantage in modern multi-domain operations, as outlined in the following sections.

1. Information: The Foundation of Decision Advantage

FM 3-0 emphasizes the need to “penetrate, disintegrate, and exploit” enemy systems – a concept intrinsically linked with preemptive and concurrent shaping operations. Information operations, encompassing military information support operations (MISO), cyber operations, electronic warfare, military deception, and information-related capabilities collectively serve as the foundation for achieving decision advantage. By formally recognizing information as a warfighting function, the Army would:

• Integrate information considerations into every operational plan from inception
• Establish clear chains of responsibility for information-related capabilities
• Create dedicated staff structures at all echelons focused on information integration
• Develop training and education programs specifically tailored to information warfare

2. Degrading Enemy Combat Effectiveness Through Information

The power of information to degrade enemy combat effectiveness is evident in Ukraine, where information operations have significantly impacted Russian forces. For example, Ukrainian forces have effectively leveraged social media to showcase Russian losses, highlight logistical failures, and portray a narrative of Ukrainian resilience against the invasion. The Ukrainian military has strategically released footage of destroyed Russian equipment, captured soldiers, and battlefield successes on platforms like Telegram, Twitter, and YouTube. According to a 2023 Atlantic Council report, these efforts have significantly contributed to declining morale among Russian forces, with desertion rates reportedly increasing by 15-20% in certain frontline units.

By establishing information as a warfighting function, the Army would institutionalize these capabilities, ensuring that commanders prioritize information effects with the same rigor as fires and maneuver.

• Information operations are fully resourced and synchronized with other warfighting functions
• Metrics for measuring information effectiveness are developed and standardized
• Information planning occurs concurrently with operational planning, not as an afterthought

3. Enabling Integrated Deception Operations

Information capabilities are essential to effective deception, a critical component of MDO. The Ukrainian experience demonstrates how integrated information operations can create strategic and tactical advantages. For instance, prior to Ukraine’s Kharkiv counteroffensive in September 2022, Ukrainian forces conducted an elaborate deception campaign, publicly announcing planned operations in the southern Kherson region while secretly preparing for their main effort in the northeast. This deception operation, supported by strategic information releases, resulted in the reclamation of approximately 3,400 square miles of territory in just six days.

4. Protecting Operations Through Operational Security and Resilience

An information warfighting function would encompass not just offensive capabilities, but also defensive measures to protect friendly information and systems.

Ukrainian forces have been strategic in controlling information regarding their operations, only releasing select footage of successful strikes and limiting information on troop movements. The Ukrainian government has worked in coordination with NGO’s to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation efforts. The Ukrainian Crisis Media Center effectively controls narratives and boosts domestic morale through curated messaging, as seen in its coverage of military successes and reforms.

5. Shaping the Civilian Information Environment

In the complex landscape of LSCO, civilian populations become critical actors. Information operations directed at civilian populations can create decisive advantages: FM 3-0 explicitly states that “commanders must account for relevant aspects of the civil situation in their areas of operations” and emphasizes that “civil considerations affect all operations”. Ukrainian forces have employed information operations against Ukrainian civilian populations in occupied areas to prepare those areas for liberation. For example, the “Yellow Ribbon” resistance movement, supported by Ukrainian information efforts, has maintained pro-Ukrainian sentiment in occupied territories and facilitated intelligence gathering

An information warfighting function would provide doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions for effectively engaging civilian populations as part of the overall campaign.

Implementation Framework for Information as a Warfighting Function

Establishing information as a warfighting function requires comprehensive changes across several dimensions:

1. Doctrinal Recognition

The Army should formally recognize information as a warfighting function in its foundational doctrine, including FM 3-0 and ADP 3-0. This would include:

• Defining the scope and components of the information warfighting function
• Establishing the relationship between information and other warfighting functions
• Updating specific tactics, techniques, and procedures for information operations during LSCO
• Focusing on metrics for assessing information operations’ effectiveness

2. Organizational Structure

New staff structures would be required at all echelons to support the information warfighting function:

• Creation of G7/S7 (Information) staff directorates at the division and above, equal to the other assistant chiefs of staff
• Dedicated information planners integrated into brigade combat team and battalion staff
• Development of specialized information units and capabilities to conduct operations at the tactical level in support of division and below during LSCO
• Clear command relationships for information-related capabilities

According to a 2023 RAND Corporation study, current force structure allocates limited information operations personnel to conventional forces, with approximately one MISO detachment per brigade, insufficient for the demands of MDO in LSCO environments. The establishment of information as a warfighting function would drive force structure changes to address these shortfalls.

3. Training and Education

Comprehensive training programs would be required to build expertise in the information warfighting function:

• Addition of information warfare to professional military education at all levels
• Alignment of information-specific career paths and specialties into a single functional category
• Increased integration of information operations into training center rotations and warfighter exercises
• Creation of an information warfare center of excellence to consolidate existing courses

4. Technical Capabilities

The information warfighting function would require specialized equipment and systems:

FM 3-0 acknowledges that “commanders must be able to compete in and through cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum”. This requires dedicated resources for information warfare capabilities, including cyber tools, electronic warfare systems, deception, MISO and advanced analytics for measuring information effects.

Addressing Counterarguments

Some may argue that establishing information as a warfighting function is unnecessary or could dilute the focus on traditional combat capabilities. However:

• Information is already central to operations. The Army already conducts information operations. Formalizing information as a warfighting function simply recognizes reality and ensures proper resourcing and integration.
• Peer competitors have already adapted. Russia and China have already organized their forces around information warfare concepts. The U.S. Army must adapt to remain competitive.
• The cognitive dimension determines physical outcomes. As seen in Ukraine, success in the cognitive dimension through information operations often determines physical battlefield outcomes.
• Integration improves efficiency. Rather than treating information as an add-on, formalizing it as a warfighting function would improve integration and efficiency across the air, space and land domains.

Conclusion

The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that information operations are not merely supportive but central to modern warfare. By establishing information as a core warfighting function, the U.S. Army would formally recognize this reality and create the doctrinal foundation, organizational structure, and training programs necessary to excel in Multi-Domain Operations.

Ukraine’s innovative integration of drones, physical decoys, cyber operations, and strategic messaging illustrates how information capabilities, when properly integrated, can enable a numerically inferior force to effectively counter a larger adversary. These lessons must inform U.S. Army doctrine and organization.

The current approach, which treats information operations as a supporting element rather than a core function, risks creating critical gaps in operational planning and execution. By elevating information to the same level as movement and maneuver, fires, and other warfighting functions, the Army would ensure that commanders at all levels have the tools, training, and personnel needed to fight and win in the Information Age.

Just as the invention of aircraft has made air power central to military operations, the advent of information warfare demands formal recognition through the establishment of information in the Army as a core warfighting function. The future of warfare demands nothing less.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.)