Evolving Perils: Assessing North Korea’s Shifting Security Dynamics in 2024
Disclaimer: This analysis was completed on August 30, 2024. As world news is constantly evolving, developments may have occurred since this date that could counter the arguments and perspectives proposed herein.
Introduction
In January 2024, Kim Jong Un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea (DPRK), announced in his speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly that the country would no longer pursue the longstanding goal of unification of the Korean Peninsula, and would now view South Korea (ROK) as its primary foe. Days later, he began to emphasize war preparations to DPRK state media and made multiple appearances at military facilities to showcase the country’s procurement capabilities. In the months since then, numerous events have drawn attention to Kim and the so-called pariah state. As Kim has the longest tenure of all current leaders in Northeast Asia, he aims to establish his legacy in the DPRK. Experts in Indo-Pacific affairs have debated whether DPRK’s actions now, more than ever, could have an impact on global security. To fully understand the DPRK’s potential as an international security concern, this compostion will begin by examining the recent political and military advancements within the DPRK and the corresponding reactions from the United States (US) and the ROK. It will then explore the DPRK’s diplomatic ties with Russia and the ROK, focusing on significant shifts in their bilateral relations. The counterargument that the DPRK may not pose a significant security risk will then be assessed by scrutinizing the country’s current economic challenges and track record of provocation. Ultimately, the conclusion will present a nuanced perspective on how the United States and its allies should interpret the actions of the DPRK.
Reason #1: Actions on the Domestic Front
On the home front, Kim’s declarations are materializing in the DPRK, as he has mandated the amendment of the country’s constitution to designate the ROK as a primary adversary. While the amendment remains pending, it underscores Kim’s steadfastness in his stance. Additionally, in January 2024, the DPRK abolished several important government agencies that were responsible for managing inter-Korean relations, furthering the divide between the neighboring countries. At the civilian level, DPRK propaganda has been revised, removing the messages of unification, and now depicting antagonism towards the ROK. The DPRK has also dismantled iconic symbols of reunification such as the Arch of Reunification, a monument that symbolized the efforts for a unified Korean Peninsula and possibly sections of the Inter-Korean Railway, according to the National Intelligence Service of South Korea (NIS). As propaganda and symbolism are major apparatuses for the Kim regime to maintain its domination of the country, these changes underscore Kim’s seriousness about redefining bilateral relations with the ROK.
Another, more peculiar incident that further delineates the DPRK’s designation of the ROK as an adversary is the ongoing balloon quandary. The flying of ballons, which South Korean activists have engaged in for years, involves sending thousands of balloons with leaflets and USB drives containing South Korean content with the hope that North Korean civilians will retrieve them and learn about their neighbors. However, in the case of the DPRK’s response in May 2024, instead of leaflets and media, it sent bags of waste. Historically, both the DPRK and, at times, the ROK governments have expressed criticism regarding this activity, with the former also making threats. However, the decisive response from the DPRK represents a significant escalation. Although this incident may seem like a juvenile tit-for-tat, it can be interpreted as an insult, demonstrating a lack of interest in relations or any attempts at communication with the ROK. Following the initial balloon episode, a press statement by Kim Kang Il, Vice-Minister of National Defense of DPRK, was released in June 2024 vindicating its motives. He stated:
We made the ROK clans get enough experience of how much unpleasant they feel and how much effort is needed to remove the scattered wastepaper. We are going to halt wastepaper scattering over the border temporarily as our action was a countermeasure from A to Z. But, if the ROK clans resume anti-DPRK leaflet scattering, we will correspond to it by intensively scattering wastepaper and rubbish hundred times the amount of scattered leaflets and the number of cases, as we have already warned.
Astonishingly enough, the vice-minister used the word “guggyeong,” which means border. This wording is significant because the DPRK rarely refers to there being a southern border but rather the military demarcation line that divides the Korean Peninsula. The change in wording emphasizes that the DPRK has designated the ROK as a separate country. Since then, the predicament has continued and demonstrates that the DPRK is taking every opportunity to solidify its rhetoric.
