Don’t Throw the (USAID) Baby Out With the Bathwater…Remodel the Bathroom
The Department of Defense (DoD) directs the U.S. military to conduct stability operations with “proficiency equivalent to combat operations;” yet the military is fundamentally designed, trained, and equipped for conventional warfare. Stability operations are typically ad hoc, an afterthought where strategic reality forces the military to transform into (armed) humanitarians.
The much-maligned U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was an instrument of national power working within the stability operations realm. USAID’s mission emphasized “lead[ing] America’s foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance by advancing the interest of the American people, their safety and economic prosperity,” to ensure “a free, peaceful, and prosperous world.” In other words, USAID purportedly worked to ensure global stability.
Now, the Trump administration has essentially closed USAID citing, “USAID has been unaccountable to taxpayers as it funnels massive sums of money to the ridiculous—and, in many cases, malicious—pet projects of entrenched bureaucrats, with next-to-no oversight.”
Regardless of whether you agree with the shuttering of USAID, we must acknowledge that since the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States has had a poor track record of fostering global stability. The United States lost the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—not on the battlefield, but in the stability operations space, which included the likes of USAID. In both countries, our military instruments of national power temporarily defeated the enemy but failed to secure the peace. As such, we are now at a crossroads in history where we can capitalize on recent lessons learned and change the way we do business and work to ensure global stability.
U.S. Army Stability doctrine states the aim of stability operations is “to stabilize the environment enough so the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure … establish a safe, secure environment that facilitates reconciliation among local or regional adversaries” … and “establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy.” Lessons learned from our stability methodology in Iraq and Afghanistan have now (supposedly) shifted our efforts towards integrating stability initiatives into all military operations. The prosecution of recent wars has led us to the (alleged) realization that, “military force alone cannot secure a sustainable peace.” We are no longer (purportedly) in the business of military-led nation building, we are now partnering with host nations and promoting long-term stability through capacity building.
To be proactive, our leaders must reconsider the way we currently do “stability” with a focus on efficiency of desired outcomes. Some would argue that we are already proactive, and stability operations strategy is already being implemented by U.S. Embassy country-teams, Special Operations Forces (SOF), Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), and Civil Affairs (CA) personnel; but these entities are already stretched thin, with the majority of their stability operations efforts devoted to security cooperation. Any provincial-level governance, rule of law, and socio-economic development lines of effort are typically afterthoughts. Now, with the deletion of USAID from the U.S. Embassy country-team, we reduced the number of personnel who could be used to address broad-spectrum instability.
More work needs to be done.
In 2010, I argued for a new stability operations construct in a chapter I wrote for the National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations. In the book, Unity of Mission: Civilian-Military Teams in War and Peace. I illustrated how my Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) changed the doctrinal way of conducting stability operations. We accomplished a full transition of security, reconstruction, and governance to our Afghan counterparts addressing all lines of effort in a transparent manner—without resorting to using “Money as a Weapon System.” Instead, we employed partnering and mentoring. By restricting funding and direct aid, provincial leadership eventually started building autonomous capacity rather than solely relying on the United States. The removal of U.S. funds was initially met with disdain, but Afghan provincial leadership eventually came around to acknowledge that we were, “the first PRT to actually make us work, and that’s good.”
In my chapter I outlined how a perverse incentive structure within the stability operations/international aid and development paradigm actually prolongs instability and works against success—as long as the money continues to flow. I witnessed firsthand how direct aid and money have a tendency to promote dependency and fuel corruption (the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction documented this corruption in a 2016 report to Congress). Instead of direct aid and money, I argued for a new steady state construct designed to bridge the chasm between conventional warfare (DoD), diplomacy (Department of State), and direct aid (USAID). I termed the construct a “Stability Operations Force.”
We’re at a point where the United States needs to spend moderately on “an ounce of prevention”—proactive stability operations—to avoid breaking the bank on “a pound of cure.”
