Options for Small NATO Countries to Prepare for Multi-Domain Operations

Options for Small NATO Countries to Prepare for Multi-Domain Operations

By Maj. Donatas Palavenis,

Chief Specialist in the Warfare Institute at the Training and Doctrine Command of the Lithuanian Armed Forces

Recently, the new term Multi-domain operations (MDO) has popped up, which describes how battles will be conducted in the future as militaries would operate in a more concentrated manner (Figure 1), meaning, they would act in five military domains: air, ground, sea, space, and cyberspace. Military operations will be carried out in five domains under their simultaneous management or coordination from a single center. This new perception, arguably a change in warfare, is influenced by the level of current technological development, the need to improve the survivability of own troops on the battlefield, and the perception that effective military activity requires actions carried out not only through classical military environments but also in space and cyberspace. This, of course, changes the established understanding of the conduct of military operations, and now is the right time to start thinking about how small NATO countries will adapt to this change.

Figure 1. The conceptual difference in the execution of operations[1]

The United States has made the most progress in this area. Therefore, in this article, we will firstly discuss the U.S. understanding of the conduct of the MDO, what additional national capabilities the U.S. has already now and how they are integrated into military structures. We will continue the article with an overview of other NATO countries in that regard, and conclude with reflections on how the Armed Forces of small NATO countries should prepare for the future challenges that MDO is bringing.

Changes in the U.S. Armed Forces

We will begin this section by discussing the term MDO, then reviewing the changes taking place in the U.S. Armed Forces, and ending with the changes taking place at their Joint level. The term MDO was firstly used by the U.S. Army in 2017 with the introduction of Multi-Domain Fighting as a Continuation of the Concentrated Weapons Concept in the 21st Century.[2] This publication identified the need for a change in warfare to enable the U.S. Army to operate in all areas, which are well adapted by potential opponents and strengthened by their military power. It is assumed that in future conflicts, various means would be used to influence the opponent in electromagnetic, information, and cyberspace; also, other means such as space-based effectors, economic, legal, and political pressure tools would be utilized. Of course, all these measures could be also introduced in response to the practices of potential U.S. opponents.

It is noted that the timely and rapid exchange of data between different actors and headquarters operating in MDO is the key to success. This can be ensured by choosing the optimal data exchange architecture. Flexible interoperability and operational management structure need to be put in place, as operations will be conducted in a dynamic environment and with limited resources.

The intelligence systems currently being developed to identify and track targets in the depths of the battlefield will be further developed, as will the means of destroying targets, which would become more accurate and could affect the target from an even greater distance. Intelligence systems would be integrated into a single network that would allow receiving information from a variety of sensors, unmanned intelligence platforms, and ground, sea, airborne units, and satellites in space.

The publication emphasizes that the successful conduct of the MDO requires not only the U.S. military component, and the capabilities of the partners, but also other means available to the government as a whole to contribute to solving military problems. The developed concept describes in detail the possible actions of the opponent’s forces and own priorities for capability development in preparation for and implementation of the MDO in 2025 – 2040.

Much of the conceptual reflection expressed both in the aforementioned publication and in other publications is currently being put into practice by the U.S. Army. A report to Congress released in  November 2021 mentions that five MDO task forces will be created (Figure 2). Interestingly, two of which are already fully operational. The first one is based in the U.S. state of Washington and is responsible for operations in the Pacific, while the second is based in Wiesbaden, Germany, and is responsible for supporting operations within the European and African continents.

Much of the conceptual reflection expressed both in the aforementioned publication and in other publications is currently being put into practice by the U.S. Army. A report to Congress released in  November 2021 mentions that five MDO task forces will be created (Figure 2). Interestingly, two of which are already fully operational. The first one is based in the U.S. state of Washington and is responsible for operations in the Pacific, while the second is based in Wiesbaden, Germany, and is responsible for supporting operations within the European and African continents.

Figure 2. Generic structure of the MDO task force

It is foreseen that the MDO task force will remain under the command and control of the theater commander, e.g. U.S. Army Command in Europe and Africa. However, going down the levels corps-division-brigade part of the MDO task force capacity available in the theater could be allocated to support certain stages of operations. In addition, certain military units have their own original combat support and combat service support units, which have advanced technical capabilities to conduct electronic warfare. In addition, national or international cyber defense capabilities may be included at the corps level, and electronic warfare elements may be attached at the divisional level. Brigade headquarters may be granted access to all intelligence obtained from available means.

It is foreseen that the MDO task force will remain under the command and control of the theater commander, e.g. U.S. Army Command in Europe and Africa. However, going down the levels corps-division-brigade part of the MDO task force capacity available in the theater could be allocated to support certain stages of operations. In addition, certain military units have their own original combat support and combat service support units, which have advanced technical capabilities to conduct electronic warfare. In addition, national or international cyber defense capabilities may be included at the corps level, and electronic warfare elements may be attached at the divisional level. Brigade headquarters may be granted access to all intelligence obtained from available means.

There is talk at the U.S. joint force level, of the need to exchange information and strengthen existing and build new capabilities. The existing information exchange initiative between the U.S. Army and Air Force (Combined Joint All-Domain C2 (CJADC2)) is currently being developed. It is expected that the initiative will lead to the development of a functioning data exchange system for the exchange of large amounts of data during MDO. Meanwhile, Space Force has been set up in the U.S. over the past few years, and new cyber defense capabilities have been developed, e.g., 915 Cyber ​​Combat Battalion. Priorities have been set for future acquisitions that would consistently strengthen or build the new capacity required to execute the MDO. It is planned to strengthen the capabilities of intelligence / cyber combat units and increase the number of medium-range air defense and long-range artillery systems.