Reason #2: The Enhancement of Military Weaponry
Moreover, a major factor contributing to the likelihood of a security risk is the DPRK’s growing military capability. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the US. Intelligence Community notes that Kim will “Continue to pursue nuclear and conventional military capabilities that threaten the United State and its allies, enabling periodic aggressive actions to reshape the regional security environment in his favor.” Between January 2023 to August 2024, the DPRK launched more than 30 ballistic missile launch events. A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies indicated that these tests tend to increase during significant US events, such as election years and joint US-ROK military exercises. With 2024 being a year of global elections, including in the United States, Japan, and the ROK, the DPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use missile tests as a means of exerting political pressure and drawing international attention.
Furthermore, the DPRK claims its missile tests have been successful. For example, in March 2024, DPRK state media reported the “successful test of a solid-fuel engine for a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile.” According to experts, this type of missile is capable of reaching targets like Guam, home to several US military installations. In late May 2024, the DPRK launched a battery of ballistic missiles that flew over 200 miles before landing in the Sea of Japan, following a failed attempt to launch a military reconnaissance satellite. In July 2024, the DPRK launched a missile capable of carrying a super-large warhead. Additionally, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) intensified its exercises and launched more missiles in response to Freedom Shield 2024 and Freedom Edge 2024, joint exercises between the US and its regional allies. Notably, even Kim participated in some of the military exercises. The DPRK has also enhanced its nuclear arsenal. Although no nuclear test explosions occurred in the past year, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that the country has amassed around 50 warheads and has sufficient fissile material to potentially expand its arsenal to up to 90 warheads. These are just some of the actions in 2024 that highlight the DPRK’s ongoing efforts to enhance its military capabilities and assert its presence on the global stage
Reason #3: The revival of DPRK-Russia relations
A pivotal factor that has also contributed to the concerns of the DPRK is that it has reignited its bilateral relations with Russia, a longstanding ally and fellow heavily-sanctioned pariah state. According to the US Intelligence Community’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment, “Russia has been providing North Korea with diplomatic, economic, and military concessions in exchange for weaponry to continue the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.” This became noticeable in mid-to-late 2023 when Kim hosted high-level Chinese and Russian delegations in Pyongyang, followed by his first post-pandemic overseas trip to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. During the trip, the two leaders toured several Russian military facilities, including the Vostochney Cosmodrome, giving speculation that the arms trade, clear violations of United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, was coming to fruition.
The United States gradually revealed its perception on its strategic rival collaborating with the DPRK. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken called the affiliation a matter of deep concern. In early 2024, the US State Department reported that between September 2023 and February 2024, the DPRK had “Transferred ballistic missiles as well as 10,000 containers of ammunition to Russia via train for use in the ongoing war in Ukraine.” Some sources estimate that Russia was provided with up to five million rounds of ammunition. In late April 2024, UN sanctions experts released a report validating claims from Ukrainian officials that DPRK ballistic missiles were found in missile debris in Kharkiv, Ukraine, a known hot zone in the Russia-Ukraine war. The Defense Intelligence Agency also confirmed this in a May 2024 report.
The re-ignition of DPRK-Russia bilateral relations is concerning because Russia has technology that the DPRK can utilize to augment its military capabilities, such as satellite technology. As the DPRK has successfully and disastrously launched several satellites since late 2023 to mid-2024, Russian technology could improve the success rate (although NIS has speculated Russia has already assisted in the launches). Additionally, the bilateral relationship, or as Kim has referred to as the “unbreakable relationship,” has benefitted the DPRK on the international stage because Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), vetoed the resolution to extend the mandate for the United Nations’ Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on DPRK in March 2024. In June 2024, the bilateral ties further solidified when Putin visited the DPRK capital of Pyongyang, where he and Kim signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. According to Russian state media, the comprehensive strategic partnership covers areas of cooperation such as military, political, and economics. After the signing, Kim stated to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) that:
The relations of the two countries have also been placed on a better track of long-term development conducive to the progress and well-being of the two countries through the expansion of mutual cooperation in various fields, including politics, economy, culture, and military affairs.
