Airpower and Modern Politics: Symbolism Beyond Effectiveness
Abstract
As air interdiction between NATO and Russian air forces multiplies in the Baltic Sea, and while the use of missiles and drones in Ukraine and the Middle East increases, Russian and NATO forces are showcasing successive demonstrations of their respective air power. The face of air power changed since the heroic image of Top Gun, or the US Air Force raids to the tune of ‘Rock the Casbah’ by The Clash, broadcasted on the radio of American troops during the early hours of Operation Desert Storm. However, it remains a major factor in the projection of force. It is therefore important to understand its position as a weapon of first political choice despite its debatable strategic effectiveness. This article therefore concludes that, beyond its occasionally mixed effectiveness, air power remains a vector, that assimilates issues of operational cost, pedagogy, and innovation, all of which make it a preferred means of warfare.
Why Air Power Has Become An Instrument of Choice
Defining airpower can be challenging. The definition has never stayed constant and certainly continues to change over time. This is a result of evolving technology, political objectives, and legal justifications of what is and is not a lawful target and the lawful use of force. The UK joint doctrine, used as the definition for air power in this article, states that airpower is “The ability to use air capabilities in and from the air, to influence the behavior of actors and the course of events”.
This article aims to deconstruct the analysis of airpower as a weapon of first political choice in four distinct parts. The first part focuses on the theoretical expectations of air power, before the second part takes a more nuanced look at its application and strategic evaluation. Expectations are a historical construct of air power tactics and strategy, developed thanks to the emergence of new technologies and justified by political considerations that make airpower the primary military tool today. They must then be nuanced by their application in wartime, and we can find many limits to air power doctrine. The third part of this article looks at the future of airpower, which, although uncertain and subject to many changes, enables it to remain a leading military and political tool. Changes such as the new generations of fighter aircraft and the use of UAVs point to new possible uses and even new doctrines that will help to maintain airpower as the weapon of choice. Finally, the last part of the essay examines air power and its symbolic significance. Any military asset carries a symbolic charge that serves as a political vector through the justification for its use and its destructive potential. This symbolic significance, which acts as a magnifying glass on the place of airpower in contemporary conflicts, is broken down into deterrence, political pedagogy and the scope for industrial and operational cooperation. These elements make up the position of air power as a privileged instrument, both strategically, even if its effects are difficult to assess, and politically for modern politicians.
In conclusion, this article attempts to provide a more in-depth understanding of the political and strategic issues at stake when we watch an air campaign unfold or a military contract signed between two countries. These same issues have a strategic and operational value for contemporary warfare, and a political value through the justification of military action.
Theoretical Expectations of Airpower
First, we must analyze the expectations of air power strategically, before analyzing its decisiveness. The most influential theory on air power is from the Italian general and theorist Giulio Douhet in The Command of the Air. He tries to find a solution to the slaughter of World War I by deflecting centers of gravity from the battlefield to behind the enemy’s line. He recommends using air power to targeting the whole logistics, industrial base, and morale of an enemy’s nation. The use of strategic bombing, which is made possible by the speed of the air force and the control of the air, allows the enemy’s structures to be targeted and lose their means of resistance more quickly. Douhet posits a strategy that consists of selecting and prioritizing targets such as factories, communication routes, and civilian populations. This was largely used during the bombing campaign of World War II for example, with large operations on cities and industrial complexes.
For the first time, a military instrument, in this case airpower, was seen as a means of reducing the human, economic, and logistical costs of war, which was interesting politically and strategically. Douhet directly addressed to the command of the Italian army in 1915, “The war as I understand it would be less terrible, although more impressive, faster and more conclusive.” In theory, airpower has all the means to achieve victory at an adequate cost than a large-scale infantry or naval operation. Airpower offers significant tactical and strategic advantages during a conflict: reach, rapidity, flexibility and height. Together they offer new capability and perspective to the battlefield (at least in theory). Reaching targets that are out of range for the artillery and infantry, while maintaining an altitude sufficient to be itself out of danger. Fast deployment and various capabilities of action, makes airpower an omnipotent instrument. To that extent, air power is used for many missions, from the control of the air to intelligence and mobility. It fights in its own environment, engaging in close air-to-air fights (dogfights) and intercepting the enemy’s air means of fighting.
Airpower can also support the ground effort with intelligence and reconnaissance, but also with close air support. Airpower is often used to project a military response, rapidly deploy a small unit, or provide humanitarian aid. Altogether it makes airpower a cheap instrument, providing a quick response at a minimum risk for the military and so forth the political leaders. Subsequently, it was this cost argument that led to the major use of air power in remote conflicts, enabling rapid, low-cost use of force.
Strategic Reality of Airpower
As the saying goes “There is no such thing as free lunch,” and likewise a costless operation exists only in theory. Modern warfare relies heavily on airpower as a cheap and less risky use of force. In the 1990s airpower reached its pinnacle, but it was also at that time its limitations became apparent. However, strategic limitations did not stop its use nor its dominance as the preferred option for the use of force. When the US-led coalition launched the first Gulf War in 1991 (Operation Desert Storm), the coalition’s air campaign became it’s most well-known feature.