This is not an argument to rebrand the PRTs as a Stability Operations Force; the PRTs were an ad hoc civ-mil conglomeration whose mission devolved into (primarily) reconstruction and contract management. Nor is this an argument to transform the entire U.S. military into stability operations experts. Rather, the argument is to adjust to current doctrine and create a permanent hybrid stability operations structure designed to fill the void left by USAID and address the inefficiencies of current military-centric stability operations. The argument is to build and employ a formalized a Stability Operations Force, working on the local-level, whose mission is to build partner nation capacity. The argument is for a formalized Stability Operations Force assembled into country-specific teams that combine select expertise from the government, local NGOs, and functional experts (public works, police, city planners, logisticians, construction workers, mechanics, medical professionals, budget professionals, etc.) chosen for their analytical and technical skills, and their ability to interact with partner nations honestly and effectively.
I don’t want to get too deep into the administrative and bureaucratic make-up of the proposed Stability Operations Force—like which executive branch of the government should own it, or whether it should stand on its own. However, to avoid any confusion with existing Special Operations Forces (SOF), the suggested Stability Operations Force can be termed a Stability-Combined Operations Group (S-COG). Additionally, to avoid any confusion with the existing U.S. Embassy country teams, the S-COG country teams can be further defined by adding a secondary identifier describing the team’s area of responsibility. As an example, an S-COG assigned to the Atlántida province (Department) of Honduras would be called “S-COG – Atlántida, Honduras.”)
Demonstrating strategic patience, the S-COG team will first take the time to develop a deep understanding of their local-level area of operation; therefore, contextual learning is a top priority. The intent of contextual learning (or, common operating picture) is to establish a real-world understanding of local culture and each sector of government while simultaneously building trust and valued relationships with government figures and with the community. Building transparent and trusted relationships—not rooted in monetary reward—is the underpinning of every S-COG team.
To achieve effectiveness, the S-COG teams must be tailored to fit each of their deployed locations. The S-COG is designed and positioned to work from a “bottom-up” perspective, where they partner with provincial-level officials, and seek local partner-nation led solutions. The S-COG mission focuses on building provincial-level individual and institutional capacity through partnership and mentorship. Currently, most stability, aid, and development organizations work from a “top-down” perspective, where they work from a central government position. Within the S-COG construct, top-down stability efforts still reside within the Department of State.
Capacity development is “about transformations that empower individuals, leaders, organizations and societies,” and “generated, guided and sustained by those whom it is meant to benefit.” To achieve mission success, the S-COG team will work through the defined capacity building cycle by engaging with partners, building consensus, assessing capacity needs, designing capacity building strategies, implementing capacity building strategies, and then monitoring, mentoring, and adjusting strategies as the situation warrants.
Capacity building opportunities usually present themselves as problems during the initial contextual learning, relationship building, and analysis period. By taking the time to understand the intricacies of the systems, the culture, and the people, it should expose gaps, weaknesses, ineptness, and corruption within governance structures and with government officials. It should also lead to an understanding of the internal and external factors leading to organizational change and an understanding of the second and third order effects of any organizational change. With this knowledge, the S-COG team will tailor their approach to working with those partners who are also invested in the practice of good governance. The team will continue to conduct analysis throughout their tenure and adjust capacity building agendas as necessary.
Working with trusted counterparts, the S-COG team will adopt mentorship interventions designed to empower and build the capability and capacity of the host nation local government and the trust of the population. As an example, if local public works personnel lack the skills to repair and maintain their existing heavy-equipment, a S-COG team mechanic would be dispatched to train and mentor the public works personnel. If parts are needed, then the request should go through government channels. If those channels are dysfunctional, then another capacity building opportunity emerges that may require mentoring from a team logistician. When the public works personnel can fix and maintain their own heavy-equipment, the institutional capacity of the public works department is increased. Within this construct, any monetary assistance, or money outside of the formal governmental budgeting process, is limited only to emergency situations. The intent of this policy is to get them to work through their systems, and if their systems don’t work, mentor system change.
The true measure of effectiveness of an effective S-COG is the creation of allied autonomous partner nations; in short, nations without the need for an S-COG.
The shuttering of USAID provides an opportunity to capitalize on this moment in history, revisit our recent failures, learn from our mistakes, create a trusted, transparent, and effective Stability-Combined Operations Group, and change the way we conduct international aid and stability operations. In other words, we’re at a point where the United States needs to spend moderately on “an ounce of prevention”—proactive stability operations—to avoid breaking the bank on “a pound of cure.”