This new treaty succeeds the previous bilateral agreements signed in 1961 and 2000, as experts have affirmed that it is a revision of the former, including language regarding mutual assistance in the event of aggression. During the event, Kim also went on the record to affirm his support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Moreover, the ROK’s reaction to the DPRK-Russia alliance has brought its stance in line with that of the United States. ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol called the alliance “A threat to his country’s security and a violation of UNSC resolutions,” expressing concerns that it would have negative consequences on ROK-Russia relations. Following the signing of the agreement, ROK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong Kyun summoned the Russian Ambassador to object to the partnership and cease the cooperation, as the ROK is now worried that the DPRK may escalate tensions.
In addition, the ROK has already contributed to the efforts of the Ukrainians in their war with Russia; the ROK government has focused its direct support for Ukraine on financial, humanitarian, and non-lethal military aid due to being forbidden by its Foreign Trade Act to the export of weapons to countries at war and the re-export of weapons without permission. The ROK has found ways around the law by around it by transferring lethal military assistance to allies. For example, in 2023, it collaborated with the United States to send 300,000 shells to Ukraine.
Now, with the strengthened Russia-DPRK partnership, the ROK is reconsidering the Foreign Trade Act in order to directly procure arms to Ukrainian security forces as a deterrent and message to the partnership. Additionally, in July 2024, ROK Minister of National Defense Shin Wonsik and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin released a joint statement condemning Russia-DPRK partnership and underscoring that the trade is a clear violation of UNSC sanctions.
The DPRK-Russia bilateral relationship can be seen as a security concern for the United States, ROK, as well as for European countries who condemn Russia’s war of aggression. Unlike their relationship during the Cold War, the DPRK now has the upper hand, as it possesses what Russia urgently needs. Some scholars argue that this cooperation may be short-term or transactional but given the nature of the exchanges and Kim Jong Un’s continued expressions of gratitude, the partnership could endure. This evolving relationship highlights North Korea’s growing influence and reinforces why it should be seen as a security threat.
Reason #4: The corrosion of Inter-Korean Relations
Both the DPRK’s political and military adjustments have jointly deteriorated inter-Korean relations. Since the DPRK has terminated the inter-Korean offices, communications have been cut. The ROK and the United States have offered humanitarian and economic aid in order to initiate dialogue, but the DPRK has reportedly rejected all offers. With communication attempts ineffective, the ROK has taken other actions against the DPRK; in response to the May 2024 balloon incident, President Yoon approved a proposal for the country to suspend the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement, an inter-Korean arrangement on lowering front-line military tensions on the peninsula (part of the agreement had already been suspended by the DPRK in November 2023). Other actions include the ROK military reinstating loudspeakers aimed at the DPRK in July 2024 after an eight-year hiatus. The loudspeakers broadcast anti-DPRK propaganda, weather reports, and ROK music. This approach, arguably a form of psychological warfare, has been used historically, making it a somewhat antiquated tactic.
Moreover, the ROK has improved diplomatic relations with other neighboring countries, such as the United States, Japan, and (slightly) China. President Yoon attended the 2024 NATO Summit for the third consecutive year, where he, along with other Indo-Pacific partners of the alliance (the Asia-Pacific Four, or AP4), jointly condemned the DPRK’s role in the Russia-Ukraine War. However, the DPRK does not seem pleased by any diplomatic accomplishments made by the ROK. As stated before, the DPRK has increased its launching of missiles, not only to US triumphs but the ROK as well. For example, following a May 2024 trilateral summit that was attended by the ROK, Japan, and China, a joint declaration was released and stated that:
We reaffirmed that maintaining peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia serves our common interest and is our common responsibility. We reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the abductions issue, respectively. We agree to continue to make positive efforts for the political settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue.
Immediately afterwards, the DPRK reportedly released a statement as well as fired 10 projectile missiles into the East Sea, also known as the Sea of Japan. It was later discovered that the DPRK had also attempted to disrupt South Korean GPS signals. The DPRK’s response was clearly displeasure towards the joint affirmation of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As both Koreas strengthen their ties with their respective allies, the hostility towards one another is nostalgic to the inter-Korean relationship during the initial phase of the Korean War.
