Still ‘Raging Against the Machines’: Preventive Defense in the Age of Social Media Platforms
As the global security environment grows more intricate in the context of compound security competition and hybrid warfare, the mechanization and information starvation phenomena continue to persist with near-equal intensity, albeit in evolved forms.
In today’s landscape, warfare is not defined solely by conventional military engagements but also by the convergence of state and non-state actors, cyber and physical domains, and military and civilian targets. Mechanized military approaches, while highly effective in traditional state-on-state conflicts, remain limited in addressing these new hybrid threats where insurgency, cyber warfare, and information operations blur the lines of battle.
The reliance on mechanization in such environments exacerbates information starvation, wherein state and military actors are often disconnected from the socio-political realities on the ground and in the digital sphere. As was evident in Iraq and Afghanistan, the inability of mechanized forces to engage directly with local populations led to the alienation of civilians—an error that has carried over into the cyber frontlines of today’s hybrid conflicts.
In this modern iteration, social media platforms, cyber disinformation campaigns, and algorithmic manipulation create a similar dynamic, where governments and security forces struggle to understand and counteract the narratives driving radicalization to insurgency.
The Problem of Mechanization in Modern Warfare
Historically, mechanized forces, developed during the industrial age, were optimized for mass movement, firepower, and survivability. These attributes, while advantageous in conventional engagements, have proven detrimental in asymmetric warfare.
Research by Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III has demonstrated that mechanized militaries, which rely on advanced machinery and technology, become isolated from the populations they aim to secure. In past conflicts, this isolation deprived these forces of the on-the-ground intelligence needed to distinguish between insurgents and civilians, leading to broad, indiscriminate tactics that alienated local populations.
Fast forward to the present, and the same disconnection is visible but has migrated to a new domain: social media platforms and information ecosystems. As governments and militaries attempt to combat hybrid warfare threats, they face the challenge of understanding and responding to complex digital insurgencies.
In many ways, the mechanized isolation of the past has been replaced by algorithmic isolation today, where information bubbles and disinformation campaigns distort public discourse and fracture societies. Just as mechanized forces once struggled to understand their human environments, today’s governments struggle to grasp the digital environments that foster extremist ideologies.
Social Media Platforms: Mechanized Machines of the Information Age
In today’s hybrid warfare context, social media platforms function as the modern “machines” of information.
These platforms, through their algorithms, create their own form of lock-in, similar to the industrial-age mechanization that once limited militaries. By prioritizing engagement over truth, platforms such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube exacerbate information starvation, promoting emotionally charged content that divides rather than unites. Governments, trapped by these platforms’ commercial interests and algorithms, find themselves disconnected from the very populations they seek to govern and protect.
In much the same way that mechanized military forces once isolated themselves from local populations, the dynamics of modern social media create a digital isolation that prevents governments from understanding the roots of discontent. The result is the emergence of echo chambers and filter bubbles that amplify disinformation and extremist ideologies, depriving security forces of the intelligence they need to counter growing insurgent mentalities.
Case Study: Internal Discord in the United States – The Fragmenting Fabric of the Union
Nowhere is the impact of this digital disconnection more evident than in the contemporary internal discord within the United States.
Over the past decade, the U.S. has faced a growing political and social polarization that threatens the very fabric of its “united” identity. The country has found itself increasingly divided along lines of race, class, geography, and ideology—fractures that are deepened and amplified by social media platforms.
Social media has played a pivotal role in amplifying both sides of this divide. While intended as platforms for open dialogue and exchange, algorithms designed to maximize user engagement have, in fact, exacerbated division.
Whether real or fabricated, content that provokes outrage is prioritized, creating a feedback loop that deepens ideological entrenchment.
Political figures, conspiracy theorists, and foreign actors alike have exploited these dynamics to stoke fears and heighten tensions.
The rise of movements such as QAnon, which spread conspiracy theories about government corruption and elite cabals, demonstrates the capacity of social media to rapidly disseminate disinformation and radicalize ordinary citizens. These online movements often lead to real-world actions, as seen during the January 6th Capitol insurrection in 2021, when a mob—incited by claims of a stolen election—stormed the U.S. Capitol in an unprecedented attack on American democracy.