In Kosovo, a similar situation unfolded. NATO intervened in Kosovo to drive back the Yugoslav forces led by Slobodan Milošević, at that time President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In doing so, a brilliant air campaign seemingly reduced the need for land forces. By the turn of the millennium, airpower was seen as the weapon of first political choice, but its limitations were becoming apparent. Nevertheless, airpower has three main primary limitations: (1) the ineffectiveness of bombing civilian populations, (2) the need to be part of a more global strategy, and (3) the need for a ground presence.
Bombing civilian populations proved ineffective in WWII. The German and Japanese populations remained united with their government against those who were destroying their homes. In a counter-insurgency context, at a time when Western forces are seeking to win hearts and minds, social bonds will not support invading forces. To do this, the army must work closely with civilian authorities and other non-military actors to gain a thorough understanding of the conflict and the wider environment in which it is taking place. Air power must also operate as part of a more global strategy that cannot be reduced to air campaigns, as was the case in Kosovo. The NATO operation, which according to the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said would last 3 days, but in reality, lasted 78 days. The air operations encountered difficulties in the face of the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević’s forces, which, having observed the American operations of 1991, adopted a tactic of dispersal and refused to fight. Keeping the radars of the anti-aircraft defenses switched off, preventing them from being detected by NATO aircraft, which then had to remain at a high altitude, thereby unable to target precisely the troops on the ground. Not to mention debates about the effects on troop morale and the impact on ethnic cleansing. Bombing campaigns, accompanied by diplomatic action, negotiations and economic pressure altogether were the factors that made Milošević give in. Airpower, however, can only be truly successful if it is accompanied by ground troops. One of the characteristics of aviation is that it is impermanent in a theatre of operations. As an Iraqi forces pilot stated in 2014: “When we go to bomb a place, the ground troops don’t accompany us. We bomb a place and kill a few, the ISIS disperse but they regroup later’.
In short, the presumption that airpower is the ultimate weapon for achieving victory at the lowest cost and with the least risk is wrong. In reality, it is the ability to capitalize on the effects of airpower, through a strategy as a complete framework, that enables military operations to be carried out successfully. Capitalizing on the effects of airpower requires greater risk and will always be more expensive than a single air operation, which puts off the politicians from committing themselves further.
The Future of Airpower Will Enable it to Remain at the Forefront
Airpower is undergoing major changes in its application. Technological advances are bringing new ways of waging war, influencing tactics, and providing new strategic perspectives, all of which promise airpower a future that is still uncertain but will always play a major role in political and military decision-making. Like the use of GPS in the 1990s, which extended airpower to satellite lines of communication, airpower is changing shape, expanding into new areas and becoming accessible, but it remains an area of confrontation, and therefore keeping it at the forefront of political choice. In this section we will look at the technological advances made on the various airpower platforms, such as aircraft, drones, and missiles, which are changing the tactical and strategic structure of airpower.
The 5th generation aircraft, for example, have not yet found their operational limits, and militaries are still toying with them. They are defined according to their capabilities – stealth, high maneuverability, super cruise, advanced avionics (including low-probability-of-intercept radar (LPIR)), data fusion, and multirole capability. We never had the opportunity to use such advanced aircraft to the full extent of their capabilities, which above all makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about them.
Another major technological advance is the use of drones. Although their existence is not new, nor do they offer new actions that aviation was unable to perform. In theory, they offer three advantages: (1) less risk for the pilot or operator, (2) compresses the time between information acquisition and action, and (3) offers more flight time. Drones remain a platform for action and do not constitute a revolution in military affairs. However, they do open new strategic choices. They take on the dangerous, dull, and dirty missions that humans avoid –navigating in hostile environments, enduring monotonous tasks, and handling hazardous conditions efficiently. Subsequently, drones have become both a cutting-edge and a poor man’s weapon, thanks to their wide accessibility and the diversity of their offerings at extremely varied costs. The cost of a drone ranges from hundreds of dollars (for modified recreational drones) to tens of millions (around $30 million for the US Reaper).
Clearly, these platforms do not offer the same tools for action, but lowering the cost of warfare has a strong influence on the phenomenon of attrition, while at the same time opening military resources, although precarious, to forces with a much weaker economy. This gives rise to possible “drone nations”, using drones as airpower’s tool of choice to gradually gain influence. As Eric Schmidt, former chairman of Google, put it, this “democratizes the ability to fight war”. A disproportionate impact compared with the very low cost of strikes makes drones “cheap and nasty: cheap for us and nasty for the enemy.” This is the case, for example, with the Houthis in the Red Sea, who use drones or missiles (also considered UAVs) to strike commercial vessels. It is also a useful weapon when air dominance is in short supply. As is the case in Ukraine, where neither side has succeeded in gaining air dominance over the other, the majority of airpower operations are carried out using drones or missile air strikes. Western politicians and military must find new affordable counter airpower measures, as using a large missile to take down a small drone is not sustainable.