Counterargument #1 – Cannot Be a Security Concern and a “Pitiful State”
On the other hand, Kim Jong Un has priorities for the nation that would hinder the possibility of being a security concern, in particular the state’s well-being in terms of economic and food security. It is widely known that the DPRK has gone through eras of economic policies that navigate how GDP is allocated. For Kim II Sung, the first leader of DPRK, it was juche, the self-reliant approach without external assistance. His son and successor Kim Jong Il initiated songun, an expansion of its predecessor with an emphasis on military credibility at the expense of civilians and the economy. Then in 2013, Kim Jong Un initiated byungjin noseon, or parallel line, an expansion of the 1960s policy of economic development and a strengthened military, but with a new emphasis on nuclear capabilities. This marked a shift from previous policies, where the military was not prioritized or central to economic reform.
Although Kim’s economic policy seems reasonable on paper, the DPRK economy reportedly diminished according to scholars as well as from Kim himself, as he described it in the January 2024 8th Central Committee of the Korean Worker’s Party as a “pitiful state. However, a July 2024 report from the Bank of Korea (BOK) indicated that the DPRK’s GDP increased by 3.1% in 2023 due to eased COVID-related restrictions, growth in trade with China, and favorable weather conditions. Due to the BOK being of the few accredited sources for DPRK data, it suggests some recent improvements in the economic situation of the DPRK.
In February 2024, Kim announced a new 20×10 policy which would establish factories in twenty countries in the next decade. The policy seems to have put the nation in the right direction; Kim stated in the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in the summer of 2024 that several construction projects were in development, cultivation was in progress, and that that the overall economic situation is on an “upward trajectory” compared the previous year. However, experts from the BOK caution that this growth might be temporary, dependent on continued cooperation with China and Russia.
In addition, DPRK is reportedly experiencing food insecurity; in a report published by Statistics Korea in December 2023, scholars noted that food production in the DPRK such as grains “decreased by 4 percent to 4.51 million tons in 2022 as well as food shipments from China also dropped from 500,000 tons of rice in 2021 to 130,383 tons in 2022.” However, in a July 2024 statement published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), reported that its director, Qu Dongyu, made a recent visit to the DPRK and asserted that agricultural development in the country was improving. Nevertheless, DPRK experts have expressed doubt about the validity of this statement, suggesting it was more of a political gesture aimed at maintaining DPRK-FAO relations since UN agencies have struggled to re-enter the country since the COVID-19 pandemic. Their cynicism is reflected in the interpretation of the FAO statement:
The Director-General commended the great achievements made by the DPRK people in agriculture development, food security, and the Pyongyang city under the leadership of H.E. Kim Jong-un, and expressed his appreciation for being received by the DPRK as the first UN specialized agency principal allowed to visit since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019.
Despite the recent positive developments, the underlying issues that have plagued the DPRK economy and food security persist, suggesting that the situation remains precarious. Therefore, while there are signs of recovery, the DPRK’s ongoing challenges may limit its ability to focus on extraordinary security measures effectively.
Counterargument #2 – DPRK’s Tactic of Provocations
Moreover, the DPRK has a long track record of conducting provocations, which arguably may not necessarily equate to an imminent threat of war; these provocations are typically controlled and strategically calculated to avoid escalating into full-scale conflict. These actions are often proportionate responses to perceived threats and include built-in mechanisms for de-escalation. For instance, the sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan in 2010, although severe, was designed to inflict political damage while avoiding full-scale retaliation. This viewpoint could indicate that the DPRK was aware of the consequences of pushing too far and aims to achieve specific political and military objectives without crossing the line into war. This can be seen in the increasing military capabilities and change of rhetoric. While these provocations contribute to regional instability, they may not suggest a reckless intent. Instead, they can reflect a complex strategy of controlled escalation, highlighting the need for measured responses that prevent miscalculation and unintended escalation.
