Welcome to the Age of the Commando
Welcome to the Age of the Commando by Matt Gallagher, New York Times
… The mythos of Special Operations has seized our nation’s popular imagination, and has proved to be the one prism through which the public will engage with America’s wars. From the box office to bookstores, the Special Ops commando — quiet and professional, stoic and square-jawed — thrives. That he works in the shadows, where missions are classified and enemy combatants come in silhouettes of night-vision green, is all for the better — details only complicate. We like our heroes sanitized, perhaps especially in murky times like these.
The age of the commando, though, is more than pop cultural fantasy emanating from Hollywood. It’s now a significant part of our military strategy.
Last month the White House announced the nomination of Gen. Joseph L. Votel to lead United States Central Command, which is responsible for military operations in 20 countries in the Middle East and Central Asia, including Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Syria and Saudi Arabia — in other words, the hotbed of our geopolitical conflicts. General Votel has been the head of the military’s Special Operations Command since 2014. His Central Command nomination represents a break in tradition; it has almost always gone to generals of more conventional backgrounds. Military analysts hailed it as a sign of the Obama administration’s trust in, and reliance on, Special Operations…
I think Anthony Cordesman might have coined the phrase of the era: “Strategic Tokenism” for the use of SOF. http://bit.ly/1PYsPJj
But this article, although written by a former Army Captain with no love lost for special operations, should make one think. This entire article focuses on only one aspect of Special Operations and the smallest part at that. This is all about the forces that conduct surgical strike (the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence adversaries and threats.) It does not talk about the vast majority of special operations being conducted around the world that are defined as special warfare (the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.)
This article and all the emphasis on surgical strike (despite the words of senior leaders, to include GEN Votel who try to talk about the importance of special warfare and unconventional warfare see the JFQ article: http://bit.ly/1SRbTVV ) really should lead one to think of whether we are correctly organized for special operations. The dominant special operations organization is JSOC and its national mission forces. Is there really a need for 4 star functional combatant command? Why does JSOC need a higher headquarters? What value does USSOCOM add to JSOC operations?
I am coming to think that the Army actually appreciates the special warfare capabilities that reside in Army Special Operations more than the rest of USSOCOM. After all it is the Army that has incorporated special warfare and surgical strike as the doctrinal descriptions of special warfare and surgical strike and not USSOCOM. I think General Votel is the only member of USSOCOM in Tampa to use the words special warfare (again see this JFQ article http://bit.ly/1SRbTVV)
What we do not have is an organization that is organized and optimized to conduct special warfare. Perhaps the Army ought to recall its special operations forces (assuming that Title 10 Section 167 could be repealed) and form a Special Warfare organization that would be organized, trained, equipped, and optimized for special warfare. The forces exist to conduct special warfare but there is no organization to conduct special warfare with the priorities, authorities, and resources similar to the scale of those that exist with our premier surgical strike organization. Of course my words are sacrilege and I will probably be forced to turn in my SOF union card but my extreme rhetoric is really meant to ask are we giving sufficient priority to our special warfare capabilities. Again, I think the Army appreciates them perhaps a bit more than the broader SOF community and certainly more than our policy makers and political leaders who desire the strategic tokenism offered by employment of our surgical strike forces (and I do not mean to disparage those forces at all – we have the best in the world and we need to sustain the highest level of capability within that force). But I am not the first to ask these questions. In 2009 someone named Yasotay asked whether we still need a USSOCOM at this link: http://bit.ly/20fhBWf (Full disclosure – I do believe in USSOCOM but I believe we need to place greater priority on our special warfare forces but not at the expense of our surgical strike forces.)
SOF should exist for crucial missions where technical skills (mountain climbing, diving, using submersibles)or rare personal skills (the ability to pass as an Arab etc.)are a must. Variations of standard infantry tactics such as the raid or ambush or teaching locals how to be infantrymen shouldn’t require SOF to execute them. If they are it is an indication of shortfalls in infantry recruiting, training and leadership.
One could also question if it’s wise to officially inform most of the army that they are not elite or are 2nd or 3rd Tier. Creating a situation where ambitious soldiers spend a great deal of time trying to escape to a more fashionable unit can’t be good for the force as a whole. Better they spend their time trying to improve their current unit so it’s recognized as first rate.
As long as we continue to understand and describe problems in “surgical strike” terms, we will continue to provide a predominantly surgical strike solution. SOF is what our policy leaders want it to be.
With better understanding of problems, better education of policy leaders – we get to a more special warfare dominated approach.
Listening to the Presidential debates and various House and Senate forums the majority show little inclination toward evolution; nor do the “experts” who clean a living from the very faulty thinking that has brought us to where we are today.
