Alliance and Conflict Networks Among Criminal Armed Groups (CAGs) in Chiapas 2024
Chiapas, once known as a safe state in terms of Mexican narco-violence, has become a battleground state in a bipolar conflict between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Gary Hale’s recent article Armed Confrontations and Forced Evacuations from Villages in Chiapas outlined specific instances of criminal armed groups (CAGs) and violent non-state actor (VNSA) violence leading to the displacement of local populations and profiled the groups involved.[1][2]
As a follow-on, this research note visualizes the networks of alliances and conflict which can be gleaned from the data within that article and adds to it an analysis of Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED) for Chiapas conflicts.
Social network analysis (SNA) is a useful tool for understanding dark networks and visually representing alliance and conflict networks.[3] Scholars such Prieto-Curiel et al 2023 have applied it to Mexican cartel alliance and conflict networks as have Jones et al 2022.[4] Scholars such as Glaser, Sullivan, and Jones (2024) have applied to the internal organizational structures of southern Mexican cartel networks such as the Guerreros Unidos organization.[5]
Non-State Actor Alliance Network
In Figure 1 we see that the CJNG is the most central actor in the alliance network. The CJNG allies with 7 local armed groups directly and more through those allies and proxies (See Figure 1 below). The Sinaloa Cartel on the other hand has one local affiliate, the group El Karma (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Chiapas Non-State Actor Alliance Network. Source: Authors’ Elaboration.
This alliance strategy appears consistent with the growth model of the CJNG which relies on working with, and at times absorbing, local affiliates which helped to explain its rapid expansion in the early 2010s.[6] This expansion was also capitalized by the control of ports and the expansion into synthetic drug markets.[7]
Non-State Actor Conflict Network
In Figure 2 below we see the conflict network which is more decentralized and disconnected. This is likely due to missing ties. We see a central component which includes conflicts between the CJNG and the Sinaloa cartel in addition to the Cartel de Chiapas y Guatemala (CCYG) which also combats the Sinaloa cartel. Thus, the Sinaloa cartel is the most central actor in the conflict network in this component. It should be noted that there is sometimes conflict between Los Machetes and Los Herrera, which both ally with the CJNG. This suggests alliance in-fighting or possibly shifting alliances.
Figure 2. Chiapas Non-State Actor Conflict Network. Source: Authors’ Elaboration.
Figure 3. 2024 Chiapas Non-State Armed Actor Conflict Network Based on ACLED Data. Source: Authors’ Elaboration based on Armed Conflict Location Event Data Project (ACLED).
As we can see in Figure 3 above, the results of the SNA of Hale’s analysis of the conflict network in Chiapas in 2024 is consistent with a network analysis based on the Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED) filtered for criminal armed groups and community militias in the year 2024 for Chiapas.[8] Here we see some of the communal militias are more emphasized and identified by name, but the key actors in the conflict including a component wherein the Sinaloa cartel fights the CJNG which is allied with the Cartel of Chiapas y Guatemala (CCYG), are similar. The Herrera gang also plays a significant role in combat with local communal militias. ACLED has been reviewed here on Small Wars Journal previously.[9] It is an open-source data set with an open access code book and is a highly respected data set. A visualization of all of the available ACLED data (2018-2024 for Mexico) filtered by armed group/non-state actors and by “main component” of the network is visualized below in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Chiapas Non-State Actor Conflict Network 2018-2024 Based on ACLED Data. Source: Authors’ Elaboration based on Armed Location Event Data Project Data.
In Figure 4 we see 91 non-state armed groups and 435 edges (battles or strategic developments with mutual VNSA participation) for the period in Chiapas between 2018 and 2024 based on ACLED data. This data was gleaned by utilizing the ACLED data set columns for actor 1 and actor 2 which invariably were involved in conflict given that this data was filtered by cartels, gangs, and community militias and “battle” and “strategic developments.” As other scholars have shown, ACLED data can be useful for network analysis, particularly for conflict networks.[10] Figure 4 demonstrates the CJNG is by far the center of the conflict network with the highest degree and betweenness centralities of all actors. The Sinaloa cartel is clearly the second most central actor in the overall conflict network period.
Conclusion
This research note has briefly demonstrated the value of social network analysis for visualizing the alliances and conflict networks within Chiapas, a poorly understood state facing incredible pressures related to migratory and drug flows and a bipolar conflict between Mexico’s largest cartels and their proxies. Future research will provide a full exploratory SNA of the ACLED data which can assist in validating detailed qualitative studies demonstrating alliances between cartels in the region. The CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel are the dominant poles of power in the conflict and alliance network. It should be noted however that the Sinaloa cartel is suffering significant internecine conflict between the Chapito’s faction and those loyal to Ismael Zambada Sicairos “Mayo Flaco,” the son of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada García.[11] This could lead to new alliances and arrangements within the underworld which will continue to have significant impact on Chiapas as increased border enforcement will likely lead to higher smuggling prices and more value in controlling various smuggling corridors.