Both drones and cruise missiles still have a bright future ahead of them through the use of artificial intelligence and their integration into new avionics systems. Artificial intelligence enables rapid data processing and more efficient data fusion. Airpower will be subject to a speed competition, with the winner being the fastest to respond and make decisions. These systems are gradually being integrated into the industrial projects of the major Western powers. For example, the ‘loyal wingman’ project aims to develop an aircraft that can follow a route in total autonomy without any human intervention. We could also mention the European FCAS program, where the aircraft would have a sub-assembly of the Next Generation Weapon System (NGWS), which itself comprises a new-generation fighter aircraft (sixth-generation fighter) accompanied by UAVs. The whole system will be interconnected within a combat cloud. The strategic limitations of airpower have therefore not, in the final analysis, signed its death warrant. New technologies will be combined with a demand for new doctrines and new uses. Perfection may not exist, nevertheless airpower continues to progress.
Symbolic of Airpower, a Magnifying Glass Effect on Contemporary Warfare
Finally, air power is a powerful symbol for politicians. It is an important geopolitical asset in deterrence, national political discourse, and industrial and operational cooperation.
Warfare is by nature a political affair, so airpower has a powerful and easily readable symbolism. As Professor Michael Clarke, Fellow of King’s College London, puts it: “the use of airpower in any military conflict in whatever way it is applied, carries more political overtones and sensitivities than most military instruments.” Thus, the symbolism of effective airpower serves a nation in terms of deterrence, which puts an end to the debate about whether airpower is strategically effective, because it will be the main tool in deterrence policy. Airpower provides the ability to respond quickly with a large strike force and almost anywhere, making it an asset in the projection of both nuclear and conventional capabilities, as – apart from submarines – airpower is the main nuclear deterrent tool.
More broadly, this symbolic reach provides a link between the spectacular nature of operations and the effects on the ground. Since the political authority has to justify its actions to the population in a pedagogical way, air power is a tangible tool that is easily accessible and highly comprehensible. The actions of air power are therefore situated in the continuum of national security, political weight and operational effectiveness. Although, as mentioned above, the strategic results of airpower are variable and difficult to assess, it will always enable the political authorities to assert their position and convey both a national and an international message. We can take as an example the immediate action taken by the former French President François Hollande after the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. At a time when the nation was mourning the loss of its murdered citizens, the French Armée de l’Air was bombing Islamic State bases in Raqqa and even going so far as to deploy its aircraft carrier there. This did not, of course, put an end to ISIS, but it did send an important and clear political message: France will not be attacked with impunity, and have both the information and the means to project a destructive force.
In line with the importance of the political message, air power continues to carry a great deal of weight in cooperation operations, both industrial and operational. Airpower – its production, maintenance, and professionalization – represents a significant and exponential cost, as the demand for resources increases with technological advances. Industrial cooperation is therefore imperative and serves to share the burden. Countries that share common values can align in the design or purchase of aircraft. This, in turn, influences the soft power of airpower-producing nations and the quality of their engineers. The Eurofighter Typhoon is an important example of European industrial and technological cooperation in the field of air power. The project, which began in the 1980s, involved several European countries – Germany, the UK, Italy, and Spain – jointly developing a multi-role fighter aircraft designed to meet the strategic requirements of their respective air forces. The design of the Typhoon was based on the integration of each nation’s specific technical and industrial capabilities, particularly in aeronautics, electronics, and weapons systems. This partnership made it possible to share research and development costs while promoting greater strategic independence for the participating nations. This continues today with the FCAS project and future aeronautical technologies. Another example is the cooperation between France and India in the production of the Rafale. Dassault Aviation is moving a new production line to India, helping to offset France’s industrial deficit while meeting India’s order for cutting-edge aircraft on time.
Finally, there is operational cooperation in the form of joint maneuvers and training between alliances and powers. This allows the compatibility of systems to be tested, reinforces the symbolic value of airpower as an instrument of power, and demonstrates the strength of the ties between allied countries. The Ramstein Alloy Exercises (formerly known as Ramstein Flag) are multinational military maneuvers conducted under the NATO flag to strengthen cooperation between air forces. These exercises, which take place mainly in Europe, are crucial for improving the interoperability of allied forces, particularly in collective defense scenarios. The strategic importance of these exercises lies in their ability to simulate complex air operations and coordinate rapid responses to potential threats. Moreover, in the context of Sweden‘s recent adhesion to the Alliance in 2024, the integration of its Saab JAS 39 Gripen aircraft into a NATO exercise is an important first. By consolidating cooperation between the various partners, Ramstein Flag plays a key role in maintaining regional stability and preparing Allied forces for joint military operations, thereby strengthening deterrence and solidarity within NATO.
Conclusion
In conclusion, air power plays an important strategic role in modern conflicts, offering a unique ability to project power quickly and effectively. However, the results of its use are often clouded by contextual factors and strategic or political constraints. Despite these limitations, the continuing evolution of technology offers a promising future for airpower, with innovations in areas such as artificial intelligence, drones, and electronic warfare systems that could radically transform its effectiveness and impact. Finally, the symbolic importance of air power is an undeniable asset in the politico-military discourse of great powers, enhancing their prestige and ability to project power. With its image of a modern, high-tech force, air power is an indispensable lever not only on the battlefield but also in international relations, making it the favorite instrument of choice for modern political leaders.