There is a lit if money in getting this wrong, and both sides if the aisle are equally culpable in that regard.
From the author’s article above:
“In the political sense, the policy works. The secrecy surrounding Special Ops keeps the heavy human costs of war off the front pages. But in doing so, it also keeps the nonmilitary public wholly disconnected from the armed violence carried out in our name. It enables our state of perpetual warfare, and ensures that as little as we care and understand today, we’ll care and understand even less tomorrow.”
BINGO ! There you go ! Exactly ! In a nutshell !
In this regard to especially focus in on:
a. The specific words above, to wit: “enables our state of perpetual warfare, and ensures that as little as we care and understand today, we’ll care and understand even less tomorrow.” And to.
b. Compare this to my similar explanation below — which is to be seen, likewise and in this exact same “perpetual war” terms — as how we are to understand “The Age of the Commando” today and going forward:
BEGIN EXPLANATION:
President Obama’s (and future presidents’) use primarily of special operations and air forces must be viewed from the following strategic point of view.
Thus, as a means/method of (1) defeating our enemies’ “political attrition” strategy and of (2) achieving, in spite of this, our political objective — which is — the transformation of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
Our enemies’ “political attrition” strategy is designed to provide that the U.S./the West, via over-extension, over-commitment and associated political exhaustion might, as in Vietnam, have to (1) come home and have to (2) leave the region entirely in the hands of our enemies; this with, and again as in Vietnam:
a. Our political objective — of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western lines — not realized and with
b. Our enemies political objective — of transforming outlying states and societies more along NON-western political, economic and social lines — achieved.
Thus, by using primarily special operations and air forces, U.S./Western leaders hope to:
a. Overcome/defeat our enemies such “political attrition” strategy.
b. Never have to go home, never have to leave the field of battle and never have to leave the region entirely in the hands of our enemies. And, thus, be able to
1. Continue to pursue our goal — of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines — indefinitely and
2. Continue to be able to thwart, indefinitely (and via various disenchantment, demoralization and exhaustion means), our enemies’ goal of transforming outlying states and societies more along NON-western/less-western political, economic and social lines.
Thus, via the “limited engagement” approach outlined above (the use primarily of special operations and air forces) we might be able, unlike Vietnam, to “stay on” and “fight on” indefinitely.
Such would not be the case if we played into the enemies hands, played by the enemies’ rules, took the enemies’ bait and “over-committed” via the use of large numbers of ground forces; this in:
a. The endless number of places that the enemy might choose to appear and reappear indefinitely and in
b. The endless number of guise (AQ; ISIS, etc.) that the enemy might decide to take on.
Thus, to understand how:
a. An endless commitment of large numbers of ground forces is not considered to be a reasonable and/or sustainable strategy. And to understand how:
b. An endless commitment of (much smaller numbers) of special operations and air forces is — in the “endless war” light offered above — considered to be a much more intelligent approach.
END EXPLANATION
What about “special warfare?”
Certainly fits, I believe, the “more-limited approach needed for endless/perpetual war” mold offered by the author and I above.
But takes someone much more informed than either he or I, I believe, to carefully outline how this approach — as compared to “surgical strike” above — will better accomplish the mission of:
a. Facilitating our transformation of outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and of
b. Preventing the enemy from moving these same states and societies in some other direction.
Herein to ask what seems to be the logical question re: special warfare:
1. If no government exists to coerce or overthrow,
2. Or if a government does exist but we do not — for newly-made-obvious reasons — wish to overthrow it; these facts providing us with no coercive leverage,
3. Then how might special warfare apply/find utility; this,
4. As per the mission-set outlined at “a” and “b” immediately above?
Slap,
If you go down this well-trodden path you must be willing to give up your uniform and all that entails.
Sure there’re folks who are willing to do that but the military find such folks difficult to process / control / recognize – especially if it goes badly.
The fact ghosts are always sent to shit-holes makes the recruitment that much harder/complex
RC
Was this 1999 Colin Gray piece mentioned here before?
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/99spring/gray.htm
That Parameters article pretty much covers everything.
102 Days Versus 88 Days:
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/support-grows-for-standing-up-an-unconventional-warfare-command/
Because the military –or more accurately the Deep State–as Mike Lofgren uses the term:
cannot look honestly at what happened in Afghanistan, it can never really write a true history or have a better understanding of what SOF needs, aside from careerist or money making aspirations.
It is a shame in so many ways, not least of which would be an intellectual revitalization of a strangely dead intellectual field, a complete lack of rigor and creativity.
The peer reviewed journal Small Wars and Insurgencies does have several new articles on Afghanistan that look promising. Washington operators are not remotely interested in reading these things and are in love with their own ignorance–or the ignorance of the larger public.