Conclusion and Recommendations
When juxtaposed, there are compelling reasons to argue whether or not the DPRK poses a security concern more than ever. However, with each passing day, the actions taken by the DPRK increasingly corroborate distresses from the international community. DPRK military exhibitions have been increasing since the fallout of the Hanoi Summit. As missile launches transpire in response to ROK endeavors, the United States has expressed concerns of an October Surprise ahead of its 2024 presidential election. Additionally, Kim has dedicated significant time and resources to identifying the ROK as an adversary through political, military, and propaganda channels. It would seem imprudent to expend such assets merely to convey a false message. Inter-Korean relations have diminished with both nations taking action and strengthening their alliances. For the ROK, it’s the neighboring countries as well as the West. For the DPRK, it’s the “reciprocal cooperation” with Russia. In just a matter of months, Russia has become the DPRK’s most powerful diplomatic, economic and military patron. The DPRK has now officiated its role in the Russia-Ukraine War, meaning the conflict could escalate to the deployment of the KPA (as there are rumors of engineering troops being deployed for reconstruction work), or possibly expand into the Indo-Pacific. The invigorated Russia-DPRK alliance encompasses support in trade, economics, and humanitarian aid, addressing doubts about the DPRK’s threat level and demonstrating that it has allies beyond China. Although China has been relatively quiet regarding this alliance, it remains on complex terms with the ROK while at the same time maintaining economic and military ties with Russia. Another contention against viewing the DPRK’s rhetoric as a concern is that Kim Jong Un could be pursuing a new method for unifying the Korean Peninsula. Scholars such as Dr. Daniel Pinkston have considered that, despite the failures of past unification attempts, Kim has not abandoned the goal but has shifted towards considering force if conditions permit. This strategy reflects a persistent ambition for unification under Kim’s terms, adapted to the current unstable global order.
Building on the previous trepidations, President Yoon’s freedom-based unification policy, presented during an August 2024 speech commemorating the ROK’s Liberation Day, offers an alternative vision for the Korean Peninsula; The policy focuses on providing North Koreans with access to reliable information, sparking a desire for democracy and freedom, and opening a new avenue for inter-Korean dialogue. While some initially viewed this as an attempt at unification by force, the ROK government clarified that this approach is not aimed at forcibly absorbing the DPKR, but rather updating the long-standing unification roadmap to reflect the current international dynamics. Despite its potential, the policy may be a case of too little, too late in countering the DPRK’s immediate and escalating military provocations in 2024. Now more than ever is the DPRK an international security threat.
Experts have varying opinions on how to resolve the concerns the DPRK brings to international security, ranging from disrupting the DPRK-Russia arms trade, enhancing defense and deterrence measures through strengthened alliances, and engaging in robust diplomatic efforts with regional actors. Additionally, there have been suggestions to focus on human rights campaigns and continue economically and diplomatically isolating the DPRK to counter its aggressive strategies and maintain regional stability. While some experts agree on the need for a multifaceted approach to address the concern posed by the DPRK, others question the effectiveness of these measures. Moreover, while intergovernmental organizations such as NATO and the UN/UNSC have condemned the DPRK, they have their limits. NATO’s partnership with its Indo-Pacific allies is still (at the time of this writing) coming into fruition, and the UNSC has two permanent members who are the most prominent allies of the DPRK.
In terms of bilateral relations, the United States and ROK consistently sought for dialogue with the DPRK without preconditions, but the calls have gone unanswered. There needs to be a reassessment of past attempts and the formulation of a comprehensive strategy to effectively dissuade the threat posed by the DPRK once and for all. However, several hindrances stand in the way; First, so long as the Russian-Ukraine war continues and Putin remains in power, the DPRK will have its missing catalyst to numerous issues. Second, dialogue of some sort needs to be established before matters exacerbate. Utilizing third party facilitators as an approach should be considered. Third, as mentioned in the beginning of this piece, 2024 is a year of elections, with many leaders, including those in Japan, the ROK, and the United States, more focused on their efforts to either get re-elected or pave the way for the next administration. That being said, there is a strong possibility that a long-term strategy may not be instituted by the end of 2024. No matter what, there needs to be a foundation established by those leaders (whether they stay in office or not) or by non-state actors. If not, then the DPRK will remain an international security concern for years to come.
