Five questions to ask before declaring war on cartels
“The drug cartels are waging war on America—and it’s now time for America to wage war on the cartels,” these words, from a statement by President Donald Trump from 2023, reflect a nascent consensus within the Republican foreign policy establishment. Built up over years of growing anxiety over drugs, crime, and illegal immigration, the belief that the United States should take kinetic action against criminal organizations in its southern neighbor is trickling into the political mainstream. Trump is far from alone in this—his Republican primary opponents sparred in their debates over how and to what degree the United States should pursue military action against Mexican criminal organizations—and Trump’s National Security Advisor pick Mike Waltz co-sponsored a 2023 Joint Resolution on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against drug cartels. According to one report, the Trump team is not so much questioning “if” the United States should invade Mexico, but “how much.”
Let there be no mistake, the possibility that the United States could take unilateral military action against one of its closest neighbors and number one trading partner will likely be catastrophic no matter what permutation it takes. But in the interest of identifying the least-catastrophic option, this article seeks to outline some of the key considerations for any potential military action against Mexico, and what the United States should consider doing instead.
1. What are your victory conditions?
Legal frameworks and Mexico’s position aside, this is the most important question any US official should be asking when told to contemplate military action against a neighbor. Broadly speaking there are three categories of objectives the United States could pursue in Mexico; disrupting fentanyl production, degrading drug cartels, and stabilizing the Mexican security environment.
Disrupting fentanyl production is the most likely goal of a theoretical Trump campaign in Mexico. Fentanyl overdoses are the leading cause of death among adults 18-45 in the United States, and a highly salient political issue. A campaign oriented around this would likely involve light footprint strikes on major labs and trafficking outfits, paired with increased border security and efforts to “build the wall” once and for all. However, such an effort could escalate if left unchecked to include proposals to blockade Mexican ports in order to search shipments for precursor chemicals. Furthermore, while curbing fentanyl production would be a significant win for the United States in the short term, it will likely do little to address the underlying security situation in Mexico. The major criminal groups there have diversified their revenue streams significantly, branching into extortion, illegal mining and logging, and a host of other activities. If the costs of producing fentanyl become too high to bear, these groups may simply pivot to other forms of illicit commerce less likely to incur the wrath of the United States, but they will be no less deadly for Mexican citizens.
Degrading the ability of drug cartels to operate could go hand-in-hand with tackling fentanyl production, but likely encompasses a broader target set. Rather than just going after labs and traffickers, the United States could seek to eliminate the leadership structures for major cartels like Sinaloa and CJNG. More targets require more man- and airpower, likely requiring a larger US commitment. It also raises questions of designation and targeting. Legislation like the “AUMF CARTEL” (H.J.Res.18) and Senator Graham’s “Ending the NARCOS Act” (S.1048) propose designating particular criminal groups who are the greatest offenders. But how should the United States conceive of the Sinaloa Cartel, currently embroiled in a brutal civil war? Should it favor one side in the conflict, or target everyone involved? What happens if a splinter group spins off into a distinct new entity not originally conceptualized by the authorizing legislation? The case of Ecuador is a useful example of how quickly the frontlines in a (literal) war on crime can become blurred. President Daniel Noboa, in declaring a state of internal armed conflict, designated 22 gangs as supposed terrorist groups, provoking confusion from observers who noted that some of the designated entities were marginal players at best in the country’s criminal dynamics. Over-designation also raises the potential for mission creep and risks placing the goalposts for victory further out of reach. Degrading criminal capabilities is also a more open-ended goal, as criminal groups rarely disappear entirely, instead splintering into a multitude of smaller, and potentially even more violent entities. Indeed, former President Felipe Calderón is often criticized for pursuing a “kingpin strategy” going after major cartel bosses which in reality merely fueled succession crises that birthed new criminal actors. The United States accordingly may find itself involved in a game of whac-a-mole requiring a constant presence but with no end in sight.
The final, and most ambitious goal involves a long-term project aimed at helping Mexico wrest control of its security future from the cartels. Such an effort could resemble a hybrid of Plan Colombia and US security assistance in Iraq, depending on the degree of cooperation the United States could achieve with the Mexican government. It would demand sizeable troop numbers who could patrol cities and towns in drug trafficking hot spots, extensive training and equipment programs for Mexican police and armed forces, and a clear strategic vision from the President and commanders responsible for overseeing the operation. The upside to such an effort is sizeable, a Mexico where the power of transnational gangs is curbed would be a far safer, stable, and prosperous country. But the prospects of success are remote indeed. Mexico is a devilishly challenging environment for large-scale security operations. It is nearly five times the size of Iraq, nearly twice the size of Colombia, and has roughly 2.6 times the population of either. Mexico is highly urbanized, with approximately 80 percent of the population residing in cities that require security forces to operate within chaotic human and physical terrain that advantages well-entrenched criminal networks. Thus, the most long-term solution for the challenge of violence and drug trafficking from Mexico also harbors the greatest chances for suffering and destruction on both sides of the border.
