The Ukraine War in 2024: A Pivotal Year for the Transatlantic Alliance and World Order
The Ukraine War in 2024
A Pivotal Year for the Transatlantic Alliance and World Order
John Nagl and Alexander Peris
Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine is now in its third year. Ukraine successfully repelled most of Russia’s initial strikes in 2022, and the West rallied to provide enormous support for the battle-hardened Ukrainian people. Yet Ukraine now faces serious challenges on and off the battlefield. Russia is advancing at the same time as international support for Ukraine has been thrown into doubt. The implications stretch far beyond Central and Eastern Europe in what some observers are now calling the opening phases of a renewed Cold War and even a possible World War III.
Russia’s initial battlefield blunders in the face of a nimble and courageous defense saw Ukrainian troops thwart Russia’s thrusts into Kyiv and northern Ukraine. While Russia did gain ground in the south and east, counter offensives saw Russian troops pushed out of the regional capital of Kherson and Ukraine’s “second city,” Kharkiv. Ukraine succeeded in large part thanks to excellent leadership and operational flexibility. President Volodymr Zelensky famously illustrated Ukrainian resolve with the line “I need ammunition, not a ride,” while his generals under military chief Valerii Zaluzhny outwitted the Russians.
International support made the difference in the early stages of the war. Donated weapons such as the Javelin anti-tank missile and the HIMARS rocket system decimated Russian armored formations, command posts, and supply depots. The United States and its Western allies have kept Ukraine in the fight, delivering a wide variety of tanks, artillery, aircraft, and other materiel. They have also provided crucial economic aid and formed a mostly united front against Russia, expanding NATO and levying sanctions en masse.
Yet three years on, Russia, supported by what Hal Brands terms a cohort of “Eurasian autocracies,” is achieving increasing success. Thanks to large-scale trade with China, Russia has side-stepped many of the sanctions facing it. The “No Limits” partnership between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping has given Russia access to the components needed to rapidly expand its defense-industrial base. Countries such as North Korea and Iran are increasingly acting in concert with Russia, providing it with arms and ammunition. Pyongyang has sold Moscow millions of artillery rounds while Tehran has provided thousands of suicide drones and the requisite know-how to employ them effectively on the battlefield.
Brands describes the emergence of two, opposing autocratic and liberal-democratic geopolitical blocs as “Cold War II.” Much like Cold War I, this has been accompanied by a rhetorical battle across the developing world. Many African countries have aligned with Russia, booting out American and European troops and importing Russian mercenaries instead. In short, the war in Ukraine has become a global showdown, with implications off and on the battlefield. For Ukraine, Russia’s access to global resources and weaponry means the military environment has become considerably more difficult.
Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed to gain much ground as new equipment fell victim to Russian artillery and drones. Ukraine’s defense of Bakhmut, while strategically sound, was costly in casualties. Russia’s casualty rate is leagues worse, but with a considerably smaller population, Ukraine remains at an enduring disadvantage. A shortage of combat troops has caused polarizing internal debates about expanding the draft-eligible population. The hero of the early war, General Zaluzhny, is gone, replaced by President Zelensky amid murky political maneuvering. Russian troops have made steady advances this year. Alarmingly, this includes a return to the Kharkiv region, where indiscriminate Russian bombing has caused many civilian casualties.
Given the circumstances, Ukraine’s current difficulties are unsurprising. Consider Russia’s artillery advantage. Thanks in part to components from China and ammunition from Iran and North Korea, Russia is estimated to possess a 5:1 advantage in shells fired in a war where up to 80% of the casualties have been caused by artillery. Russia’s shell production continues to outstrip that of the EU and the United States combined; the West has struggled to accelerate production of artillery shells and other weapons and ammunition.
Yet perhaps the most significant worry for Ukraine is not on the front lines. Rather, it lies thousands of miles away in Washington DC, where the aid that keeps Ukraine in the fight is coming under increasing threat. One key reason Russia made advances earlier this year is that a vital $60 billion aid package was stuck in Congress, forcing Ukrainian troops to conserve ammunition amid human wave attacks. Large elements of the Republican-majority House tacked to an isolationist course and refused to vote for the bill, which only passed after months of political maneuvering. Donald Trump, the de facto Republican nominee for President, has expressed a desire to end the war quickly and may seek to curtail U.S. aid to Ukraine if elected.
Admittedly, the EU and Ukraine’s European partners are trying to step up. French President Emmanuel Macron has played an important role in rallying support, even coordinating a potential plan to send French advisors to Ukraine. The Czech Republic is leading a European initiative to source hundreds of thousands of artillery shells for Ukraine. The European Union and Ukraine’s other European partners have also provided essential economic aid to Ukraine.
However, Ukraine cannot fight at its current operational tempo without American military aid, even if Europe continues to support its beleaguered neighbor. Europe cannot provide enough support to allow Ukraine to hold off Russia’s numerical and materiel superiority. A cut in aid would lead to the long-term weakening of Ukrainian troops, opening the potential for a devastating Russian breakthrough as artillery and anti-air munitions run low. Alternatively, Ukraine may be forced to the negotiating table, risking leaving nearly a fifth of its territory and millions of its citizens under Russian control. Either outcome puts millions of Ukrainians at risk from an occupying power whose attacks on civilians are a feature, not a bug, of Russia’s strategy. Either outcome would also give Russia time to regroup and rearm, endangering not only millions of Ukrainians but also America’s NATO partners in Eastern Europe.
The next year will be crucial. Ukrainian courage and Western support have thus far kept Russia and its alliance of autocracies at bay. The future of Ukraine, Europe, and the entire transatlantic alliance now lies in the balance.
John Nagl is Professor of Warfighting Studies at the United States Army War College and director of the Ukraine War Integrated Research Project there. A retired Army officer, he served in tank units in both Iraq Wars.
Alexander Peris is a research intern at the U.S. Army War College. He is currently supporting the Ukraine Integrated Research Project, synthesizing the lessons from the war in Ukraine for the U.S. Army. A Pennsylvania native, Alexander studies international relations and modern history at the University of St Andrews in Scotland.
This article reflects their views and not those of the United States Army War College, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense. It draws upon the book A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, edited by John Nagl and Colonel Katie Crombe (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press, 2024).