6/17/2020 News & Commentary – Korea
News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Duncan Moore.
1. North Korea blows up a strategic building to blackmail the U.S. Don’t fall for it.
2. Why North Korea just blew up its de facto embassy with South Korea
3. (North Korean Statements) S. Korean authorities plead for accepting special envoys and commentary on height of impudence
4. South Korea vows to respond sternly if North keeps raising tensions
5. N.Korea’s threats continue but Kim Jong-Un keeps in background
6. Why is North Korea starting a crisis now?
7. Bureau 39 Kim’s Cash Machine 01 June 2020
8. Kim may have more targets after blowing up Korea liaison office
9. Korean War: open questions (Open question: the lasting legacies of Korean War special operations)
10. Knowing when to flinch
11. Sister of North Korea’s Kim Jong Un rises in prominence as threats replace outreach
12. Could North Korea survive without Kim Jong-Un?
13. South Korean Unification Minister offers to step down amid worsening spat with North Korea
14. N. Korea will pay price if it takes actual military action: defense ministry
15. Cheong Wa Dae hits back at N. Korea’s ‘rude, senseless’ criticism of Moon
16. N.Korea threatens more provocations
17. N.Korea’s antics signal desperation
1. North Korea blows up a strategic building to blackmail the U.S. Don’t fall for it.
NBC News · by David Maxwell & Mathew Ha · June 16, 2020
Our latest article from Mathew Ha and me.
2. Why North Korea just blew up its de facto embassy with South Korea
The Washington Post · by Rick Noack · June 16, 2020
Why? Because the regime is continuing to execute its blackmail diplomacy in support of its political warfare strategy to execute its “long con.”
Here some my assessment thoughts:
1. The bottom line: the demolition of the liaison office in Kaesong is designed to undermine President Moon’s “peace strategy,” cause further division in the ROK/US alliance, and support its blackmail diplomacy – the use of increased tensions and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. This action is especially shrewd, because they destroyed a ROK government built facility that was on North Korean territory in order to raise tensions without causing a kinetic response that would possibly occur if they conducted another provocation along the lines of the Cheonan sinking (murder of 46 South Korean sailors in 2010) or the Yongpyong Island shelling (killing 5 South Korean civilians in 2010).
2. Why did the North conduct this action?
A. The regime is under enormous internal pressure for failing to gain sanctions relief from the ROK and US.
B. It must demonstrate strength to its elite and military and shift the blame for failure to the ROK and/or US.
C. The regime is exploiting the friction in the ROK/US alliance over burden sharing and other issues and this may be designed to drive a wedge further in the alliance. A key element of North Korean strategy is to split the ROK/US alliance to drive US forces from the peninsula.
D. This could be Kim Yo-Jong’s “coming out party.” She has been appointed to high office in the party and given responsibility for North-South relations. This could be to establish her legitimacy in preparation for a possible future succession.
3. What should the ROK and the ROK/US alliance do?
A. This should be a wake call for the Moon administration to realize its strategy is built on the false assumption that North Korea wants to act as a responsible member of the international community. The Moon administration must change its naive strategy.
B. The alliance must respond with strength and resolve – reinitiate combined exercises this summer and deploy strategic assets on a routine basis to maintain deterrence.
C. The ROK and US must solve alliance problems immediately to prevent further exploitation by the regime.
D. The Alliance must sustain maximum pressure.
E. This action confirms the Kim family regime has never wavered from executing its strategy based on subversion, coercion/extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to dominate the Korean peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State of North Korea to ensure the survival of the Kim family regime.
3. (North Korean statements) S. Korean authorities plead for accepting special envoys and commentary on height of impudence
KCNA Watch · by KCNA.kp · June 17, 2020
Two provocative statements from North Korea (of a number of them). North Korea is the height of hypocrisy. It is ratcheting up the bellicose rhetoric as it conducts provocations yet blames South Korea for everything. There is some great vocabulary in these two messages.
4. South Korea vows to respond sternly if North keeps raising tensions
Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin & Andrew Heavens · June 16, 2020
This should be a wakeup call for the Moon administration. North Korea is showing its true colors. It is good to read this statement from the Blue House. But actions speak louder than words.
5. N.Korea’s threats continue but Kim Jong-Un keeps in background
The Chosun Ilbo · by Kim Myong-Song · June 16, 2020
This gives some credence to the idea that Kim Jong-Un is allowing his sister to take the lead. This could be about preparing and legitimizing Kim Yo-Jong for succession. It could also give Kim Jong-Un the opportunity to return to a charm offensive and blame Kim Yo-Jong when the time is right.