2. What is your legal basis?
Any use of US military forces abroad requires an appropriate legal justification. While the United States Congress has given the president significant leeway when it comes to protecting national security, the type of justification bounds the kinds of actions a Trump Administration could take, and impacts the kinds of constraints Congress might impose.
Trump’s day-one executive order authorizing the designation of certain transnational criminal groups as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) provides an indication of how his administration might approach this question. When queried by a reporter about whether he would consider using special forces against these cartels-cum-terrorists, Trump responded that “stranger things have happened.” Indeed, the idea of kinetic action against cartels is not a new one, and reports suggest that late in the first Trump administration, the president allegedly floated air strikes against drug labs, only to be talked out of it by then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper. Now, with a team of handpicked loyalists in charge of key agencies, the prospect that Trump could exercise the presidency’s expansive counterterrorism authorities to press for more direct action against criminal groups seems far closer to reality.
It is telling indeed that, parallel to the FTO designation, another Trump Executive Order declared a state of emergency at the US southern border and ordered elements to the military, including the marines to reinforce the Customs and Border Protection units stationed there. The language of this declaration, which termed illegal border crossings to constitute an “invasion” suggests an administration that views crime and migration in and through Mexico as a legitimate national security threat. This framing of an external threat to US security by Mexican criminal groups is necessary as military deployments within the United States are constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the military from being used for domestic law enforcement. If the president is justified in deploying the armed forces on US soil to combat Mexican cartels, it is an even lower standard to meet for him to order them into Mexico for the same purpose.
Nevertheless, designating cartels as terrorist groups does not mean the United States will take military action. At its most basic level, the decision opens a wider set of legal mechanisms through which to prosecute individuals under foreign terrorist financing charges. This may have unforeseen consequences, as US persons and companies engaged in seemingly innocuous activity could find themselves staring down the barrel of terrorism financing charges. Especially as Mexican criminal groups have diversified their operations into formal markets, including lime, avocado, and tortilla production, any business with cross-border dealings could come under increased scrutiny. Applying a counter-terrorism approach could also have unforeseen implications for a Republican administration given the interconnectedness of the US and Mexican criminal underworld. For instance, surely individuals who sell weapons to terrorists should be top priority for harsher prosecution, but it seems unlikely that the Trump administration will jump at the chance to aggressively investigate gun sales.
An even more expansive option would be for Congress to pass AUMF targeting cartels. This would grant Trump sweeping authorities to employ the full might of US military capabilities against criminal groups and any state actors who stand behind them. As a Congressman, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has sponsored legislation to that effect with the “AUMF CARTEL” (notably, this AUMF could theoretically also sanction military action against China as a foreign nation involved in the production of fentanyl precursors) while Senator Lindsey Graham has sponsored thew aforementioned “Ending the NARCOS Act” to designate fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction and cartels as terrorist actors. With a Republican-controlled House and Senate, the probability that such a measure could move forward remains remote, but nonzero.
A final option is not to use the military at all, relying instead on covert operations carried out by the CIA and the like. This has the advantage of operating behind a shroud of secrecy where, in an ideal world, neither the Mexican nor US public would need to be aware of the operation. However, much as this might evoke romantic images ripped from the film reels of Sicario, a covert operations campaign would be highly limited in scope and scale. Furthermore, the risks of being uncovered, and the subsequent public relations and congressional fallout would be major, particularly if there are casualties.
3. Do you get Mexico onboard?
Everything about a military operation against cartels gets easier if the Mexican government comes onboard with the effort. US forces could use bases within Mexico for logistics and support, intelligence services could plug into trusted units built up over the course of the Mérida Initiative to better map and target cartel activity. Most importantly, cooperation between US and Mexican security forces could be leveraged to bolster Mexico’s domestic law enforcement capabilities with a view to handing off security responsibilities eventually, reducing the chances that the United States finds itself bogged down into a multi-decade operation. Unfortunately, the Sheinbaum administration, which will outlast Trump’s second term, is not predisposed to cooperate with the United States. Under her predecessor Andrés Manuel López Obrador (commonly known as AMLO), security relations between Mexico and the United States fell to historic lows. In an especially embarrassing 2021 incident, AMLO demanded the repatriation of former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos who was arrested in the United States on drug trafficking charges, exonerated him of all charges, then published the classified intelligence shared by the United States as justification for his arrest. Sheinbaum has likely inherited her predecessor’s nationalist impulse, and her constituents support her in part due to this image of not being the United States’ lapdog.
