10/22/2020 News & Commentary – Korea
News and Commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and Published by Riley Murray.
1. U.S. says OPCON transfer will be impossible by 2022
2. Non-weapon materials brought into THAAD base after dispersal of protesters
3. N. Korean nukes highlight importance of strategic deterrence: U.S. commander
4. North Koreans Scoff as Government Mobilizes Them for ’80-Day Battle’
5. North Korea Tells Citizens to Report on Illegal Contact with Foreigners
6. Does Size Matter? North Korea’s Newest ICBM
7. Analyst: North Korea making strides in solid propellant ballistic missiles
8. North Korea’s Kim Lauds Chinese War Dead On Anniversary
9. South Korea Tries to Quell Anxiety Over Flu Shots After 13 Unexplained Deaths
10. FDD | Russia and China Obstruct UN Reporting on North Korea
11. North Korea outbreak: Panic as new disease spreads through hermit state – markets impacted
12. North Korea PARANOIA: Kim Jong-un launches desperate bid to stop spies at border
13. Head of South Korea ruling party sees chance of inter-Korean ‘breakthrough’
14. South Korea Is Caught Between China and the United States
15. South Korea’s Asean strategy needs sturdy pillars of understanding to succeed
16. International humanitarian institutions managed by central power in Pyongyang – retired US diplomat
17. U.S., South Korea alliance facing setback, ex-U.S. commander says
1. U.S. says OPCON transfer will be impossible by 2022
donga.com – 22 October 2020
This is not good. I am getting very worried about the alliance. This is a more significant problem than the SMA stalemate.
2. Non-weapon materials brought into THAAD base after dispersal of protesters
en.yna.co.kr · by 유청모 · October 22, 2020
This is one of the issues few Americans are aware of. Very hardcore anti-American leftist and well organized activists continue to protest the THAAD deployment and work to prevent resupply of the THAAD battery. They block the access road 24-7 and the ROK government has been unable to remove them. These are not the same type of protestors we see in Seoul. These are sophisticated activists who know how to manipulate the government with their activities and through social media.
3. N. Korean nukes highlight importance of strategic deterrence: U.S. commander
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · October 22, 2020
Is Kim Jong-un deterred? What does deter him? Do “traditional” methods of deterrence work? Have we been lulled into a false sense of security because we have successfully deterred the resumption of hostilities for the past 67 years? How do we know deterrence is actually working? As Sir Lawrence Freedman says, “Deterrence works. Until it doesn’t.”
4. North Koreans Scoff as Government Mobilizes Them for ’80-Day Battle’
Again, I am grateful for the reporting Radio Free Asia and Voice of America do to provide us insights into what is happening inside north Korea.
5. North Korea Tells Citizens to Report on Illegal Contact with Foreigners
As Dr. Jung Pak often asks: Who does Kim Jong-un fear more? The US or the Korean people living in the north? It is the Korean people who he fears the most and he really fears the people when they are armed with information. Therefore, he must prevent foreign contacts.
6. Does Size Matter? North Korea’s Newest ICBM
38north.org · by Michael Elleman · October 21, 2020
Yes, it does. But, as Michael Ellemna notes, the real capability we need to be concerned with is the development of solid-fuel ICBM. Conclusion: “As it stands today, Kim Jong Un cannot be certain that his ICBMs will succeed in striking the US mainland. Perhaps the development of the Hwasong-16 is a near-term solution to the perceived need for a mobile, multiple-warhead ICBM. But North Korea has an active solid-fuel development and production infrastructure in place to facilitate the creation of large solid-fuel boosters for an ICBM. Thus, a more prudent and cost-effective path forward would focus on the longer-term development of solid-fuel technologies and a solid ICBM. In a best-case scenario, it will take longer than four or five years to succeed in this enterprise. The resulting ICBM, however, would be far more survivable and operationally flexible than a Hwasong-16, which will have limited mobility. Which direction the North’s ICBM development program will take remains to be seen.”
7. Analyst: North Korea making strides in solid propellant ballistic missiles
upi.com – by Elizabeth Shim – 20 October 2020
8. North Korea’s Kim Lauds Chinese War Dead On Anniversary
Barron’s · by AFP – Agence France Presse
Another indication that Kim wants to sustain close relations with China.
9. South Korea Tries to Quell Anxiety Over Flu Shots After 13 Unexplained Deaths
The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun and Sui-Lee Wee · October 21, 2020
I hope they can determine the cause of these deaths. This can obviously have long term negative effects on fighting COVID-19.
10. FDD | Russia and China Obstruct UN Reporting on North Korea
fdd.org · by Andrea Stricker · October 21, 2020
Important analysis from our FDD colleague Andrea Stricker. Russia and China cannot get a pass for their complicity in helping north Korea evade sanctions even if it is only hindering the Panel of Experts (but it goes well beyond that).
11. North Korea outbreak: Panic as new disease spreads through hermit state – markets impacted
Express · by Steven Brown · October 22, 2020
Another food source for the Korean people is compromised. Why can the north supposedly prevent a spread of COVID-19 but not Swine Flu?
12. North Korea PARANOIA: Kim Jong-un launches desperate bid to stop spies at border
Express · by Luke Hawker · October 22, 2020
Paranoia is in the DNA of all authoritarian leaders, but I think it courses through the veins of the Kim family regime.
13. Head of South Korea ruling party sees chance of inter-Korean ‘breakthrough’
upi.com – by Thomas Maresca – 21 October 2020
With all due respect there is only one word to describe this: delusional. I urge the Moon administration to re-examine its assumptions upon which it is basing its policy toward north Korea. I think it is wrong to assume that Kim shares President Moon’s vision for engagement and for peace and reconciliation. A better assumption is that Kim Jong-un seeks the domination of the Korean peninsula. There is much more evidence to support this assumption.
14. South Korea Is Caught Between China and the United States
carnegieendowment.org · by Chung Min Lee
Important analysis from a former National Security Advisor.
15. South Korea’s Asean strategy needs sturdy pillars of understanding to succeed
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3106500/south-koreas-asean-strategy-needs-sturdy-pillars-understanding – by Pou Sothirak – 22 October 2020
My Korean friends tell me the ROK’s Southern Strategy is complementary to and supportive of the US strategy for a Free and Open INDOPACIFIC.
16. International humanitarian institutions managed by central power in Pyongyang – retired US diplomat
rnz.co.nz · October 22, 2020
This is what the Kim family regime does. All the “Friendship Society” are exploited and controlled by the regime.
17. U.S., South Korea alliance facing setback, ex-U.S. commander says
upi.com – by Elizabeth Shim – 21 October 2020
I participated in this conference. General Brooks provided important advice on how to repair and manage the alliance in the mutual interests of both the ROK and US. He provided one of the best descriptions of what is and is not OPCON transition and what it means and does not mean.
“Reasoning will never make a man correct an ill opinion which by reasoning he never acquired.”
– Jonathan Swift
“The sign of an intelligent people is their ability to control emotions by the application of reason.”
– Marya Mannes
“Technology is so much fun but we can drown in our technology. The fog of information can drive out knowledge.”
– Daniel J. Boorstin