Goodbye to Land Warfare? No, Says Controversial New Study
Goodbye to Land Warfare? No, Says Controversial New Study by Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian
The Future of Land Warfare, by Michael O’Hanlon of the Washington-based Brookings thinktank, is an antidote to conventional wisdom. The author refers to “the supposed obsolescene of large-scale ground combat”, reflected in official American policy and defence reviews.
He concludes that the size of the US army, which some commentators – notably senior members of other branches of the armed forces – want to slash should stay where it is now: about 500,000 active duty soldiers and 550,000 reservists.
They should have the capability to wage one major “all-out regional battle” while “contributing substantially” to two multiyear, multilateral, operations.
Though O’Hanlon’s arguments are directly mainly at the US, they can apply easily to other Nato members. European countries with the biggest armies are imposing significant cuts…
Is it acceptable yet to mock any argument against land armies? I’ve heard a version of this argument all of my 13 years in uniform plus my time as a cadet. More to the point, is there anyone outside of the Navy and Air Force (and associated contractors) who credibly thinks this is even a question?
If a New Cold War is, indeed, our new paradigm, — one which finds the U.S./the West today doing “expansion” (of our way of life, our way of governance, etc.) and our opponents now doing “containment” — then considerations re: land forces and land warfare, one would think, would need to be significantly informed by this new paradigm.
In this regard, consider the following challenges/problems — which appear to be common to the “expansionist” element (whether, for example, the former USSR/the communists in the Old Cold War days or the U.S./the West today):
1. State actor challenges/problems:
a. Lesser rulers/regimes: Who resist/fail to adequately support transformation of their states and societies more along the expansionist power’s political, economic and social lines. (For the U.S./the West today, for example, Assad of Syria, Kim of N. Korea, etc., etc., etc.?)
b. Great nation rivals: Who use “containment” as their “spoiling” weapon of choice; this, so as to thwart their opponent’s efforts to gain greater power, influence and control — in various regions of the world — via these such “expansionist” efforts/attempts. (Our “containment-doing” great nation rivals today: Russia and China?)
2. Non-state actors challenges/problems:
a. Resisting individuals, groups and populations (for example conservative groups): Those who do not wish to see their states and societies transformed along, in their view, alien and profane (for example: “secular?”) political, economic and social lines. (Example: the Islamists; whether we are talking the Soviet/communist’s “secular” expansion attempts during the Old Cold War or our such attempts today.)
b. Inept population groups: That is, populations who simply cannot make such rapid and radical transformations as the great power — the one now doing “expansion” — desires/requires. (Found everywhere, both back-in-the-day and again currently.)
Possible bottom line consideration re: a Cold War paradigm and the land forces/land warfare needed for the expansionist power to prevail therein:
Attempts by great nations — to accomplish radical and rapid state and societal change in other states, societies and/or civilizations (as with the Soviets/the communists back then; and as with the U.S./the West today) — these such great nations and their such expansionist endeavors, one might suggest, are not normally associated with the term or idea of “stability.” (“Stability,” in fact, being the attempted calling card and selling point of the rival “containing” great nation?)
This being the case, and given the specific challenges/problems commonly encountered by the great nation attempting expansion during a Cold War (see my Items “1” and “2” above), then:
a. Must not today’s expansionist power (the U.S./the West)
b. Operating in today’s New Cold War
c. Determine his land forces/land warfare requirements with these such challenges/problems well in mind?
(Either that, or abandon, exceptionally scale back, or simply put on long-term hold his expansionist efforts and agenda?)
The only organization out there with angst about land armies is the U.S. Army. The budget-driven (of course) arguments have not been about role of or necessity for maintaining the Army, but rather what drives any particular end-strength. Oddly enough, the U.S. Army itself has been its own worst enemy in this discussion. They responded to the Navy/Air Force AirSea Battle concept by essentially making the argument that waging war anywhere revolves around land warfare, a difficult position in a theater dominated by ocean, and where the primary (and vital) role of land forces in the last decisively resolved conflict was to secure island anchorages and airfields.
When it came to the end-strength debate, rather than making a case that current U.S. policy in the Middle East makes a 450,000-man Army a poor idea (if it indeed does), pundits resurrected old, now improbable Cold War scenarios — defending Taiwan against a cross-strait invasion (easier for the Chinese just to buy the rest of the island), refighting the Korean War of 1950 (back when Seoul was an oversized village, rather than a mobility-killing metropolis), or staring the Russians down over the Estonian border (as even now we scramble to work out operational control measures to avoid accidental contact over Syria). O’Hanlon’s book doesn’t look to bring more sanity to the debate — according to the review, we need to size forces to intervene in any conflict that springs up on the face of the earth? Does anyone really believe that we’re going to deploy ground forces in strength to maintain order in Saudi Arabia, or to hold India and Pakistan apart? Or invade Iran?!
In the end, none of that contributes to answering the real question: a professional land force of some size is essential to waging war. How many active duty troops are necessary to accomplish what the Army is really expected to do?
By the way, I am a discussant on a panel tomorrow with Michael O’Hanlon at the Heritage Foundation.. Although it is focused on Korea security issues we will likely address his new book as it pertains to Korea. If anyone has any burning questions they would like me to try to ask please feel free to send them my way.
http://www.heritage.org/events/2015/10/icas
Co-hosted by the Institute for Corean-American Studies Liberty Foundation
The Korean Peninsula Issues and U.S. National Security
Click here to RSVP
Featuring
Joseph Bosco, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Glen S. Fukushima, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation
Joon Oh, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the U.N.
Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Director of Research, The Brookings Institution
and Discussants
Joseph Bosco, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Peter Huessy, President, GeoStrategic Analysis
Tong Kim, Washington Correspondent and Columnist, The Korea Times
David Maxwell, Associate Director, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University
Larry Niksch, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Chaired by
Synja P. Kim, Fellow, President and Chairman, ICAS
Moderated by
Sang Joo Kim, Senior Fellow and Executive Vice President, ICAS
~ Reception Following ~
A/the central theme — underlying O’Hanlon’s suggestions re: land warfare — appears to be his belief that the main combat forces of the U.S. Army MUST (in direct contradiction to the Obama administration’s 2012 and 2014 defense plans) be both sized and shaped — and, indeed, be trained, organized, equipped and deployed — so as to be able to accomplish large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions.
In this regard, consider the following from O’Hanlon’s “Brookings” announcement of his new “Future of Land Warfare” offering:
BEGIN QUOTE
“In my new book, ‘The Future of Land Warfare’ (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), I attempt to debunk the new conventional wisdom (which began with the Obama administration but also permeates thinking beyond): Messy ground operations can be relegated to the dustbin of history. That is a paraphrase and dramatization, to be sure—but only a modest one, since the administration’s 2012 and 2014 defense plans both state that the U.S. Army will no longer size its main combat forces with large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions in mind.
This is, I believe, a major conceptual mistake, even if not yet one that has decimated the Army. But it will cause increasing harm with time if we buy into the idea. The active-duty Army is already below its Clinton-era size and only slightly more than half its Reagan-era size. Reductions to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have been almost as steep. None need grow at this juncture, but the cuts should stop.
Army Annual Budget as Portion of All Department of Defense Spending
I recognize that we need to maintain counterinsurgency and stabilization capacity, as well as a robust deterrent against possible threats to NATO by Russian President Vladimir Putin and to South Korea by North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, among other concerns.
But we also need to think about nontraditional scenarios. While unlikely—and unpalatable—on an individual basis, they may be hard to avoid. To paraphrase the old Bolshevik saying: We may not have an interest in ugly stabilization missions, but they may have an interest in us. In some cases, the needed response may entail not just trainers and drones, but brigades and divisions.”
END QUOTE
( Read more at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/08/31-future-of-land-warfare-ohanlon )
Thus, from my perspective, and re: the perceived requirement to transform (of necessity) certain outlying and/or belligerent states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines, O’Hanlon seems to label as unrealistic both:
a. The Bush Jr. administration’s “universal values”/”overwhelming appeal of our way of life” concepts and
b. The Obama administration’s “we can take a break/pawn this off on others” concepts.
(BOTH of which suggest[ed] — erroneously — that the U.S. Army’s main combat forces need not to be sized, shaped and/or employed to [a] do large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions [b] in the service of transforming outlying/belligerent states and societies more along modern western lines?)
Edited and added to:
Given the definition of “nation-building,” offered immediately below, might we consider that what O’Hanlon is actually suggesting is that the U.S. Army be sized and shaped — and be trained, organized and equipped — so as to do “nation-building?”
“Nation-building involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. This guidebook is a practical “how-to” manual on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development.”
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557.html
In this exact “nation-building” light, to understand O’Hanlon’s suggestions that the U.S. Army size and shape its main combat forces with large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions in mind?
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/08/31-future-of-land-warfare-ohanlon
Thus, O’Hanlon saying that:
a. Bush Jr. was obviously wrong in believing that — due to universal values, etc., thinking — “nation-building” requirements would not be thrust upon him following major combat operations. And that
b. Obama is also obviously wrong, in believing that the enemy does not get a vote. (And in believing, accordingly, that he can simply avoid major conflict operations and/or the “nation-building” requirements that routinely follow in their wake.)
Thus, in O’Hanlon’s eyes, the unavoidable (and forcibly and legally interrelated?) requirements of being able to do both (a) major combat operations AND (b) the “nation-building” tasks that follow thereafter?
Bottom Line Question:
Is “the future of land warfare” (as per O’Hanlon”) to be based on the (realistic) idea and premise — that the requirements of “nation-building” — following major combat operations — cannot be avoided, and that, accordingly, these “nation-building” requirements must be provided for in the force design and structure?
(O’Hanlon’s call for large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization capabilities, in the U.S. Army’s major combat organizations, to be seen exactly in this “unavoidable nation-building requirement” light?)
Bottom Line Example:
Major combat operations against N.Korea.
Thus to ask: Following major combat operations against N.Korea, could we, ethically, lawfully or realistically, simply avoid the requirement — and/or the responsibility — to do “nation-building” following our victory? (This, for example, by simply allowing the N. Koreans to return to their radically different, and grossly incompatible, “communist” political, economic and social orientation and way of life, to wit: the elements which together form the “root cause” of the conflict?)
(The need for O’Hanlon’s “standing” large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization capabilities, in the U.S. Army’s main combat formations, to be evaluated, understood and determined in light of our answer to such questions as are posed by the nation-building “Bottom Line Example” offered immediately above?)
Re: my suggestions below — that “nation-building” may lie at the heart of (or at least as an integral part of) O’Hanlon’s “The Future of Land Warfare” concepts,
(Herein explaining, for example, why he suggests that our main combat forces need to be sized and shaped with large-scale counterinsurgency and stabilization missions in mind?)
In this regard, consider O’Hanlon’s specific reference to “nation-building” at the following AUSA article/link:
http://www.ausa.org/development/Documents/AMPanel_TheNeedForaMulti-PurposeArmy_OHanlon.pdf
(See the 2nd paragraph of Page 1, and the 2nd paragraph of Page 3.)