When Trump, as President-elect, floated the idea of imposing 25% tariffs on Mexico and Canada if the two countries did not act to stop the flow of migrants and fentanyl to the United States, President Sheinbaum did not race to petition Trump to drop the threat immediately as Canadian leader Justin Trudeau did. Instead, she penned a letter reaffirming the United States’ own responsibility in the matter, a move calculated to show Mexico would not be cowed by bombastic threats from its northern neighbor. Projecting strength while quietly cooperating on key issues was one of the key ingredients in AMLO’s ability to successfully navigate the first Trump term. But US-Mexico relations today are not the same as back then, and a desire to showcase strength and independence on security matters could easily come across as intransigence in Washington.
This is not to say that striking an accord is impossible. The United States could threaten eye-watering tariffs on Mexican goods to cripple Mexico’s economy (and kneecap United States’ own) unless Sheinbaum goes along with some kinetic operations. The United States could also simply issue an ultimatum that it will be launching strikes with or without Mexico’s approval, forcing Sheinbaum to either assent to save face or admit she cannot ensure Mexico’s sovereignty when push comes to shove. But coercing Mexico is second only to invading Mexico outright in the hierarchy of least desirable outcomes. Any cooperation the United States might be able to wring out of the Sheinbaum administration down the barrel of a gun would likely be undone by the unravelling of US-Mexico relations on trade, migration, and intelligence sharing. The results would also lead the United States to take on more of the cost of security operations in Mexico, reduce the odds of completing an eventual handoff to Mexican security forces, and tarnish its reputation with other key partners in Latin America.
4. What do you do about casualties?
Any military operation will inevitably result in casualties, not just among the drug traffickers. How prepared the United States will be to respond can have a sizeable impact on the way the conflict could evolve. There are three types of casualties that could shift this calculus, US uniformed service members, Mexican civilians, and US civilians.
The scale of the operation and number of personnel involved significantly changes the probability of this happening. The bigger the US effort, the more likely mistakes and miscalculations will result in lethal consequences for US uniformed personnel. A campaign conducted largely via airstrikes is less likely to see US casualties, while one involving door-to-door raids on suspected drug traffickers exposes even highly trained special forces to the potential of injury or death. Let there be no mistake, contrary to their own propaganda, the majority of cartel forces are neither well disciplined, nor prepared to resist a concerted military campaign. Nevertheless, they remain heavily armed, and have taken measures to bolster capabilities, including through the recruitment of ex-military and police, and through the creation of elite units with greater training and unit cohesion than the average gunman. Should US forces return in body bags, the calculus in Washington will become fraught, either continue to undertake operations even if it means casualties mount, escalate to show resolve and punish those criminals targeting US forces, or otherwise pull back to lower-risk, but potentially less effective tactics like airstrikes or cyber operations.
A second type of casualty is Mexican civilians. Especially if the United States elects for an airpower-intensive approach to limit its own casualties, collateral damage will likely be inevitable, and with it a host of new political challenges. In particular, the moment Mexican civilians are caught in the crossfire, public pressure within Mexico will reach a boiling point. Indeed, the Sheinbaum administration may be willing to sit back under duress as US forces launch surgical strikes on cartel forces, it will likely be untenable for her political position to be seen as standing idly by while US bombs land on Mexican nationals. Civilian casualties will also likely play into the cartels’ media narrative, allowing the groups which for years have preyed upon innocent communities to cast themselves as rebel defenders of the people. Indeed, if there is any outcome wherein the criminal dynamics in Mexico metastasize into a full-blown insurgency, it runs through US military operation that inflicts widespread civilian casualties.
A final possibility is US citizens who could be targeted. More than 30 million US citizens travel to Mexico each year as tourists, their lives could be seen by some criminal organizations as a bargaining chip to hold at risk in order to force the United States to ease up on its campaign. Again, this presents a choice, escalate or de-escalate. Escalation poses risks of drawing more US troops into a conflict, worsening relations with Mexico, and causing more damage and destruction, while de-escalation may be construed as a capitulation to the cartels.
5. What happens if you succeed?
The chances that the United States will fail to achieve some or all of its goals in Mexico are high. But more interesting, and perhaps more dangerous, is the chance that the United States succeeds.
