02/21/2021 News & Commentary – Korea
News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Riley Murray.
1. Defectors to sue unification minister for alleged defamation
2. US generals war Seoul against rush to revamp joint command
3. A quiet North Korea
4. Rebuild the trilateral cooperation (ROK-Japan-US)
5. France sends frigate to East China Sea to join surveillance on North Korea
6. North Korea defections ‘zero’ as meth smuggling and Covid make it impossible to escape
7. North Korea’s economy is ravaged by sanctions and pandemic isolation. Kim is lashing out.
8. North Koreans piloted Bank of Valletta heist with Nigerian social media influencer
9. Ramseyer ‘comfort women’ paper challenged by historians
10. North Korea’s nukes aren’t going anywhere, and the US needs to get over it
11. ICAS Strategy poll – Moon’s Peace Process Doomed To Fail The Security Of Korean Peninsula
12. Outcome of Korea-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Video Teleconference (Feb. 19)
13. South Korea’s prime minister has joined Clubhouse
14. Kimchi feud: Korea rallies support from foreign envoys
1. Defectors to sue unification minister for alleged defamation
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · February 21, 2021
An opportunity to demonstrate rule of law versus rule by law.
2. US generals war Seoul against rush to revamp joint command
koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · February 21, 2021
There is only one general that has publicly stated this and that is General Bell who is the only retired GO named in the article. General Abrams’ statement is consistent with the US position (and the position of military and national security professionals in both the ROK and the US): the conditions must be met to proceed with OPCON transition.
But this article perpetuates so many misconceptions about OPCON transition.
First OPCON transition does not necessarily mean withdrawal of the nuclear umbrella.
Second, OPCON is not being transferred from Washington to Seoul. The future ROK/US Combined Forces Command that is commanded by a ROK general officer will still report to the Military Committee just as the current ROK/US/CFC with a US general in command does. The US DOES NOT control the ROK/US CFC and the ROKG will not control the future ROK/US CFC when OPCON transition is complete. It will be jointly controlled equally for each country through its representatives from their respective national command and military authorities on the Military Committee just as it is now. This is why I think one of the most important conditions for OPCON transition is sufficient information being provided to the press, pundits, politicos, and public so there is a sufficient understanding of what OPCON transition means. The ROK/US Military Committee needs to direct the implementation of a comprehensive information campaign to inform and educate. Successful execution of this should be the fourth condition necessary for OPCON transition.
But I do not think this is ever going to happen. US nuclear weapons will always remain under US control. While consultation is of course appropriate I do not believe any foreign officer is going to be integrated into the nuclear use decision making process.
The US should offer South Korea a major role in implementing the nuclear options if Seoul takes charge, Bennett added.
“I also believe that the conditions have not yet been met, and that the training on the employment nuclear weapons and integration of ROK personnel into this process is going to take some time.”
3. A quiet North Korea
koreajoongangdaily.joins.com – by Kim Pil-Kyu
South Korea is calling for the appointment of a US Special representative for north Korea.
I have received a number of queries from the press about rumors the Biden administration does not intend to appoint a special representative for north Korea nor a special envoy for north Korean human rights.
I think we have to be patient. I am confident that a special envoy for north Korean human rights will be appointed in due time. The North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 specified that “the President shall appoint a special envoy for human rights in North Korea within the Department of State.” https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/4011/text
I am confident the Biden administration will comply with the law.
There is no statutory requirement for a special representative for north Korea that I am aware of. It is possible the Biden administration will want to assign the responsibility to an existing State Department position such as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Pacific. Given the acting secretary Sung Kim’s experience, if he is nominated for the permanent position he could perform the functions of the special envoy for north Korea.
However, what I think could be happening is that before any Korea specific appointments are made, the Biden administration will want to complete the policy review and develop the policy and strategy for the way forward. In fact, I would think the possible appointees may actually be part of the policy review process. I would try to determine who is conducting the review to discern who might be the possible nominees.
That said if the policy includes an arms control component the responsibility for that could fall to the arms control negotiations at State.
I also think the Kim family regime is not ready for engagement with the US given the current situation inside north Korea and the internal pressure on Kim Jong-un. Paradoxically both Kim and Biden have to focus on domestic challenges in the near term.
The bottom line is I think we need to be patient and allow the policy review process to play out. I strongly believe the Biden administration will comply with the law and at least appoint a special envoy for north Korean human rights. If certain current State Department officials in existing positions have sufficient north Korean expertise they could be tasked with performing the duties of the special representative. But again I think the administration will comply with the law and appoint a special envoy for human rights.
But the Joongang Ilbo editorial board is concerned about the lack of potential engagement between the north and the US:
It is concerning how long this uncomfortable silence will continue. If North Korea provokes, each side will have markedly less cards to play. Unless it is a top-down decision style of Trump, it would be harder to start the talks. North Korea would not want to waste the valuable time of the early days of a new administration in the U.S. That’s why we should care more about North Korea policy when Pyongyang is quiet.
4. Rebuild the trilateral cooperation (ROK-Japan-US)
I am gratified to see the Korean media (some news outlets) advocate for better trilateral cooperation. To continue to beat the dead horse, I will again say there will be NO success on the Korean peninsula for any of the three nations without sufficient trilateral cooperation (and the stronger the better).
