03/22/2021 News & Commentary – Korea
News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Daniel Riggs
1. ‘Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula’: Pyongyang’s trick language for keeping its nukes
2. 5 Takeaways From Investigating Covert Oil Deliveries to North Korea
3. South Korea Hints It May Strengthen Military Ties With Japan
4. U.S. Flags Human Rights Concerns in S.Korea
5. North Korea’s new nuclear gambit and the fate of denuclearisation
6. When I escaped to South Korea, I felt guilt
7. How Korea Bungled Coronavirus Vaccination
8. S. Korea to seek other ways to engage with N.K. as overseas spectators banned from Tokyo Olympics: ministry
- Unification minister renews support for private sector efforts to resume aid to N. Korea
10. State Department spotlights corruption, abuse in South
11. Moon’s approval rating at all-time low of 34.1 pct: Realmeter
12. Moon’s plan to revive peace initiative through Tokyo Games faces hitch
13. North Korean man extradited to US in sanctions case
14. (South Korean) Defense chief to visit UAE, India this week
15. Two border guards fled to China in January to find food
16. Here’s How America Can Strengthen Relations with Japan and South Korea
17. North Korea in Crisis: Food Shortages and Information Lockdown
18. S. Korea’s observation satellite successfully launched into orbit
1. ‘Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula’: Pyongyang’s trick language for keeping its nukes
AEI · by Nicholas Eberstadt
A critically important essay from Nick Eberstadt, one of the leading Korea watchers in the US.
Key excerpt: “Of course, it is not difficult to understand why some international actors are willing to play along with North Korean code language. Moscow and Beijing are delighted by the mischief it inevitably invites. The current leftist Blue House, as part of its dangerous double-game of balancing the neighbor that wants to destroy it against the ally committed to protecting it, pretends there is simply nothing to see here. At his joint press conference yesterday with Secretary Blinken, for example, ROK Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong — a North Korea expert, frequent flier to Pyongyang, and repeat interlocutor with Kim Jong Un — acted as if he had no idea this North Korean formulation even existed. But he and the rest of his government carefully parrot the North’s favored phrasing nonetheless.”
I actually think this public debate is a good thing because it allows us to both expose KJU’s strategy to dominate the peninsula by breaking the alliance (and how it has failed to live up to all the agreements calling for denuclearization) while at the same time exposing the appeasers, those who would endanger the ROK, or the ignorant. It is a pretty simple litmus test to determine who’s who: are you for denuclearization of the north or of the peninsula?
Dr Tara O shared this comment about Nick’s essay. It is something we should really pay attention to: “Terminology Deception/Confusion Tactics (용어혼란전술) used by North Korea, more specifically used by the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chinese Communist Party, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, etc.” I would this is an important tool in the political warfare toolbox.
2. 5 Takeaways From Investigating Covert Oil Deliveries to North Korea
NY Times · by Stella Cooper, Christoph Koettl and Muyi Xiao
10 minute Video (which is very good) and other graphics are at the link.
This is very important reporting that illustrates the complexity of enforcing sanctions. Much more work needs to be done. Note the linkage to Taiwan, Hong Kong, the PRC, and Indonesia.
Here is the link to the 84 page RUSI and C4ADS report.
3. South Korea Hints It May Strengthen Military Ties With Japan
Bloomberg · by Jeong-Ho Lee and Jihye Lee · March 21, 2021
Could be a very good development.
4. U.S. Flags Human Rights Concerns in S.Korea
english.chosun.com · March 22, 2021
Another source of alliance friction that will increase if/when the US Congress holds hearings on the anti-leaflet law. Unfortunately for the ROK they just cannot justify the law from an international legal and human rights perspective.
Although counterintuitive perhaps, calling out our ally gives us more justification to focus on the real human rights abuser – the Kim family regime.
The way out of this alliance friction is for the ROK to repeal the anti-leaflet amendment and to participate in an aggressive alliance campaign for north Korean human rights.
5. North Korea’s new nuclear gambit and the fate of denuclearisation
eastasiaforum.org · by Evans Revere · March 22, 2021
Important conclusion from Evans Revere:
“It remains to be seen whether the Biden administration will take the bait and pursue an arms control approach with Pyongyang. If it does, President Joe Biden will no doubt assure us that he does not ‘accept’ North Korea’s nuclear program, but rather wants to limit it quantitatively and qualitatively. Such an argument ignores the fact that denuclearisation agreements in 1994, 2005 and 2007 failed to freeze the nuclear program because of Pyongyang’s evasiveness about monitoring and verification. As a fully-fledged nuclear power, North Korea will probably be even more reluctant to accept intrusive inspections today.
With the door to North Korea’s denuclearisation closing, Kim Jong-un believes he can shut it forever and open a new one that will lead the country to become a permanently nuclear-armed state. If the Biden administration decides to take the slippery slope leading to arms control talks with Pyongyang, it will find an eager ‘partner’ in Kim Jong-un.
But it is this excerpt that tells the complete story of the regime and its strategy. This should be no surprise to anyone who has studied north Korea’s political warfare strategy but most turn a blind eye to this. It is from 2012.
‘If you remove the threat’, Ri said, ‘we will feel more secure, and in 10 or 20 years we will be able to consider denuclearisation’. ‘In the meantime,’ he declared, ‘we can sit down and engage in arms control talks as one nuclear power with another’.