6. Why Is North Korea starting a crisis now?
The National Interest · by Salvatore Babones · June 16, 2020
Hmmm … Are our three carriers really deployed in response to tensions on the Korean peninsula? Maybe one or two will be diverted, but I think these carriers were deployed for other reasons.
Regarding what may be happening in Pyongyang we must keep in mind that North Korea is masterful at denial and deception. We have to question everything we see coming from the North and question every statement. Sometimes the statements say exactly what they mean and other times they are telling us what the want us to hear to shape their perception of the information environment.
7. Bureau 39 Kim’s Cash Machine 01 June 2020
YouTube · posted by Noor Khan · June 3, 2020
Bureau (Office, Department, Room) 39.
Video at the link above. Sent from a good friend and colleague. Below is her summary of the show. Department 39 is one of the key organizations in North Korea. This is worth spending 42 minutes watching.
Features Remco Breuker.
Overseas workers are highlighted at 15:27.
-150,000 total
-up to 40,000 in Russia
-up to 100,000 in China
-Kuwait, Malaysia, Cambodia (some outdated info now; I think the NK built museum in Siem Reap was shut down), Mongolia, Oman, Qatar, UAE, and in “African countries”
-NK workers in Poland shipyards and construction sites (footage of construction site and barracks at 17:02; one person talks, says they can go out alone on Sundays)
-workers earn about 90 Euros per month (18:54)
-former Bureau 39 agent in China, spoke in Seoul, had plastic surgery because of NK death threats (19:35)
-footage of Chinese textile factory with NK workers (24:31)
-Remco tries to determine whether European brands work with Chinese companies that directly or indirectly employ North Koreans
-NK workers in Chinese factories: yes, in slavelike conditions, “but more than that, Chinese factories outsource to North Korean factories in North Korea” (25:20)
-if you look closer at some of these companies’ supply chains, sometimes you find that up to 90% of production does not take place in China
-case study: company called Vent D’est (list of customers on its website includes ZARA and Georgio Armani
-Chinese company sends cloth/fabric to NK; one month later, sewn clothes are returned to China in the same container
-‘In the same database, I found the bureaucratic department that is responsible for managing the production of textiles for one of the concentration camps outside of Pyongyang.’
-NK diplomats with diplomatic immunity carry the cash back to Pyongyang
Syria
-Syria has the greatest levels of prohibited cooperation with NK military entities
-Bureau 39 runs ships under false flags, sending large numbers of weapons and grenades to Syria
-Between 2012 and 2017, at least 40 shipments from NK passed through the Suez Canal
-in 2018, the UN managed to have one of the ships intercepted – found acid resistant tiles and valves which could be used in ballistic missile programs, connected to SSRC (36:46)
Cyber (40:00)
-Wannacry
-1000 IP addresses
-600-1300 hackers
-Lazarus
-NK steals about 80%; Russia about 20%
8. Kim may have more targets after blowing up Korea liaison office
Bloomberg · by Jon Herskovitz · June 16, 2020
I think we are going to see the frog slowly boil over the next few months. It is surely possible that the regime could destroy the buildings at Kumgangsan. They have told the South Koreans they wanted them removed because they are in a state of disrepair after tourism was suspended.
But now we are expecting that possibility. Will it have an effect if we are expecting it? While we focus on that “target” what will we be missing and what should we focus on?
9. Korean War: open questions (Open question: the lasting legacies of Korean War special operations)
The Wilson Quarterly · by Gregg Brazinsky, Chen Jian, Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Jiyul Kim, & Michael Devine · Summer 2020
An excellent summary of the tragic special operations history in the Korea War – with which most people are unfamiliar.
10. Knowing when to flinch
The Korea Times · by Steve Tharp · May 02, 2017
This is actually from three years ago but popped up in my news feed today. It could not be more timely. It was written by Steve Tharp, who is a retired US Army officer, a long time Korea hand, and has spent a lot of time on the DMZ at Panmunjom with the North Koreans.
After C. Turner Joy’s book, How Communists Negotiate and Chuck Down’s book, Over The Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy, this is the best summary of the North’s negotiating tactics.
We should all refer to this template to analyze North Korean blackmail diplomacy and the use of tensions and provocations as part of its negotiating strategy.
While we do not recognize it, what the regime is doing this week with its rhetoric and the demolition of the liaison building is shaping the negotiating environment for future actions.
11. Sister of North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un rises in prominence as threats replace outreach
The Washington Post · by Simon Denyer & Min Joo Kim · June 16, 2017
Yes, Kim Yo-Jong bears watching. She seems to have been given quite a bit of power and some very prominent and important titles in some of the key party organizations.