I would push back slightly on the editorial board painting South Korea with a broad brush about neglecting the ROK/US alliance. First, the professionals in MOFA and MND have not been neglecting the alliance. They have continued to do everything they can to sustain a strong alliance. Second, despite the anti-US sentiment within the extreme progressive wing of the ruling party, the Moon administration continues to invest heavily in both its own military and for sustaining the alliance. I think that criticism detracts from the importance of this Oped in that trilateral cooperation is critical for the national security of all three nations.
5. France sends frigate to East China Sea to join surveillance on North Korea
This is a positive development. We need a strong international coalition to go after north Korean weapons proliferation as well as sanctions evasion activities (to include ship to ship transfers. Canada, Australia, the UK, Korea, and Japan are all contributing. I know there is a joint (combined) operations center in Japan (that includes US, ROK, and Japanese naval officers and I assume our allied partners) that is focused on tracking north Korean malign maritime activity.
6. North Korea defections ‘zero’ as meth smuggling and Covid make it impossible to escape
Mirror · by Chris White · February 20, 2021
An interesting assessment.
China is complicit in the human rights abuses of Koreans from the north. We do need to put pressure on China.
7. North Korea’s economy is ravaged by sanctions and pandemic isolation. Kim is lashing out.
The Washington Post · February 20, 2021
The headline is not completely correct. The north Korean economy is ravaged by the deliberate policy decisions made by Kim Jong-un in response to the natural disasters, COVID 19, and sanctions. He has the ability to fix the economy if he would make the right policy decisions.
Professor Lankov correctly illustrates Kim’s “bankrupt” policy decisions here:
But Kim’s response to the crisis risks appears to be making the situation much worse.
Andrei Lankov, a Russian university professor based in Seoul, called it a “dramatic U-turn.” Kim has turned his back on even modest economic and market reforms and reverted back to de facto Leninism, emphasizing central planning while trying to clamp down on the private entrepreneurial activity that has become a mainstay of the country’s mixed economy, he said.
In speeches to the ruling party, Kim demanded the restoration and strengthening of the system under which the economy runs “under the unified guidance and management of the state,” putting special emphasis on metal and chemical industries as the “main link in the whole chain of economic development.”
Kim also announced plans to expand state control of society, clamp down on foreign culture and media, and launch a “powerful mass campaign against practices running counter to the socialist lifestyle.”
8. North Koreans piloted Bank of Valletta heist with Nigerian social media influencer
Now here is an “alliance” to end all alliances: the mafia like crime family cult of the KFR and the Nigerian princes.
9. Ramseyer ‘comfort women’ paper challenged by historians
10. North Korea’s nukes aren’t going anywhere, and the US needs to get over it
Business Insider · by Bonnie Kristian
Yes but…
That does not mean provide concessions or sanctions relief. It does not mean we should legitimize the regime as a nuclear power. We need to be very careful and not act in a way that Kim interprets his political warfare strategy as a success. Instead we need to execute a superior form of political warfare strategy that has a long term view. A new strategy must be built on deterrence, defense, denuclearization, and resolution of the “Korea question” (para 60 of the Armistice Agreement) by employing a superior form of political warfare. It should consist of 5 lines of effort: comprehensive diplomacy, resolute alliance military strength, pressure through enforced sanctions, cyber defense and offensive operations, and information and influence activities to target the regime elite, the second-tier leadership, and the population to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and separate the Kim family regime from the elite and the 2d tier leadership as well as to prepare the population for unification.
11. ICAS Strategy poll – Moon’s Peace Process Doomed To Fail The Security Of Korean Peninsula
A supporting power point presentation with graphic data can be directly downloaded here: https://www.icasinc.org/strategy/polling15.pptx
12. Outcome of Korea-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Video Teleconference (Feb. 19)
mofa.go.kr · by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
The ROK MOFA readout on the trilateral teleconference. A positive step forward and I hope this continues on a routine basis.
13. South Korea’s prime minister has joined Clubhouse
TechCrunch · by Danny Crichton
Certainly, an interesting development.
Excerpt:
According to local media reports, Chung spoke in a Clubhouse room for over an hour with fellow Democratic Party of Korea member Jung Cheong-rae. In a public Facebook post yesterday, the prime minister said that “I heard this [app] is ‘hot’ these days so I tried it as a nighttime walk.”
He further said “I was a little startled by the unexpected questions and reactions but the new experience was enjoyable. I think I’ll participate from time to time in the future.” Elaborating, he said “the fact that it’s audio-only and everyone can have a conversation without reserve made me think that it’s a better communication tool than any other social media platforms, especially since currently we’re living in the age of non-face-to-face communication.”
14. Kimchi feud: Korea rallies support from foreign envoys
The Korea Times – by Park Han-sol February 21, 2021
Who will win the soft power battle: Korea or China? I have never seen Kimchi in China, though obviously I have never lived there and have not spent as much time there as I have in Korea (more than a decade of living there and a couple of more decades of travel there so I am biased).
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