Lines Blurring Between Special Ops, Conventional Forces, Mattis Says
Lines Blurring Between Special Ops, Conventional Forces, Mattis Says
Jim Garamone – DoD News
There is a blurring line that separates conventional operating forces from special operations forces and the defense secretary expects general purpose forces will eventually shoulder missions once the province of their special forces brethren.
Defense Secretary James N. Mattis told Pentagon reporters today that the experiences of war since 9/11 have blurred the lines.
This change will not be enshrined in strategy, he said, but will come about as a result of policy and the growth of general purpose forces’ capabilities.
Growth of General Purpose Force Capabilities
Mattis said he expects more general purpose forces to take on missions in Iraq and Syria. “In the Trans-Sahel [region of Africa], many of the force supporting the French effort are general purpose forces,” the secretary said.
If a mission comes up, the secretary said he’ll determine the parameters of it and pass that to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chairman will then determine what forces take on that mission. They may be special operations forces or general purpose forces with unique capabilities.
U.S. Military Evolves Through War Experiences
This is an evolution of the U.S. military spurred by the lessons of war, the secretary said.
Mattis said he does not want a force that is dominant in yesterday’s challenges, but irrelevant in today’s. The general purpose force, he added, is going to have to have the capabilities that were once associated only with special operations forces.
The secretary gave the example of remotely piloted vehicles. In 2001, he said, the only people who ran drones were special operations forces.
In 2007, an Army captain on one street was looking at a feed from a drone overhead with strike capabilities from the Navy and Army standing by, the secretary said. In the meantime, a “CIA guy was in his headquarters talking with one of his agents in an Army brigade,” Mattis said. “That is not what an Army brigade did in Desert Storm or the Fulda Gap [in what was then West Germany]. The change happened because war initiated those changes. Those are now common capabilities.”
USSOCOM lists 12 core activities (http://www.socom.mil/about/core-activities) that they execute. If Mr. Mattis is correct (and I believe he is), and conventional forces continue to take on more missions/ activities that once fell exclusively under SOF, then should we look at reducing not only the number of SOF we have as well as their core activities (activities to be refined & laser-focused on only those that must be conducted in politically sensitive environments)? Would this also translate into a eventual reduction in conventional forces as well in favor of increasing & refining their capabilities through increased use of artificial intelligence/ drone systems & expanded joint training?
FWIW, I would look at reorganizing the Marine Corps into a smaller but more SOF-oriented force. The Marines are forward-deployed everywhere & can quickly respond, have their own ground, air, & sea elements (with much help from the Navy), Marine elements already task organize as “special operations capable” so expanding & enhancing those capabilities shouldn’t be too difficult; MARSOC has established the “Raider” units which have missions similar to US Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs (just make them “Marine SEALs”)…in short, the Marines seem tailor-made for reorganization into a more streamlined (but still sizeable) conventional force that can rapidly adapt to take on more SOF-like activities.
SOF Imperatives and SOF Truths are as applicable to GPF now as they are to SOF.
Where and who are Army Special Forces’ Bank, McClure, Volckmann, Yarborough…?
In general, could what we are talking about here be best understood in terms of irregular warfare, for example, as follows:
BEGIN QUOTE
CHAPTER ONE Introduction:
OVERVIEW
… The ancient Sun Tzu is more relevant today; although battles should be won, “winning 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill; defeating the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” There is more than one way to compel an enemy. …
IRREGULAR WARFARE
…
1-19. JP 1-02 defines IW as “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” IW is inherently a protracted conflict that will test the resolve of the United States and its partners. Adversaries will pursue IW strategies, employing a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic capabilities to undermine and erode the influence and will of the United States and its strategic partners. Meeting these challenges and combating this approach will require the concerted efforts of all instruments of U.S. national power.
1-20. IW is about people, not platforms. IW does not depend on military prowess alone. It also relies on the understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. Although IW is a violent struggle, not all participating irregulars or irregular forces are necessarily armed. People, more so than weaponry, platforms, and advanced technology, will be the key to success in IW. Successful IW relies on building relationships and partnerships at the local level. It takes patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people within the joint force to execute IW.