To sum up, the U.S. military is taking very big steps toward putting a new way of fighting into the practice. This is reflected by the slow and steady implementation of structural reforms, preparation of conceptual documents, acquisition of new armaments and equipment, and training of troops.

Ambitions and initiatives of other NATO countries

In order to prepare for a new type of military warfare and conduct of MDO, the Armed Forces of small NATO countries should rely on the work done by big NATO countries and good practice in this area. The example of the U.S. has already been discussed, which would probably only be useful for a common understanding of trends, as the U.S. military capabilities are hardly comparable to small countries. As NATO moves slowly to offer Member States common solutions that enable more focused implementation of the MDO, it is necessary to examine the experiences of other big NATO countries.

Now, the United Kingdom is focusing on developing and experimenting with necessary doctrine and new systems, e.g., leadership and management, decision making, data processing, and simulations. It is anticipated that the successful implementation of the MDO will require new capabilities, modern and adapted staff training, and experimentation. It is envisaged that the new and existing capabilities to be developed will have to be combined into a common information space, leaving the possibility for commanders to choose specific platforms to carry out specific combat tasks. IT systems will need to be upgraded to handle huge amounts of information and provide solutions to managers. This will require the use of artificial intelligence and cloud computing. It is envisaged that sensors will be connected to the common system and that efforts have been made to avoid duplication of the systems developed by the Allies[3].

In Germany the Air and Space Operations Center was opened in 2020, symbolizing the need for closer integration of available capabilities. In parallel, the development of a command and control system that would allow the integration of other military capabilities is being discussed. It should be noted that discussions on the integration of new capabilities for MDO are also taking place at the corps level. The study, published in March 2022, proposes the structure of the 1st German / Netherland Corps (Figure 3), which shows elements of cyber defense, the management of space platforms, and new capabilities to ensure the destruction of targets from a greater distance.

Figure 3. The proposed structure of the 1st German / Netherland Corps

Meanwhile, other NATO nations are not posting their plans on how they would prepare for warfare change and what particular measures will be taken. Interestingly, in 2020 the Estonian Ministry of Defense signed an agreement with the U.S. Future Command to establish a joint working group to develop solutions and experiment with cyber defense and data exchange. It is likely that some of the outcomes will be implemented later by the U.S. and NATO forces[4].

Concepts developed in the U.S. are seen to be partially transferred to other countries, but there is no rush to take such initiative. Countries rather wait for a common NATO or U.S. system (probably CJADC2) to be developed, tested, and later are expected to join. Some countries are implementing structural changes by establishing separate headquarters in their militaries, which may facilitate better exchange of information and more coordinated planning of operations between different military environments.

Preparation for MDO in small NATO countries

Countries are well aware that the implementation of the MDO is a challenge that must be overcome. It is easier for small states while being NATO members to prepare for this change, as NATO is currently trying to unify countries’ positions on MDO, however, this does not limit the country’s ability to consistently prepare for the change while taking some actions listed below.

It would be appropriate to divide preparation into several stages. In the first stage, a review of the resources within National Defense Systems must be implemented to identify and optimize the capabilities relevant for the execution of MDO and try to include them as soon as possible in military exercises. The elements of cyber defense would be one example. This would allow commanders to understand the potential of assigned elements, in this case, cyber defense, and cyber security professionals would realize their importance in conducting military operations. The same could be done with the airborne or space-based intelligence assists that normally are managed by military units or contractors. Representatives of companies providing such services have to be involved in the training as well.

In the second stage, more intensive cooperation between different types of services in the Armed Forces has to be ensured, but also other actors that would be acting in the total defense of the country have to be engaged. It is very important that as many staff as possible are aware of the importance of timely exchange of information during a conflict. The participation of these actors in joint exercises or other types of events would allow them to understand the specifics of the future operation, and the particularities of other elements. In order to deepen the understanding of MDO, it would also be worthwhile to send some officers or non-commissioned officers to other military services’ training institutions. High attention must be paid to the importance of MDO subject in courses organized in higher military staff courses.

Thirdly, decisions have to be made on a data exchange architecture. This decision can be taken jointly with NATO allies, or individually if the search for technical solutions in the Alliance takes too long. Most likely, NATO countries would choose the U.S. CJADC2 information system. With this solution, it will be necessary to install sensors consistently and purposefully in the military equipment available for the Armed Forces. This would allow combining the available data into one information space and ensure the optimal use of equipment. In addition, data would be made available to other NATO nations during the conflict, which would improve interoperability and make the overall operation a success. Important to note, that there are many commercial solutions on the market today that allow the integration of sensors, fire control, and decision-making systems and effectors. At this stage, it is recommended that the representatives of the Armed Forces take an interest in the CJADC2 subsystem tests organized by the U.S. Armed Forces, e.g., U.S. Army tests Project Convergence, Navy – Project Overmatch, Air Force – Advanced Battle Management System.

Additionally, new weapons, sensors, and effectors have to be able to exchange data through a unified data exchange system. For this purpose, it is necessary to review the Armed Forces Capability Catalog and the requirements for newly acquired armaments systems. The number of intelligence capabilities will expand in the future, as more unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites or stratospheric platforms will be procured. Data exchange systems and additional sensors would be consistently installed in legacy systems.

Lastly, doctrinal publications need to be updated, staff training needs to be provided, and awareness of the effectiveness of MDO needs to be expanded. Of course, the mentioned stages may overlap and run in parallel.

Should the need arise, the representatives of the national defense industry, science, and business have to be engaged in this transformation to develop certain national decisions that would allow the Armed Forces to be successful in the future.