The bipolar nature of the armed conflict in Chiapas reveals that the CJNG is using local gangs as force multipliers in order to meet or beat the apparently larger and stronger Sinaloa forces, they are confronting. This arrangement provides CJNG with additional troops, firepower and important local knowledge necessary for fighters engaged in the Chiapas Plaza to navigate the mountain pathways, roads and just as importantly, the local political environment. While recruiting allies to join the fight may not be a new cartel development, the number of alliances between the CJNG and local Chiapas gangs is impressive and speaks to the ability of CJNG leadership to reach mutually beneficial agreements that will likely place them in an advantageous position of strength over their competitors.
Endnotes
[1] On CAGs see: Carlos Frederico de Oliviera Pereira, “Non-International Armed Conflict – Current Conceptual Challenges: Confronting Organized Crime and Globalization of the Conflict.” Small Wars Journal. 18 February 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/02/18/non-international-armed-conflict-current-conceptual-challenges-confronting-organized-crime-and-globalization-of-the-conflict/; John P. Sullivan, “Crime Wars: Operational Perspectives on Criminal Armed Groups in Mexico and Brazil.” International Review of the Red Cross. Vol. 105, no. 923. June 2023: pp. 1–27, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383122000558.
[2] Gary J. Hale, “Armed Confrontations and Forced Evacuation from Villages in Chiapas, Mexico: The Uncontrolled Southern Border with Guatemala.” Small Wars Journal. 20 February 2025, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/02/20/armed-confrontations-and-forced-evacuation-from-villages-in-chiapas-mexico-the-uncontrolled-southern-border-with-guatemala/.
[3] Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems.” Journal of Public Administration and Research Theory. Vol. 13, no. 4. 2003: pp. 413–39; Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[4] Rafael Prieto-Curiel, Gian Maria Campedelli, and Alejandro Hope, “Reducing Cartel Recruitment Is the Only Way to Lower Violence in Mexico.” Science. Vol. 381, no. 6664 22 September 2023: pp. 1312–16, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adh2888; Nathan Jones, Irina Chindea, Daniel Weisz Argomedo, and John P. Sullivan, “A Social Network Analysis of Mexico’s Dark Network Alliance Structure.” Journal of Strategic Security. Vol. 15, no. 4. 2022: pp. 76—105, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.4.2046.
[5] Pilar Glaser, John P. Sullivan, and Nathan P. Jones, “A Social Network Analysis of the Guerreros Unidos Crime Syndicate.” Small Wars Journal. 5 January 2024, https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/social-network-analysis-guerreros-unidos-crime-syndicate.
[6] Nathan P. Jones, “The Strategic Implications of the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación,” Journal of Strategic Security. Vol. 11, no. 1. 2018: pp. 19–42, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.1.1661; Raúl Benítez Manaut and Josué González, “The Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación: The Most Significant Security Challenge in the Mexico-United States Relationship.” Small Wars Journal. 30 September 2023, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cartel-de-jalisco-nueva-generacion-most-significant-security-challenge-mexico-united.
[7] Carlos Antonio Flores Pérez, “Jalisco En La Escena Del Tráfico de Drogas,” in Marcos Pablo Moloeznik and Abelardo Rodriguez Sumano, Eds. Seguridad y Justicia En Jalisco: Escenarios y Propuestas. Mexico City: COECYTJAL, 2016.
[8] Clionadh Raleigh, Rew Linke, Håvard Hegre, Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature,” Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 47, no. 5. 2010: pp. 651–60, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310378914.
[9] Nathan P. Jones, “ACLED Brings Coverage to Mexico Violence: A New Tool for Mexico Scholars and Analysts.” Small Wars Journal. 23 May 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/acled-brings-coverage-mexico-violence-new-tool-mexico-scholars-and-analysts.
[10] Daniel Cunningham, Sean F. Everton, and Kristen Tsolis, “Exploring the Spatial and Social Networks of Transnational Rebellions in Africa,” in Olivier J. Walther and William F.S. Miles, Eds. African Border Disorders: Addressing Transnational Extremist Organizations. New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 39–59.
[11] “Mexican Prosecutors Consider Treason Charges after US Jails Drug Lord ‘El Mayo’ Zambada.” AP News. 12 August 2024, https://apnews.com/article/mexico-treason-el-mayo-zambada-sinaloa-cartel-a65c9c1c4bb7d26a5ce443e12de7cdca.