This insurrection, a culmination of digital disinformation, highlights the fragility of the social contract within the U.S.
For months leading up to the 2020 election and its aftermath, platforms such as Facebook and YouTube acted as catalysts for disinformation campaigns, stoking claims of electoral fraud, eroding trust in democratic institutions, and encouraging violent actions. In essence, the echo chambers of social media exacerbated information starvation in reverse—feeding some populations with over-simplified, unverified, and often false narratives while starving others of truthful discourse. This resulted in a nation unable to agree on basic facts, fostering disaffection among millions of Americans who now question the legitimacy of the U.S. government itself.
The divisions in contemporary America mirror the dynamics seen in traditional insurgencies abroad. The fragmented political landscape, where extremist ideologies find fertile ground, combined with widespread mistrust of institutions, is reminiscent of how insurgencies grow in countries undergoing civil strife.
The widespread dissemination of disinformation, the absence of credible mediating voices, and the loss of a unifying national narrative have placed America on a precarious path, one where insurgent ideologies can metastasize into more frequent and larger-scale acts of domestic terrorism.
As explored in Letters to the Republic, the threat of internal division is perhaps the most pressing security challenge facing the U.S. today. The political gridlock that has paralyzed Congress, the growing influence of white nationalist groups, and the widespread alienation felt by racial and ethnic minorities are all symptoms of a deeper sickness. Social media platforms, by feeding this discontent, have acted as modern mechanizations—machines that drive information starvation and disaffection, amplifying divisions instead of bridging them.
Information Starvation: When Force Structures Obscure Truth
On 09 January 2009, the flagship journal of International Relations, International Organization (IO), published the article, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” by coauthors Dr. Jason Lyall and Dr. (and Colonel. US Army, Retired) Isaiah Wilson III.
In that study we sought to explain a peculiar phenomenon. Historically, states held the upper hand in defeating insurgencies, but by the 20th century, this advantage eroded. One key reason: the increasing mechanization of military force structures, which distanced armies from local populations, making it harder to gather reliable intelligence and apply measured responses. Lacking the ability to distinguish insurgents from civilians, modern militaries often resort to indiscriminate tactics that fuel, rather than suppress, rebellion. This phenomenon we labeled Information starvation, which describes the condition where militaries and governments are deprived of critical intelligence from local populations, preventing them from making informed decisions.
Information Starvation in the Social Media Era
This phenomenon extends beyond the battlefield. In today’s digital age, social media algorithms act as a new kind of force structure, shaping public discourse in ways that mimic mechanized warfare’s blind spots. Just as armored divisions isolate soldiers from on-the-ground realities, algorithm-driven content curation isolates societies from nuanced, fact-based discussions. By prioritizing sensationalism over substance, these digital mechanisms create a distorted information environment where truth is fragmented, context is lost, and polarization deepens.
This starvation breeds disaffection in vulnerable populations, who are bombarded with partial truths, conspiracy theories, and extremist content. These populations, who in traditional counterinsurgency theory might have been considered “fence-sitters,” now become digitally radicalized, drawn into online echo chambers that incubate insurgent ideologies, and compromising the fidelity bond between the incumbent government (the public services provider, in more generalizable terms) and the public. The insurgent of today is not necessarily armed with a rifle but may instead wield the power of disinformation, organizing through encrypted messaging platforms and employing guerrilla tactics within the digital space.
Whether in war or in governance, when institutions rely on structures that hinder accurate information flow, they risk strategic blindness—misidentifying threats, misallocating resources, and ultimately, losing legitimacy. The challenge, then, is not just about having access to data, but ensuring that systems—whether military or digital—enhance rather than obstruct the capacity for clear and accurate understanding.
From Industrial Lock-in to Algorithmic Lock-in
The industrial lock-in of mechanized forces has evolved into a new form of algorithmic lock-in, where social media companies hold enormous sway over public discourse. The reliance on these platforms for communication, political messaging, and even intelligence gathering creates vulnerabilities for governments and military forces. As was the case with mechanized armies in traditional conflicts, today’s governments are trapped by the very systems they rely on, with social media algorithms guiding public opinion and driving division rather than unity.