A military operation which successfully curbs the flow of fentanyl and depletes the capabilities of criminal organizations could be seen as a template for future US security policy in Latin America. With it, the chance that the United States returns to a pre-Good Neighbor Policy approach to the region characterized by rampant invasions and an imperial approach to US-Latin American relations. Columnists have already warned of the pitfalls of applying a 21st-century Monroe Doctrine to the region, this would appear to be more akin to the Roosevelt Corollary, opening the door for US intervention throughout the Western Hemisphere. A successful operation also increases the risk of future miscalculations in security assistance by applying a one-size-fits-all model to countering transnational organized crime which fails to recognize local criminal dynamics or political differences between countries. Mexico may be a success story, but perhaps Guatemala, Ecuador, or Peru prove to be the United States’ new military morass.
This kind of success could also play into the hands of geopolitical rivals, most notably Russia and China. A US government willing to intervene unilaterally would hold at risk the security of every other country in the Western Hemisphere, and create new pressures for governments to align with great power benefactors for their self-preservation. Anti-US dictatorships such as Venezuela and Nicaragua would likely be the first to hammer down the doors of Moscow and Beijing for new security guarantees, but other countries could follow.
Another way
The US-Mexico security relationship is a wicked problem for the Trump administration to try and unravel. While statements by the administration have stoked fears and raised hackles on both sides of the border, the shape of bilateral security cooperation remains in flux. The only thing that seems certain is that the status quo before January 20 cannot remain in place.
Rather than seeking out conflict, the United States and Mexico should take this moment to reset their relations. To begin, both countries need to agree on some shared facts. This was a perennial challenge under the Biden administration, where high-level consensus on security cooperation was virtually nonexistent. AMLO himself has asserted that Mexico did not produce fentanyl to begin with. There can be no productive dialogue between the two allies and neighbors if both deny basic reality.
Arms trafficking is another bitter pill for both sides to swallow. The United States should acknowledge that the vast majority of the weapons fueling violence south of the border come from its own domestic market. Mexico, for its part, should recognize that even if arms trafficking from the United States were to cease completely, it will still need help to target and dismantle the well-armed and violent criminal groups already active within its borders. US designation of cartels as FTOs may be a boon here. While the Trump administration is assuredly reticent to be seen as acting to curb Second Amendment rights, a surgical campaign against the worst offenders in arms trafficking to Mexico could pay serious dividends. These actors tend to be clustered in border cities and have close ties to organized crime, their clientele is not the American people but rather violent non-state actors, and disrupting their ability to do business promises to directly improve the safety, strength, and prosperity of the United States.
In Mexico, the Sheinbaum administration should take steps to publicly signal openness to collaboration on security policy. The AMLO approach of maintaining low-level ties while public statements railed against US overreach is unlikely to be a recipe for success. Mexico is already taking important action, for instance stepping up seizures of fentanyl and fentanyl precursors, and moving to allow foreign troops to enter Mexico for training exercises. Sheinbaum’s response to the Sinaloa civil war, deploying over 11,000 troops to the heart of the violence in Culiacán, further indicates a tacit acceptance that AMLO’s security policy is unsustainable. But these practical efforts must be paired with high-level messaging that Mexico takes its security seriously and values the relationship with the United States. Another key signal in this regard would be walking back the country’s foreign agents law which significantly impaired the ability of US law enforcement agencies to coordinate with their Mexican counterparts. So would the convening of a high-level security dialogue between the United States and Mexico to discuss join responses to the cartel threat.
Ultimately, Mexico and the United States should consider options for joint military coordination against cartels as part of a broader package of security cooperation. Kinetic action is no silver bullet, but the security crisis in Mexico has metastasized beyond the capability of traditional law enforcement action alone to deal with. Military cooperation with the United States in this regard can grant Mexico access to resources it otherwise lacks, including advanced drones for persistent intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance of cartel activity, and the airlift capacity to surge forces to hotspots of criminal activity. At the same time, aggressive anticorruption investigations, trainings, and capacity-building efforts across all levels of Mexico’s security forces should be emphasized.
While critics may be quick to dismiss this as a mere repeat of the Bush-era Mérida Initiative, which ultimately failed to check organized crime in Mexico, there are three reasons to believe now is a more opportune moment to revisit US-Mexico security policy. For one, the United States is more invested now in its shared neighborhood than it has been likely in decades. The Trump administration has come in with a laser-focus on curbing migration and halting the flow of drugs which has drawn its attention to Latin America as a whole and Mexico in particular. Second, President Sheinbaum in Mexico benefits from a powerful political coalition and legislative supermajority giving her wide remit to implement key policy measures. While her base is unlikely to be enthusiastic about military cooperation with the United States, framing it as allowing Mexico to take the fight to cartels could draw a level of buy-in that the Mérida-era presidents Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto never had. Finally, growing consensus among Mexico’s public and business community alike holds that violence and insecurity are reaching untenable levels. Within this tumultuous and highly contingent environment, the risks of failure are high, but so too is the potential for the United States and Mexico to strike a better deal on a safer and more prosperous shared future.