1-21. Waging protracted IW depends on building global capability and capacity. IW will not be won by the United States alone but rather through combined efforts with multinational partners. Combined IW will require the joint force to establish a long-term sustained presence in numerous countries to build partner capability and capacity. This capability and capacity extends U.S. operational reach, multiplies forces available, and provides increased options for defeating adversaries. The constituent activities of IW are:
– Insurgency.
– COIN.
– UW.
– Terrorism.
– CT.
– FID.
– Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
– Strategic communication (SC).
– PSYOP.
– Civil-military operations (CMO).
– Information operations (IO).
– Intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) activities.
– Transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions that support or sustain IW.
– Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries.
1-22. The above list of operations and activities can be conducted within IW; however, they are not new and most are addressed in current joint and Service doctrine. What is new is their application within the IW conceptual construct. The list of activities considered together is also useful in characterizing how IW is distinct from conventional warfare and its emphasis on major combat operations (MCO). Particularly noteworthy is that UW (including support for insurgencies), CT, FID, PSYOP, and CMO/CAO are ARSOF core tasks; thus, ARSOF are well-suited to be major practitioners of IW.
…
END QUOTE
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf
“Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training, often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.” JP3-05
The definition of what makes a “Special Operation” is as good as any definition in joint doctrine. Better than most.
So, by definition, three things should be clear: Conventional Forces are misused when asked to conduct a special operation, and most operations conducted by SOF are not special operations. But Special Operations Units and personnel are supposed to be able to conduct special operations when tasked.
None of the SOF core missions are inherently “special operations.”
From our article above:
BEGIN QUOTE
“Mattis said he expects more general purpose forces to take on missions in Iraq and Syria. “In the Trans-Sahel [region of Africa], many of the force supporting the French effort are general purpose forces,” the secretary said.
END QUOTE
If one considers — that the primary problem facing the U.S./the West today — is that certain of our opponents are employing a strategy of “political attrition” against us.
(Thus, not a strategy designed to gradually erode the combat power of our armed forces but, rather, a strategy designed to gradually erode our will to pursue our — expansionary — “limited” wars/our such “wars of choice;” this, at the expense of other, possibly much more important requirements for our nation. Such a choice/such a trade-off not being present in a — non-expansionary — “total” war/a “war for survival?”)
Then one comes to understand the effort being made by the U.S./the West today relates primarily to:
a. Finding how to pursue one’s — expansionary — “limited” wars/one’s such “wars of choice;” this,
b. In some exceptionally cheap and economical way.
(The goal here being to use so few resources — in the prosecution of these such “limited” wars/these such “wars of choice” — that we can [a] continue to use “guns” to pursue “butter” and yet [b] avoid the “political attrition” trap addressed above.)
It is as to this requirement (a cheaper way to wage our “limited” wars/our “wars of choice”; this, so as to continue to be able to use “guns” to pursue “butter” and yet avoid the “political attrition” trap) that, I believe, has brought our use of special operations forces to the fore.
If, however, due to the insufficiency of our special operations forces for these purposes, we now must, AGAIN, apply our general purpose forces to our such efforts, then have we not fallen BACK into the “political attrition” trap?
Herein, asking the U.S./Western populations — and the politicians representing same — to sacrifice “butter” for “guns?” This, in a situation wherein neither the “threat,” nor the projected gain from such expansionary efforts, warrant such a diversion of exceptionally limited and finite resources?
(Note: I have obviously taken an “imperial” view of this situation, much as Andrew Mack seems to have done in his, much consulted by me here, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetrical Conflict.” https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Mack%20WP%201975%20Asymm%20Conf.pdf Herein, Mack seeming to suggest, much like C.E. Callwell before him, that “small wars” — between Big Nations and Smaller Entities — these can generally only be understood in “imperial,” “limited” and, thus, “wars of choice” terms? https://www.amazon.com/Small-Wars-Their-Principles-Practice/dp/1438513887)