Yes, it could be for succession preparation. It could be because her brother trusts only her. And it could be that KJU is using her as the point person to allow him to maintain his relationship with President Trump and to allow him to blame her if he decides to resume a charm offensive with the South. He is giving the appearance of keeping his hands clean, though we all know he has approved every decision and every message that has gone out in Kim Yo-Jong’s name (unless he is incapacitated due to his health. In that case this may be about succession).
12. Could North Korea survive without Kim Jong-Un?
The National Interest · by Doug Bandow · June 16, 2020
Give North Korea to China? The second best alternative? Do we really think China is going to exert “full influence” over North Korea?
I am glad we have been thinking about this for the past few decades. See Bob Collin’s seven phases of regime collapse in “When North Korea Falls” (Robert Kaplan, The Atlantic, October 2006).
Here are a few of my articles.
“A Strategy for Dealing with North Korea’s Provocations”
“Should the United States Support Korean Unification and If So, How?”
“Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the United States Military”
Also Dr. Tara O’s book: The Collapse of North Korea: Challenges, Planning and Geopolitics of Unification
And then there is Dr. Burce Bennett’s seminal RAND study: Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse
13. South Korean Unification Minister offers to step down amid worsening spat with North Korea
CNN · by Joshua Berlinger and Jake Kwon · June 17, 2020
I often disagree with the policies of the Ministry of Unification, especially those toward the escapees/defectors and their leaflet operations. But this is a mistake. He should not have offered to do this. This plays right into the hands of the Kim family regime. One of the major lines of effort in the regime’s strategy is subversion against the ROK. The regime will assess this and other moves within the Korean government as a result of its bellicose rhetoric and actions. This invites more action to try to subvert South Korea.
What is subversion?
The undermining of the power and authority of an established system or institution. As in: “the ruthless subversion of democracy.”
This is an Ideological War – a choice between:
Shared ROK/US Values à Freedom and individual liberty, liberal democracy, rule of law, free market economy, and human rights
Kim family regime (KFR) “values” à Juche/Kimilsungism, Socialist Workers Paradise, Songun, Songbun, Byungjin, rule BY law, and denial of human rights to sustain KFR power
NK engages in active subversion of the ROK as well as the ROK/US Alliance as a fundamental part of its strategy.
14. N. Korea will pay price if it takes actual military action: defense ministry
Yonhap News Agency · by Choi Soo-Hyang & Oh Seok-Min · June 17, 2020
The right words. Again, actions speak louder than words. If the North conducts a kinetic provocation against the South, the ROK military must respond with decisive force at the time and place of the provocation. There cannot be a repeat of 2010 or the recent 30 minute delay in responding to the North Korean firing on a South Korean guard post.
15. Cheong Wa Dae hits back at N. Korea’s ‘rude, senseless’ criticism of Moon
Yonhap News Agency · by Lee Chi-Dong · June 17, 2020
This is one of the problems on the Korean peninsula. The South says the North’s words and actions “‘fundamentally harm’ mutual trust between the leaders of the two sides.” It is an erroneous assumption to believe there is “mutual trust” on the Korea peninsula. Kim Jong-Un trusts no one, save perhaps Kim Yo-Jong. The Moon administration executes strategy based on the assumption of mutual trust. This is a recipe for failure. The North’s actions over the past two years demonstrate the regime cannot be trusted. And the track record for the last seven decades reinforces this. The Moon administration must change its strategy and shift to an alliance strategy that seeks to solve the “Korea question.”
16. N.Korea threatens more provocations
The Chosun Ilbo · by Yang Seung-Sik · June 17, 2020
Of course they do. Again, we should use Steve Tharp’s 8-step template for understanding the provocation cycle. Consider this cycle in the short term and long term. This cycle has been taking place since 2017 and the elections of Trump and Kim. In terms the Singapore Summit and the North-South meetings at Panmunjom and Pyongyang we can see steps 7 and 8 playing out.
17. N.Korea’s Antics Signal Desperation
The Chosun Ilbo · by Editorial · June 17, 2020
A good op-ed. It notes the extreme pressure the regime is under in Pyongyang. It provides a brief history of some the major and recent attempts at blackmail diplomacy. It also describes a strange statement by a South Korean Minjoo party member comparing the situation to the George Llyod situation in the US. The editorial board says if the North wants to “breathe again,” it needs to give up its nuclear weapons.
But here is the buried lede: although the ROK government is not publicly admitting this, it appears it has given up on its effort to try to get the North to denuclearize. Rather, the ROKG is only focusing on “publicity stunts.” The board also says they think Trump may do something with Kim before the election. (I think that is doubtful).
“If you want to know who controls you, look at who you are not allowed to criticize.”
– Voltaire
“Experience is not what happens to you; it’s what you do with what happens to you.”
– Aldous Huxley
“He who knows all the answers has not been asked all the questions.”
– Confucius