And in the meantime we will execute our political warfare strategy based on the use of subversion, coercion, extortion, and force to unify Korea under northern domination to ensure regime survival.
6. When I escaped to South Korea, I felt guilt
The Korea Times · by Park Sung-ae · March 21, 2021
Note the discussion of unification.
7. How Korea Bungled Coronavirus Vaccination
Excerpt: “Korea was the 104th country in the world to start coronavirus vaccinations, around two months slower than the U.S. and U.K. and similar in pace to Southeast Asian and some African countries.”
8. S. Korea to seek other ways to engage with N.K. as overseas spectators banned from Tokyo Olympics: ministry
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · March 22, 2021
9. Unification minister renews support for private sector efforts to resume aid to N. Korea
en.yna.co.kr · by 고병준 · March 22, 2021
We should note the report that all UN personnel have withdrawn from Pyongyang. What makes any think private sector humanitarian assistance is going to be received by the regime? (unless it can be accompanied by massive under the table payoffs).
10. State Department spotlights corruption, abuse in South
koreajoongangdaily.joins.com · by Sarah Kim
Our report is airing South Korea’s dirty laundry – the article below summarizes the recent scandals. etc, of the South in recent years.
11. Moon’s approval rating at all-time low of 34.1 pct: Realmeter
en.yna.co.kr c이치동 · March 22, 2021
But not unexpected for a South Korea lame duck president this far into the single term.
12. Moon’s plan to revive peace initiative through Tokyo Games faces hitch
The Korea Times · March 22, 2021
No chance for a second meeting with the dragon lady, Kim Yo-jong, at an Olympic games. And it worked out so well the last time!!
13. North Korean man extradited to US in sanctions case
The Korea Times · March 22, 2021
Someone asked me my comments on this, e.g., how will this hurt the regime, how significant is the criminal, what does the US hope to gain? Here is my response:
Yes it is significant as you note simply because it is the first extradition of a north Korean who operates Kim Jong-un’s illicit activities network. But it is bigger than that. This is a necessary action if we want to have a rules based international order. This person was breaking US and international law through money laundering activities (and probably more). Extradition is an important international legal and diplomatic tool. It is also significant because it is a direct action against north Korea’s illicit activities network run by Office 39 which is directly responsible for raising hard currency for the royal court economy of Kim Jong-un.
I am not sure if the individual himself is significant, but his knowledge and links to the illicit activities network are certainly significant. I am sure the regime fears that he will be of great intelligence value to the US if he confesses and provides information as part of a possible plea deal. This may be what the regime fears most though they are obviously taking measures to minimize the damage. Cutting off relations may be a diplomatic signal to show displeasure with allowing the extradition but the real reason may be that their illicit business activities may be in jeopardy because of the extradition. There are hundreds of north Korean front companies in Malaysia (according to the research of Dr. Bruce Bechtol) most in partnership with Malaysian businesses. The regime may feel that it is necessary to cut its losses to protect it global illicit activities and network and mitigate the damage that will be done when Mun Choi Myong testifies or provides intelligence to US authorities. Protecting Office 39 and its illicit activities may be more important than the activities being conducted in Malaysia (although Malaysia was a very good location for the regime to do a lot of business).
The US hopes to gain information about the regime’s illicit activities network. It hopes to send a message to the regime and all those conducting illicit activities in support of the regime that we can reach out and get you through international legal and diplomatic means. It will expose Kim Jong-un’s global illicit activities operations to the outside world. It demonstrates the importance of the rules based international order and our willingness to reinforce it.
The regime loses all of the above, exposure, harm to its activities (loss of revenue) and reputation, and possibly losses of other bases of operations when other countries are no longer willing to turn a blind eye to its illicit activities. And most importantly by cutting off relations with Malaysia it is losing a one of its most important bases of operations for its illicit activities. The regime probably assesses it has to give up Malaysia in order to protect the rest of its network.
14. (South Korean) Defense chief to visit UAE, India this week
en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · March 22, 2021
Good timing on the visit to Idia. Will India press the ROK on the Quad?
15. Two border guards fled to China in January to find food
dailynk.com · by Mun Dong Hui · March 22, 2021
Indications of the potential breakdown of the three chains of control and command systems (the traditional military chain, the political chain, and the security chain).
16. Here’s How America Can Strengthen Relations with Japan and South Korea
The National Interest · by Elliot Silverberg and Daniel Aum · March 21, 2021
Conclusion: No doubt these efforts will take considerable discipline and energy to implement. China necessarily gets a vote on the future evolution of the region, as Beijing will push back against any effort which it perceives as a move to contain it. Indeed, engaging China will be critical to the ultimate success of any North Korea policy. Despite potential opposition and the need to cooperate with Beijing where interests align, it is ultimately up to the United States and its allies not merely to counter risks and threats but to push forward a positive vision for the region. Re-energizing trilateral cooperation is undoubtedly an essential place to start.
17. North Korea in Crisis: Food Shortages and Information Lockdown
hrw.org · by Lina Yoon · March 16, 2021
The regime is exploiting COVID to further oppress the Korean people living in the north to sustain it in power.
18. S. Korea’s observation satellite successfully launched into orbit
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · March 22, 2021
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