The profit motives of these platforms further complicate matters. Driven by engagement metrics, platforms elevate content that is divisive or sensationalist, fueling societal fractures and inhibiting the flow of accurate, diverse information. In this way, social media platforms replicate the limitations of mechanized warfare, locking governments into ineffective strategies that fail to address the root causes of discontent and insurgency.
Addressing Digital Insurgency with Preventive Defense
A preventive defense strategy must now be reimagined for the digital age, focusing not only on physical security but also on countering the disinformation and division spread through social media platforms. Just as counterinsurgency efforts in the past required deep engagement with local communities, today’s preventive strategies must focus on engaging digital communities in meaningful, sustained ways.
Perry and Carter argued that the absence of a clear existential threat, like the Soviet Union during the Cold War, presented an opportunity for the U.S. to prioritize proactive measures aimed at preventing the rise of new dangers such as nuclear proliferation, regional instability, and terrorism. Their strategy centered on using diplomacy, economic influence, and defense partnerships to avert threats before they materialized.
This framework of Preventive Defense can be adapted to counter today’s digital insurgencies and the threats posed by disinformation and social media-driven division. In the digital age, social media platforms have become breeding grounds for radical ideologies, undermining social cohesion and enabling hybrid warfare by state and non-state actors alike. As a result, Preventive Defense must now focus on addressing information warfare, cyberattacks, and digital insurgency.
A reimagined Preventive Defense for the digital age would involve the following strategic pillars:
- Proactive Digital Engagement and Diplomacy
Much like Perry and Carter emphasized diplomatic engagement with emerging powers such as post-Soviet Russia and China, today’s Preventive Defense must include early digital engagement. Governments should work alongside tech companies, civil society, and global institutions to establish trust and transparency in the digital space. By engaging in “track-two” dialogues with both private platforms and international partners, governments can help shape digital norms, ensure freedom of speech, and prevent the unchecked spread of extremism. - Fostering Digital Literacy and Public Resilience
In line with the need to preempt threats, digital resilience must be built into the educational infrastructure of modern societies. Just as Perry and Carter focused on preventing nuclear and biological threats through public education and international cooperation, today’s defense must prioritize digital literacy at all levels of society. This means empowering citizens to recognize disinformation, engage critically with online content, and become more resilient against manipulation. Governments and tech companies should collaborate to create public awareness campaigns and educational programs that promote media literacy. - Cyber Partnerships and Cooperative Defense
Perry and Carter’s Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program targeted the dismantling of Cold War-era weapons before they could fall into the hands of rogue actors.Similarly, Preventive Defense today must involve creating public-private partnerships to monitor and mitigate the risks posed by cyber weapons, disinformation networks, and extremist groups online. This could include cross-border collaborations between governments and tech firms to ensure real-time identification of disinformation campaigns, bot networks, and algorithmic transparency. - Algorithmic Accountability and Regulation
Perry and Carter advocated for a blend of diplomacy and defense measures to counter potential threats, including nuclear proliferation and terrorism. In the digital context, similar measures must be applied to regulate social media algorithms that prioritize sensationalism and divisive content over truthful information. Governments should implement algorithmic transparency requirements, forcing platforms to disclose how content is curated and take accountability for the spread of harmful content. Additionally, incentivizing the creation of algorithms that promote accurate, diverse, and constructive content could help prevent the escalation of digital insurgency. - Preemptive Legal Frameworks and Norm Setting
To counter emerging digital threats, legal frameworks must be established that reflect the complexities of modern hybrid warfare. Perry and Carter’s strategy urged the U.S. to shape international norms around weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, today’s Preventive Defense should focus on building international legal norms around cyber operations, disinformation, and data privacy, while also safeguarding civil liberties and democratic principles.
By reapplying the Preventive Defense approach to today’s information warfare, we can forestall the growth of digital insurgency and mitigate the destabilizing effects of disinformation. Just as Perry and Carter urged the U.S. to act preemptively to secure its future in the post-Cold War world, we must now act to ensure that disinformation and social media do no further harm to undermine democratic systems and foster internal discord.
